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vers./uers. versiculus
VI Liber Sextus (1298)
VIR Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae
viz. videlicet, namely 
vol(s). volume(s)
Vrb Verzekeringsrechtelijke berichten
vs. versus
abbreviations XXI
W. Weekblad van het Regt
WAM Wet aansprakelijkheidsverzekering motorrijtuigen (Motor
 Insurance Liability Act)
WPNR Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie
WvK Wetboek van Koophandel 
WVW (1994) Wegenverkeerswet (Road Traffic Act)
X Liber Extra (Decretales Gregorii IX, 1234)
ZEuP Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 
ZPO Zivilprozeßordnung (1900, between 1878–1900: CPO)
ZSS RA Zeitchrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. 
 Romanistische Abteilung
* As to the manuscripts, I adopted the abbreviations used by G. Dolezalek, Verzeichnis der 
Handschriften zum römischen Recht bis 1600, I-IV, Frankfurt am Main 1972 (now available online 
at http://manuscripts.rg.mpg.de); further information on the meaning of these abbreviations 
can be found in this work.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 The subject of this study
Often accidents occur not only through the fault of a wrongdoer but also 
(partly) by the conduct or activity of the injured party. In the latter case the 
question arises of how to deal with this contribution of the injured party (from 
a legal point of view). This contributory conduct of the injured party, often 
dealt with by the concept of contributory negligence, and its consequences 
for the delictual liability of the person who committed the unlawful act have 
been central issues in the study of private law throughout the centuries. This 
phenomenon of contributory negligence is of all periods and can occur in all 
legal orders.1 In addition, the defence of contributory negligence is of great 
importance in legal practice in various European countries and is particularly 
often raised in cases involving motorcar accidents.2 In the Netherlands, various 
scholars have argued that Article 6:101 of the (new) Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek 
of 1992 that provides the most important rule on contributory negligence does 
not offer adequate guidance to solve issues of contributory negligence and 
liability. That point of view is affirmed by case law, from which it becomes clear 
that judges, if they are aware at all of the criteria for contributory negligence 
pursuant to Article 6:101 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992, do not succeed 
in working with the rule provided. As will become clear from this study, the 
Dutch Hoge Raad expressed the view that lower judges (should) distinguish 
between the (two) standards of this article (the primary apportionment made 
by a correlative balancing of causes, and secondarily an equitable adjustment 
of the outcome of the primary apportionment).3 One has to keep in mind 
that the question of contributory negligence is often one of the final issues to 
1 In the same sense Looschelders 1999, p. 3f.
2 Magnus & Martín-Casals 2004, p. 260. In some countries, however, the importance of 
contributory negligence, especially in the field of law, is being reduced; see Magnus & Martín-
Casals 2004, p. 260.
3 See, e.g., HR, 13 January 2006, NJ 2006, 59.
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be considered in the rulings of judges, who mostly concentrate on the main 
question regarding the liability of the wrongdoer. It is also true that the debate 
between litigants does not usually offer a solid basis to judges upon which to 
make a coherent assessment on the issue of contributory negligence.4 The 
present research provides new historical and comparative perspectives5 to 
approach the issue of contributory negligence and in this way leads to a deeper 
knowledge of the phenomenon of contributory negligence.
Apart from the importance of a thorough study of the foundations of 
the concept of contributory negligence in the Netherlands, such a study is 
also – and possibly even more – important from an international, especially 
European, perspective. A short explanation is necessary to make this 
clear. Most Continental laws of delict have been influenced by Roman law 
(especially the lex Aquilia). As regards delictual liability, the ultimate origin 
of the contemporary provisions is sometimes considered to be provided 
by the Roman law of delicts. There are, however, important differences 
between the Roman law of delicts and our present-day delictual liability. 
This research focuses on some of these differences by tracing their historical 
origins, more specifically concerning contributory negligence. In so doing, 
it provides a historical background of this particular aspect of the law of 
obligations – offering a better insight into the reason behind certain rules on 
this matter – in order to facilitate and enrich the present European discussion 
in this area of study. The present research offers new perspectives regarding 
the issue of contributory negligence and (delictual) liability by investigating 
solutions that have been proposed by legal scholarship, legal practice 
and codifications throughout the centuries. These solutions have directly 
influenced our contemporary approach to this subject, which has been shaped 
by its long history and cannot be completely understood without knowledge 
of its historical development. Since the study of the history of contributory 
negligence with its alleged origins in Roman law (and if it were proven that 
the origins do not lie so much in Roman law, possibly in other legal systems) 
until the present day, linking past legal developments to contemporary law 
has not been fully undertaken yet, this research fills lacuna in our knowledge 
and supplies the necessary data for other researchers in this field in Europe.6 
4 Keirse 2006, p. 185.
5 Another perspective could have been to study the conceptual and normative issues of the 
problem of contributory negligence – such research largely falls outside the scope of this study; 
some reflections on this topic can be found in Simons 1995a, p. 461ff.; 1995b, p. 1693ff.
6 One has to remember that ‘the Roman law’ does not exist. Roman law is not primarily 
meant as the law in a certain period of time, but rather as an element of the Roman(-canonical) 
tradition which underwent significant development throughout the centuries.
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Often scholars discuss (Justinianic) Roman law of the Corpus Iuris and then 
skip over almost all of the ensuing history, only picking up the discussion again 
with the nineteenth century codifications. However, and my study confirms 
this, the period in between is of major importance:7 not only because of the re-
ception of Roman law in legal practice, but also because of the influence of this 
period of ius commune on later legal doctrine and codes throughout Europe.8 
Although this study can be qualified as a dogmatic study, apart from the 
study of legal doctrine it also includes legal practice. The historical approach 
to the subject matter uncovers the origins of similarities and differences 
between the various European countries as regards the subject of contributory 
negligence. These are relevant in light of the attempts to harmonise private law 
within the entire European Union. Furthermore, legal history and comparative 
law are two sides of the same coin,9 and legal history can offer extensive 
information for practitioners of comparative law. My research will hopefully 
enable scholars practicing comparative law in the area of private law to obtain 
a more complete picture on the topic of contributory negligence.
Although, as described above, Roman law is one of the foundations of our 
contemporary continental private law systems, it is questionable whether 
this is also true for liability in the event of unlawful acts. The other pillars are 
canon law and indigenous law, the influence of which, as will be shown in 
this study, is possibly stronger compared to the influence of Roman law. One 
could question whether the sources of Roman law already addressed the issue 
of contributory negligence. By comparing and contrasting our contemporary 
ideas on specific subjects with provisions in Roman law, insights can be gained 
into shared problems and potential solutions.10 Unfortunately, Roman law is 
often used as a short reference, as a brief background before passing on to a 
more detailed exposition of present-day law. While legal scholars sometimes 
state that certain rules can be traced to Roman precedents, this tracing has 
to be performed with great care, since Roman sources are easily misread and 
sometimes rules are anachronistically read into these sources.
7  In the same sense already Ankum 1956/1957, p. 131.
8  In this study the influence of other systems such as canon law and indigenous law will 
also be discussed as far as necessary for the interaction with Roman law and for the understanding 
of the (Roman?) origins of later aspects of the doctrine of contributory negligence.
9  See also Heirbaut 2005, p. 136.
10  In the same sense Travis Laster 1996, p. 188.
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Furthermore, sometimes Roman law sources are used in order to support a 
contemporary rule and to show that the same result was reached in a society 
that is distant both in terms of time and of space.11 That is why the search for 
similarities must be performed with particular care. All these approaches are 
imprudent and result in incorrect information or at least in comparisons of 
rules of dissimilar nature. A deeper study, such as the present one, provides 
more valuable insights into the way the problem of contributory negligence 
has been dealt with throughout history.
Little secondary literature on the topic of the historical development of 
contributory negligence is available and the material that can be found is in-
complete and contradictory. The topic of the historical roots of contributory 
negligence was first studied in a more or less comprehensive way in the modern 
monographic dogmatic study on contributory negligence by Kaser’s student 
Peter Aumann in 1964, and this study has been partly complemented by an 
elaborate article by Klaus Luig in 1969. Although these scholarly publications 
presented extensive material, some aspects of the problem still remained 
unsolved. In his work, Aumann did not consider the Middle Ages or the early 
modern period;12 this omission was only partly filled by Luig. In my study, in 
addition to primary sources mentioned in the available secondary literature, 
an independent study of primary sources has been made, and the sources 
found were interpreted in order to obtain the proper perspective on these 
materials. The secondary literature has not only been supplemented but also 
corrected. Nevertheless, the work of the two scholars mentioned has given rise 
to discussions on the topic of contributory negligence, although there are still 
gaps in their research. The goal of my study is to fill that gap. As will be shown, 
the available research material is incomplete and, especially with regard to 
medieval ius commune, the historical context is not always fully taken into 
account, and of course it was impossible that later, contemporary develop-
ments were taken into account in these older studies. The overview of the later 
developments will also include various monographic studies written in more 
recent times on the topic of contributory negligence. The innovative features 
of the investigation consist in filling in the gap in the existing literature as 
regards the historical development of the doctrine of contributory negligence 
and in providing an outline of this aspect of delictual liability in Western legal 
scholarship, from Roman Antiquity until today.
11  See also Travis Laster 1996, p. 189.
12  An important fact is that Aumann revealed the new ideas of systematic rationalist 
natural law (Vernunftrecht) of Christian Wolff. Wolff ’s view will be elaborately discussed further 
in this study.
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1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Central questions
This study seeks to address the following two central questions. Firstly, what 
was the historical development of the solutions provided for the problem of 
contributory negligence in the event of delictual liability? Secondly, what was 
the influence of solutions found in Roman law, canon law and indigenous law13 
on later and present-day doctrines and on codes?
As to the effect of contributory negligence, theoretically two solutions 
appear possible: all-or-nothing or an apportionment of damages between 
wrongdoer and injured party. The first solution, ‘all-or-nothing’, could be 
substantiated with an explanation on the level of an imputation, one that 
ties up with the question whether the injured party’s conduct was the last or 
decisive cause of the damage. Another possibility is to solve the problem by 
way of allocation of a loss, imputable to both parties, to just one of the par-
ties. This possibility can be based just on the fact that the injured party has 
been contributorily negligent, or on a weighing of the extent of negligence of 
both parties or of the other circumstances of the case.14 With regard to an ap-
portionment of damages, other solutions are also imaginable. Certain types 
of damages can be entirely allocated to the persons involved (possibly the 
direct damage to the wrongdoer and the consequential damage to the injured 
party) or the total damage can be partitioned between the persons concerned, 
in halves or according to a certain quota based on the concrete circumstances 
of the case.15 As will be discussed in this study, causation and negligence are 
most commonly used as criteria to come to such a partition. This main ques-
tion, a historical and theoretical problem, and the theoretical solutions are in 
essence the same for all times.16
It is necessary to answer the first (central) question in order to provide 
an answer to the second (central) question, which can be regarded as pulling 
together various views and solutions provided in various periods in legal 
13  Indigenous law is only discussed where the learned sources give an immediate reason to 
do so. In general the sources do not (or only to a limited extent) give reason for such a discussion; 
furthermore, an extensive study into indigenous law would have been too time-consuming and 
falls outside the scope of this study.
14  Jansen 2007, p. 663.
15  ibid
16  Looschelders 1999, p. 5, argued that the first solution means an unequal treatment of 
both parties: the negligence of the wrongdoer is only relevant when there is no contributory 
negligence of the injured party; the second solution means an equal treatment of the parties as 
each has to bear the damage to the degree to which he is responsible for it. I will come back to 
this matter in chapter five.
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history. This main query gives rise to several questions. Since it has not been 
possible to study all possible subquestions extensively, I have chosen to 
concentrate on the following. I will start with the views of classical Roman 
jurists as regards contributory negligence. These views are interesting from a 
comparative point of view, and furthermore the exegeses of the relevant texts 
in the context of classical Roman law are important because of the influence 
of this law on legal Humanism (e.g. the Dutch Elegant School). A treatment 
of the topic of contributory negligence in Justinian law follows; the rules 
contained in Justinian law were the starting point of later developments in 
European legal scholarship with regard to intellectual thinking about the 
effects of contributory negligence in cases of delictual liability. Therefore, 
this treatment is necessary in order to make it possible to understand later 
developments; it is crucial to obtaining a good understanding of the texts of 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis.17 These texts will therefore be discussed in chapter two 
in order to provide a basis for the following chapters to build upon.
With regard to the medieval period, in chapter three, the emphasis lies 
on the ius commune (Roman law and canon law). With regard to the early 
modern period (humanists, jurists of the usus modernus pandectarum, natural 
law scholars), in chapter four the emphasis lies on the development from the 
reception to the codifications. For each period I will show how cases in which 
the injured party’s own act was considered to have contributed to the damage 
were solved dogmatically. What was the legal effect of the injured party’s 
contribution to delictual liability? As regards the early modern period, I also 
include legal practice. 
The study concludes in chapter five with the contemporary way in which 
jurists in European countries (particularly France, the German territories and 
the Netherlands) have dealt with the problem of contributory negligence. 
France and the German Empire were chosen to be studied because they 
produced influential codes of  substantive (and procedural) civil law. 
Furthermore, the Netherlands was chosen as it has a very recent law provision 
on contributory negligence including a new, different element. In the 
discussion of these modern codifications (and of the preceding nineteenth-
century development), particular attention is given to the extent to which 
these legal systems have been influenced by ius commune approaches to 
contributory negligence, theories of Natural Law and the German Pandectists, 
and also to the extent to which these legal systems have developed their own 
unique approach to the concept of contributory negligence. 
17  All translations of (Latin) texts into English are mine, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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The answers to questions relating to this matter have allowed me to determine 
whether common (historical) foundations of liability law may be discerned as 
regards contributory negligence in Europe.  
1.2.2 Comparative legal history
One of the methods used in this thesis is that of comparative legal history as 
a method of analysis in order to answer the central questions stated above.18 
This study does not depart from the normative legal concept of contributory 
negligence as such, but from a perspective of a functional problem. This study 
seeks to compare the function of ‘contributory negligence’ in its attempt to 
solve a factual problem. At first the problem will be defined in general terms, 
the focus of the elaboration of the study being on the area of the law of delicts 
and on the solutions for the problem in the past (starting with classical Roman 
law and up to the present day). What was the legal effect of the contribution of 
the injured party to extra-contractual, i.e. delictual liability?19 One has to keep 
in mind that the ‘law of delicts’ does not concern criminal law but civil liability. 
In this study the factual problem, which will be used as a basis, is as follows: 
Without the existence of a contractual relationship, two persons interact in 
such a way that one of them suffered loss as a result. In principle – the less 
complicated situation – the person who did not suffer damage is regarded as 
the wrongdoer. If the applicable requirements are fulfilled, he is liable for the 
damages suffered by the other party, i.e. the injured party. How does one solve 
the delictual cases in which the injured party’s own act was considered to have 
contributed to the damage? 
1.2.3 Definition of contributory negligence
In this study contributory negligence is assumed to be present if the person 
who suffered damage in one way or another contributed to his own harm 
(in a legally sufficient way).20 When studying the historical roots of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence, it is essential to be aware of the danger 
of anachronisms. Perhaps there was no such thing as ‘contributory negligence’ 
in (classical) Roman law, medieval ius commune or in later periods. 
18  More specific methods, different for each period, will be used and discussed in the 
introductory part of the respective chapters.
19  The problem of contributory negligence in other areas, e.g. criminal law or contract law, 
is only dealt with when this is necessary for the essence of contributory negligence.
20 cf. Magnus & Martín-Casals 2004, p. 259.
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In my study I used the term ‘contributory negligence’ as a classification 
concept, a concept that may not appear in the sources but that is used for 
better understanding of the sources.21 In other words, the term ‘contributory 
negligence’ may not be found, but the problem it intends to deal with can be 
found. Therefore, the term ‘contributory negligence’ is a useful tool to indicate 
comparable problems. Furthermore, I studied situations in which today we 
would assume contributory negligence and situations in which today the 
defence of contributory negligence would probably or possibly be raised.
The term ‘contributory negligence’ is traditionally used in common law, 
while in continental legal systems the broader term ‘contributory fault’ 
(including both negligent and intentional conduct) is more familiar.22 In this 
thesis these terms are used as synonyms, unless the contrary is explicitly stated. 
The term contributory negligence is also used for the sake of convenience 
for either traditional contributory negligence (leading to a complete bar to 
recovery) or the so-called comparative negligence (where the negligence of the 
injured party reduces – not necessarily bars – his23 right to claim recovery).24 
Therefore, contributory negligence is not used in the technical common law 
sense, but as a useful shorthand.
In principle, the term contributory negligence is used in a more restricted 
way than the expression ‘fault of the victim’: it excludes conduct that is 
merely contributory but not  the sole cause. Although examples of this second 
category, i.e. conduct that is the sole cause of the victim’s harm, will also be 
frequently mentioned in this study – especially to contrast these examples 
with the first category, i.e. the cases in which the conduct of the injured party 
is merely contributory to the victim’s harm – that category does not represent 
the central subject matter of this study. The use of the term contributory neg-
ligence also excludes intentional rather than merely negligent conduct. If the 
conduct of the injured party was intentional, this will be explicitly stated and 
– if necessary – dealt with separately. Examples of these cases will be explicitly 
mentioned and clearly distinguished. Conduct of the victim occurring after 
the conduct of the wrongdoer will only be dealt with in the final chapter on 
contemporary law. 
21  See Veen 1996, p. 10.
22  Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 689
23 In general, in this study the masculine form is used, which also refers to the feminine 
form. In case masculine or feminine forms are specifically meant, it is stated explicitly.
24  cf. also, e.g., Simons 1995a, p. 463; 1995b, p. 1697.
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1.2.4 Delineation of the study
It is impossible to write a comprehensive study on contributory negligence 
due to the immense mass of material on this topic. Therefore, following this 
broad outline of the subject of this study in the previous subsections, I will 
now explain more in detail how I delineated my study. First of all, two basic 
types of contributory negligence cases can be distinguished. Firstly, the case 
in which the injured contributes to the damage. In such cases an interaction 
between the injured and the wrongdoer always takes place. Secondly, the case 
in which contributory negligence is presumed, viz. the injured party has made 
no attempt to restrict the extent of the damage arising from his injury. In that 
case, the injured contributed to the increase of the damage. My study primarily 
deals with the former case, i.e. when the act of the injured party contributed to 
the occurrence of the damage. The latter case, i.e. when the act of the injured 
party contributed to the amount of loss, has not been the focus of attention 
in this study but – for the sake of completeness – has been briefly mentioned 
at the end of the study (see section 5.7). 
As to the authors of the early modern period, a selection had to be made; 
a reproduction (and translation) of the precise argumentations found in 
early modern writings on the action to claim damages would not only have 
been impossible but is also pointless, since it would only constitute a long 
repetition of materials from the Corpus Iuris and writings of scholars. Only 
writings offering insight into the (new) ideas about contributory negligence 
or about the historical context of certain texts of the Corpus Iuris are included. 
The outline of the developments from the nineteenth century onwards is 
restricted to France, Germany (German territories) and the Netherlands. 
France and Germany are chosen as representative countries of major legal 
families in continental Europe. The Netherlands is mainly studied because 
of this country’s very recent new Civil Code (the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992). 
In case of relevancy, reference is also made to other jurisdictions (England, 
Switzerland and Austria; see chapter five). 
Contributory negligence has implications for the behaviour of people, for 
accident avoidance, i.e. it forces injured parties to take precautions for their 
own safety.25 Another remarkable theory, which must be demarked from my 
topic, and which is not extensively discussed as such, is the theory of the as-
sumption of risk. 
25 See, e.g., Travis Laster 1996, p. 190f.
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This theory refers to the situation when a plaintiff recognises a certain amount 
of risk of harm, but nevertheless chooses to proceed anyway. Also the topic of 
consent of the victim, although very interesting, is not extensively discussed 
in this study.
1.3 Structure
The study is subdivided into three main parts, each with its own methodological 
approach as already stated above. A more elaborate explanation on the 
methodology used can be found in the respective upcoming chapters.
In the first part, a coherent interpretation of relevant texts from classical 
Roman law is provided. Subject of the investigation is the way in which 
classical Roman jurists dealt with the question of contributory negligence. The 
research focuses on a number of casuistic texts from the Digest. A thorough 
analysis and exegesis of these texts in their palingenetic and socio-cultural 
context was necessary. From this elaborate study, it becomes clear that Roman 
legal sources may not be taken as support for a modern rule or to show that 
the same result was reached in such a distant society, separated by a very long 
period of time, unless the search for similarities is performed with utmost care. 
The way the Roman jurists worked with Roman law texts and the way in which 
medieval legal scholars worked with texts from the Corpus Iuris will be set off 
against each other. This gave me the possibility to show that contemporary 
scholars often interpret texts outside their contexts, and thus the perspective 
from which sources are interpreted has to be elucidated.26 The results of the 
first part of this study can be found in chapter two, which also includes a 
treatment of the problem of contributory negligence in Justinian law
The second part of the investigation concerns the development of the 
solutions to the problem of contributory negligence from the Middle Ages 
until the twentieth century. Unlike the first part, this second part focuses 
on the relevant texts as part of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, and – apart from 
some humanist authors – not so much on their original meaning in classical 
Roman law. Questions that are answered are: How were the relevant texts 
interpreted in medieval doctrine? To which other texts in the Corpus Iuris 
were they linked?27 Which dogmatic rules were derived from these texts? In 
26 To find (large amounts of) secondary literature, firstly the classical manuals on Roman 
private law and the fundamental commentaries on the Corpus Iuris were examined. In addition, 
the most important monographs on the lex Aquilia were consulted. By using the Bibliotheca iuris 
antiqui (BIA), important recent literature on the various texts has been traced.
27  As regards the contents of the texts of the littera vulgata, I used the edition of Kriegel 
(edn. 1844) unless text-critical discussion demanded otherwise, and as to the contents of the 
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which way was legal practice influenced by the learned theories from the days 
of the reception of Roman law? This second part endeavours to clarify the 
meaning of the relevant texts in the tradition of ius commune. The period of the 
Glossators (1120-1260) is studied through an analysis of printed sources and a 
selection of manuscripts (see chapter three). The choice of manuscripts was 
pragmatic: it depended on the availability and the legibility of the manuscripts 
in question. Reading the manuscripts was necessary, considering the fact 
that the important Apparatus Maior to the Digest of Azo was unpublished in 
print. Furthermore, it was necessary to make clear the line of development 
in the pre-Accursian period. As regards the period of the Commentators, a 
selection of the most important writers was made. Commentaries on the most 
relevant texts in the Corpus Iuris have been studied as well as special treatises, 
court reports and consilia (see chapter three). As to the consilia, a study of a 
selection of indices to them has been made  for the purpose of finding the 
relevant consilia which dealt with the problem of contributory negligence 
in delictual liability cases. Apart from references to consilia in early modern 
writings and contemporary secondary literature, not many relevant consilia 
have been found. This second part of the investigation consists of a study of 
primary sources. Subsequently, the reception in legal practice of Roman law 
as regards contributory negligence is studied, as well as the role of the writers 
of the usus modernus and of natural law in this respect (chapter four). 
The third part of this study concludes with a discussion of the contemporary 
concept of contributory negligence, concentrating on the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century doctrines, case law and codes in France, Germany and 
the Netherlands. The concept of contributory negligence in these three 
contemporary jurisdictions, firmly based on the tradition of the ius commune, 
allowed a discussion of the continuity and discontinuity in Western legal 
thought on this subject (see chapter five).
Glossa Ordinaria of Accursius I used the edition from Venice 1487-1489 (reprint Turin 1968/1969). 
The citation of texts follows the modern numbering system of Mommsen/Krüger.

chapter two
ROMAN LAW IN ANTIQUITY
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Subject and purpose of this chapter
It is commonly argued that until the nineteenth century the injured party 
could not recover damages in a legal procedure when his negligence con-
tributed to the occurrence of the injury, unless the wrongdoer had acted 
intentionally. This idea should already have been present in Roman law, but 
one has argued that the foundation of this rule in Roman law was unclear.1 
In this chapter clarity will be provided with regard to both aspects. While I 
will argue that the first statement should be regarded as oversimplified, even 
untrue, I will clarify whether the second statement is true, i.e. whether such 
a foundation indeed existed.
The main subject of this chapter is the role of the conduct of the injured 
party. Questions which will be dealt with are: what was the approach of legal 
practice of the Roman jurists dealing with what we would now call the ‘con-
tributory negligence’ of the injured party? If this notion was recognised in legal 
practice, then what were the consequences of such ‘contributory negligence’? 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, a good understanding of the 
relevant texts of Justinian’s legislation2 (later called the Corpus Iuris Civilis) is neces-
sary in order to understand the later developments in the period of ius commune. 
Secondly, an exegesis of the relevant texts in the context of classical Roman law is 
important not so much because of the significance for the ius commune but because 
of the influence of this law on legal Humanism (e.g. the Dutch Elegant School).3
1 Smits 1997, p. 214f.
2 The number of differences between Justinian’s legislation and modern codifications 
and their importance is so great that it is better to avoid the term codification; see Ankum 2001 
(reprint 2007, p. 399ff.).
3 Besides, it is also important because of the influence of classical Roman law on modern 
scholarly (Romanistic) studies.
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With regard to classical Roman law, the main sources on the effect of 
contributory negligence of the injured party on the liability of the wrongdoer 
in Roman law (in Antiquity) can be found in the compilation of Justinian, 
more specifically in title D. 9.2 and also in one fragment of the last title of the 
Digest, namely, D. 50.17.203. The maxim of D. 50.17.203 is nearly always used 
as a relevant provision; however, in this chapter it will be argued that this text 
did not represent a general rule4 and that it was not generally applied in the 
classical period. With regard to classical Roman law, all the other fragments 
of the Digest have to be interpreted bearing this fact in mind; this situation 
changed in Justinian law. Many texts are linked to the subject of contributory 
negligence, and obviously not all of them can be discussed.5 After dealing with 
the above-mentioned text of D. 50.17.203, this chapter continues with three 
sections in which three important texts, namely, D. 9.2.9.4, D. 9.2.11pr. and D. 
9.2.52.1, will be critically examined (sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5). This examination 
will start with an exegesis of D. 9.2.52.1 because this text includes the oldest 
legal reply (i.e. advice of Alfenus, a jurist from the late Republic), followed by 
two fragments by Ulpian viz. D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr.
After the exegesis of these texts in classical Roman law, a comparison with the 
approach in Justinian law will be made. Justinian included the above-mentioned 
fragments by Alfenus and Ulpian in his Digest. He made these fragments as well 
as the text from the Institutiones (Inst. 4.3.4) all equally applicable, promulgating 
them as law.6 They have to be interpreted in connection with each other, being 
provisions of one and the same piece of legislation. 
4 This was defended in earlier times, e.g. by Heilfron 1920, p. 245; Holdsworth 1937 (repr. 
1966), p. 459; see also Looschelders 1999, p. 7.
5 Recently, Travis Laster wrote an article in which he discussed six cases in the Digest 
where the conduct of the victim was, according to his opinion, clearly relevant (Travis Laster 
1996, p. 203). According to Travis Laster, the cases ‘uniformly show that the victim’s conduct was 
considered as one contingent fact in an overall contextual inquiry into blame’. The fragments I 
have chosen were selected based on the frequency of occurrence in Romanistic literature and 
on their influence later in ius commune. The cases of the bear pits (D. 9.2.28-29pr.) only very 
implicitly concern the contributory negligence of the injured party. The texts concern more the 
overall discussion of the blameworthiness of the defendant. Also in the case of the tree pruner 
(D. 9.2.31), the role of the victim’s conduct is taken into account in the overall discussion of the 
blameworthiness of the tree pruner; this text will frequently be dealt with in this chapter because 
it could indeed be interpreted as considering contributory negligence. More information on this 
text will follow later. Because these two texts together with the cases of the javelin throwers all 
seem to illustrate a contextual fault-based inquiry (Travis Laster 1996, p. 203), I have chosen 
the most important one, D. 9.2.9.4, for an integral treatment in this chapter to show the way 
classical jurists treated this matter. The last case, which Travis Laster discussed and which I do 
not, D. 9.2.52.4, seems to have been considered more within the context of the distinction and 
the boundaries between culpa and casus.
6 As to the concept of contributory negligence of the injured, apart from fragments from 
the Institutes and Digest, also Codex title 3.35 could be relevant (De lege Aquilia), but, after closer 
examination, the respective texts appear not to be relevant for my topic.
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Therefore, in section 2.6, I will see whether there is sufficient coherence in the 
texts so that they are based on the same principle of law.
Finally, the fact that the concept of contributory negligence also developed 
in the Eastern Roman Empire merits attention to be paid also to Byzantine 
law. Moreover, Byzantine law will be included in the exegesis of the relevant 
texts in Antiquity, since it can be helpful when reconstructing classical Roman 
law. After Antiquity, the developments of legal scholarship in Eastern and 
Western Europe did not run parallel, due to the (temporary) interruption of 
the development of Roman law in Western Europe, only to be resumed with 
the Glossators. The theories of the Glossators with regard to the concept of 
contributory negligence will be expounded in the next chapter.7 The current 
chapter will end with some concluding observations in which the above ques-
tions will be answered (see section 2.7). 
2.1.2 Structure and method
In the first four sections exegeses of fragments of the Digest will be presented. 
Apart from the specific fragments of the Digest, a text from another part of the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis is also relevant, namely, Inst. 4.3, as well as texts from two 
other sources, the Paraphrasis Institutionum  of Theophilus and the Basilica. 
These texts will be discussed together with the corresponding relevant frag-
ments in the Digest and Institutes. 
The structure of these exegeses will be similar: after the text of the source 
is provided and a text-critical discussion based on a consultation of the text 
editions of the Digest of Mommsen and of Gebauer-Spangenberg is made,8 
7 The ‘new’ scholia, which can give us insight into the way the law was interpreted in the 
11th century in the East, and in this respect especially that of Hagiotheodoritès, therefore, do not 
fit within the scope of this study, and will as such not lead to new insights into the development 
of law in Western Europe. These scholia are, however, important for the development of the 
concept of contributory negligence in the sense that they can provide a better understanding of 
how legal problems were solved in Byzantine law. Being interesting from a comparative point of 
view, one of these scholia will be discussed in the next chapter.
8 The text-critical discussion will start with the edition of Mommsen. However, this edition 
is very much based on the littera Florentina and too little notice is given to the littera vulgata. 
Mommsen made a complete collation of only one manuscript, namely, Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4450, 
and only consulted other manuscripts of the Digestum Vetus when Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4450, and 
the littera Florentina disagreed; see Radding & Ciaralli 2007, p. 173. On Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4450, see 
Radding & Ciaralli 2007, p. 205ff. In order to compensate for this limitation, I used the edition 
of Kriegel (edn. 1844) as the first starting point for the littera vulgata, and I also consulted the 
edition of Gebauer- Spangenberg as well as several vulgate editions (e.g. Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, 
vat. lat. 1406, fo. 80v, which has been qualified as the earliest manuscript of the vulgate tradition; 
see Radding & Ciaralli 2007, p. 171, 197f.). For my text-critical reproduction, I discussed the main 
variants of the reading of the texts in these editions.
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a translation of the source is given, the inscriptio of the text is discussed, and 
an exegesis of the texts in their classical context follows, including a discussion 
of possible later interpolations. Finally, the post-classical development of the 
texts, in the context of Justinian law, is discussed.
Most importantly, in these exegeses, is the legal problem, i.e. the legal 
articulation of the actual conflict that gave rise to the legal dispute, which 
will be defined. Furthermore, the reply of the jurist or jurists involved will be 
discussed. Especially important for the discovery of the legal problem and the 
reply of the jurist(s) are the particular circumstances of the case, the claims 
of the plaintiff and the defence of the defendant. Reconstructing the case in 
this way often helps to understand the advice that jurists gave in a particular 
case. Then, the different interpretations in modern and present-day literature 
will be discussed and where these seem to be inaccurate, new ways to solve 
the problem will be provided.
2.2 The origin of the regula of D. 50.17.203
2.2.1 The text of D. 50.17.203
As mentioned above, this subsection will start with the reading of D. 50.17.203,9 
followed by a text-critical discussion.
Pomponius libro octavo ad Quintum Mucium.
Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intellegitur damnum sentire.
The first peculiarity of this fragment is that the name of Pomponius is lacking 
in the oldest manuscript of the Digest, the littera Florentina (there is an empty 
space in place of his name).10 However, Torelli seems to have filled in the empty 
space by printing the name of Pomponius in his edition of 1553, which was fully 
and directly based on the littera Florentina.11 Also the littera vulgata contains the 
name of Pomponius.12 Furthermore, there are no reasons to assume that someone 
9  The readings of the Digest texts which are elaborately discussed in this chapter are taken 
from the editio maior (and the editio minor) of Mommsen & Krüger.
10  Fo. 474r of the facsimile edition of the Florentina.
11  See edition of Torelli of 1553, III, p. 1665.
12  cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 979. See also the critical edition of Gebauer-Spangenberg 
containing variants of the littera vulgata (Gebauer-Spangenberg 1776, p. 1144). In the edition of 
Gregorius Haloander (1501–1531), which incompletely and indirectly contains elements from the 
littera Florentina (see Feenstra 1974, p. 128), the inscriptio only contains IDEM (see edn. of 1550, 
fo. 1694v). In the edition of Haloander, the inscriptiones of the previous phrases also contain the 
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else wrote this fragment. Accordingly, it seems plausible and acceptable that this 
fragment was correctly ascribed to Pomponius by Mommsen.
The second peculiarity concerns an inserted word. In the littera Florentina a small 
‘si’ is written between the lines.13 Probably, as Mommsen also stated in his editio 
maior, the first corrector of the littera Florentina (F²) made an addition in the 
margin of the Florentine. He added ‘si’ (then the text reads quod si quis). Another 
manuscript, namely, a (vulgate) manuscript, collected by Thomas Rehdiger (1541–
1576), part of the so-called (Codices) Rehdigerani, provides additional information 
on this point. The reading of D. 50.17.203 originally commenced with the words 
Quod si quis.14 The word si was deleted at a later moment by means of dots (sed 
vocula ‘si’ punctis est deleta).15 However, the insertion of ‘si’ seems to add to the 
fragment a meaning more general than would be justifiable for classical Roman 
law.16 As with si the phrase is more likely to be a general statement (if someone 
X, then Y), and without si the phrase could be considered as the end of a casuistic 
decision, the latter option is more plausible (as will also be discussed below).
A final problem concerns the second word damnum. In the littera Florentina and 
in the littera vulgata the second word damnum is clearly present.17 Mommsen 
suggested deleting this word.18 However, such a deletion seems to be unnecessary 
for classical Roman law, as will appear below. 
word IDEM, and by looking back to the first different inscriptio one finds Iabolenus (D. 50.17.198). 
Therefore, one could conclude that the IDEM at D. 50.17.203, according to Haloander, has to refer 
to Iabolenus, and thus this has to be a mistake of Haloander’s.
13  See fo. 474r of the facsimile edition of the Florentina.
14  See Ms. Wroclaw BU, Rehd. 289, fo. 285r.
15  Gebauer-Spangenberg 1776, p. 1144; differently, the littera vulgata cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 
979, which contains ‘Quod quis’.
16  The placing of this text in Lenel’s Palingenesia (see section 2.2.3, p. 19) does not give 
cause to consider D. 50.17.203 as a general rule. The formulation of D. 50.17.203 originates from 
a larger text and belongs to a reply to a concrete case rather than that is was meant as a general 
(didactical) rule. Also the Greek reading of the ‘rule’ of Pomponius in the Basilica in the title 
about ‘various rules of old law’, B. 2.3.203 [BT 66/16-17], cannot provide sufficient grounds for 
such an insertion. When comparing B. 2.3.203 with D. 50.17.203, one observes that the fragment 
was stated in a more general manner. 
17  See  fo. 474r of the facsimile edition of the Florentina (and similarly in the later edition of 
Torelli of 1553, III, p. 1665), and also the littera vulgata cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 979. 
18  Mommsen & Krüger 1963b (editio maior), II, p. 969; also De Ligt/Sirks in: Spruit et al. 
2001, p. 986, leave this word untranslated.
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2.2.2 Translation of D. 50.17.203
The following translation will be as literal (in order to remain faithful to 
the Latin text) and as grammatically acceptable as possible. As a result, the 
incompleteness of the fragment becomes visible, more specifically, the fact 
that the text was removed from its original context. The text of D. 50.17.203 
could be translated in two different wpays: ‘damage that someone suffers ...’ 
or ‘because someone who suffers damage …’. I think the first translation is less 
accurate, therefore, and for the reasons I will mention later on, I have chosen 
the second translation.
 
Pomponius in his eighth book on Quintus Mucius.
Because19 the one, who suffers loss20 as a result of his own negligence (culpa),21 
is not considered to suffer any loss.
19  ‘Quod’ is translated differently by Scott 1973, p. 317 (‘He who sustains any damage through 
his own fault …’) and De Ligt/Sirks in: Spruit et al. 2001, p. 986 (‘Schade die iemand door eigen 
schuld lijdt …’); and not translated by Watson 1985, who starts with ‘If anyone …’, nor d’Ors et al. 
1975, p. 882, who start with ‘No se considera que …’; different also Otto, Schilling & Sintenis 1832 
(reprint 1984), p. 1285, who did translate this word, but differently, namely, as ‘wenn’. 
20 cf. Heumann & Seckel 1907 (reprint 1958), p. 120, s.v. damnum, this fragment is classified 
under damnum iniuria, Sachbeschädigung, by which loss as the damage to an object is meant. On 
p. 534 it is written that sentire damnum has to be interpreted as ‘Schaden leiden, davon betroffen 
werden’. The meaning of the term damnum will be further discussed below.
21  In this chapter, culpa is mostly translated as negligence, sometimes as fault; according to 
MacCormack 1974, p. 201ff., culpa (in the context of the lex Aquilia) has to be translated as fault. 
With the translations of the word culpa, no principal choice in this respect is made; with the 
translation into negligence, no necessary implicit principle of forseeability is meant (in classical 
Roman law); the choice is mostly made for linguistic reasons based on what is most suitable in 
each individual case.
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2.2.3 Inscriptio
The context of D. 50.17.203
This fragment derives from Pomponius’ commentary22 on Quintus Mucius 
Scaevola.23 Q. Mucius Scaevola24 (ca. 140–82 BC) became known mainly due 
to his Iuris civilis libri XVIII. This work contained a systematic treatise of the ius 
civile25 and was the only pre-classical work still read in the classical period. In 
the second century AD it was even commented on by Laelius Felix, Gaius and 
Pomponius.26 D. 50.17.203 concerns a commentary of Pomponius on Q. Mucius 
Scaevola’s record of the ius civile, and, therefore, can be seen as a commentary 
on the ius civile. As is generally known, the ius civile at the time of Quintus 
Mucius is understood to have consisted of ‘private’ law as far as enclosed in 
laws (e.g. Lex XII Tabularum), senatus consulta and it also comprised the in-
terpretation of all these legal sources by the jurists. At the time of Pomponius 
the imperial constitutions also became part of the ius civile.27 D. 50.17.203 
contains a fragment by Pomponius in the eighth book of his commentary on 
Q. Mucius Scaevola.
Lenel, in his Palingenesia, placed the fragment of D. 50.17.203 in the com-
mentary of Pomponius on Quintus Mucius under the title De legatis.28 This 
fragment (pal. nr. 260) is the last fragment of liber VIII (De legatis 6), which 
part consists of nine Digest texts (in seven pal. numbers). Book eight (De legatis 
6) is one of the parts  about legacies (De legatis), De legatis consisting of seven 
parts in total (liber III [pal. nr. 228ff.] to liber IX). Unfortunately, Lenel’s 
22  In humanistic literature, there has been a discussion on the precise nature of Pomponius’ 
commentaries on Q. Mucius. According to Jacobus Gothofredus, Pomponius wrote notae to 
the regulae of Q. Mucius Scaevola. See J. Gothofredus, Commentarius in titulum Pandectarum 
de diversis regulis iuris antiqui, col. 1221f., paragraph before the commentary on D. 50.17.203. 
However, the Dutchman (Frisian) Georgius d’Arnaud (1711–1740) argued that Pomponius 
shaped his commentaries as ‘Readings (Lectiones) on Quintus Mucius’. See G. d’Arnaud, Variae 
conjecturarum, II.29, p. 400. Also Johannes Bachius (1721–1758) cited those writings as ‘Q. 
Mucium Lectionum XXXIX’. See I.A. Bachius, Historiae Jurisprudentiae Romanae, III.2 sect. 5 § 13.
23 Already in the humanistic edition of Schulting-Smallenburg, three fragments of the 
same origin as D. 50.17.203 are mentioned, namely, D. 23.3.66, D. 29.2.77 and D. 31.45. With 
regard to the content of D. 50.17.203, reference is made to D. 43.16.9.1, which will be discussed by 
J. Gothofredus and Donellus in their commentaries on D. 50.17.203 (see chapter four).
24  See on Scaevola also Behrends 1976; Bauman 1983, p. 340ff.; Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), 
p. 18; Liebs 2002, p. 569ff.; also Kübler 1933 (RE 31), col. 442ff., which is about his life as a jurist. 
25 Pomp. D. 1.2.2.41: ‘Post hos Quintus Mucius Publii filius pontifex maximus ius civile primum 
constituit generatim in libros decem et octo redigendo.’
26 Spruit 1994, p. 99; Liebs 2002, p. 571.
27  In the 2nd century AD, Gaius noted that the ‘responses prudentium’ were also part of the 
ius civile (Gai. Inst. 1.2).
28 Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, II, col. 68 pal. nr. 6.260.  
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reconstruction in his Palingenesia is the only indication available.29 Since there 
is no well-founded reason to take a different view, the best option seems to 
consider his indication as an assumption. 
A legacy is a bequest in a will of certain goods or rights to another person or 
to persons other than the heir. In the classical period one could mainly dis-
tinguish two categories of legata: legatum per vindicationem and legatum per 
damnationem.30 Later, the compilers of the Digest placed this fragment in the 
title De diversis regulis iuris antiqui (various rules of ancient law).31 
Sextus Pomponius
The writer of this text, Sextus Pomponius,32 lived in the second century AD. 
In the absence of any other sources, his works provide the only information 
available about his life. Pomponius wrote his works during the reign of the 
emperors Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. He 
was probably born in about 110 AD and died around 180 AD. From the com-
plete ‘silence of the sources’, we may deduce that Pomponius did not exercise 
public functions and that the ius respondendi was not granted to him.33 We do 
not know whether Pomponius belonged to one of the schools and, if he did, 
to which school he belonged (the Proculiani or the Sabiniani).34 The majority 
of present-day scholars seem to maintain that Pomponius was an adherent 
of the Sabinian school.35 However, a more correct view would be that there is 
no conclusive indication as to Pomponius’ own preference for one school or 
the other.36
Pomponius wrote over three hundred papyrus rolls (libri). Fragments of his 
writings are indirectly handed down to us via the Digest, and they are possibly 
altered by interpolations. His now most famous work is the Enchiridium, a di-
29 Some humanists, namely Raevardus and Donellus, attempted to reconstruct by means 
of palingenesis the contextual origin of D. 50.17.203, which they also considered to be the law 
of legacies. However, they came to a conclusion different from mine as will be made clear in the 
discussion of their views in chapter four.
30 See on legatum: Voci 1967, p. 11f., 21ff.; Kaser 1971, p. 109ff., 740ff.; 1975, p. 549ff.
31  Only then did the fragment become a maxim; see the end of this section.
32  On S. Pomponius, see, e.g., Wesenberg 1952 (RE 21), col. 2416ff.; Nörr 1976, p. 497-604; 
Liebs 1997a, p. 144-150; Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 170f.
33 Ankum 1974, p. 1; see also Wesenberg 1952 (RE 21), col. 2417.
34 cf. Wesenberg 1952 (RE 21), col. 2417; Honoré 1962a, p. 21ff.; - In general, on the Sabiniani 
and Proculiani, see Liebs 1976; Falchi 1981 and recently Leesen 2009.
35 See references mentioned by Leesen 2009, p. 4 nt. 3. The opposite view is held by Baviera 
1898, p. 27ff.; Honoré 1962a, p. 21ff., esp. 25f., argued that Pomponius was first educated at the 
Proculian law school, but later moved to the Sabinian school to teach.
36 Stolfi 1997, p. 7ff.; Leesen 2009, p. 4 nt. 3.
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dactical work, the more important because, besides the Institutes of Gaius, very 
few didactical works existed in the first two centuries of the Roman Empire. 
Also important are Pomponius’ two commentaries on the ius civile (one ad Q. 
Mucium [lectionum] libri XXXIX and one ad Sabinum XXXVI), a commentary 
on the edict as well as monographs on stipulations, senatusconsulta and fidei-
commissa.37 
2.2.4 Exegesis according to (classical) Roman law
Introduction
When Pomponius wrote the lines of D. 50.17.203, in later times adopted as a 
maxim, they probably formed an integral part of a larger text which is lost. The 
text may have been shortened by the compilers of Justinian, when including 
it in the Digest.38 After a study of this text one could come to the conclusion 
that identification of the details of the original context of the fragment is 
impossible.39 Also the reconstruction of Lenel (pal. nr. 260) seems to support 
that conclusion, but deeper investigation of D. 50.17.203 seems, nevertheless, 
appropriate.
One can assume that this fragment, like all regulae, originally referred to a 
concrete case.40 From Lenels’ reconstruction it becomes clear that Pomponius’ 
statement D. 50.17.203 belonged to the law of legacies.41 So, probably originally, 
i.e. when Pomponius wrote his commentary, it concerned a case of legacy.42 It 
is not clear whether the fragment is even much older, i.e. if it already derives 
from Quintus Mucius.43 In the event the fragment is indeed much older, Pom-
ponius has cited Quintus Mucius, or he made the citation to comment on it, or 
he was just referring to the cited fragment. Possibly, the fragment originated 
37  For a more detailed and precise overview on Pomponius’ work, see Wesenberg 1952 (RE 21), 
col. 2417f.; Liebs 1997a, p. 145ff.; Wieacker, Wolff & Manthe 2006, p. 108ff.
38 According to Jörs 1927, p. 119, the fragment is interpolated; see also Levy & Rabel 1935, 
col. 600.
39 Medicus 1962, p. 323; according to Buckland, McNair & Lawson 1974, p. 372, the text is 
corrupt.
40 Lange 1955, p. 71; on the (development in the) meaning of the regulae (iuris), see, inter 
alia, Stein 1966; Schmidlin 1970; Pérez Simeón 2001, p. 380ff.; Nörr 2003, p. 775*ff.
41  Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, II, col. 68 pal. nr. 6.260, categorised D. 50.17.203 under the 
eighth book of Pomponius’ commentary on Quintus Mucius under the title De legatis 6; - Also 
Endemann 1893, p. 56; Pernice 1895, p. 98 nt. 1; Medicus 1962, p. 323 n. 13; Aumann 1964, p. 30f.; 
Wollschläger 1976, p. 119; Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 29; - Differently Deschizeaux 1934, p. 11, who 
argued that the rule of Pomponius is a remnant from the time in ancient Rome when liability 
was just penal, and the rule was applied in the sense that the punishment as serious as the talio 
was not applied when the victim also was at fault.
42 See Riezler 1941, p. 190; Genzmer 1942, p. 126.
43 See, for a positive answer, Arnò 1939/1940, p. 41.
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already from Republican times. However, it cannot be ascertained whether Q. 
Mucius Scaevola had already formulated it in the wording adopted by Pom-
ponius.44 Possibly, the expression ‘damnum sentire’, common to Pomponius’ 
style,45 could indicate that this fragment was extracted from the commentary 
of Pomponius.46 In addition, the concise style (quod quis …), the technique 
and the method of solving the problem by word interpretation could support 
such a conclusion.47 
Despite the fact that there is no reference to a legacy in this text, it is plausible 
that such a reference to a legacy existed somewhere in the original context, i.e. 
when Pomponius added his statement or commentary. As stated earlier, the 
text contained a commentary of Pomponius, or maybe already of Q. Mucius, 
on a specific legal problem. The word ‘Quod’ also gives reason to presume that a 
part is missing before the word ‘Quod’. It is impossible to restore the context of 
the text that preceded the fragment in Pomponius’ time; some scholars believe 
that in the fragments handed down to us (in book eight) there is even too little 
support to come up with a solution as to the original context.48 However, the 
only possibility to confer a significant meaning to this fragment is to situate 
it in its original palingenetical (law of legacies) context. The later insertion 
of the word si in the text of D. 50.17.203 can be explained by the positioning 
of the text of D. 50.17.203 in the regulae iuris and by the purpose of that title. 
Justinian described the title de diversis regulis iuris antiqui as a consumation 
of the whole work, and that whatever is expressed is in the form of a regula 
(quaeque regulariter definita).49
The problem in D. 50.17.203
The main problem the text obviously deals with is the meaning of the legal 
term damnum. The interpretation of damnum, as used by Pomponius or 
44 According to Pernice 1895, p. 97f., this can, however, be assumed.
45 Kalb 1890, p. 11f., 66; - More in general, already Petrus Burmann the Elder (1668–
1741) remarked that the expression damnum sentire was familiar to jurists; see Burmann ad 
Quintilianus’  Declamatio maior XIII.13, ad damnum intellegis, edn. 1720, p. 287. 
46 Di Marzo 1961, p. 376; according to this author, the Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum 
sentit, non intellegitur damnum sentire was already in Quintus Mucius’ time a principle with 
a widespread application: ‘quando esteso fosse pur in quell’epoca il senso attribuito a sì fatto 
principio’.
47  Wollschläger 1976, p. 122 also mentioned the origin of a parallel problem of the societas 
(see D. 17.2.52.18); he added that the uncertain dating of the partitio legata (after 169 AD?; 
see Stiegler 1968, col. 1037ff.) certainly left the possibility open that Quintus Mucius himself 
formulated the rule of partitio (this will be discussed below), so that it was Pomponius who 
limited the rule.
48 Also Medicus 1962, p. 323 nt. 13; Wollschläger 1976, p. 119.
49 Constitutio Tanta, 8; Stein 1966, p. 114f.
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already by Quintus Mucius, would currently be classified as a restrictive 
interpretation. Roman jurists, however, treated declaratory,50 extensive and 
restrictive interpretation (as it would be referred to today) as an explanation of 
words and even what we today call analogy was treated as a way of explaining 
words. Roman jurists used essential descriptions containing the verbs esse, 
intellegi, videri and contineri, with which they always indicated these kinds of 
interpretations of legal notions.51 Already from the use of the verb intellegitur, 
one can conclude that an interpretation, in this case specifically of the word 
damnum, is concerned.
 
Some scholars argue that the first damnum is damnum in the sense of 
‘disadvantage’, and that the second damnum is used in a more narrow sense, 
i.e. in the sense of an unknown norm, as commented upon here by the Roman 
jurist.52 Does the second damnum (in accusativus singularis) indeed differ from 
the first damnum? The second damnum is used in (direct) connection with 
sentire and has to be seen in this light as damnum sentire.53 By sentire damnum, 
(financial) loss resulting from the damage of a corporeal object is meant. 
Elementary also is the connection with intellegitur: is the damage mentioned 
in the first words of D. 50.17.203, ‘because someone who suffers a loss’ (quod 
quis damnum sentit), also considered (intellegitur) as damage? The question 
is whether in this specific case, of which the details are unknown to us, the 
(financial) loss resulting from the damage of a (material) object could be 
explained as damnum in the legal sense. If someone suffered damnum in the 
legal sense, because of that fact, the injured party could justly take legal ac-
tion (i.e. sue the wrongdoer before the praetor) on the ground of negligence 
(culpa).54 
50 With declaratory interpretation ‘einfache Wortauslegung’ is meant; see Wesel 1967, p. 45.
51  See Wesel 1967, p. 42ff.
52  Wollschläger 1976, p. 119; according to Arangio-Ruiz 1958, p. 222 nt. 1, it is clear that 
the first damnum in D. 50.17.203 is used in the economical sense of disadvantage, the second 
damnum is used in the legal sense of harm/damage that can be compensated or repaired; 
therefore, the emendation of Mommsen, who cancels the second damnum, does not have to 
be accepted; also Arangio-Ruiz 1958, p. 222 nt. 1, argues that it is not permissible to cancel the 
second damnum.
53 See also VIR II, col. 13.
54 VIR I, col. 1078.
chapter two24
Possibly, the second part of D. 50.17.203 is a fiction. If the damage suf-
fered was the consequence of one’s own negligence, the damage caused to 
the harmed person was presumed not to be damnum. This linguistic use of 
intellegere is quite common in fragments by Pomponius. Also in D. 46.3.16 the 
verb intellegere is used as a fiction: someone, i.e. the debtor, is considered to 
have been released from his debt some time earlier, whereas in fact he was not.
However, considering the close connection in Roman times between rhetoric 
on the one hand, and law and politics on the other hand (see next section), and 
the acquaintance with rhetoric, a different interpretation is very well possible. 
It is plausible that when the jurist wrote the lines of D. 50.17.203, he considered 
the case to be a problem of definitio (whether the damage could be considered 
damnum) and argued his case on the basis of  a locus a differentia (a distinction 
between what was damnum and what was not damnum based on the fact that 
the loss was incurred because of one’s own negligence).55  
In view of the original context, i.e. the original legal case in which Pomponius 
made his comment (cf. pal.: De legatis), one can assume that the text was an 
interpretation of a rule of the law of legacies containing the word damnum. The 
rule had to contain the word damnum and had to leave room for interpretation. 
In addition, in the case Pomponius was replying to, he obviously aimed to 
interpret this notion in a way which allowed him to solve the problem that 
arose in that particular case. Otherwise, no question concerning this case 
would have been asked, or at least the jurist would not have replied in this 
way. There must have been a case concerning a legacy for which Pomponius 
found it necessary to define or interpret the legal term damnum more closely. 
Can we find fragments dealing with the law of legacies that include the word 
damnum and comment on it?
The casus of D. 50.17.203
The view of Aumann
In recent history, two scholars have tried to elaborate a possible context. The 
first scholar, Aumann, provided two possibilities. The first possibility is that 
the text originally may have indicated that the invalidity of a legacy must not 
be considered to be to the disadvantage of the testator because the testator 
had the possibility to change his last will and make another effective legacy,56 
which he apparently did not do, and, thus, was to be seen as his own negligence 
55 On the locus a differentia, see Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, V.10.58-63.
56 Aumann 1964, p. 30.
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(culpa). This possibility is mentioned by Aumann; however, I cannot think of 
what kind of damnum Aumann had in mind here. To support his statement 
Aumann refers to Lenel’s Palingenesia. Lenel located D. 50.17.203 (pal. nr. 260) 
next to a number of other fragments on legata (pal. nr. 254-259). The fragments 
contain texts about the effectiveness of legacies as well as texts concerning the 
question whether the fulfilment of an obligation (Auflage) can be enforced. 
Does this possibility indeed make sense? A person would consult a jurist to 
receive advice on a specific (legal) problem, in this case that he had made a 
testamentary arrangement that would not become effective. Why would it not 
become effective? Is it plausible that the jurist replied that the damage was not 
considered damnum in the legal sense because the testator had the possibility 
to make another effective statement? It is not clear what the damage/loss in 
that case would be. It is more likely that the word damnum refers to damage 
of the legatee. In that case the second possibility provided by Aumann, as we 
will see, seems to make more sense. 
The second explanation is that D. 50.17.203 referred to the relationship be-
tween the legatee and the heir. It is possible that Pomponius discussed the legal 
consequences that occur when the legatee himself made it impossible for the 
heir to pay out the legacy. Let me explain this further: suppose D. 50.17.203 
concerned a legatum per damnationem. An object is bequeathed to a legatee, 
but initially the heir acquires the ownership and becomes, as a debtor, obliged 
to transfer the object to the legatee (by traditio or mancipatio). The legatee has 
a legal claim on the heir. This type of legatum was connected with a personal 
actio ex testamento. Depending on the content, the formula of the legatum was 
a formula certa with quanti ea res est or a formula incerta with quidquid ... dare 
facere oportet.57 Accordingly, in case of a formula certa, it concerned a certain 
sum of money, a certain individual thing or a definite quantity.58 In case of a 
formula incerta, it concerned neither certa pecunia nor certa res or quantitas, 
but, for example, an obligation to do something. In any event, when the legatee 
himself made it impossible for the heir to pay out the legacy, the legatee was to 
blame and, therefore, seemed to be suffering no harm.59 An actio ex testamento 
was not given in such a case.
57  Kaser 1971, p. 109ff., p. 742ff. On the post-classical development of legatum, see Kaser 
1975, p. 549ff.
58 Lenel 1985, p. 232; Schulz 1992, p. 476f.
59 Aumann 1964, p. 30.
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The view of Wollschläger
A different attempt to reconstruct the original case is provided by Christian 
Wollschläger. In his opinion, D. 50.17.203 most likely refers to a specific case, 
namely, a compensation for damages in a case of a legatum partitionis (an 
explanation of this legal concept will follow below).60 Wollschläger refers to 
Aumann, who argued that in the original case upon which Pomponius most 
likely commented, the legatee himself could be blamed for the fact that he 
made the fulfilment of the legacy impossible.61 In such a case, an actio ex 
testamento would not be granted. The denial of a remedy to the legatee was 
obviously based on the idea that the legatee had not suffered damnum in the 
legal sense. One could, however, respond that by way of the regular actio certi 
ex testamento, the value of the object, the quanti ea res est could be claimed.62 
In the rarer cases of legacies of an incertum, with the actio directed at quidquid 
dare facere oportet, the judge had more discretion to assess the damages than in 
a case of a certum. In the sources this kind of condemnatio is always qualified 
as quod interest,63 but nowhere as damnum.64 
Most likely the term damnum originally had a more specific meaning than 
just loss or damage (in the legal sense), namely, the total loss of a specific 
object.65 In a legal context, later this term was defined as any damage to 
property as determined in the third chapter of the lex Aquilia.66 This fragment 
may have concerned an argument applied in the context of the law of legacies 
commented on by Quintus Mucius (second/first century BC) or a statement 
made by Mucius on which Pomponius (second century AD) commented. 
The damages resulting from the withholding of a legacy could not be called 
damnum, provided ‘complete loss of a concrete object’ was still the usual 
60 Wollschläger 1976, p. 119; an explanation of partitio (legata) can be found in Kaser 1971, I, 
p. 745.
61  Aumann 1964, p. 30.
62  Medicus 1962, p. 212; Kaser 1971, p. 743; Wollschläger 1976, p. 120.
63 For the sources, see Medicus 1962, p. 213 nt. 4, p. 221ff.
64 Wollschläger 1976, p. 120; the word ‘damnum’ is missing in the fragments of the 
commentaries on Sabinus’ commentary on the ius civile which were categorised by Lenel under 
‘Si ex testamento agatur’. See D. 42.2.8, which is part of the fourth book of the commentary of 
Paul on Sabinus; see Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, II, pal. nr. 1674. See also D. 30.37 and D. 
30.39pr.-§6, both part of the twenty-first book of Ulpian’s commentary on Sabinus, which were 
categorised by Lenel under the subtitle ‘Si ex testamento agatur?’ (pal. nr. 2618f.). In a footnote 
to this subtitle, Lenel referred back to the commentary of Paul in book IV of his commentary on 
Sabinus). The word ‘damnum’ is also missing in the Roman law texts concerning the quidquid-
formula cited by Kaser 1950, p. 346f. (nt. 45).
65 Liebs 1968, p. 251f. The meaning of damnum indicating the loss of a concrete object is 
still used by literary sources, such as Horatius. See Epistulae, I.17.57; I.7.88; Sermones, II.3.300; see 
for a more elaborated view on this topic Liebs 1968, p. 196f.
66 See Liebs 1968, p. 189 ff., 251f.
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meaning in the time of Pomponius. In the event one assumes that the text 
concerned a legatum per damnationem, the legatee would not receive any 
object (from the inheritance). Accordingly, none of his property was damaged 
since no object was transferred to him and, thus, never became his property.67
In that case, the legatee still had not yet received any object belonging to the 
inheritance that could be taken away from him or be damaged. Therefore, the 
damage to which D. 50.17.203 refers must have occurred to the detriment of 
the heir who was still in possession of the object and for which the heir was 
responsible.68 The heir might have tried, unfairly, to shift the financial loss to 
the legatee by maintaining that he was not liable for the fact that the object 
was completely gone. To further concretise this possibility, another source, i.e. 
Gaius (second century AD), may provide the necessary information.
Investigating Gaius’ Institutiones (ca. 160/161 AD), one notices that the word 
damnum only occurs in one actual case concerning the law of legacies.69 The 
relevant text is Gai. Inst. 2.254, in which a rule is given for the partition of an 
inheritance, namely, the partitio legata.70 A legatum partitionis included the 
instruction to share the inheritance with the legatee in a certain proportion: 
My heir will share, split my inheritance with Titius (heres meus cum Titio 
hereditatem meam partitor, dividito).71 In the classical period it came to be 
understood as a legatum per damnationem of an incertum.72 The testamentary 
will containing a legatum partitionis granted part of the inheritance to the 
legatee. The partitio legata implied no real succession by two heirs, only a 
partition of the patrimony; in external relations, the heir remained the sole 
heir and the debts of the inheritance and all legal claims remained his. Only in 
their internal relation was a settlement made between the heir and the legatee. 
However, there was the problem of distribution of the profit and loss (lucrum 
and damnum) during the period after the acceptance of the inheritance until 
67  This argumentation applies, unless the text nevertheless referred to a legatum per 
vindicationem.
68 Wollschläger 1976, p. 120.
69 All in all damnum is, in addition, (only) used in relation to the lex Aquilia (Gai. Inst. 
3.210ff.), the actio furti (Gai. Inst. 4.37ff.), the legis actio damni infecti (Gai. Inst. 4.31) and the 
societas (Gai. Inst. 3.149f.). See also Gai. Inst. 2.258 on hereditas damnosa.
70  See on the partitio (legata) Cicero, De legibus II.20.50; Cicero, Pro Cluentio VII.21; Cicero, 
Pro Caecina IV.12; Labeo-Iavol. D. 32.29.1; Iavolenus D. 28.6.39pr.; Gai. Inst. 2.254ff.; also the 
Laudatio Murdiae (1st cent. AD) in FIRA III, p. 218f.; Biondi 1955, p. 440ff.; Grosso 1962, p. 20 nt. 
1, 272ff.; Metro 1963, p. 291ff.; Voci 1963, p. 343f.; Stiegler 1967, p. 357ff.; Stiegler 1968, cols. 1033-
1049.
71  Ulpiani Epitome XXIV, 25 (edn. Avenarius 2005, p. 56f., with German translation: ‘Mein 
Erbe soll mit Titius meinen Nachlaß teilen, aufteilen’; also FIRA II, p. 293 (PARTITOR); and 
Schulz 1926, p. 55 partito)).
72  Kaser 1971, p. 745.
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the partition actually occurred.73 Before splitting up the inheritance, the 
legatee was entitled to receive part of the profits from cashed claims (debts? 
payments?) and he was also liable for part of the expenses involved with 
obligations of the estate. Lucrum and damnum are adjusted as assets (activa) 
and liabilities (passiva), respectively, in the calculation of the patrimony to be 
split up.74 With regard to the period after the partition, the parties stipulated 
verbal contracts (contractus verbis) in which they agreed that future claims 
and obligations would be settled mutually: stipulationes partis et pro parte (Gai. 
Inst. 2.257). The heir promised to give his part of the received assets/claims to 
the legatee, the legatee promised to cover part of the expenses (involved with 
debt fulfilments).75 Gaius describes the purpose of such stipulations with the 
words: ut et lucrum et damnum hereditarium pro rata parte inter eos commune 
sit (Gai. Inst. 2.254).76 
Quintus Mucius was acquainted with the partitio legata.77 In his Ius Civile 
he would have dealt with the just-mentioned rule that lucrum and damnum 
go on joint account. Obviously, there was a rule that if an heir had to incur 
certain expenses, he could recover a part of the expenses (damnum) from the 
legatee. However, such a rule would not apply in all cases, for then it would 
be too broadly formulated because it would allow the heir to proportionally 
shift a damnum, for which he himself was liable, to the legatee.78 Wollschläger 
gives an example of a trial in which someone pretended to have a claim on 
the inheritance, which claim in reality did not exist. If the heir in such a case 
lost the trial, as a consequence he would have to pay for a non-existing claim 
(cf. D. 17.2.52.18). The payment could be qualified as damnum and become a 
reduction in the amount of the patrimony to be split up, or it would become 
part of the compensation the legatee promised to hand over.79 To avoid such 
a result, the principle had to be limited by an exception for damages that the 
heir himself was to blame for. 
73  Wollschläger 1976, p. 121. From Cicero we know that Quintus Mucius did know the 
partitio legata; see Cicero, De legibus II.20.50; see also D. 32.29.1 where Labeo refers to Quintus 
Mucius; also Stiegler 1968, col. 1037ff. According to Wollschläger 1976, p. 121f., Quintus Mucius 
shall also have treated the fragment in his ius civile, in which lucrum and damnum originated in 
the same calculation; probably in the style of the law of the societas omnium bonorum.
74  Stiegler 1968, col. 1044f.
75  ibid., col. 1044.
76  According to Wollschläger 1976, p. 121, one can conclude that those stipulations were 
not used for the time before the distribution of the inheritance, and that, therefore, there was an 
independent rule provided by the ius civile. See also Stiegler 1968, col. 1044f. 
77  See n. 73 above.
78  Wollschläger 1976, p. 122.
79  ibid.
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In that case the exception of D. 50.17.203 is relevant: one has to distribute the 
damnum, but not the above-mentioned damnum resulting from the (own) 
culpa of the heir.80 
A concretisation and a further elaboration on Aumann’s theory
Seen from the above perspective the first theory of Aumann seems unlikely, the 
second theory makes more sense. But from Aumann it is not quite clear what 
the legatee could have done to hamper the conveyance of the legacy. On the 
other hand, Wollschläger’s theory seems possible, but is rather complicated. 
Aumann’s view on this text can also be concretised. In case of a legatum 
per damnationem, it could be that the legatee refused to accept the legacy. If 
one assumes that the case concerned a legatum of a certum, e.g. a horse, the 
heir had to feed and take care of the horse. If the legatee was not at home 
(deliberately) every time the heir tried to deliver the horse, the heir might 
consider the feeding and caring for the horse too costly or time-consuming 
and decide to sell or slaughter the horse. A second possibility is that there was 
a suspensive condition to the legacy the legatee refused to fulfil. An example of 
the last option would be a legacy of two slaves under the suspensive condition 
that one of them would be manumitted. If the legatee refused to fulfil the 
condition, he was not considered to suffer any damage (D. 50.17.203). 
Concluding remarks on D. 50.17.203
The conclusion is that D. 50.17.203 had no general validity in classical Roman 
times. However, with Justinian’s Constitutio Tanta/Δἐδωκεν (533), the Institutes 
and the Digest acquired the status of individual constitutions enacted into law, 
and, thus, became equal in force.81 The compilers extracted D. 50.17.203 from 
its original context in Pomponius’ work and designated it as a ‘regula’. Because 
the compilers were the first to formulate the sentence as now known in the 
Digest, this sentence could become one of the bases for the later medieval 
80 ibid.
81  Van der Wal & Lokin 1985, p. 31f.; - The Codex (529), however, did not provide new 
authority and did not transform the constitutions into a new constitution of the year 529, but 
they remained separate enactments with their force of law; see also Lokin 1976, p. 34; Van der 
Wal & Lokin 1985, p. 35; Radding & Ciaralli 2007, p. 135. This is important because if it had 
become a new autonomous constitution, the relation between the constitutions would have 
changed as well as their interpretation; see Scheltema 1966, p. 346. Neither did the Codex 
repetitae praelectionis of 534 have the authority of an autonomous enactment. The constitutions 
continued to be in force as promulgated by earlier emperors and dated on previous times, what 
is important with regard to D. 1.4.4: lex posterior derogat legi priori. Apart from the applicability 
of this rule on the constitutions inside the Codex, it may also be applicable in case of an 
inconsistency between the three parts of the compilation of Justinian. On this topic also Van 
der Wal & Lokin 1985, p. 35; - On the authority of the Institutes, Digest and Codex, see Scheltema 
1966, p. 344ff.
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theory of contributory negligence.82 Because of the formulation as a regula, 
it was generally set up as an abstract principle, both valid for delictual83 and 
contractual remedies.84 Someone who suffered disadvantage resulting from his 
own negligence, in a legal sense was not considered to have suffered damage 
for which compensation could be claimed. Although in some cases the facts 
would give rise to compensation, the injured party would not be granted a 
remedy because of his contributory negligence.85  
2.3 Alfenus’ reply in the case of the innkeeper86
2.3.1 The text of D. 9.2.52.1
Alfenus libro secundo digestorum.87
Tabernarius in semita noctu supra lapidem lucernam posuerat: quidam prae-
teriens eam sustulerat: tabernarius eum consecutus lucernam reposcebat et 
fugientem retinebat: ille flagello, quod in manu habebat, in quo dolor inerat, ver-
berare tabernarium coeperat, ut se mitteret: ex eo maiore rixa facta tabernarius 
ei, qui lucernam sustulerat, oculum effoderat: consulebat, num damnum iniuria 
non videtur dedisse, quoniam prior flagello percussus esset. Respondi, nisi data 
opera effodisset oculum, non videri damnum iniuria fecisse, culpam enim penes 
eum, qui prior flagello percussit, residere: sed si ab eo non prior vapulasset, sed 
cum ei lucernam eripere vellet, rixatus esset, tabernarii culpa factum videri.
82  Luig 1969, p. 193.
83  Haymann 1921, p. 362; Cohen 1956, p. 323 n. 6. See also Arangio-Ruiz 1958, p. 222, who 
applies the maxim to the socii.
84 Aumann 1964, p. 31; for a more elaborated discussion on the application of D. 50.17.203 
in different areas (of law), see Wollschläger 1976, p. 122ff; on ‘contributory negligence’ in other 
areas, see, e.g., Luig 1969, p. 195; Jansen 2007, p. 657f.
85 Aumann 1964, p. 31.
86 This subsection, although slightly different, has already appeared in a Dutch version (see 
Van Dongen 2009).
87  Besides the editio maior (and editio minor) of Mommsen & Krüger, see also Bremer 1985, 
p. 284 nr. 6; - It is remarkable that, instead of Alfenus whose name was attached to D. 9.2.52.1, the 
Basilica reads  Ἰαβολένου (Iavolenus).
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Apart from some emendations of minor importance,88 three peculiarities can be 
distinguished in this text. The passer-by started beating the tabernarius89 with 
the flagellum, in which something painful was enclosed (in quo dolor inerat90). 
The first peculiarity concerns the word dolor.91 Mommsen follows the littera 
Florentina here. However, in the littera Florentina, the rendering of the word 
can cause some  problems. Four characters, dolo, are written at the end of a line. 
Originally, the rest, the letter r, was written on the next line, so it became: rinerat. 
The ordinary corrector removed the character r and added it to the word dolo. 
88 cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 196, the vulgate edition contained mitteret; some, however, such 
as the vulgate edition with the Accursian gloss (in edn. of 1487, fo. 167r) contain dimitteret. This 
latter reading is later followed in the edition of Haloander (edn. 1550, fo. 265v). In the primitiva 
scriptura of the littera Florentina, see fo. 154r of the facsimile edition, a second hand (the 
corrector ordinarius) had changed offoederat into effoderat. With regard to the word consulebat: 
a more recent emendation has been made into consulebatur, namely, by some manuscripts of 
the vulgate. This (first) emendation is provided by Paris BN, lat. 4450, fo. 97r, a manuscript of the 
Digestum vetus of the end of the 11th or beginning of the 12th century (close in age to the older 
Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1406), as well as by the emendation made in Ms. Padova, Bibl. 
Univ. 941, fo. 91v. This reading is also provided by Ms. Leipzig, Univ. bibl. 873, fo. 80v (the latter 
two manuscripts from the mid 12th century are later in date than that of Paris BN, lat. 4450, and 
cannot really help to unravel textual problems; conventions were already standardising the text 
by then, while copies made earlier were now rendered obsolete by an apparent abundance of 
manuscripts that met the new norms; see Radding & Ciaralli 2007, p. 210). In the Florentina, 
someone has indeed written the characters ‘UR’ above/between the words consulebat and num. 
Instead of percussit the edn. of Haloander  contains percussisset (edn. of 1550, fo. 265v).
89 The second time the word tabernarius appears in the littera Florentina, it is written as 
tauernarius. See fo. 154r of the Florentina. At first sight, it seems that the copyist initially intended 
to write something else but then wrote a ‘u’ over it. This reading is confirmed by the edition of 
Torelli of 1553, I, p. 217, the first edition fully and directly based on the littera Florentina, in which 
the second time the innkeeper appears in the text he is referred to as taUernarius. A more recent 
emendation seems to have been made to the original text (where a ‘u’ was written), namely, by 
the littera vulgata (cf. edn. Kriegel, 1844, p. 196,  which contains tabernarius). Also the critical 
edition of Gebauer-Spangenberg of 1776, p. 177, contains tabernarius. At the end of the text the 
littera Florentina contains tubernarii instead of tabernarii (it seems as though the copyist first 
wrote a different letter and afterwards wrote a ‘u’ over it). A more recent emendation has been 
made, namely, by the littera vulgata, into tabernarii; cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 196.  
90 According to Lenel in his Palingenesia, I, col. 39, Alfenus fragment 7, ‘in quo-inerat’ could 
be a (post-classical?, EvD) gloss. This view was also already held by Willem Bilderdijk (1756–1831); 
see also Van den Bergh 2002, p. 166; Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 247. In D. 47.10.5.1, Ofilius 
(also a disciple of S. Sulpicius Rufus’) explains that the difference between hitting (pulsare) 
and beating (verberare) is that beating (verberare) also caused pain and hitting (pulsare) means 
inflicting blows without pain. In the event a form of verberare is used, possibly in quo dolor is 
indeed meant as a clarification, i.e. a gloss. To me it seems more a clarification than something 
really necessary for the comprehensibility of the text, factual as well as legal. Also Bilderdijk 
argued that the words seem to give an additional explanation on the word ‘verberare’, which is 
unnecessary because it is already obvious from D. 47.10.5.1 that ‘verberare’ leads to the infliction 
of pain. See W. Bilderdijk, Observationes et Emendationes, XXXVII (edn. 1819, p. 198). Also, in the 
Digest edition of Bonfante ‘in quo-inerat’ is considered a glossema (see also Von Lübtow 1971, p. 
107); - This phrase has been extensively discussed by various scholars in the early modern period; 
see, e.g., A. Schulting-N. Smallenburg, Notae ad Digesta seu Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.52.1. This could 
be relevant: for the question of liability, the type of weapon used by one person to hit another 
makes a difference. These scholars approached the phrase in a philological way.
91  See on this topic also Van den Bergh & Stolte 1977, p. 246f. 
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The vulgate reads dolor,92 and the Glossators apparently did not consider this 
problematic. An Accursian gloss simply reads: ‘Note that (it is said that) there is 
pain in a whip because it causes pain to others’.93 Therefore, for the Glossators it 
was nothing more than a notable turn of speech.94 
Several humanists, however, followed and propagated the emendation dolon 
based on a scholion on Vergilius.95 Dolon (or dolo) is known as a whip and within 
the stick of this whip a dagger was hidden.96 The first humanist following this 
emendation was the Italian Philippus Beroaldus (1453–1505).97 The emendation 
was generally accepted after the French humanist Budaeus (1467–1540) endorsed 
it.98 Later, Haloander, Gothofredus and others followed the emendation dolo(n).99 
This emendation was no longer followed by Contius, Van Leeuwen and Gebauer, 
who preferred the reading of the littera Florentina again.100 
Various explanations and reasons for the emendation into dolon are provided 
by the humanists and the scholars of the Dutch Elegant School based on legal 
arguments or on literary sources. To be able to make a good choice as to the 
plausibility of the emendation, a summary of the most relevant arguments and 
sources will be given below, starting with the reasons for the emendation based 
on literary sources.
92  See vulgate edition with the Accursian gloss (in edn. of 1487, fo. 167r); see also Van den 
Bergh & Stolte 1977, p. 247. Differently, the edition of Kriegel 1844, p. 196, which contains the 
reading ‘dolon’.
93 Gloss inerat ad D. 9.2.52.1.
94 Van den Bergh & Stolte 1977, p. 247.
95 Differently Haloander, who is of the opinion that it has to be dolo (edn. of 1550, fo. 265v). 
Dolo could also already be found in the vulgate manuscript of the Digestum Vetus, Paris, Bibl. 
Nat., Lat. 4450, fo. 97r; see Liebs 2000, p. 525; Krampe 2002, p. 134. However, this conclusion 
seems to be premature. In the manuscript, dolor is written, but the copyist probably made an 
error because it seems that he corrected it and indicated that the ‘r’ had to be removed (two 
points, one above and one underneath the ‘r’). See Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 4450, fo. 97r.
96 Already Servius (4th cent. AD), in his commentary to Aeneis VII.664; Gebauer/
Spangenberg 1776, p. 177f. Also Heumann & Seckel 1907 (reprint 1958), p. 156, s.v. dolon classified 
D. 9.2.52.1, and only this text, under dolon (δόλων). Their explanation: ‘ein in einem Stoße 
verborgener Dolch, Stoßdegen’; according to VIR II, kol. 323, the meaning of dolo corresponds 
with that of pugio, which means dagger.
97  See Servius, Commentarius in Vergilii Aeneidos VII. 664 (edn. Beroaldus and Badius 1501, 
fo. 237v.
98 Van den Bergh & Stolte 1977, p. 247. See G. Budaeus, Annotationes, ex D. 9.2.52.1 (edn. 
1557, p. 166); and see also after him, e.g., U. Zasius, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2: In eadem l[ege] § 
Tabernarius [D. 9.2.52.1], dicitur: Flagellum in quo dolor inerat: corrige, dolon; F. Hotman, Opera, 
ad Inst. 4.3 (col. 745): ‘dolon (sic enim legendum puto, non dolor)’.
99  In Haloander the n is missing so the reading was dolo; Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 246ff.
100 See H. Brenkman, Apparatus on D. 9.2, note dolor (1) ad D. 9.2.52.1 (edn. Van den 
Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 300f.); Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 247f.; nota in quo dolor in the edition of 
Gothofredus/van Leeuwen (edn. 1663, p. 177); Gebauer/Spangenberg 1776, p. 177.
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The word dolon is rather complicated, as is proven by various works of humanistic 
writers, because it has more than one meaning.101 The most important place 
where the word dolon is found, and this is already referred to by Beroaldus, is the 
commentary of Servius Honoratus Grammaticus (early fifth century) on Vergilius’ 
Aeneis (VII. 664). Two different meanings of this word are provided: either a whip, 
with a dagger hidden in its stick;102 or, according to (Servius’ record of) Varro, 
a large javelin with a very small sword.103 In particular, the first meaning (the 
leading view) has been extensively commented upon. In this view dolones are said 
to be hidden and deceptive: they contain an iron object, but appear to be made 
of wood.104 A Greek word (dolon) was used to express deception and this word 
had to be dolo, since the deception lay in the material of the object.105 Another 
source that affirms this meaning is Hesychius of Alexandria (fifth century AD), 
who explained dolones as daggers concealed in a wooden sheath.106 Also Isidorus 
of Sevilla (ca. 560–636) referred to sword-canes (dolones) as wooden sheaths 
in which a dagger is concealed with the appearance of a cane. Sword-canes are 
named after ‘guile’ (dolus), because they trick and deceive by having an iron 
blade hidden within under the guise of wood. Commonly, people called them 
by the Greek name ὀξὺς, which means ‘sharp’.107 This view has been contested 
101  See, e.g., G. Budaeus, Annotationes, ex D. 9.2.52.1.
102 The emendation dolon (dagger) was followed by various jurists of the Dutch Elegant 
School, e.g., E. Bronckhorst (1554–1627) and G. Noodt (dolo(n)), based on the first meaning of dolon 
provided in Servius’ commentary on Vergilius’ Aeneis VII.664. See, e.g., K.F. Walch in: Eckhard-
Walch, Hermeneutica Juris, I.3 §104, p. 190; E. Bronckhorst, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203; 
G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. XIX, p. 143; E. Otto, De vita ... P. Alfenus Varus, cap. 5 
§5, p. 230f.; also nota in quo dolor in the edition of Gothofredus/van Leeuwen 1663, who referred 
to Hesychius’ Lexicon (Δόλωνες ξιφιδια ἐν ξύλεις ἀποχεχρυμμίνα), D. 9.1.1.7 and Suetonius, Claudius, 
XIII<.1>. It is interesting that the author of the gloss argues that also in D. 9.1.1.7 dolone has to 
be read instead of dolore. On this point see also W. Bilderijk, Observationes et Emendationes, 
XXXVII. A comparison with D. 9.1.1.7 has also been used by the Spaniard Gregorio Mayáns y 
Siscar (Gregorius Majansius; 1699–1781) as (part of) the basis to suggest the emendation of 
dolo(n) in D. 9.2.52.1 instead of dolor; - See also Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae, XXX.1<.21, 
EvD> (found in the handwriting of Schulting in the edn. of the Corpus Iuris of Gothofredus/Van 
Leeuwen 1663 available in Leiden (759 A 35)), where dolon is used in the meaning of  ‘dagger’.
103 The fragment of Varro can also be found in the Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta, repr. 
edn. 1969, nr. 425 (p. 360f.): dolo est - secundum Varronem ingens contus cum ferro brevissimo. 
Dolones autem a fallendo dicti sunt, quod decipiant ferro, cum speciem praeferant ligni. The 
edition continues with other references, namely, that of Servius’ commentary on Vergilius, Aen., 
VII.664, Isidorus of Sevilla, Etymologiae, XVIII.9.4 and Aelius Donatus’ commentary on Terentius’ 
Eunuchus III.3.9, ad dolo malo omnia fieri haec. In the final reference, Donatus explained dolones 
as war spears (tela bellica); - Rich 1860, p. 247, formulated the meaning of dolon (or dolo) as 
follows: ‘a long and strong stick, with a small sharp iron point at the extremity’.
104 See Servius, Commentarius  in Vergilii Aeneidos VII.664 (edn. Beroaldus and Badius 
1501, fo. 237v and Ramires et al. 2003, p. 90). See also Constanzo Landi, Exercitat., ex D. 9.2.52.1.
105 G. Budaeus, Annotationes ad D. 9.2; apparently an etymological connection was seen 
here (dolus-dolo), which is questionable.
106 See also the notae of Johannes Scheffer to Phaedrus, Fabulae Aesopiae, III.6.3, ad 
dolone; Conradus Rittershusius’ comment to Phaedrus, Fabulae Aesopiae, III.6.3, ad dolone; C.G. 
Heyne in his critical apparatus ad Vergilius’ Aeneis VII.664, ad dolone.
107 Isidorus of Sevilla, Etymologiae, XVIII.9.
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at a relatively late time, by Willem Bilderdijk (1756–1831)108 who rejected the 
emendation dolon. He argued that if this interpretation were true, the sword-
cane (dolon) could not be inside the whip, since it had to be understood that the 
dagger was concealed in the whip. However, it was not common usage to strike 
somebody with a dagger, and the text very clearly states that the passer-by beat 
(verberare) the other person with a whip. Bilderdijk argued that it was certainly 
not common to use a dagger in this way (for beating), nor to use the weapon for 
a purpose other than the usual one, nor to hide a dagger in a whip. Furthermore, 
it is not plausible that someone whose eye was knocked out in a fight having this 
weapon would refrain from using it according to its original purpose, in the way 
best fit for his defence.109
A third meaning of the word dolon based on (literary) sources is the use of dolon 
as a (short) sword.110  This sword would have been a short and curved one, a con-
cealed short-sword, in Latin called ‘sica’, i.e. a dagger which one used to engird 
oneself.111 However, this meaning is contested by the German humanist Ulrich 
Zasius (1461–1535),112 who argued that it is wrong to call dolones swords (sicas), 
because, although commonly used in his time, dolones were whips, in which 
tenuous branches protected the sting.113 
108 He is called ‘a marginal figure of the Dutch Elegant School’ by Van den Bergh 2002, 
p. 100; on Bilderdijk see also Van den Bergh 2002, p. 165ff.
109 W. Bilderdijk, Observationes et Emendationes, XXXVII (edn. 1819, p. 198f.).
110  See Suetonius, Claudius, XIII.1 (dolon as a sword-cane); and also Suetonius, Domitianus, 
XVII.1, where, based on the conjecture of the Renaissance lawyer Jacobus Ferrarius, dolonem is 
written; in this text a certain Stephanus wrapped up his left arm in woollen bandages, pretending 
he was injured, and concealed a dagger in these bandages (the translation by Rolfe 1979 is used); 
see also Phaedrus, Fabulae Aesopiae, III.6.3, where dolone is appropriately compared to the sting 
of a fly; - See also the later critical apparatus of G.A. Ruperti (1758–1839; edn. 1795, p. 203), to 
the word dolon in T.C. Silius Italicus, Punica III.250, referring to C. Dausque (1566–1644), Chr. 
Cellarius (1638–1707) and others who interpret the word dolon as pugio; see also the edition 
of Basilius Faber/Augustus Buchnerus/Cellarius 1692, col. 826, who referred to Donatus’ 
commentary on Terentius’ Eunuchus III.3.9; [Servius ad] Vergilius, Aeneis VII.664; Hesychius’ 
Lexicon; Plutarchus, Tiberius Gracchus X.7 and Suetonius, Claudius, XIII.1.
111  See Plutarchus, Tiberius Gracchus X.7 and Th. Reinesius, Variarum lectionum III.17 (edn. 
1640, p. 640). See also E. Otto, De vita ... P. Alfenus Varus, cap. 5 §5, p. 230f., who gave two interesting 
references, namely, to the word ‘Dol(c)k’ in the Otfired von Weißenburg’ Evangelienbuch [III. c. 
25] and the name of the title ‘De dolg’ in the Frisian Leges Frisionum [titulus 22], which means, 
however, ‘on wounds’ here.
112  On Zasius see, e.g., Wolf 1963, p. 59ff.; Stobbe 1965, II, p. 40f.; Stintzing 1978, I, p. 155ff.
113  See U. Zasius, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2, nr. 41.
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A fourth meaning of the term dolon is a small sail of a ship.114 If the vessel had 
three masts and consequently three sails, the dolon was the smallest of the 
three.115 Apparently, dolon was a mast with a sail of the same name, which 
subsequently served for manoeuvring before an action and for escaping after a 
defeat.116 In the context of Livy XXXVI.45.1, dolones had to mean something dif-
ferent, namely, the ends of the sail-yards covered with the sails or just the small 
sails. The word dolones probably comes from the verb ‘to deceive’, what was also 
the case in the events of 191 BC.117 
The emendation dolon has been explained in history in various ways. Someone 
(incorrectly) restored an R instead of an N.118 Formerly, the reading could have 
been dolon, but the N was partially consumed at the end of the line and thus 
114  The meaning of dolon as a small sail of a ship (dolonibus meaning top-sails) can be 
found in Livy’s description of the events of 190 BC (Ab urbe condita XXXVII.30.7), reference to 
this fragment of Livy is also made by Ramshorn 1841, p. 412, who explains dolon (δόλων), under 
the heading of the word velum (the sail in general), as ‘the small foresail, only used in favorable 
wind’; and in Livy’s description of the events of 191 BC (Livius, Ab urbe condita XXXVI.45.1); see 
also Livius, Ab urbe condita XXXVI.44.2f.
115  See Pollux, Onomasticon, I.91 who argues that  this mast was also called λόγγασος; see 
also Suidae Lexicon, ad Δόλωνες:  τὰ μικρὰ ἱστία (the small sails). A possible meaning of dolon 
could be a mast (spar) carrying a sail; see Liddell 1940, p. 443. This seems to be supported by the 
explanation given in the Lexicon, namely, as a ‘flying jib’; more extensively in an earlier edition, 
Liddell 1883, p. 383: ‘perhaps a top-sail, used when the wind was too strong for the greater 
square-sail, or when there was not time to hoist it’; Rich 1860, p. 247.
116  The use of dolons was also mentioned by Polybius, Historiae, XVI.15.2; Diodorus Siculus, 
Bibliotheca historica, XX.61.8. In an explanatory note of Geer in his English translation (1983), 
he explains that ‘δόλων was either a light spear that could be rigged at the prow of the war ship, 
extending forward like a high bowsprit, or a square sail hung on a crossarm at the end of such a 
spear. We know of such rig only on Phoenician and Roman craft. Since it could be set up more 
quickly than the ordinary mast, which was stowed before the battle, it seems to have been 
used here often.’ See on this topic also Torr 1964, esp. p. 87, who argued that Diodorus Siculus 
is perhaps misquoting his authorities, since at that time the ships might have used akatians. 
Finally, also Procopius (De bello Vandalico, I.17) mentioned dolons when describing Byzantine 
warships in 533 AD; he described dolons as small sails and distinguished them from large sails. 
Torr 1964, p. 87, argued that this fragment is an adaptation of Xenophon, Hellenica, VI.2.27. 
Furthermore, he argued that the name must have been obsolete for centuries, then revived as a 
classical term for the smaller sort of mast or sail; - Rich 1860, p. 247 described dolon as a small 
fore-sail on a ship with more than one mast, carried over the prow, and attached to the foremast 
(with reference to the explanation of dolo in Isidorus of Sevilla, Etymologiae, XIX.3.3); he refers 
to an (annexed) illustration of a ship, from a bas-relief of Villa Borghese.
117  In the events of 191 BC as described by Livy, Polyxenidas raised his top-sails (dolonibus) 
and due to that was able to flee from his enemy and thus deceived him; see the comment of 
Marcellus Donatus as reproduced by A. Drakenborch in note ad sublatis dolonibus effuse fugere 
intendit ad Livium XXXVI.45.1
118  Meaning a whip, of which the stick contained a dagger; see the French scholar 
Pardulphus Prateius (Pardoux Duprat, ca. 1520 - ca. 1570), in his Jurisprudentiae Mediae, IV.XI.
chapter two36
became an R.119 Also, several legal reasons for the emendation dolon have been 
stated by the humanists.
1. Hermann Cannegieter (1723–1804) provided a profound explanation of the 
multi-faceted concept of dolon. In addition, he also argued that verberare meant 
to hit with a dagger and pulsare to hit without a dagger. According to Cannegieter, 
dolones (pikes or sword-sticks) also cover whips, staves or even wooden sheaths, 
in which a spike is hidden under the disguise of a staff.120
2. According to Idzert Eekma (1785–1852), more cases could be found in Roman 
law in which dolor was written instead of <the right word> dolon, and one of them 
is D. 9.2.52.1. Pain (dolor), considered as animi adfectus, could not be contained 
in a whip; dolon, on the contrary, could be put in a whip: a wooden object could 
contain a little sword, and in the same way a dagger could be hidden in the stick 
of a whip.121
Finally, the humanist Antonius Faber (Antoine Favre, 1557–1624) believed the 
word dolor should not be read as ‘dolor’ as Accursius did, but as ‘dolori.’122 This 
interpretation is grammatically possible because the verb ‘inerat’ can go together 
well with a dativus. However, this view was not adopted by other humanists  nor 
by modern scholars.
With regard to classical Roman law, ‘dolor’ seems to be the best word to use. It 
seems preferable to follow the littera Florentina, it being the most authentic 
manuscript and also because dolor in the sense of pain seems plausible.
The second problem concerns the word ‘non’ in the statement num damnum 
iniuria non videtur dedisse.123 In the littera Florentina, the word ‘non’ is placed 
between quotation marks.124 It is not clear what the meaning of these marks 
119  See J.G. Marckart, Probabilia receptorum lectionem Juris Civilis, I, ad D. 9.2.52.1 (edn. 
1737, p. 136ff.); see also H. Brenkman, Apparatus on D. 9.2, note dolor (1) ad D. 9.2.52.1 (edn. Van 
den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 300f.), concluding that although the littera Florentina contained the 
word dolor, it should, without any doubt, read ‘dolon.’
120 H. Cannegieter, Commentarius ad Fragmenta veteris jurisprudentiae, p. 106f.; see also J. 
van der Linden, Adnotationes ad Voet’s Commentarius ad D. 9.1, nr. 5 (edn. Gane 1955, p. 539). 
121  I. Eekma, Dissertatio iuridica inauguralis, p. 74f.
122  A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.52.1.
123  A different possible reading is provided by Van de Water: ‘consulebatur, damnum injuria 
num videtur dedisse’. According to Van de Water, the same reading should apply in, e.g., D. 40.1.6. 
See J. van de Water, Annotatio ad Pandectas, num damnum etc. ad D. 9.2.52.1 (handwriting in edn. 
Gothofredus/Van Leeuwen of 1663; I consulted a copy with signature 759 A 36 in the University 
Library of Leiden).
124  See fo. 154r of the facsimile edition of the Florentina; also the edition of Torelli, which 
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is; I suppose the copyist doubted the appropriateness of this term. The littera 
vulgata125 also contains non but without quotation marks.126 Whatever the 
meaning of the quotation marks might have been, there seems to be no reason to 
delete the word non in this fragment.127 Already Johannes Marckart (1698–1757) 
argued that the question whether non had to be deleted or not and whether 
this question had to be read in an affirmative or in a negative way is of little 
importance.128 From a legal perspective, in my opinion he is right; however, from 
an argumentative perspective as well as a philological perspective the question 
remains interesting and relevant.
A third peculiarity concerns the word videtur.129 In the littera Florentina, the 
characters ‘RE’ have been written above videtur.130 Such a correction into 
uideretur was also made by a more recent (but medieval) emendation in the 
littera vulgata.131 However, other forms of the verb can also be found, e.g. in 
the manuscript Ms. Padova, Bibl. Univ. 941 in which the text reads uidebitur.132 
Grammatically, videretur is preferable, because when a  dependent clause is used, 
the verb has to be a subjunctive.
was based on the littera Florentina, contained the word non (see edn. of 1553, I, p. 217). 
125  cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 196. 
126 Also in the later editions of Haloander (the first humanistic edition, I consulted the 
edn. of 1550, fo. 265v) and of Gebauer/Spangenberg 1776, p. 178. Despite the fact that Gebauer 
wrote that in the edn. of Haloander ‘non’ has disappeared, this was a mistake. See A. Augustinus, 
Emendationum I.2, who argued that a more recent author made an alteration to the littera 
Florentina and tried to excise the word ‘non’ by writing ‘[non]’
127  Already the edition of A. Schulting-N. Smallenburg, Notae ad Digesta seu Pandectas, ad 
D. 9.2.52.1, stated that the deletion of the word ‘non’ has to be considered less correct (minus recte). 
Various humanists were in favour of the reading with ‘non’ (as the littera Florentina): (of course) 
Torelli in this Digest edition (the 16th-cent. edn. (1553) of the manuscript of F), A. Augustinus, 
Emendationum I.2, whose argumentation is also repeated in H. Brenkman, Apparatus on D. 9.2, 
note non (3) ad D. 9.2.52.1 (edn. Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 301), S.R. Jauch, Meditationes criticae 
de Negationibus, p. 9f., I.G. Marckart, Probabilia receptorum lectionem Juris Civilis, I, ad D. 9.2.52.1, p. 
138, and (implicitly) also I. Püttmann, Interpretationum et Observationum, cap. 7 §2, p. 31.
128  I.G. Marckart, Probabilia receptorum lectionem Juris Civilis, I, ad D. 9.2.52.1, edn. 1737, p. 138.
129  Also in Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 4450, fo. 97r, ‘non videtur dedisse’ is written.
130 According to Huvelin 1912, p. 560, the original ‘mistake’ could easily be explained by a 
fault of the copyist; in Huvelin’s opinion, one would need here an imperfect of the subjunctive.
131  cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 196; also in A. Augustinus, Emendationes I. 2, edn. 1544, p. 16 
and preferred by Gebauer/Spangenberg 1776, p. 178. Furthermore, H. Brenkman, Apparatus on 
D. 9.2, note non (3) ad D. 9.2.52.1 (edn. Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 301) noticed that (almost 
all) editions have the reading videretur instead of videtur, which is also the reading he himself 
preferred. Similarly with regard to D. 9.2.52.4, where the littera Florentina reads: ‘quaerebatur, an – 
potest’, see fo. 154v of the facsimile edition of the Florentina (the edition of Haloander contained the 
word posset), and in the wording of D. 9.2.2.2 in the littera Florentina: ‘an – continentur, quaeritur’, 
see fo. 147v of the facsimile edition of the Florentina (the littera vulgata contained contineantur).
132  Ms. Padova, Bibl. Univ. 941, fo. 91v.
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2.3.2 Translation of D. 9.2.52.1
Alfenus in the second book of his Digest
An innkeeper had placed his lantern at night on a stone at a path;133 someone 
took it when passing by. The innkeeper pursued him,134 demanded the lantern 
back, and got hold of the person running away; he (i.e. the passer-by) started 
beating the innkeeper with a whip which he had in his hand, inside of which135 
something painful136 was enclosed,137 so that he (i.e. the innkeeper) would let 
him go. From this encounter, a real brawl developed in which the innkeeper 
knocked out an eye of the man who had taken the lantern. He (i.e. the inn-
keeper) asked for advice as to whether the damage he had inflicted would not 
be considered unlawful (iniuria), bearing in mind he was hit with the whip first. 
I answered that unless he had intentionally knocked out the eye, he would not 
be considered to have caused the damage unlawfully (iniuria), as the culpa lay 
with the one138 who first struck with the whip;139 but if he had not been hit by 
him first, but he had started the brawl when he wanted to get the lantern from 
him, it seems to have happened as a result of the culpa of the innkeeper.140
133  The tabernarius did so outside his taberna. The taberna (shop) could be any kind of 
building which was fit for habitation, evidently because these were generally closed with boards; 
see Ulp. D. 50.16.183. Usually it was a place for trade or industry. Many examples can be found in 
Heumann & Seckel 1907 (reprint 1958), p. 577, s.v. taberna; differently Huvelin 1912, p. 561, who, 
based on the circumstances of the adventure and also with reference to D. 23.2.43pr. and D. 
33.7.13, translates taberna with taverne, cabaret and  tabernarius with tavernier.
134  That is, the innkeeper ran after him to seize him (persequendo adprendere); see VIR I, col. 929.
135  Refers to flagello; see VIR III/1, col. 797.
136  Monro 1898, p. 75: ‘a lash with which would inflict severe pain’; Thayer 1929, p. 47: 
‘in which there was a spike’; d’Ors et al. 1968, p. 394: ‘aguijón’; Scott 1973, p. 345: ‘and to which 
an iron was attached’; Otto, Schilling & Sintenis 1839 (reprint 1984), p. 814: ‘worin ein Dolch 
steckte’; Watson 1985: ‘on which there was a spike’; Feenstra/Spruit in: Spruit et al. 1994, p. 741, 
translate this passage as ‘waaraan een scherpe punt zat’ and explains in a footnote that they had 
translated quo dolo inerat; Schipani 2005, p. 262: ‘in cui era una punta’.
137  cf. Heumann & Seckel  1907 (reprint 1958), p. 263, s.v. inesse: ‘worin enthalten, begriffen sein’.
138  Heumann & Seckel 1907 (reprint 1958), p. 416, s.v. penes: In übertragenen Sinne zur 
Bezeichnung der Person, auf der ein nachteiliger Umstand sitzen bleibt: culpam penes aliquem 
residere (D. 9.2.52.1).
139  This part of the argumentation (‘I answered that unless he had intentionally knocked 
out the eye, he would not be considered to have caused the damage unlawfully (iniuria), as the 
culpa lay with the one who first struck with the whip’) is missing in the text of the Basilica (B. 
60.3.51.1), which simply states that the innkeeper was not responsible (on culpa as αἰτία, see 
Paschialidis 2008, esp. p. 360). The text of the Basilica continues by stating that if the tabernarius 
had not been hit first, but he had taken the lantern back, and given rise to a scuffle, he is to 
be held liable under the lex Aquilia. According to a short explanation in BS 3163/2 (scholion 1 
ad B. 60.3.51), no actio legis Aquiliae could be brought against the shopkeeper, as the ‘injured 
party’ was the first who hit with the whip. See also Paschialidis 2008, p. 360, who argued that 
according to this scholion, the passer-by first hit the innkeeper, and that, thus, the incident is not 
attributable to the shopkeeper.
140  Different d’Ors et al. 1968, p. 394: ‘el daño parecía hecho por culpa del posadero’. 
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2.3.3 Inscriptio
The context of D. 9.2.52.1
This fragment derives from the second book of the Digesta141 of Alfenus 
(Varus).142 The Digesta (libri XL) of the (pre-classical) jurist Alfenus is the 
earliest work of a Roman jurist whose texts occur in the Digest of Justinian.143 
However, the compilers of the Digest (of Justinian) did not have the original 
work of Alfenus at their disposal, but only an Epitoma by Julius Paulus, written 
in the second century (or the beginning of the third century) AD,144 and 
another Epitoma written by an anonymous jurist (probably in the first half of 
the second century).145 
As almost six hundred years elapsed between the Digesta of Alfenus and the 
Digest of Justinian, it is uncertain to what extent it really provides information 
about the law of the late Republic.146 This uncertainty is further increased by the 
circumstance that the compilers did not have the original work of Alfenus at 
their disposal and by the fact that in post-classical times texts that were adopted 
in the Digest were sometimes modified or even interpolated by the compilers. 
Neither the original Digest of Alfenus nor the original Epitomae survives 
to our day. Only the texts included in the Digest of Justinian can be the basis 
of a (certain) reconstruction of the Epitomae. The original work by Alfenus 
consisted of forty books; the Pauli Epitomae contained eight books and the 
anonymous Epitoma ten at the most.147 Only one hundred and four decisions 
of Alfenus survived in Justinian’s Digest.148 The interpretation of these texts 
may provide some information about the Epitomae, but hardly about the 
original Digest of Alfenus. In his Palingenesia, Lenel placed D. 9.2.52.1 in book 
two of Alfenus Varus’ Digesta (ab anonymo epitomata) under the title Ad legem 
Aquiliam.149 According to Lenel, this text, therefore, originally derives from 
the context of the lex Aquilia. The actio the plaintiff wanted to obtain was the 
actio legis Aquiliae.150 Based on this enactment the injured party, i.e. the one 
141  On the tradition of this Digest, see also Roth 1999, p. 20ff.
142  Assuming that the reading of the Basilica is incorrect. For the rest of my exegesis 
I assume that the text of D. 9.2.52.1 was not written by Iavolenus (cf. the reading of Basilica: 
Ἰαβολένου) but – cf. the prevailing view today – by Alfenus Varus.
143  Wieacker 1988, p. 107f.
144  In any case before 211 AD; see Roth 1999, p. 185f., 202 and Liebs 2000, p. 522.
145  Roth 1999, p. 201f.; Tellegen-Couperus 2001, p. 382.
146  Tellegen-Couperus 2001, p. 382.
147  ibid., p. 384.
148  Roth 1999, p. 20.
149  Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, I, col. 39, pal. nr. 7.
150 The dating of (the origin of) the lex Aquilia is not certain, but it probably dates from 
286 or 287 BC; see, e.g., Kaser 1971, p. 161; Watson 1984, p. 234.
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who suffered damage to his property, could ask the praetor for an actio legis 
Aquiliae against the wrongdoer. Also the compilers of the Digest placed this 
fragment under the title Ad legem Aquiliam (D. 9.2).
Alfenus
The author of this text, Publius Alfenus Varus,151 lived during the late Republic 
and the beginning of the Principate. He was consul suffectus in 39 BC. Accord-
ing to Horace, Alfenus (vafer) remained a sutor (shoemaker) even after having 
tossed aside every tool of his art and after having closed his shop; 152 this can 
be explained in the sense that a man may be actively engaged in one pursuit 
(being a consul suffectus) yet remain potentially the master of another (a 
shoemaker).153 From the commentary of Porphyrio on Horace,154 it appears that 
Alfenus Varus was born in Cremona and originally was a shoemaker or a son 
of a shoemaker.155 In addition to the meaning of the word sutor as a craftsman 
working with awl and pitched thread it can also mean a person belonging to the 
equites who is an entrepreneur and uses slaves to make shoes.156 Interpreting 
the word sutor here in the latter sense is more plausible as it is not likely that 
Octavian would have raised an actual shoemaker to the consulship.157 Besides, 
only  if Alfenus (or already his father)158 owned a large-scale enterprise, would 
he have sufficient capacity to supply the means required in the social order 
for Alfenus to aspire to a state career and dedicate himself to jurisprudence.159 
151  Klebs 1894 (RE 2), col. 1472f., Jörs 1894 (RE 2), col. 1473f.; Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 
29; Wieacker 1988, p. 607ff.; Behrends 1990, p. 607; Badian & Honoré 2000; Liebs 2010, p. 32ff. 
On Alfenus, and on his Digesta, see Ferrini 1891, p. 1ff.; De Sarlo 1940; Roth 1999 and the literature 
mentioned therein and Liebs 2000, p. 519ff.; 2010, p. 32ff.; extensively, also Bauman 1985, p. 89-105.
152  Horatius, Sermones I.3.130ff.; the tradition of this text is not clear, another version, 
namely, according to the Codex Blandiniensis, is clausaque ustrina tonsor erat: this could be 
interpreted as a corpse washer or a funeral undertaker (libitinarius); see Liebs 2010, p. 34f. (with 
references) who discussed these possibilities profoundly.
153  See also Brewster 1917, p. 71. However, according to Frank 1920, p. 160, Horatius in 
Sermones I.3.130 cited the example of Alfenus – who was once a shoemaker and recently a 
consul – in pretended support of the Stoic paradox that the wise man alone is the universal 
expert; although Alfenus long ago closed his shop, he has never outgrown being a shoemaker.
154  Porphyrio, Commentum in Horati Sermones I.3.130ff.
155  Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 29.
156  Klebs 1894 (RE 2), kol. 1472; Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 29.
157  In the same sense Frank 1920, p. 620.
158  Frank 1920, p. 620, provided the possibility that the father of Alfenus was a colonial of the 
usual type found in the Po Valley, in which case he doubtless invested the surplus earnings of his farm 
in urban shops and factories.
159  Differently Liebs 2010, p. 35ff.; - Probably the jurist is also Alfenus Varus, who, in the 
year 41 BC together with Asinius Pollio and Cornelius Gallus, let the settlement of the veterans in 
Gallia Transpadana and kept Vergilius from being penalised (i.e. expropriated) in the distribution 
of lands after the victory at Philippi, when lands were being divided among the veterans by order 
of the triumvirate; Klebs 1894 (RE 2), kol. 1472. On this topic also Liebs 2010, p. 44ff. See Vita 
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Probably P. Alfenus Varus, who was consul in the year 2 AD, was Alfenus’ son. 
Alfenus Varus, born in Cremona, was the first from Gallia Cisalpina to gain a 
consulship under Augustus (27 BC – 14 AD).
Alfenus Varus was a student of Servius Sulpicius Rufus’ (ca. 105–43 BC) and 
belonged to the last generation of pre-classical jurists. He was the first Roman 
jurist who, under the title of Digesta, wrote a casuistic work based on the 
praetorian edict in which he treated problems by means of concrete cases.160 
Frequently, Alfenus gave appraisals to his teacher Servius Sulpicius Rufus. He 
often cited consultative opinions (responsa) of his teacher Servius along with 
his own.161 According to (the writings of) Aulus Gellius, one may assume that 
Alfenus wrote another work, the Coniectanea.162 
2.3.4 Exegesis according to (classical) Roman law
Introduction to the case of D. 9.2.52.1
Before turning to the legal problem, some remarks have to be made as 
regards the facts of the case. Two persons are involved in the legal conflict: 
the innkeeper and (probably) the owner of the passer-by (assuming that the 
passer-by was a slave). The lantern was placed outside the shop of a shopkeeper 
or the inn of an innkeeper,163 beside the street.164 A taberna could be a shop for 
certain forms of retail.165 Nevertheless, one could also translate tabernarius as 
a keeper of a tavern or an innkeeper because this translation, among others, 
would be consistent with the normal language used from the second century 
BC onwards, when with tabernarius normally an innkeeper was meant.166 
When one interprets tabernarius as keeper of a tavern, one should immediately 
realise that tabernarii were notorious people167 who belonged to the lower 
Vergilii Donatiana in Brummer 1912, p. 17, and the translation of and commentary on Donatus’ 
Vita Vergilii by D. Scott Wilson-Okamura 2008, which was based on Brummer’s text.
160 Spruit 1995, p. 249.
161  On the discussion of the question whether the Digesta of Alfenus were only, or 
considerably, a collection of responsa of Servius, see Roth 1999, p. 21.
162  Noctes Atticae VII.5.1.
163  Several translations are possible. According to Heumann & Seckel 1907 (reprint 1958), p. 
577, s.v. tabernarius,  tabernarius can mean (a) Besitzer einer Kaufbude, Krämer, or (b) Schankwirt.
164 Interesting is H. Brenkman, Apparatus on D. 9.2, note semita (c) ad D. 9.2.52.1 (edn. 
Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 300). Apparently, according to Brenkman, one has to consider 
the street as a rather narrow one, a half-road. He referred to Varro, De lingua Latina, V.35, who 
mentions that narrow streets were called semita, a ‘ by-path’, or a semiter, a ‘half-road’ (see also 
the English translation by Kent 1938, p. 33).
165 Spruit 1995, p. 250. On taberna, see also VIR V, p. 933; Schneider 1932, col. 1863ff.; 
Wagner, 1982, p. 391ff.; Wacke 1989, p. 485.
166 Spruit 1995, p. 251; for further reasons, refer to this article, esp. p. 251-252.
167  See, e.g., C. 5.27.1pr.
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ranks of Roman society and to the infames personae.168 The translation as 
innkeeper does make more sense, as the lantern would be especially relevant 
in that case: at night, the visibility of an inn would be important to attrack 
potential customers.169
Some scholars assume that the passer-by did not have the intention to steal.170 
Those scholars suggest that the passer-by, to some extent, was just a little 
drunk.171 So, a drunken prank172 or a case of practical jest is suggested and even a 
simple ‘borrowing’ of the lantern (assuming the innkeeper would not mind),173 
or at any rate an act not constituting theft.174 In addition, secondary literature 
mentions that such an assumption has to be made, otherwise a problem would 
arise as regards the provision of the Twelve Tables on the fur nocturnus.175 If 
the tabernarius caught the thief in the act at night, he was allowed to kill him 
immediately. The fact that the passer-by started to use a weapon (a whip) only 
made it even more imperative to kill him. Because of the large possibility to 
do justice by his own hands, there would have been no reason to argue about 
the less serious injuries inflicted on the thief.176 However, in the meantime, 
the introduction of the actio furti manifesti by the praetors had put an end 
168 See also literary sources such as Cicero, In Catilinam IV.17; Pro Flacco 18; for further 
sources, see Spruit 1995, p. 251. In this article, a sociological interpretation is given of D. 9.2.52.1 
in which the social position of the persons and the (social) relations between the persons 
involved are used to interpret D. 9.2.52.1.
169 Although this also – in principle –  applies to shops, it seems less likely that shops were 
open at night.
170  A different conclusion could be made based on the text of the Basilica B. 60.3.51. The 
content of the text of the Basilica is mainly identical to the fragment in the Digest, in D. 9.2.52.1 
(except for the part that a part of Alfenus’ argumentation is missing in B. 60.3.51). The fragment 
from the Basilica is more explicit, in the sense that it mentions the verb ὑπέκλεψε instead of 
sustulerat in D. 9.2.52.1. Thereby, it explicitly states that the case concerns a passer-by who stole 
a lantern.
171  Spruit 1995, p. 247.
172  Watson 1984, p. 239; Travis Laster 1996, p. 217ff.
173  Lawson 1968, p. 131; as Travis Laster 1996, p. 217 and Hausmaninger 1996b, p. 248 nt 71 
rightly sate, this is disproved by his refusal to return it.
174  MacCormack 1975, p. 46; - According to Huvelin 1912, p. 571, the case did not give 
a hypothesis of theft because ‘anciennement la soustraction ne rentrait pas dans la notion 
technique du furtum’; differently De Castillo Santana 1994, p. 52f., who argues that the verb 
residere indicates that there was a reference to theft in the fragment. The compilers would have 
deleted it to make it fit into the sedes materiae of the lex Aquilia.
175  See Lex XII Tabularum 8.12; 8.13; Ulp. Coll. 7.3.2; Ulp. D. 4.2.7.1; Gai. D. 47.2.55.2; Noctes 
Atticae XI.18. 6-8; Kaser 1972, p. 158 nt. 34; Spruit 1995, p. 247; on these matters also, Huvelin 1912, 
p. 569ff.; Del Portillo 1983, p. 163f.; Roth 1999, p. 105f.
176  Spruit 1995, p. 253;- According to Hausmaninger 1996b, p. 247, the dolo  (Hausmaninger 
wished to emendate dolor into dolo), i.e. a dagger or a spike, which was inserted into a stick, was 
probably only stressed by the tabernarius in order to dramatise the danger threatening him; for 
the rest it did not really play a role in the discussion/dispute.
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to the archaic forms of permissible self-redress in theft,177 and, therefore, it is 
questionable whether such competence still existed. A second reason why one 
states that the passer-by could not be qualified as a thief is that it is not at all 
clear why the owner of the thief should ever have been allowed an Aquilian 
action in respect of an injury received in the course of a struggle with the 
innkeeper.178 Taking into consideration that the lantern probably was a very 
common thing of relatively low value, knocking out an eye was more serious 
than taking away a cheap lantern. In that case, the reaction of the innkeeper 
knocking out an eye is disproportionate,179 and would not be allowed.
Clearly, Alfenus was consulted by the innkeeper.180 The innkeeper asked 
whether the damage in this particular case had (not) unlawfully been inflicted. 
The fact that the passer-by took the lantern was not in question, but just the 
fight.181 The innkeeper thought (and hoped) that his action would not be seen 
as unlawful (iniuria),182 and he would not be at fault (culpa) because of the fact 
that he was hit first by the passer-by and only defended himself. Therefore, 
the theft was not the central problem, but only the knocking out of the eye. 
 Which specific actio was applicable in this case Alfenus does not tell us 
explicitly. However, because of the phrase damnum iniuria non videtur dedisse, 
it probably concerned the actio legis Aquiliae based on the third chapter of the 
lex Aquilia, and not – as has also been defended – the actio iniuriarum.183 
177  Zimmermann 1996, p. 938, and see also already Kaser 1971, p. 616.
178  MacCormack 1975, p. 46.
179  Spruit 1995, p. 253; see p. 257ff. for the reason why it was the tabernarius who consulted 
the jurist; Cannata 1971, p. 71, considers the lantern to be a neutral object of public use.
180 Maybe the responsum is already of S. Sulpicius Rufus. One says that the form Respondi 
does not with certainty mean that it concerns a reply of Alfenus; on this topic, see Sanio 1858, p. 
73ff.; Huvelin 1912, p. 562 nt.1; Schulz 1961, p. 108f., 255; Watson 1984, p. 240; Del Castillo Santana 
1994, p. 52. 
181  As appears from these facts, in particular from the beating with this whip, a rather big 
fight originated, i.e. a real fight, not confined to an argument but the quarrellers came to blows. 
In the same sense already G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. XIX, p. 143 (and also H. 
Brenkman, Apparatus on D. 9.2, note rixa (d) ad D. 9.2.52.1 (edn. Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 
301), who shares Noodt’s view on this point). Noodt mentioned some literary sources interesting 
in this respect. An almost similar case was mentioned by Suetonius in his commentary on the 
life of Nero; see Suetonius, Nero, XXVI.2, who stated that in quarrels there was often danger to 
life and limb for Nero, since in one case he was almost beaten to death by a man of the senatorial 
order, whose wife he had touched. That the fight must be interpreted in this way is also confirmed 
by the use of the word rixa by Juvenalis, Satires, III.287 and Tacitus, Historiae, I.64, in which they 
used the word rixa (brawl) in the same meaning.
182  In other words: has he inflicted unlawful damage at all? (cf. Von Lübtow 1971, p. 107: ob 
er überhaupt widerrechtlich Schaden zugefügt habe).
183  See Huvelin 1912, p. 565ff. who interprets the fragment from the perspective of the 
actio iniuriarum; this possibility is also suggested by Lawson 1968, p. 131, namely, that this was a 
case of iniuria, wedged in between cases of damnum; on this possibility, see also Pugsley 1968, p. 
383 (nt. 50) and Krampe 2002, p. 137.
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Although Alfenus does not further specify the person of the passer-by, in 
particular did not say whether he was a slave, modern scholars often assume 
he was.184 In fact, it seems that we have to assume that the injured person 
was a slave185 or a son under paternal control (filius familias) because it is not 
plausible that (the pre-classical) Alfenus would allow an Aquilian action to 
a free person sui iuris for physical injuries suffered.186 Otherwise, this would 
be evidence of an actio utilis for negligent injury to a freeman as early as in 
the Republic. That Alfenus pronounced upon granting such an actio utilis187 is 
not likely, since there are hardly any traces to justify such a possibility in the 
Digest, apart from the two exceptional late-classical cases of the liber homo 
bona fide serviens (Ulp. D. 9.2.13pr.; application by analogy188) and the case of 
the apprentice of the shoemaker (Ulp. D. 9.2.5.3).189 
 
The reply of Alfenus
Before pursuing the legal interpretation of this text, it is appropriate to focus 
more closely on the structure of this responsum of Alfenus. The master of 
the injured passer-by (assuming that the passer-by was a slave – as discussed 
above) brought a lawsuit against the innkeeper. The innkeeper asked Alfenus 
about the lawfulness of his act. The jurist gave a twofold answer. 1) He answered 
that the damage was not inflicted unlawfully, unless the innkeeper knocked 
out the eye intentionally,190 because the culpa did not lie on his side but on the 
person who first struck with the whip (i.e. the passer-by).191 2) If the innkeeper 
184  cf. Mommsen 1955, p. 830 nt. 7; Von Lübtow 1971, p. 107, 120, even presumed that the 
text had been changed and that Alfenus originally wrote servus praeteriens instead of quidam 
praeteriens (an interpolation).
185  Also Wieacker 1975, p. 357; Roth 1999, p. 104. Spruit 1995, p. 254f. believes that to 
contemporaries of Alfenus it was clear that the case was about a slave, also because there was no 
extension of the lex Aquilia to freemen in the time of Alfenus.
186  MacCormack 1975, p. 47; Roth 1999, p. 104; differently Del Portillo 1983, p. 163f.
187  See Huvelin 1912, p. 565f.; also Ulp. D. 9.2.5.3; differently Del Portillo 1983, p. 161ff.; - On 
this topic also Wittman 1972, esp. p. 98ff.
188  A freeman, who did not know his status and served in good faith as someone else’s 
slave, had been injured. The reason, therefore, probably was that since this person until then 
had been treated as a slave, it would have been inequitable to withhold from him the specific 
protection accorded to a slave; see Wittmann 1972, p. 104; Zimmermann 1996, p. 1017.
189  On this text, see, e.g., Del Portillo 1983, p. 160ff.
190 On the words data opera, see, e.g., Schipani 1969, p. 172f.
191  Also the phrase culpam enim penes eum … residere was suspected as being an 
interpolation; see Albertario 1923, p. 506 (nt. 4); differently Rodriguez-Ennes 1984, p. 93, who 
argued that this statement must be understood in such a way that the action must be brought 
against a person whose authorship is presumed, in the case of D. 9.2.52.1, because he was the one 
who first hit with the whip; Rotondi 1922, p. 489 criticised the meaning of residere as ‘to remain, 
to stay’, based on VIR V, col. 167. In the Vocabularium, one can see the unique use of residere, 
because D. 9.2.52.1 is the only case in which residere means neither to reside physically nor to 
remain, stay (dotem apud maritum, peculium); differently Huvelin 1912, p. 564 and Schipani 1969, 
p. 174. Also the reference to culpa in this phrase is suspected of being spurious. See Albertario 
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had started the fight himself when trying to get the lantern back, he would have 
been at fault (culpa) and would, therefore, be liable for the damage. 
Alfenus thus drew distinctions. It has been suggested that they are only hypo-
thetical variations, which had nothing to do with legal practice and which were 
particularly well suited to explain difficult legal problems to law students.192 For 
such didactical purposes, however, no direct proof can be found in any other 
source. Furthermore, such a clear (implied) distinction between responsa col-
lected for use in legal practice and responsa collected for didactical purposes 
was never made in the time of Alfenus.193
Other authors consider this second part of Alfenus’ reply (sed si … factum vi-
deri) an interpolation.194 This last sentence would be redundant and could be 
deleted without altering the sense of the decision.195 Besides, this phrase would 
solve a question the tabernarius had not asked because of the presumption that 
not the innkeeper but the adversary of the tabernarius had given the first blow 
(ille flagello … tabernarium coeperat). Alfenus had to give an answer assuming 
that it was the passer-by who struck the first blow and not the tabernarius. 
Why, then, contemplate the inverse case, as if the tabernarius was the one who 
had taken the offensive?196
In my opinion, it is possible that this second part is not a hypothetical variation, 
but reflects an argument in favour of the passer-by assuming a different set 
of facts. Probably the passer-by argued that the facts were not as stated by 
the innkeeper and that it was not he, but the innkeeper who struck first and 
started the fight.197 Alfenus replied to the defence of the passer-by (that it was 
the innkeeper who started fighting) by stating that if this indeed had been the 
1936, p. 87 nt. 1; Beinart 1953, p. 287 nt. 37; differently De Sarlo 1940, p. 124ff.; Visky 1949, p. 451ff.; 
MacCormack 1974, p. 223f.; Schipani 1969, p. 168ff.; Watson 1984, p. 239; Pugsley 1970, p. 427 
suggests that the facts stated by Alfenus were used by the compilers ‘as a peg on which to hang a 
discussion of their own’.
192  Roth 1999, p. 102ff., 203.
193  See Tellegen-Couperus 2001, p. 384, a responsum could be used as an argument in 
pleading a case as well as used as a decision for teaching purposes.
194 Huvelin 1912, p. 563; Riccobono 1913, p. 76 nt. 3; see also Lawson 1968, p. 130f.; 
Taubenschlag 1925, col. 2326f. and 2327: ‘die Unterwerfung des damnum iniuria datum unter die 
Allgemeine Kategorie von der culpa ist erst ein Werk byzanistischen Jurisprudenz’ (see, e.g., the 
interpolation in D. 9.2.52.1; see Rotondi 1922, p. 486, and also Bonfante 1946, p. 524); differently 
Roth 1999, p. 107.
195  Accordingly, Huvelin 1912, p. 563.
196 Therefore, this part of the decision should not belong to the original part of the 
responsum of Alfenus. See Huvelin 1912, p. 563; Del Portillo 1983, p. 160.
197  Tellegen-Couperus 2001, p. 384; the author adds another possibility, namely, that such 
‘variations’ may also be arguments Alfenus used in order to make his decision more convincing.
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case, the innkeeper would have been liable. The outcome was not yet clarified 
and had to be assessed by the judge (iudex). So Alfenus argues both ways: 
firstly, according to the facts presented by the innkeeper and, secondly, as an 
alternative, according to the facts presented by the passer-by.198
Another remarkable part of Alfenus’ reply is the phrase nisi data opera effodisset 
oculum. Possibly, these words were not included in the original responsum; they 
may have been added by the compilers,199 perhaps in order to give the phrase 
a broader meaning. They are part of the answer to num damnum … percussus 
esset. The response, including the phrase nisi data opera effodisset oculum, 
however, would not represent a logical answer to the question whether the 
damage could be considered unlawful given the fact that the tabernarius was 
hit first by the passer-by. Besides, (only) based on the information of Alfenus, it 
is impossible to say whether the knocking out of the eye was done intentionally. 
Moreover, according to Huvelin (1873–1924),200 restrictive propositions in 
the Digest starting with nisi are often interpolated.201 Obviously, however, in 
Huvelin’s time  passages were more often and more easily suspected of being 
interpolated than today. 
It would be too simple to state that all passages starting with nisi are inter-
polated. Also in this case this seems to go too far, since there are no solid 
arguments for assuming such an interpolation. Possibly the contrast between 
such a restriction and the rest of the responsum is an argument in favour of 
a later addition. While nisi … oculum provokes the problem of the delictual 
intention, the rest of the text only concerns the priority of the aggression.202 
At first sight, given the fact that Roman jurists did not write scholarly treatises, 
it does not seem plausible that num damnum … percussus esset was originally 
part of the text. It is not necessary to provide an answer to the question posed 
by the tabernarius. Below, however, it will be argued that this addition was in 
fact necessary. When answering the question whether the tabernarius was at 
fault (culpa), Alfenus made use of an argumentum ab initio incremento summa, 
but he added a restriction that applied for the case in which the tabernarius 
acted intentionally.203
198  Also Krampe 2002, p. 139.
199 Huvelin 1912, p. 564; Del Portillo 1983, p. 160; differently De Castillo Santana 1994, p. 53f.
200 P. Huvelin was a professor at the Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Lyon.
201 Eisele 1899, p. 296ff.; Huvelin 1912, p. 564; Appleton 1967, p. 52ff., 265ff. 
202 Huvelin 1912, p. 564 nt. 3; Del Portillo 1983, p. 160.
203 Also Spruit 1995, p. 260 argues that the passage has to be seen as a restriction, namely, 
to the priority of the aggression as criterion to determine the culpa.
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Various interpretations of D. 9.2.52.1: Introduction
Before explaining my new theory, various interpretations of the meaning of 
D. 9.2.52.1 have to be discussed. When examining Digest texts in which the 
actio legis Aquiliae played a role, it is important to avoid interpretations of Ro-
man law from a perspective determined by later developments (anachronistic 
interpretation). A requirement to succesfully apply for an actio legis Aquiliae 
(for damnum iniuria datum) was that the damnum had to be caused iniuria. 
With damnum in the third chapter of the lex Aquilia the loss inflicted on the 
victim of the delictual act is meant. It is often assumed that damnum refers to 
the actual damage done to the object concerned, in this case the knocked-out 
eye. However, it seems more precise to argue that damnum refers to the loss 
caused to the owner.204
The damnum had to be caused iniuria. Unfortunately, the meaning of iniuria 
is very complex,205 as is also the relation between iniuria and culpa.206 The 
majority view considers the concept of iniuria as evolving over time.207 Iniuria 
had the generic and most probably earlier meaning of unlawfulness (non iure), 
without justification.208 In relation to the lex Aquilia it can also mean culpa.209 
The concept of culpa had a gradual influence, in time, on the concept iniuria. 
Eventually, culpa ousted the earlier concept to a certain degree, so that aspects 
of iniuria in many cases just became a ‘pleading device’ (the formula included 
the word iniuria so the jurists had to do this); it was, however, never completely 
suppressed, but rather submerged. Jurists thought more in terms of culpa and 
204 See Daube 1948, esp. p. 98ff.
205 Recently, on the meaning of iniuria in the lex Aquilia, Paschalidis 2008, p. 321ff. and on 
the meaning of iniuria and culpa in the lex Aquilia, Corbino 2009b, p. 77ff., Cursi 2010, p. 45ff., 59ff.
206 On this topic also Paschalidis 2008, p. 322ff.
207 On this view, see Travis Laster 1996, p. 195ff. A minority view (mainly defended by 
MacCormack) argues that iniuria always meant acting wrongfully in the general sense (‘what is 
not right’ in the positive sense of what is wrong), and that the terms dolus and culpa appeared 
merely to satisfy a semantic need for flexible terminology; see Travis Laster 1996, p. 195, 199f.; see 
also MacCormack 1981, p. 122f., 126.
208 According to De Robertis 2000, p. 91, during the Republic, iniuria indeed meant ‘quod 
non iure fit’. See also Travis Laster 1996, p. 194ff., who argued that by the late Republic jurists were 
focusing on the concepts of dolus and culpa.
209 Beinart 1953, p. 281; - According to Parisi 1992, p. 60f., at a later stage, iniuria datum 
came to be interpreted as being given with culpa or dolus. He argued that, at this time, the notion 
of the individual’s culpability was thus gradually added to the objective notion of iniuria as the 
basis of liability. Differently Pugsley 1982, p. 12, who argues that in D. 9.2.52.1 culpa is not said 
to be an interpretation of iniuria or to ground liability under the statute. According to Alfenus, 
statutory liability has been excluded except in cases of intentional wrongdoing. Culpa, therefore, 
must refer to an independent liability, the praetorian actio in factum. Alfenus thereby would 
have made a distinction between statutory liability for iniuria for intentional wrongdoing and 
praetorian liability for culpa. See also Ziliotto 2000, p. 37 nt. 5.
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dolus, even in the realm of what, strictly speaking, was unlawfulness.210 Also in 
D. 9.2.52.1 Alfenus seems to interpret iniuria in the sense of culpa, and made 
culpa (in the sense of fault) the basis of the test whether the innkeeper would 
be liable, determining the culpa by examining the circumstances of the case. 
In that respect it is important to remember the penal character of the lex 
Aquilia in classical Roman law. Because of the penal character,211 and because 
of the wording of the actio legis Aquiliae,212 the only question was whether 
the defendant had to be punished or not. That is the central question, as it 
concerned a poena.
Various interpretations of D. 9.2.52.1: self-defence
In secondary literature, there are roughly two theories in which an attempt is 
made to explain Alfenus’ responsum. Some authors interpret the text in such a 
way that the tabernarius invoked in his defence that he had legitimately acted 
in self-defence.213 Due to the act of self-defence, there would be no iniuria (in 
the sense of acting non iure), since the wrongfulness disappears.214 In that 
case the act is justified by a preceding, unjust act of aggression.215 However, 
210 Beinart 1953, p. 285.
211  See, e.g., Wallinga 2009, p. 1386f., who reminds us of the fact that it was only since the 
medieval theory of restitution from moral theology that it became more obvious that someone 
who suffered damage may bring a claim against the culpable causer.
212  Recently, on the delictual origin, penal nature and the reipersecutory object of the actio 
damni iniuriae legis Aquiliae, see Sirks 2009, p. 303ff., and on the character of the actio legis Aquiliae, 
Ankum 1987–1988, p. 3ff. (reprint 2007, p. 99ff.); Wallinga 2009, p. 1385ff.; see also Cursi 2010, p. 67ff.
213  See, e.g., Grüber 1886, p. 170; Ruhm 1898, p. 27; Von Leyden 1902, p. 28; Van Nierop 1905, 
p. 5f; Coppa-Zuccari 1909, p. 30f.; Tassin 1912, p. 37f.; Garraud 1912, p. 327ff.; Rossi Masella 1951, p. 
191; Hausmaninger 1996b, p. 248; Jansen 2004, p. 122; 2009, p. 236f.; Corbino 2008, p. 162f.; or on 
the possibility of an excess of self-defence, see Wacke 1989, p. 484ff. (Notwehrexcess); De Robertis 
2000, p. 91: eccesso di reazione (e quindi esorbitante dai limiti del proprio diritto); Castresana 
2001, p. 69f. also interesting is the view of Cannata who argued that the tabernarius had a causa 
giustificazione until the first outbreak of the brawl. If he had hit the fugitive intentionally, he 
would have no justification, just as in the case when he was not hit first, but, because he wanted 
the lantern back, started a fight; see Cannata 1995, p. 39, and Ziliotto 2000, p. 40f. nt. 13.
214  Demelius 1861, p. 61; Levison 1891, p. 43; Plog 1896, p. 59; Mommsen 1955, p. 78, p. 621 
nt. 1, p. 830 nt. 7. So the tabernarius is a priori not liable; so there could be no compensation of 
the acts or of the culpae of the parties at all; also Van Nierop 1905, p. 6.
215  Interesting is BS 3163/3-5 (scholion 2 ad B. 60.3.51), where the final (Greek) phrase of 
60.3.51.1 (But if the tabernarius had not been hit first, but wishing to take the lantern back gave 
rise to a scuffle, he would have been held liable under the lex Aquilia), is interpreted as follows. 
According to this scholion, it is lawful to repel violence with violence, as in D. 9.2.45.4. Here, the 
other person had not used violence on the tabernarius, but <only> took the lantern. Besides, it is 
permitted to him, to whom violence occurs, to protect himself against a beating, acting without 
the reason of revenge (apparently revenge would have been the case if the tabernarius had not 
been hit first, but wishing to take the lantern back initiated a scuffle). No such explanation is 
given in the text of a Byzantine work of the 10th century, a text of the Epitome legum 42.34, where 
it is only stated that the person who started the fight (who first hit the other) and suffered loss as 
a result of that (because the other hit him back quite hard) cannot take legal action; in Zachariae 
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no foundation for this theory can be found in the text,216 nor is there any refer-
ence to any compulsion. Moreover, it is not necessary to consider the question 
of self-defence217 (as ground for exclusion of iniuria) because Alfenus ends 
with the question of culpa: did the innkeeper act culpably? This question is 
answered negatively, and since there was no culpa, the innkeeper did not act 
with iniuria. Therefore, the question whether his act was justified does not 
have to be dealt with. 
Various interpretations of D. 9.2.52.1: culpae compensatio
Other authors consider D. 9.2.52.1 as an example of the idea of culpae com-
pensatio.218 The rixa is provoked by the passer-by, i.e. by a hit, and in doing 
so, the passer-by acted culpably (with culpa). The negligence (culpa) of the 
tabernarius in knocking out the eye is compensated by this negligence (culpa) 
of the passer-by. However, when reading the text it is clear that there is no 
separate treatment of the culpability of the actions of both persons. Alfenus 
is not discussing any reciprocity of faults, and this was even impossible due to 
the formulary procedure. Only the culpa of the wrongdoer was relevant to be 
granted an actio based on the third chapter of the lex Aquilia.219 Alfenus seems 
 
von Lingenthal’s edition of the Epitome legum a reference is made to D. 9.2.52.1.
216 In the same sense Pernice 1895, p. 98 nt. 3; Aumann 1964, p. 8; Jansen 2004, p. 122; 
2009, p. 237, argues that in the case where the innkeeper first hit the passer-by, the means 
(hitting someone leading to the loss of an eye) was not in proportion to the purpose (preventing 
damage to a relatively cheap object), and hitting was not the most appropriate means to achieve 
his goal; therefore, he would have acted with culpa. However, there is no textual basis for this 
interpretation. Furthermore, Jansen argued that in the event that damage occurred, the thief 
would not be free from responsability (because he took the lantern). This vision also seems to 
lack textual basis. Therefore, a set-off/balancing of respective negligent acts of two parties is not 
at stake. This will be discussed below.
217  See also Spruit 1995, p. 257; differently Van Warmelo 1967, p. 14; Wacke 1988, p. 530ff.; 
Travis Laster 1996, p. 218, called D. 9.2.52.1 an example of different social norms. Roman jurists 
appear to have accepted inebriation as an excuse for deviant behaviour, and they supported the 
immediate resort to a forceful self-help remedy. Because these examples of conduct were not 
blameworthy, the jurist could focus on the fight. This interpretation seems to read too much into 
the source.
218  Pernice 1867, p. 58-64; 1895, p. 98; Bekker 1871, p. 172f. nt. 14; Levison 1891, p. 41ff.; Rossi 
Masella 1951, p. 190; Von Lübtow 1971, p. 108, 136; Lawson 1968, p. 54; differently Von Leyden 1902, 
p. 28; Thayer 1929, p. 115f.
219  Also Spruit 1995, p. 256, argues that one does not have to argue in terms of culpae 
compensatio in this text. Such culpae compensatio was not possible in the formula procedure: 
the iudex had to condemn or absolve (tertium non datur); - Also Fried 1960, p. 148, who argues 
that the conclusion of culpa negligence is the last stage in injury for the Roman lawyer, and the 
application of the term is itself the verdict of guilty. Fried argues that it is absurd to speak of a 
culpa-compensation: there cannot be culpa in both parties because the notion of culpa refers to 
the legal imputability of blame, which by its nature can only attach to the defendant, if at all; - 
The formula of the actio legis Aquiliae is, however, not passed on to us. Recently, on the formula 
of the actio legis Aquiliae, see Nörr 2009, p. 833ff.
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to have discussed this case as a whole, in which he constructed just one fault, 
i.e. the fault of the person who first hit the other.220
 
A new perspective on D. 9.2.52.1
Because these two, rather technical theories about the responsum of Alfenus 
are quite unsatisfactory, in order to correctly explain Alfenus’ answer a totally 
different approach has to be chosen. Alfenus answered the question of iniuria 
by discussing the requirement of culpa. The requirement of culpa has to be 
considered by looking at the circumstances of the case. Apparently, the facts 
are not sufficient to provide a clear answer as to how the tabernarius knocked 
out the eye with the whip. Therefore, the case was decided by means of another 
criterion, namely, a criterion originating from Greek law: who struck first?221 
Applied to this case this means that the tabernarius acted without culpa because 
he was not the person who struck first. A remarkable similarity can be noted here 
with a fragment from rhetoric, namely, Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, V.10.71-
72. In Roman times there was a close connection between rhetoric, on the one 
hand, and law and politics, on the other hand.222 Roman jurists were acquainted 
with rhetoric, it belonged to their education, and, therefore, knowledge about 
argumentation figures can be assumed. Rhetoric can, therefore, be used as an 
auxiliary resource to interpret this fragment by Alfenus.
Whenever a legal problem allowed more than one plausible interpretation, the 
jurist had to substantiate his decision persuasively. In rhetoric, the method for 
searching for true (or probable) arguments that make a case credible is called 
inventio.223 Thereby, it is essential to study the places of arguments (topoi, 
220 Huvelin 1912, p. 567f.; according to Paschalidis 2008, p. 350, only if the thief had 
been at fault would the fault of the tabernarius not matter. And this, according to Paschalidis, 
is in tune with the lack of a doctrine of contributory negligence in Roman law. Furthermore, 
Paschalidis (2008, p. 350f.), interpreting D. 9.2.52.1 in Aristotelian terms, argued that the poking 
out of the eye was an unjust act, but that, nevertheless, no injustice was committed against the 
lantern thief. The two acts (taking away the lantern and striking the tabernarius with a whip), 
per se unjust, created a situation in which the tabernarius reacted and poked out the eye of the 
passer-by. The incident would not have taken place if it was not the passer-by’s intention to fight, 
and thus, the incident was due to the own culpa of the passer-by. Paschialidis on p. 351 note 
176, explains that the word culpa is not meant as negligence but as culpa in the meaning of the 
phrase ‘Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa!’ (Missale Romanum). This remark could be 
interesting, but is, in my opinion, not understandable without further explanation.
221  There are traces from Greek law, and from the Tetralogies of Antiphon in D. 9.2.52.1; 
see also Wollschläger 1976, p. 129f.; Castresana 2001, p. 75; - The killing of the person who struck 
first was without penalty already since the law of Drakon (see Sylloge I nr. 111, 33 in Dittenberger 
1915, p. 150), which can be reconstructed to that extent after Antiphon, Tetralogiae III.2.6; III.3.2; 
III.4.2 & 4 and after Plato, Leges 869C; Dittenberger 1915, n. 17; Ruschenbusch 1960, p. 150; Latte 
1968, p. 289; Maschke 1979, 78ff.
222 See also Tellegen-Couperus 2003b, p. 12ff.
223 Saiz Noeda 2003, p. 97.
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loci). The status theory of Hermagoras of Temnos (second century BC)224 is 
important in this perspective because the theory of status has a central place in 
the search for arguments. The status theory of Quintilianus (and also of Cicero) 
is probably based on that of Hermagoras.225 This is a method to determine what 
is at issue in a case that results from rhetorical arguments. The term status 
refers to the nature of the quaestio that results from the confrontation between 
claim and defence.226 As the claim always has the same factual character, the 
status is determined by the changing contents of the defence. When a jurist 
had determined which status was at stake, he could find arguments for his 
point of view by consulting lists of topoi that were specifically relevant for 
the specific status.227 For a jurist to substantiate his decision persuasively, 
rhetoric and more specifically the topoi (or loci) were apposite methodological 
tools.228 In that respect Quintilianus is relevant. Marcus Fabius Quintilianus 
(first century AD) was an orator who wrote the Institutionis oratoriae libri XII 
(published in 94 or 95 AD).229 These twelve books on the education of the 
orator contain a full and systematic survey of the rhetorical insights that had 
been developed in the previous centuries, i.e. of the rhetorical system.230 In 
his Institutio Oratoria, as the work is generally called, he uses examples from 
practice to unfold his (rhetorical) theory. In this context the fifth book on the 
discovery of arguments is relevant (see below).
Firstly, Alfenus had to determine the status of the conflict. What was the quaestio 
resulting from the confrontation between the views of the plaintiff and the 
defendant? The master of the passer-by was of the opinion that the innkeeper 
unlawfully inflicted damage to his slave and because of that brought an actio 
legis Aquiliae against the innkeeper. The innkeeper denied that his act could be 
considered to have been performed with iniuria. The resulting quaestio is: did 
the innkeeper inflict damage with iniuria? The applicable status (according to 
the status theory of Hermagoras) is the status qualitatis because the case did not 
concern a dispute about the facts (the knocking out of the eye), nor a definition 
of the act, but about the quality: was the act unlawful? Thereafter, Alfenus would 
have looked at which topoi were specifically relevant for the status qualitatis. He 
could use these topoi to find arguments in support of the position of the person 
224 See, e.g., Leeman & Braet 1987, p. 76ff.; Wieacker 1988, I, p. 669ff.
225 See Cicero, Topica, 21.82; Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, III.5.10.
226 Leesen 2009, p. 35.
227 See Leesen 2006, p. 275, also Tellegen-Couperus & Tellegen 2006, p. 384.
228 Also Leesen 2009, p. 28; see also p. 38f., where she referred to Cicero, Topica, 17.66 and 
17.65, which texts confirm that jurists were acquainted with rhetoric and topoi.
229 On Quintilianus and his Institutio Oratoria, see, e.g., Tellegen-Couperus 2003b, p. 11ff., 17ff.
230 Tellegen-Couperus 2003b, p. 11.
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who consulted him, the innkeeper.231 He found an argument in the gradual 
development of events in three moments: from a start, through an escalation, to 
a climax (argumentum ab initio incremento summa). This argument is described 
in Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, V.10.71-72:232 
Ut sunt autem tria tempora, ita ordo rerum tribus momentis consertus est: habent 
enim omnia <initium>, incrementum, summam, ut iurgium, deinde <rixa, tum> 
caedes. Est ergo hic argumentorum quoque locus invicem probantium; nam et ex 
initiis summa colligitur, quale est: ‘non possum togam praetextam sperare cum ex-
ordium pullum videam’, et contra: ‘non dominationis causa Sullam arma sumpsisse, 
argumentum est dictatura deposita.’ Similiter ex incremento in utramque partem 
ducitur ratio cum in coniectura, tum etiam in tractatu aequitatis, an ad initium 
summa referenda sit, id est, an ei caedes inputanda sit a quo iurgium coepet.
Just as there are three divisions of Time, so the order of events is made up of 
three stages: everything has <a beginning,> a development, and a culmination: 
quarrel, then <brawl, then> murder. So here too is a Place for Arguments which 
support one another. (1) The culmination may be inferred from the beginning: 
‘I cannot hope for the toga with a purple edge when I see the weave begins so 
drab.’ (2) The other way around: ‘Sulla’s resigning the dictatorship is a proof that 
he did not take up arms to set up a tyranny.’ (3) We can similarly argue forwards 
or backwards from the development stage both in Conjecture and in questions 
of Equity: should the culmination be referred to the beginning, that is, should the 
murder be set to the account of the man who started the quarrel?233
Quintilian(us) uses this status theory in Institutio Oratoria V.10.71-72 and also 
Alfenus could have been guided by this doctrine (in D. 9.2.52.1). In both cases 
the status qualitatis was relevant. The last sentence in the text of Quintilian 
is extremely relevant in this context. Alfenus constructed his argumentation 
in a similar manner as Quintilian. The ordering of events by Alfenus is the 
same: beginning, culmination and climax. In Quintilian’s fragment there was a 
quarrel, a brawl and then a murder; in Alfenus’ text one reads that the passer-by 
hits the innkeeper, then the fight (rixa), and subsequently the knocking out 
of an eye of the passer-by. Such an orderly and gradual unfolding of events 
in three stages plays a main role in the finding of arguments that support 
each other.234 From the development stage one can argue both forwards and 
231  It was not uncommon for a jurist to give advice that served the cause of the citizen who 
consulted him; see Cicero, De Oratore, I.239-240.
232 See also Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, V.10.94.
233 Text and translation from Russell 2001.
234 Saiz Noeda 2003, p. 109.
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backwards. Alfenus argued from the beginning to the end: the person who hit 
first had to be held responsible for the climax. Alfenus was of the opinion that, 
considering the circumstances of the case, among which particularly the fact 
that the passer-by had to be held responsible for his act (the start of the fight), 
no fault (culpa) could be attributed to the innkeeper and, therefore, he could 
not be considered to have inflicted damage unlawfully (iniuria).
This new perspective has the advantage that it does not use concepts from 
later legal doctrines (and thus is not anachronistic) but connects, maybe even 
better, and in any case more directly, to the sources. There was no technical 
theory at all behind the reply of Alfenus. The reply of Alfenus was one of a 
rhetorical nature. The question whether the tabernarius was at fault (culpa), 
was considered in the light of the status qualitatis and answered with the use of 
an argumentum ab initio incremento summa: in Alfenus’ opinion the culmination 
in this case should indeed be referred to the beginning. Accordingly, (according 
to the facts as presented by the tabernarius) the passer-by was the person 
who struck first and not the tabernarius. Therefore, the damnum could not be 
qualified as unlawful (iniuria) because the culpa rested with the person who 
struck first. Thus, the person who started the fight was negligent (culpa). The 
tabernarius did not start the fight, could not be accused of negligence (culpa), 
and as a consequence was not liable and would not have to pay a poena.
D. 9.2.52.1 in Justinian law
From the above discussion it appears that the Roman jurist did solve a situation 
which could be interpreted from a modern perspective as contributory 
negligence without knowing such a concept. This situation does not change 
for Justinian law. Nevertheless, some final remarks as regards the case of the 
innkeeper in Justinian law have to be made.235 Firstly, the discussion on the 
status of the person, whether the passer-by was a slave or a free man, lost 
its relevance.236 In Justinian law an actio legis Aquiliae utilis was generally 
applicable to injured free persons (D. 9.2.13pr.). Secondly, although the positioning 
of this text in title 9.2 confirms the applicability of the actio legis Aquiliae in D. 
9.2.52.1.237, there is a difference as regards the amount of money the wrongdoer had 
235 In Justinian law it is not self-evident that theories of Quintilian were meant to play 
a big role, so a dogmatic explanation of the compilation of Justinian is quite possible. Future 
investigation of the precise influence of the Institutio Oratoria seems necessary on this point.
236 Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 36 nt. 77, mentions the possibility that if Alfenus wrote servus, 
later someone, possibly Justinian, changed the word into quidam and by doing so made the case 
more general.
237 This is affirmed by the fact that this case, as well as the cases of the javelin thrower and 
barber can be found in the title about the lex Aquilia de damno in the Basilica.
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to pay. For the case in which a slave was injured, D. 9.2.27.5 was applicable, meaning 
that the wrongdoer had to pay what the slave was worth in the nearest thirty days. 
In the case where a free man was injured, however, D. 9.2.7pr. was applicable and 
the wrongdoer had to pay the father the amount of money corresponding to the 
value of the services of the son, which he lost because of the destruction of the 
son’s eye, as well as all expenses incurred for medical treatment. Thirdly, one could 
question whether D. 9.2.52.1 should be seen as an application of D. 50.17.203. This 
was probably not the case, as also appears from the scholia discussed above (see 
footnote 215), where the case of D. 9.2.52.1 was used in the discussion on self-
defence (this will also initially be the case with the Glossators; see next chapter).
2.4 Ulpian’s reply in the case of the javelin throwers
2.4.1 The text of D. 9.2.9.4
Ulpianus libro octavo decimo ad edictum
Sed si per lusum iaculantibus servus fuerit occisus, Aquiliae locus est: sed si cum 
alii in campo iacularentur, servus per eum locum transierit, Aquilia cessat, quia 
non debuit per campum iaculatorium iter intempestive facere. qui tamen data 
opera in eum iaculatus est, utique Aquilia tenebitur:
Unlike the littera Florentina, in certain manuscripts the word ‘a’ has been inserted 
before ‘iaculantibus’.238 With regard to classical Roman law, it is unnecessary to 
emend the original text of the littera Florentina. It is not evident that the changes 
were part of the original text. With regard to the remaining text of the fragment, 
an extensive discussion is not necessary.239
238 Ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 4450, fo. 93r, the ‘a’ is even connected to iaculantibus; also in 
Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Barb. lat. 1459, fo. 88r; Ms. Padova, Bibl. Univ. 941, fo. 88r, Ms. Leipzig, Univ. 
bibl. 873, fo. 76v; see also the vulgate edition with the Accursian gloss (in edn. of 1487, fo. 162v), 
where – furthermore – the word ‘et’ is inserted between the twice appearing words ‘sed’ and ‘si’. 
These two insertions (of the word ‘a’ and of the word ‘et’) were made neither in the vulgate edition 
cf. edn. of Kriegel 1844, p. 191, the Florentina (see fo. 148v of the facsimile edition of the Florentina) 
nor in the edition of Torelli (see edn. of 1553, I, p. 238). In the humanist edition of Haloander (edn. 
of 1550, fo. 1550r), not only did he make both insertions, but he even reformulated the first phrase 
in the following way: Sed et si a iaculantibus per lusum servus fuerit occisus.
239 With regard to the word ‘quia’, it can be noticed that the littera Florentina first contained 
the word iulia, but that a second hand corrected it to quia. See fo. 148v of the facsimile edition 
of the Florentina. Instead of ‘intempestive’, the reading ‘tempestive’ was followed by the orginal 
text of Ms. Padova, Bibl. Univ. 941, fo. 88r (however, later it was emended into intempestive). This 
reading can also be found in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1406, (fo. 80v, EvD). The manuscript 
contains the reading intempestive. However, after consulting the original manuscript, I have to 
conclude that the character ī was inserted at a later date, in a caroline hand, with a darker ink. 
Furthermore, Mommsen referred to the uncertain reading of Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4450 (fo. 93r, 
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2.4.2 Translation of D. 9.2.9.4
Ulpian in the eighteenth book of his commentary on the edict
But if a slave were killed while persons threw javelins in a game, there is a place 
for the [lex] Aquilia;240 but if when others were throwing javelins in a field241 
a slave crossed the field, the [lex] Aquilia is not applicable, because he ought 
not to have passed at an inopportune time through a field of javelin throwers. 
Nevertheless, the person who intentionally threw a javelin at him will, in any 
case, be held (liable) under the [lex] Aquilia. 
2.4.3 Inscriptio
The context of D. 9.2.9.4
This fragment is part of the eighteenth book of the commentary of Ulpian 
on the edict (of the praetor). Book eighteen was probably written during the 
sole reign of emperor Caracalla (211–217 AD).242 D. 9.2.9.4 is derived from the 
comment of Ulpian on the edict, which regarded the actio legis Aquiliae; an 
introduction to the lex Aquilia has already been provided in the preceding 
section. Since the fragment concerns the killing of a slave, the first chapter of 
the lex Aquilia is relevant.243 That this fragment originally concerned the lex 
Aquilia is endorsed by Lenel, who, in his Palingenesia, placed this fragment in 
book eighteen of Ulpian’s commentary on the edict, in the part dealing with 
the first chapter of the title Ad legem Aquiliam.244 The compilers of the Digest 
incorporated this fragment in the title Ad legem Aquiliam.245
EvD). Indeed, the space between iter and (in)tempestive is less than in other spaces; however, the 
size of the character (ĩ) is not smaller than the rest, and at first sight the handwriting does not 
seem different.
240 Of course the actio based on the lex Aquilia is meant (see also Watson, 1985, I, p. 280; 
Feenstra/Spruit in: Spruit et al. 1994, p. 715; Schipani 2005, p. 241). This is, however, not explicitly 
mentioned in the text, so it is not translated as such.
241  According to Heumann & Seckel 1907 (reprint 1958), p. 242, s.v. iaculatorius campus 
this was an ‘Übungsplatz für das Speerwerfen’; also Feenstra/Spruit in: Spruit et al. 1994, p. 715: 
‘oefenveld’; Otto, Schilling & Sintenis 1839 (reprint 1984), p. 792, just added the words [dazu 
bestimmten]; Schipani 2005, p. 241 translates: ‘in un campo di Marte’.
242 Honoré 2002, p. 176.
243 See Gai. D. 9.2.2pr.
244 Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, II, col. 523f., pal. nr. 614.
245 According to Mommsen, this fragment fell into disuse when a similar one, i.e. Inst. 
4.3.4, began to be read; see Mommsen & Krüger 1963a, I, p. 157 (‘interciderunt similia iis quae 
leguntur Inst. 4.3.4, talia fere: si miles, qui iaculis exercitatur in campo, ubi solent exercitari, 
transeuntem servum tuum traiecerit, nulla culpa eius intelligitur’); and it seems that Mommsen 
considered Inst. 4.3.4 as a need to give meaning to the phrase/the words (starting with) sed si 
cum alii. Mommsen & Krüger 1962 (editio maior), I, p. 280 (‘exciderunt similia iis quae leguntur 
Inst. 4.3.4, haec fere: si miles, qui iaculis exercitatur in campo, ubi solent exercitari, transeuntem 
servum tuum traiecerit, nulla culpa eius intellegitur: talia requirunt quae sequuntur verba sed et alii’). 
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Domitius Ulpianus
The fragment is written by the late-classical jurist Domitius Ulpianus (ca. 
170–223 AD).246 He originally came from Tyrus in Phoenicia,247 which area 
now belongs to Lebanon. Living in the same period as Paul and Papinian, he 
was probably born around the year 170 AD.248 Ulpian had an extensive politi-
cal career; among other functions we can mention: procurator a libellis, prae-
fectus annonae and praefectus praetorio. In 223 AD he was murdered by his 
own praetorian guard, during the reign of Alexander Severus (222–235). This 
emperor was very well-disposed towards him, in contrast to his predecessor 
the emperor Elagabalus (218–222): the latter even dismissed Ulpian from his 
function as praefectus praetorio; later Alexander Severus appointed Ulpian as 
praefectus annonae and reappointed him later in his function as praefectus 
praetorio.249 During the reign of Alexander Severus, Ulpian’s career reached 
its climax. Ulpian had tried to unite the  law into two large commentaries (on 
the ius civile and the ius honorarium). The results of his work were remarkable: 
83 books ad edictum, 51 books ad Sabinum, numerous monographs and two 
books of Responsa.250 Most likely he wrote the largest part of his extensive work 
during the reign of Caracalla (211–217) and the reign of Macrinus (217–218).251
2.4.4 Exegesis according to classical Roman law
Introduction: the case of D. 9.2.9.4
The facts of the following case are quite simple: persons are playing a game252 
of javelin throwing.253 Blunt spear heads were generally used for practice, 
especially for distance throws. For target practice sharp javelins were used.254 
Both pointed and blunt javelins were light objects. They were thrown by means 
246 See Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 245ff. On the person of Ulpian, see also Mayer-Maly 
1961 (RE 17), col. 567ff., Crifò 1976, p. 708-789; Liebs 1997b, p. 175-187; Zwalve 1998, p. 83-114; Liebs 
in: Kunkel-Liebs 2001, p. XIII and Honoré 2002, esp. p. 1-36.
247 Ulp. D. 50.15.1pr.
248 Honoré 2002, p. 14.
249 Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 246.
250 Tellegen-Couperus 2003a, p. 102.
251  Spruit 1994, p. 186.
252 Per lusum seems to be contrasted with in campo, and does mean that it was not a game 
in an official form. According to Monro 1898, p. 13, in campo probably implies military drill (cf. 
Inst. 4.3.4).
253 Zimmermann 1996, p. 1007, is speaking about a person who is throwing the javelin by 
way of sport (also Thayer 1929, p. 11; Wacke 1979, p. 275), but outside a proper sports field (he is 
held responsible under the lex Aquilia if he hits and kills a slave who happens to be passing by)
254 See Antiphon, Tetr. II.2, in which case a youth, who accidentally missed the mark, 
accidentally hit and killed another person; also Norman Gardiner 1907, p. 250. 
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of an amentum.255 The amentum was a leather thong, a foot or eighteen inches 
long (i.e. 30.48 cm. – 45.72 cm.). It was firmly bound around the shaft of the 
javelin, leaving a free loop of three or four inches long (i.e. 7.62 cm. – 10.16 
cm.), in which the thrower inserted his index finger, or his index and middle 
fingers.256 While the javelin throwers were practising with the javelins, a slave 
crossed the field and was killed by a javelin. The persons involved in the legal 
dispute are the javelin thrower and the master of the slave. 
One could wonder whether the field (campum) was a usual place designated 
for training and/or javelin throwing in the first centuries AD. Already the 
philologist Henricus Valesius (Henri Valois, 1603–1676) endorsed that once 
there were tombs outside the city of Edessa; soldiers, possibly trained by a 
commander, used to practise outside the city borders on a certain field used 
as a burial field.257 Hadrianus Valesius (1607–1692) also mentioned the field 
(campus) as a place where soldiers used to be trained in various exercises, and 
as a place to assemble soldiers. These fields were outside the city, in this case 
in the suburbs of Lutetia (now Paris), i.e. away from the insula (Île de la Cité) 
and on the other side of the bridges.258 Also the ‘Marsfield’ was a place for spear 
exercises.259 Apparently, the field lay outside the walls of the city.260 According 
to the Spanish legal humanist Ioannes Suárez de Mendoza (†1681),261 the field 
of the javelin throwers in D. 9.2.9.4 had to be a field designated for training with 
weapons, such as the Marsfield. Roman leaders used to train their recruits or 
(new) soldiers (tirones sive novi milites) in times of peace in the use of all kinds 
255 See also on this topic Harris 1979, p. 92ff.; Wacke 1977, p. 9; 1979, p. 275; 1991, p. 361; Knütel 
2001, p. 357. On the origin of the Roman use of the amentum, see Norman Gardiner 1907, p. 255ff.
256 Norman Gardiner 1907, p. 251; - The first purpose of the amentum was that it enabled the 
thrower to give a rotary motion to the javelin. This helped to keep its direction and increased its 
carry and penetrating power. Secondly, it served to mark the point at which the javelin was to be 
grasped. Finally, the amentum afforded a convenient handle; see Norman Gardiner 1907, p. 251f.
257 Henricus Valesius in commentary on Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae, XVIII.7, ad 
per Edessena sepulcra.  He referred to Artemidorus of Daldis, <Oneirocritica>, I.58; Libanius, 
πρεσβευτικῷ (Presbeutikos) [=Oratio XV.76; EvD]; Zosimus, Historia nova, IV<.54, lines 14-16, 
EvD>; Ennodius, Panegyricus Theoderico dictus, 19.
258 Valesius referred to Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae, XX.4.11f., XX.5.1, XX.9.6, XXI.2.1. 
259 Hadrianus Valesius in commentary on Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae, XX.4, ad 
omnes petivere Platium, who referred to Suetonius, Augustus, II.83 and the Historia miscella 
XVII.74. 
260 See also A.Schulting-N.Smallenburg, Notae ad Digesta seu Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.9.4.
261 On Ioannes/Juan Suárez de Mendoza see, e.g., Mesa 1951, p. 280ff.; according to 
Osler 1996, p. 349, when G. Noodt published his monograph on the Lex Aquilia in 1691, he was 
completely unaware of the existence of the humanist masterpiece published on the lex Aquilia 
by Suarez de Mendoza at Salamanca in 1640; Ioannes (Juan) Suárez de Mendoza’s Commentarius 
ad Legem Aquiliam was reprinted by Gerard Meerman in his Novus Thesaurus; - A critical study 
of Suárez de Mendoza’s Commentarius is being prepared by a research project by Dr. P. Święcicka.
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of weapons, among which the throwing of spears.262 Furthermore, Church 
father Cyprianus (†258) had argued that a soldier had to train in a field before 
he could go to war;263 Theodoretus Cyrensis (393–466) described St. Aphraates 
walking through a street leading to the suburban fields, then arriving at a field 
where soldiers used to practise;264 and finally, Johannes Chrysostomos (ca. 
347–407) described that soldiers were taught tactics by their teachers, in the 
broad and level plains almost every day (in patentes et latos campos quotidie 
fere exeuntes).265 After their training, the young men could wash off their 
sweat and dust in the Tiber near the Marsfield and relieve their fatigue from 
the running they had done by swimming exercises. Furthermore, according 
to Vergilius the place outside the city might have been used by young men to 
train in the skills of horsemanship, ‘or to break into teams amidst the dust, or 
to bend eager bows, or to hurl with their arms tough darts, and to challenge 
others to race or to a boxing bout.’266 
The reply of Ulpian
The master of the slave who was killed asked Ulpian whether there was an actio 
for this situation and, if so, what the basis of such an actio would be. Firstly, 
and this considers a more general situation/remark, Ulpian answered that (in 
general) the lex Aquilia was applicable.267 Secondly, he added that in a more 
specific situation (an exception) there would be no possibility for the master to 
obtain an actio legis Aquiliae, namely, in the case where persons were javelin-
throwing in a field and a slave crossed the field. The reason is that the slave 
should not have crossed the field of javelin throwers at an inappropriate time. 
Thirdly, Ulpian added that the person who throws a javelin at the slave with 
262 See J. Suarez, Commentarius ad legem Aquiliam, lib. I. cap. II. sectio VII, nr. 3f., who 
referred to various literary sources, and to C. 1.27.2.9; - Indeed, according to Vegetius’ Epitoma 
rei militari, II.23, the training of soldiers included javelin throwing in exercise fields (reference 
made by G. Noodt).
263 Cyprianus, Praefatio of Liber de Exhortatio Martyrii, p. 238.
264 Theodoretus Cyrensis, Historia ecclesiastica IV.26.2; also a French translation is available, 
namely, by Canivet et al. 2009, at p. 301.
265 Johannes Chrysostomus, Homiliae in 1 Thess., III, 4.
266 Vergilius, Aeneis VII.162 (transl. Rushton Fairclough 1986, p. 13, 15); - Apparently neither 
the humanists nor the scholars of the Dutch Elegant School mentioned the Ars Armandi of 
Ovidius in their discussion of D. 9.2.9.4. However, one fragment seems to be relevant, namely, 
Ovidius, Ars Armandi, III.382-385, because it mentioned i.a. ball games, discus games and javelin 
throwing, and seems to link these to the Campus (field of Mars, EvD).
267 According to Wacke 1979, p. 275, the first sentence of the passage, in which the javelin 
thrower is held liable, obviously refers to the case in which people play with javelins in public 
places or streets (also Von Lübtow 1971, p. 106). In such generally accessible localities, this 
dangerous activity would not be permitted. The practice of sports in these circumstances in itself 
constitutes a fault, according to Paul D. 9.2.10. The thrower cannot excuse himself by relying on 
the dead slave’s own negligence; also Wacke 1977, p. 8; 1991, p. 361; Castresana 2001, p. 97.
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intention (data opera), will in any case be held (liable) under the lex Aquilia, 
in which case it is irrelevant what kind of field the slave crossed, an exercise 
field or just a ‘normal’ field.  
The question addressed to Ulpian obviously referred to the applicability of 
the first chapter of the lex Aquilia. This chapter was applicable when someone 
caused loss by unlawfully killing a male or female slave belonging to another 
or a four-footed animal in the category of pecudes belonging to another.268 
From the fragment by Ulpian it is clear that a slave was killed. In order to be 
able to hold someone liable on the basis of the lex Aquilia, it must be proven 
that the damage caused has been the result of active behaviour. A direct action 
was possible if the person committed the act directly with his body (corpore). 
Ulpian was even prepared to make an extension of this rule and also to provide 
a direct action in case a weapon was thrown.269 
The act which led to the damage of this chapter of the lex Aquilia was called 
occidere. Possibly, in this case the interpretation of occidere was crucial.270 The 
problem of the killing caused by means of throwing a javelin (possibly to be 
categorised under ‘alio telo’ in Ulp. D. 9.2.7.1) as well as the possible inapplica-
bility of the actio legis Aquiliae if the slave had crossed the campus iaculatorius 
imprudently, are well connected to the topic of the interpretation of occidere;271 
therefore, all aspects have to be taken into account in the following discussion.
The first sentence of the fragment possibly refers to the situation in which a 
slave had taken part in a game (per lusum) of javelin throwing,272 but it could 
also be the case that the slave had picked up something (e.g. a spear) or had 
tried to pick up something. The second sentence of D. 9.2.9.4 concerns 
268 See Gai. D. 9.2.2pr. and see, for a discussion of the three capita of the lex Aquilia, also, 
e.g., Crook 1984 and Valditara 1994, p. 830ff.
269 Ulp. D. 9.2.7.1 (‘vel alio telo’); Powell 1951, p. 198f.; Falcone 2004/2005, p. 297; Corbino 
2008, p. 114.
270 According to Wollschläger 1976, p. 127, this case is even placed in Ulpian’s commentary 
on occidere in the first section of the lex Aquilia.
271  Albanese 1950, p. 143.
272 Javelin throwing for mere sport (not for proof of valour) was apparently discouraged; 
see D. 11.5.2.1 and D. 11.5.3; therefore, argues Beinart 1953, p. 292, there was Aquilian liability if a 
slave was killed, because the throwers had acted contra ius. 
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another situation, in which others (alii) were practising in campo.273 At a 
certain moment, a slave crossed the field. In that case, when the slave walked 
across the exercise area at an inappropriate time, the master would not be 
granted an actio legis Aquiliae and, as a result, would be denied payment of a 
poena. However, an actio legis Aquiliae was possible if the javelin was thrown 
intentionally. In that case the master of the slave could obtain the poena from 
the wrongdoer consisting of the highest value of the slave in the preceding year. 
It is a common view that this is an expression of the so-called ‘all-or-nothing 
approach’, predetermined by the formulary procedure. The iudex could only 
condemn the defendant to the total poena or absolve him (tertium non datur).274 
So, if the wrongdoer acted with culpa or dolus, and if the other requirements of 
an actio legis Aquiliae were fulfilled, the iudex would condemn him to a poena; 
if he did not act with culpa or dolus, the iudex would absolve him. 
However, this final outcome did not really change when the formulary 
procedure disappeared, namely, when the cognition procedure began to be ap-
plied. There were indeed differences: the procedure started when the plaintiff 
handed over a libellus conventionis to the judge,275 this magistrate, now a civil 
servant, was not bound by a formula anymore.
Nevertheless, the decision remained the same, which can no longer be ex-
plained as resulting from the procedural rules for litigation. It can be explained, 
however, against the background of the penal character of the remedy. This 
would imply that the all-or-nothing approach rather derives from the deci-
sion whether or not there was sufficient culpa on the side of the wrongdoer to 
impose a civil fine (poena) upon him.
Is D. 9.2.9.4 interpolated?
Before discussing the interpretations of Ulp. D. 9.2.9.4 provided by secondary 
literature, suspicions of interpolations will be discussed. These suspicions 
occur in two areas: as to the form and as to the possible relation with Paul D. 
9.2.10.276 Some authors have made remarks regarding the form: the fragment 
by Ulpian would have been written in a remarkably loose style (si per lusum 
iaculantibus servus fuerit occisus; cum alii … iacularentur; per eum locum; sed si 
273 For this antithesis, see also Lawson 1968, p. 88.
274 See, e.g., Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 29.
275 On the beginning of a process by a libellus, see Kaser-Hackl 1996, p. 570ff.
276 See, e.g., Kunkel 1929, p. 176; Albanese 1950, p. 142f.; Longo 1958, p. 64, who considers 
the end of D. 9.2.9.4 (sed si cum alii – tenebitur) interpolated as well as D. 9.2.10; also already 
Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, II, col. 524; also Mommsen 1962 (editio maior), p. 280, suspects 
an interpolation, based on a comparison with Inst. 4.3.4. See also Lawson 1968, p. 88, who notes 
that the idea of Mommsen that words have dropped out of the Digest is contrary to a Basilica 
scholion, where the difference between the fragment of the Digest and the fragment of the 
Institutes is mentioned.
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… sed si),277 the start of the fragment with an ablativus-construction is regarded 
as difficult, and, according to these authors, the two times sed si appears are 
proof of stylistic poverty. Also, the phrase quia non debuit per campum iacula-
torium iter intempestive facere is regarded as not being very elegant,278 and it is 
even suggested that this phrase is a [post-classical] gloss.279 Stylistic arguments 
alone should, however, not be considered sufficient to draw such a conclusion.
The connection with D. 9.2.10 is not defensible for classical Roman law,280 
already because the two texts are written by different jurists. Besides, the frag-
ment by Paul is stated in a more general way, in contrast with Ulpian’s, which 
was given in a casuistic manner. Ulpian tried to establish whether there was 
culpa in certain situations. Given this formulation, the comment by Paul (D. 
9.2.10) inserted by the compilers281 was probably inserted in order to provide an 
explanation of the last phrase of Ulpian’s reply (qui tamen ... tenebitur). It is even 
uncertain whether Paul himself used the phrase lusus noxius in a situation of 
this kind.282 MacCormack understands lusus noxius to describe the situation in 
which players throw javelins not deliberately to kill the slave or to injure him 
but to frighten him and provide themselves with a cruel sport.283 If he is right 
in this interpretation, then the compilers were of the opinion that negligence 
(culpa) also included participation in a mischievous/cruel sport. However, 
the interpretation of the whole phrase of D. 9.2.10 must be considered as 
conjectural in classical times, since the original context of the statement is 
not known to us.284 
Interpretations in secondary literature: culpae compensatio
Regarding the interpretation of D. 9.2.9.4, some authors advanced that this 
case (originally) was an example of culpae compensatio, in the sense that the 
277 Albanese 1950, p. 143; for suspicions of interpolation regarding the form, see Kunkel 
1929, p. 175f., who rejects the conjecture of Mommsen.
278 Not unsuspect, according to Beseler 1922, p. 540; see also Schipani 1969, p. 328 nt. 25.
279 Kunkel 1929, p. 176.
280 Differently, apparently, Travis Laster 1996, p. 208f.
281  Kunkel 1929, p. 176: ‘die steife und gedrechselte Ausdrucksweise’; also Von Lübtow 1971, 
p. 106, treats it as a gloss.
282 Rotondi 1922, p. 487 and nt. 3; MacCormack 1974, p. 214; Kunkel 1929, p. 176 and nt. 
2, attributes D. 9.2.10 to the compilers; also Longo 1958, p. 65; Beseler 1948, p. 332: ‘törichte 
Randbemerkung’; differently Beinart 1953, p. 292; Schipani 1969, p. 361 (on the terms noxius and 
lusus, see p. 361f.; see also Lawson 1968, p. 88).
283 MacCormack 1974, p. 214.
284 The situation in the reconstruction of Lenel (Palingenesia iuris civilis, I, col. 1010, pal. 
nr. 360 (Pauli ad edictum lib. XXII)), under the title Ad legem Aquiliam. 1. Ad caput primum, does 
not provide sufficient information; MacCormack 1974, p. 215, believes that it is not absolutely 
certain either how D. 9.2.10 was understood by the compilers.
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negligence of the wrongdoer was cancelled out by the one of the injured.285 
However, this does not seem likely. It is sometimes argued that this case clearly 
shows that the slave, who crossed the sports field intempestive, i.e. while jave-
lins were being thrown, had full responsibility for what happened.286 Only 
the slave was to be  blamed, the javelin thrower did nothing wrong because 
he acted on a field especially designated for that purpose.287 Despite the fact 
that one could consider the act wrongful (iniuria),288 no negligence (culpa) 
occurred on the side of the javelin thrower.289 Accordingly, a prerequisite for a 
successful actio legis Aquiliae was lacking. As long as the javelin thrower was 
not negligent (culpa), he was not liable a priori. So there is no need to argue 
that his negligence could be compensated by the negligence of the slave.290
Interpretations in secondary literature: only the slave is negligent
Secondary literature offers another interpretation which is more or less related 
to the interpretation elaborated upon above. This second interpretation 
comprises the thought that Ulpian solved the problem by creating a sole 
285 Pernice 1867, p. 62; Grüber 1886, p. 31; see also p. 228f.; Wendt 1892, p. 152; Endemann 
1893, p. 57; Heilfron 1920, p. 245; Rossi Masella 1951, p. 190; Von Lübtow 1971, p. 106, 136; Scott 
1984, p. 168; see also Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 30; differently Demelius 1861, p. 59f.; Levison 1891, 
p. 41f.; Plog 1896, p. 62; Ruhm 1898, p. 26; Coppa-Zuccari 1909, p. 29; Van den Heever 1944, p. 57f.; 
Wollschläger 1976, p. 127; Castresana 2001, p. 75, 98; Piro 2004, p. 134, qualifies the act of the slave 
crossing over as ‘una responsabilità colposa del servo medesimo’, and in that case there was no 
responsibility. She did not explicitly state whether she applies the theory under discussion here 
or not. The javelin thrower’s act as cause of the occasio was not regarded iniuria, unless the death 
of the slave can be attributed with apparent certainty to the voluntary behaviour of the agent.
286 Valditara 1994, p. 862; - Obviously an actio legis Aquiliae would be granted when the 
slave  crossed at an appropriate time; however, it remains uncertain what such an appropriate 
time would be. The following examples are mentioned by Travis Laster 1996, p. 209f. Possibly, 
when the throwers saw the slave and agreed to let him pass. This may involve waving the slave 
across. If, in such case, a thrower threw a javelin, because he thought the slave was far enough 
away to be beyond the range of the javelin cast, and hit him, he would be liable. It could also 
involve stopping briefly to let him pass, then starting again, because he thought the slave had 
already crossed the field, only to discover he was not yet out of danger. 
287 Wollschläger 1976, p. 127.
288 Travis Laster 1996, p. 209 adds what he called a ‘common view’ of the javelin case, 
namely, that it represents action non iure. According to this author, if the javelin throwers are 
practising in general, they act non iure and are liable. If they practised at a place set aside for 
such purpose, they act iure and are not liable (see also Watson 1991, p. 348 nt. 9). Indeed, as 
Travis Laster already argued, this interpretation just focuses on one element of the location of 
the activity, and ignores other (equally important) aspects of the case; the issue was not solely 
about a right to throw javelins on a place set aside for such purpose. In Theophilus, Paraphrasis 
Institutionum, 4.3.4, and Inst. 4.3.4 another decisive element was added, namely that of the 
person of the thrower (i.e. whether the thrower was a soldier or a private person). This will be 
further discussed below on p. 75
289 Also Van den Heever 1944, p. 58, believes the javelin thrower had no culpa at all. He 
grounded this on the fact that citizens had the privilege to practise this warlike skill (javelin 
throwing) provided they did so at the proper place set aside for it. Public policy required that 
they be exempt from liability if they accidentally killed a slave who walked over the range.
290 See Van Nierop 1905, p. 7.
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negligence (culpa) on the side of the slave, as he was more negligent than the 
javelin thrower.291 The theory of the Romans may have been that preponderant 
negligence on the slave’s part excluded the liability of the javelin thrower.292 
Wacke argued that if the arena was clearly marked for javelin throwing, 
outsiders were expected to avoid the danger,293 in contrast with the situation 
on public roads where no passer-by was obliged to guard himself from such 
lance exercises. When the area was clearly marked, a person who exposed 
himself to the danger ran the risk of being killed. The predominant negligence 
of the injured party would exclude the liability of the thrower; Wacke added 
the statement of Pomp. D. 50.17.203. This sentence, however, originally had 
nothing to do with damnum iniuria datum, as is argued in the first section of 
this chapter.294 Possibly, the argumentation could make sense, but only with 
regard to Justinian law, because Justinian generalised D. 50.17.203 as a maxim, 
isolated from its original context.
Interpretations in secondary literature: expectations of the javelin throwers
Except for the case in which the thrower threw intentionally (data opera), the 
thrower was not liable. According to Ulpian, the slave should have refrained from 
crossing the javelin field at an improper time. Powell suspects this argument of 
Ulpian’s and adds that it comes entirely out of the blue.295 Indeed, this argument 
is not repeated in Inst. 4.3.4, nor in the Paraphrasis Institutionum of Theophilus, 
where the example is given in relation to the question whether soldiers practising 
with javelins on the parade ground are liable for culpa. Possibly the real reason 
for Ulpian’s decision was that people who were throwing javelins on a javelin 
field would not expect strangers to cross the field and were, therefore, normally 
not at fault if someone happened to cross and got pierced. But the moment they 
became aware of a person crossing, their awareness would become a new factor 
in the situation, creating liability for culpa.296 If that view is correct, the javelin 
throwers who were unaware of the crossing of the slave were exempted from 
liability, not because of an activity of the slave who intervened between the 
291  Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 221.
292 See Wacke 1978/79, p. 9; 1979, p. 276; 1991, p. 361; also Luig 1969, p. 194. Ulpian’s text 
does not, however, provide any foundation for such a line of thought.
293 He also mentioned Paul. D. 9.2.28 in which the principle of anticipation was also 
observed. See on this text Wacke 1979, p. 276.
294 In the same sense Wacke 1978/79, p.  9 nt. 24; 1979, p. 276 nt. 11.
295 Powell 1951, p. 211.
296 See D. 9.2.31, where a similar principle is applied in the case of a tree pruner throwing 
down branches from a tree.
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 act of the javelin thrower and the damage suffered by the master of the slave 
(novus actus),297 but due to the absence of their own negligence (culpa).298
My view: D. 9.2.9.4 as  a problem of culpa
From the above discussion it appears that the particular situation, which 
could be interpreted from a modern perspective as a problem of contributory 
negligence, is solved without the use of such a concept. Probably, the Roman 
jurists did not know contributory negligence as a legal notion. The Roman 
jurists did not question negligence on both sides, but merely enquired whether 
the injury, considering the circumstances, was due to the negligence of the 
wrongdoer or not.299 If a slave crossed a sports field and was pierced by a 
javelin as a result, this was considered due to the slave’s own negligence. In 
any event, the javelin thrower was not to be blamed for such an incident.300 
Probably, modern scholars have invented and tried to attribute the theory of 
culpae compensatio to the Roman jurists, and attempted to force that theory 
upon the Roman sources.301
Nevertheless, it is possible that the case concerned the problem of culpa. 
If so, D. 9.2.9.4 deals with the culpa requirement and provides a specification 
of culpa for an individual situation.302 A certain act could involve culpa at a 
certain time, but could not involve culpa at another time.303 Carefully, Ulpian 
has drawn a line: no negligence can be ascribed to the javelin thrower if he 
exercised on an exercise field.304 Roman jurists approached the question of 
culpa in a casuistic manner, as they did with all legal problems. They did not 
try to subsume the facts of the individual case under a standardised test or 
297 In the event of a novus actus interveniens, a (factual) harmful act or  cause  which 
occurs subsequent to an initial wrongful act of a tortfeasor. The novus actus breaks the chain of 
causation between that initial act and the damage or loss sustained by the injured party.
298 Powell 1951, p. 211.
299 See also Travis Laster 1996, p. 201, who rightly stated: ‘Rather than singling out the 
plaintiff and considering his conduct in isolation for conformance with an objective standard, 
the Roman jurists incorporated the plaintiff ’s actions into the overall scenario.’
300 Zimmermann 1996, p. 1011; Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 29; Wollschläger 1976, p. 127.
301 In the same sense  Buckland, McNair & Lawson 1974, p. 370.
302 Zimmermann 1996, p. 1007. According to Travis Laster 1996, p. 208f., the jurist first 
offered a general rule assigning liability in which there was no reference to culpa; because Ulpian 
seemed to have assumed that javelin throwing was dangerous, he thought the participants were, 
therefore, at fault in the typical case. Then, Ulpian varied the scenario and added a specific 
situation, to alter the determination of fault, namely, where the throwers would not be liable.
303 Lawson 1968, p. 38.
304 In this context Paul. D. 9.2.31 (tree pruner) is relevant. The question whether the tree 
pruner was liable depended on the place where the accident happened and the further relevant 
circumstances. See also Paul. D. 9.2.30.3 (farmer case). On these texts, see Zimmermann 1996, p. 
1007ff.
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formulation.305 The jurists, so also Ulpian in this case, asked themselves if the 
defendant was at fault (culpa): if he had behaved in the way he should have. It is 
useful to remember that from the perspective of the litigating parties and their 
jurists/lawyers, the central question (quaestio) of the conflict involves a matter 
of quality (status qualitatis), because an act is not permitted or appropriate 
everywhere.306 The question whether the javelin thrower acted as he should 
have depended on the evaluation of all the circumstances of the case and 
tended to be determined from an objective point of view.307 The final phrase 
of D. 9.2.9.4 comprises the situation in which the thrower aimed intentionally 
at the slave; this will be discussed in the following.
Interpretations of the final phrase of D. 9.2.9.4: causal connection (I)
Sometimes the case described by the second part of D. 9.2.9.4 is interpreted 
by the principle of causal connection.308 It is possible that the Romans applied 
a theory of causation. The negligent or intending person was liable for the 
harm he caused, but not if some intervening agency prevented his act from 
producing effect.309 The nexus was also broken if between the fault (culpa) of 
the wrongdoer and the damage, some other cause intervened in the absence 
of which the damage would not have occurred.310 But if the original act was 
wilful, it is generally held that intervening negligence of the injured person did 
not constitute a defence, though there was the same breach of causal nexus.311 
This is problematic since the result ought to be the same regardless of the in-
tentional or merely negligent nature of the original act. If the javelin thrower 
did not cause the accident in one case, neither would he have in the other.312 
Obviously, the Roman way of applying the theory of causation did not go so 
far as to relieve the intentional wrongdoer from his liability.
305 Zimmermann 1996, p. 1008. They did not ask in every case whether the defendant 
ought to have foreseen the damage. Foreseeability or carelessness could be important issues (e.g. 
in D. 9.2.31), but would not necessarily and conclusively be decisive for the question of liability; 
see Zimmermann 1996, p. 1008, and the literature mentioned therein
306 See Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, V.10.38-40; - From the perspective of the judge, the 
question was, of course, whether the accused person should be condemned/punished or not.
307 Zimmermann 1996, p. 1008; - According to the classical notion of liability, the inquiry 
into culpa was conducted objectively; see Parisi 1992, p. 69ff.
308 Thayer 1929, p. 65; Buckland & Stein 2007, p. 587; differently Luig 1969, p. 194 (nt. 42). 
According to Wittmann, p. 22, in case of strict liability for directly caused acts, the culpa in old 
Roman law is still closely linked with causality; on the denial of liability in case of sole indirect 
causality in the Attic law of homicide, see Antiphon, Tetr. II.2.8: τό ἔργον οὐχ ἡμέτερον ἀλλἀ τοῦ 
ἐξαμαρτόντος ἐστί (The act is not ours but from the one who made the error). See also Maschke 
1979, p. 73f.
309 Buckland, McNair & Lawson 1974, p. 371.
310 Buckland & Stein 2007, p. 587, who refer to D. 9.2.11pr. and D. 50.17.203.
311  ibid.
312  Buckland, McNair & Lawson 1974, p. 372.
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Interpretations of the final phrase of D. 9.2.9.4: causal connection (II)
A different interpretation, also regarding causal connection, is to view the 
intent to kill a person as the last direct effective cause.313 Indirect evidence 
that the decision can be explained with the question of the cause of the culpa 
(Schuldursache) can be found in another source from Antiquity, namely, a 
Greek example of the javelin throwers handed down by the sophist and orator 
Antiphon of Ramnus (about 480–411 BC).314 It can be found in his Second 
Tetralogy.315 It concerned a hypothetical case of homicide.316 Boys were 
practising javelin throwing in the gymnasium under the supervision of their 
trainer. One boy threw his javelin exactly at the moment in which another boy 
ran out onto the field to pick up javelins already thrown. This boy was pierced 
by a javelin and died. The question was whether the killing caused by the boy 
who threw the javelin was due to him, or to the victim, or to the trainer.317 The 
facts were not in dispute, the legal case concerned the interpretation of these 
facts. The Second Tetralogy of Antiphon consists of four speeches, two on each 
side. The javelin thrower was sued by the father of the boy who died before the 
Epheten on the Palladion.318 The prosecution accuses the javelin thrower of 
‘unintentional homicide’ (φόνος ἀκούσιος). Also, in the case where the killing 
occurred without negligence, the thrower could be punished with exile.319 That 
is why for the defence (i.e. the father of the javelin thrower) it was not sufficient 
to prove that there was no negligence, and so they tried to prove that it was not 
the thrower who was the wrongdoer but that the victim was to be blamed for 
his own death as a consequence of his negligence. The victim himself was the 
author of his own death by walking onto the field and into the trajectory of 
the javelins.320 Besides the fact that the young men trained in the gymnasium, 
313  See also Looschelders 1999, p. 10.
314  Wollschläger 1976, p. 128; - On Antiphon of Ramnus, see, e.g., Thalheim 1984, col. 
2527ff.; Maidment 1953, p. 2ff.; Morrison 1972, p. 108ff., 114ff.
315  See Greek text in edn. Blass/Thalheim 1966, p. 28ff.; an English translation can be 
found in Maidment 1953, p. 89ff.; Morrison 1972, p. 147ff. See on the Second Tetralogy also Blass 
1887, p. 162ff.; Pernice 1896, p. 241f.; Condanari-Michler 1948, p. 55ff.; Schmidt & Stählin 1961, p. 
119ff.; MacDowell 1966, p. 74; Daube 1969, p. 168ff.; Maschke 1979, p. 73ff.; Gagarin 1997, p. 144ff.; 
2002, p. 103ff. (on the Tetralogies in general), p. 119ff.; Ibbetson 2004, p. 112f.
316  According to Loomis 1972, p. 92, this set of four speeches was never used in a real 
case, but was a pedagogical device for young orators. The author adds that as a teaching device, 
however, it was based on current practice; according to Leeman & Braet 1987, p. 7, the speeches 
are fictive, but fit the legal reality; also Gagarin 2002, p. 103, according to whom the speeches 
were not written for delivery in court but for a more intellectual audience. It was written for 
readers who had the time to think about and assess the arguments (Gagarin 2002, p. 105).
317  Ibbetson 2004, p. 112f.
318  See Knütel 2001, p. 360f., where one can also find a summary of the argumentation of 
the speech of the defence.
319  Wollschläger 1976, p. 128 and the literature mentioned there.
320 See also Castresana 2001, p. 75.
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which was permitted and the exercise in itself was not forbidden, one could 
argue that the thrower did exactly what he wanted, i.e. throw the javelin at the 
target, and would not have missed it if he had not been prevented by the victim 
who ran out to pick up javelins at the wrong time; however, the victim erred by 
running out to pick up javelins at the wrong time.321 Therefore, the victim was 
the sole cause and thus had to bear the sole responsibility for his own death.322 
In the last case the injured would already have been punished by his death. 
There was no  need to (additionally) punish the javelin thrower. Without going 
into further detail about the finalities of the sophistic discussion as presented 
in the four speeches, summarising we can say that in fact the question was 
whether the javelin thrower was guilty of unintentional homicide or whether 
the injured was guilty of unintentional suicide.323
A comparison of D. 9.2.9.4 with the argumentation of the defence of 
Antiphon of Ramnus has already been made by Desiderius Heraldus (Didier 
Herault; 1579–1649).324 When we read the final phrase of D. 9.2.9.4 against the 
background of the discussion in the Tetralogy of Antiphon, it is unlikely that 
D. 9.2.9.4 had anything to do with compensation of culpa. The only reason 
why the negligence of the victim by which he was injured was considered at 
all was to eliminate the causal connection between the act of throwing and 
the homicide. The underlying idea was that one sole culpa had to be estab-
lished either on the side of the injured or on the side of the javelin thrower.325 
Probably, the Roman jurists had knowledge of these old Greek fragments due 
to their training in Rhetoric;326 furthermore, in the endphase of the Republic, 
there were close links between jurisprudence and rhetoric.327 One has to 
consider D. 9.2.9.4 in this way, only the slave was to blame, that he crossed the 
 
321  This is not the theory of novus actus interveniens as there is no original breach of duty 
on the side of the thrower. The event that the victim erred by running out to pick up javelins at 
the wrong time did not occur subsequent to any negligent conduct of the defendant.
322 Gagarin 2002, p. 119.
323 See also Loomis 1972, p. 92.
324 The situation would have been different if the javelin thrower intentionally pointed his 
bow at the second boy; in that case he would have caused the damage unlawfully and the javelin 
thrower would be liable for negligent homicide; see extensively D. Heraldus, Observationes ad Jus 
Atticum et Romanum, V.6, nr. 12.
325 Wollschläger 1976, p. 129.
326 See on this, e.g., Cicero, De oratore, I.57.244; Schulz 1961, p. 64; Wollschläger 1976, p. 129.
327 See Knütel 2001, p. 362. Furthermore, the influence of Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric 
on the Roman jurists was more significant than was thought by scholars far into the last century; 
see Kaser 1975, p. 7f.; Wieacker 1988, I, p. 662ff., 669ff., with references; Knütel 2001, p. 363. 
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field at an inappropriate time; the javelin thrower behaved properly and was 
not at fault.328
The final phrase of D. 9.2.9.4: a different meaning of data opera
Finally, some remarks regarding the last sentence of the fragment have to 
be made. Ulpian described the person who threw intentionally in the same 
wording as Alfenus in D. 9.2.52.1, namely, data opera.329 If the javelin thrower 
threw with data opera, the victim’s interruption at the causation of the result 
had no effect.330 In that case, the liability of the thrower prevailed upon the 
circumstance that the injured had exposed himself to the danger.331 However, 
according to secondary literature, this data opera has to be interpreted in a 
more extensive manner than usual. It seems that acting opera data did not 
necessarily mean the actor had the intention to hit the other person.332 Apart 
from deliberately aiming at the person, even if the aim only was to frighten 
that person,333 or maybe just to show the thrower’s capacity not to hit the 
person,334 he would be liable for the damage caused.335 The same applies if 
he threw near enough to make the slave jump,336 or perhaps if he recklessly 
persisted in throwing after he knew the slave was in the area of danger.337 In 
all these interpretations of data opera, the thrower was aware of the presence 
of the slave and, therefore, was responsible and liable. If one accepted this 
extension, this category would be somewhat broader than what is normally 
understood as dolus (namely, with the intention to kill). At any rate, it does not 
seem necessary to make further complicated distinctions, so in the following I 
will stick to the generally used word dolus, unless I explicitly state otherwise.
328 In this sense also Wollschläger 1976, p. 127; Knütel 2001, p. 362. 
329 On these words see, e.g., Thayer 1929, p. 66f.
330 Aumann 1964, p. 9.
331  Wacke 1991, p. 362.
332 See Wacke 1988, p. 532; 1991, p. 362; Castresana 2001, p. 99.
333 MacCormack 1974, p. 214.
334 Pernice 1867, p. 55 nt. 30; Grüber 1886, p. 31.
335 See also Wacke 1978/79, p. 10; Knütel 2001, p. 358; Castresana 2001, p. 99.
336 Powell 1951, p. 210f.; also Van den Heever 1944, p. 58: ‘designedly attempt to register 
near-miss’. 
337 Powell 1951, p. 210f. According to Pollock 1929, p. 615, ‘it is not clear whether the words 
“data opera” are intended to cover the case of reckless persistence in the javelin throwing after 
the danger to the slave who has put himself in the way is manifest.’ In his opinion, there can be 
no doubt whatsoever that Ulpian would have considered such conduct equivalent to dolus.
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The final phrase of D. 9.2.9.4: dolus opposed to culpa
One possible explanation could be that in such a case the negligence of the 
slave is opposed to the intentional act of the wrongdoer. The question regards 
the relation between the two assumptions. Some argue that the more serious 
degree of negligence, the predominant one, would have been decisive,338 and 
that the victim could only obtain compensation if his negligence was less 
serious than the negligence of the wrongdoer.339 The person who acted with 
dolus was liable, despite the contributory negligence of the victim. Others 
argue that the less serious degree of negligence, i.e. culpa, is absorbed by the 
higher degree, dolus.340 Such argumentations are unnecessarily theoretical 
and difficult, since no such theory can be found within the text. Another 
seemingly more plausible explanation is that dolus can convert a lawful act 
into an unlawful one. Thus, the javelin thrower, whether or not on the campus 
iaculatorius, was liable if he designedly threw a spear at the slave.341
The final phrase of D. 9.2.9.4: Plutarchus, Pericles 36.3
Possibly, another similar case could help to interpret D. 9.2.9.4. The first report 
of Pericles (ca. 490–429 BC), regarding a comparable case that must have oc-
curred in the fifth century BC, is handed down by Plutarchus.342 When an (pent)
athlete unintentionally struck Epitimus the Pharsalian (a spectator) with a 
javelin and killed him, Pericles spent the entire day with the sophist Protagoras 
(ca. 485–415 BC) arguing whether one should believe that the javelin or the 
javelin thrower or those who arranged the contest (the judges)343 were more 
to blame344 and if they, according to the most correct account,345 ought to be 
338 Aumann 1964, p. 9; Luig 1969, p. 194; Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 29. 
339 According to Van Nierop, p. 59, this idea floated already among Roman jurists.
340 Visky 1979, p. 494f.; - Pernice 1867, p. 62, argued that the rule of culpa-compensation 
suffers an exception when the wrongdoer is in dolo, for only similar things can be set off against 
each other. Dolus and culpa are, however, according to Pernice, completely unlike; according to 
Van den Heever 1944, p. 58, the javelin thrower exceeded his privilege and is thus liable in case of 
acting data opera. See also n. 289 above.
341  Beinart 1953, p. 294.
342 For the Greek text and an English translation, see Perrin 1967, p. 104f. For an extensive 
comparison between Plutarchus, Pericles 36.3 and Ulp. D. 9.2.9.4, see Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 
489ff.; - Possibly this case had influenced the Table 8.24a and, thereby, the fragments by Cicero 
and Alfenus (which will be discussed later); see Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 505f.
343 MacDowell 1963: ‘or were the organisers of the contest to blame for allowing spectators 
to stand where they might be hit?’
344 An actio legis Aquiliae against the masters of the game was not an option at all in the 
case of D. 9.2.9.4 because the judges did not fulfil the requisite of corpore-corpori. See Del Castillo 
Santana 1994, p. 27; Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 500ff.
345 Perrin 1967, p. 105: ‘in the strictest sense’; also Ibbetson 2004, p. 112; Gagarin 2004, 
p. 2 and also p. 3, where the author discussed the meaning of κατὰ τὸν ὀρθότατον λόγον in the 
fragment by Protagoras; according to Gagarin 2004, p. 6, sources for Protagoras’ work suggest 
that he was best known for his highly provocative observations aimed at stimulating others to 
chapter two70
responsible for the disaster that occurred.346 In comparison with D. 9.2.9.4, the 
facts appear to be almost identical, but the responses are not. The methodol-
ogy applied in the answers, however, is the same.347 In Plutarchus, Pericles 36.3, 
three possible solutions are mentioned (that the javelin,348 the javelin thrower 
or those who arranged the contest ought to be held responsible), which is for-
mulated with an exclusive disjunction. The exclusive disjunction excludes the 
possibility of liability of more than one person. In D. 9.2.9.4 the two possible 
solutions are also formulated by way of an exclusive disjunction: sed si per … 
fuerit occisus: the javelin thrower is liable; sed si cum … locum transierit: the slave 
is responsible (and the master of the slave has to suffer the damages).349 When 
comparing the specific possible liabilities, only one is dealt with by Ulpian, i.e. 
the liability of the javelin thrower.
The final phrase of D. 9.2.9.4: Pseudo-Quintilianus, Declamatio Maior XIII
Another relevant text in which a resemblance with D. 9.2.9.4 can be found is 
Pseudo-Quintilianus, Declamatio Maior XIII.350 This rhetoric fragment from 
the second or third century AD could, perhaps, provide some insight into 
the interpretation of the lex Aquilia – moreover, about the reception of the 
lex Aquilia among intellectuals.351 It is a parody on legal practice. A poor man 
question traditional views; the assertion that the javelin itself could have been responsible for 
someone’s accidental death may have been in large part heuristic, intended to stimulate further 
reflection as to the correctness in these and related areas.
346 See also Knütel 2001, p. 359.
347 Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 489; - This does not necessarily mean that the Greek influenced 
the Roman system; according to Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 495f., the reason has to be found in 
criminal law.
348 This seems strange, but one has to keep in mind that it is just a manner of 
argumentation. On this possibility, see Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 496ff.; - The inclusion of the 
spear in this discussion becomes understandable from the background that in Athens there was 
a court on murders in the Prytaneion; this court was competent in cases involving the killing 
of a person by animals or things and perhaps also when the offender was unknown; see Nörr 
1986, p. 68; Knütel 2001, p. 359f. The court probably was used over time in cases involving an 
involuntary or an unintentional killing for the purpose of transferring the result from the person 
who performed the act onto the tool used; the negligent killing first appears in Greece in the 
guise of causation of an instrument; see Condanari-Michler 1948, p. 48; Knütel 2001, p. 360. 
Against the spear, a trial could have been brought, and, in case of conviction, it would have to be 
removed from Attica; see Nörr 1986, p. 68; Knütel 2001, p. 360. 
349 This last possibility is, however, not mentioned in Plutarchus, Pericles 36.3. See 
Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 493; exceptionally, in some legal thought, like the culpae compensatio, 
an inclusive disjunction is used; see Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 496.
350 See Lehnert 1905, p. 246ff.; Håkanson 1982, p. 264ff. Krapinger 2005; Mantovani 2007, 
p. 379ff.; Nörr 2003, p. 1708*; - On this fragment see also Frier 1994, p. 140f. (also discussing other 
cases about bees); Mantovani 2007; Corbino 2009a, p. 511ff.
351  Nörr 2003, p. 1708*.
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(pauper) and a rich man (dives) were neighbours in the countryside. The rich 
man had flowers in his garden, the poor man had bees. The rich man com-
plained that the bees were feeding on his flowers and gave notice that the 
poor man should change their location. When the poor man did not do so, he 
sprinkled his flowers with poison. All the bees of the poor man died.352 The 
poor man brought a lawsuit against his wealthy neighbour based on unlawful 
damage to his property. However, the rich man did not kill his neighbour’s bees, 
but just poisoned his own flowers in his own garden (because the bees were 
eating his flowers, and the pauper did not want to move his bees to another 
place).353 Although the rich man confessed to doing as he did (poisoning the 
flowers), he denied that there was a financial loss (damnum),354 and he argued 
that the loss was not caused by his unlawful conduct (iniuria).355 
One of the arguments with which the rich man objected was that it was not 
he who killed the bees, but the bees killed themselves.356  To lead this argument 
ad absurdum, the poor man used examples which, regarding the content and 
sequence, have some resemblance with the commentary of Ulpian. Has the 
victim killed himself if he brings the poisoned cup to his lips himself? Would 
the victim have fallen into the ambush on his own accord if someone had 
stationed an assassin in the woods? If a javelin had been thrown in the dark, 
would a victim walking into the spear have killed himself?357 Of course not, 
one would think.
Final remarks on the final phrase of D. 9.2.9.4: resemblance with Inst. 4.3.4
Apart from the resemblance with D. 9.2.9.4, Declamatio Maior XIII had a 
resemblance with Inst. 4.3.4 because in these two texts the same approach was 
used with regard to the determination of culpa.358 Liability seems to be based 
352 Summary of the case is based on the English translation by Sussman 1987, p. 165.
353 See also Corbino 2009a, p. 512; there is a resemblance with the case of Ulp. D. 9.2.49pr., 
in which an actio in factum is given when someone drives away bees belonging to another or 
even kills them by means of making smoke.
354 Because the poor man lost a creature that was free, able to fly, nomadic and situated 
beyond human control (transl. Sussman 1987, p. 169); - A discussion of this argument can be 
found in Corbino 2009a, p. 516ff.
355 Because the rich man destroyed, on his own private property, bees which were harming 
his interests, and because the bees went to their death voluntarily after some poison had just 
been sprinkled on his own flowers (transl. Sussman 1987, p. 169); Corbino 2009a, p. 515., also on 
the second argument, see p. 518; see also Mantovani 2007, esp. 341f.
356 This argument and the following argument are taken from Pseudo-Quintilianus, 
Declamatio Maior XIII, cap. 14.
357 Nörr 2003, p. 1709*; Sussman 1987, p. 174 (English translation); Krapinger 2005, p. 56f. 
(Latin text and German translation); - Of course the situation mentioned is slightly different from 
D. 9.2.9.4, because in that case the spear was thrown on a field (campus), and not in the dark.
358 Reinoso-Barbero 1993, p. 499.
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on the voluntariness of the act; so, in the absence of a voluntary act when an 
accident occurs, there is an exemption of liability.359 Two other fragments 
on javelin throwers could provide a deeper understanding of these matters, 
namely, Cicero, Topica 17.64360 and Alfenus D. 9.2.52.2. The two Roman authors 
suggest voluntary actions by using similar expressions: si telum manu … iecit 
(Topica 17.64) and si quis ex manu telum immisisset (D. 9.2.52.2). They seem 
to refer to the Twelve Tables (fifth century BC) here, namely, to 8.24a.361 This 
fragment holds a useful application of the topos from causes (locus causarum) 
for jurists. Causes are places which have to do with things that produce effect 
(Topica 20.58). Some causes are hidden, namely, those subject to fortune. 
Actions taken are partly involuntary, partly intentional; intended are those 
actions preceded by deliberation. Fortuitous events are either involuntary or 
intentional. Throwing a javelin is subject to a will, hitting someone you did not 
intend to hit is due to misfortune.362 A last case on javelin throwers that seems 
to be in line with the argumentation of Cicero is Marcianus D. 48.19.11.2. An 
act is committed either deliberately, or upon a sudden impulse, or by chance. 
An act is committed by chance, e.g. if a man kills another man while hunting 
and aiming a dart at a wild beast. Also here the jurist seems to argue on the 
basis of the idea of voluntary acts.
2.4.5 Post-classical development
The compilers inserted the comment by Paul (D. 9.2.10) after D. 9.2.9.4, probably 
in order to provide an explanation (it starts with nam) of the last phrase of 
Ulpian’s reply in D. 9.2.9.4 (qui tamen ... tenebitur). Indeed, as to the interpretation 
of Justinian law, these fragments (D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.10) have to be seen in 
relation to each other.363 It has been stated that it is not absolutely certain either 
how D. 9.2.10 was understood by the compilers.364 
359 Amaya García 1993, p. 64.
360 Cicero, Topica 17.64: Nam iacere telum voluntatis est, ferire quem nolueris fortunae. Ex 
quo aries subiciter ille in vestris actionibus ‘si telum manu fugit magis quam iecit’; for the Latin text 
with English translation, see the edition of Reinhardt 2003, p. 148f.
361 Table 8.24a: Si telum manu fugit magis quam iecit; see on this text as well as the above-
mentioned texts, Del Castillo Santana 1994, p. 25ff. The author concludes (p. 28) by stating that 
the intervention of the element of intention at the time of the Twelve Tables was limited to the 
contrast between voluntary or intentional acts and acts caused by accident or force majeure; see 
also Amaya García 1993, p. 65f.
362 See Cicero, Topica 10.63-20.64.
363 cf. also scholion 11 ad B. 60.3.9 (BS 3101/12); see page 77.
364 MacCormack 1974, p. 215.
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Although this view seems correct, I will attempt to interpret it, to give it a 
useful meaning. 
According to D. 9.2.9.4, if the javelin thrower threw with data opera, the 
victim’s interruption of the causation of the result had no effect. When putting 
the text of D. 9.2.9.4 as an explanation (and bringing ludus noxius in relation 
to the words data opera), this would mean: for a dangerous game should be 
classed as an act of negligence. This is rather strange, when one would interpret 
data opera as intention, because intentional throwing would be qualified as a 
dangerous game and as negligence (culpa).
However, as already mentioned above, the view has been defended in 
secondary literature, that data opera has to be interpreted in a more extensive 
manner here. It seems that acting opera data did not necessarily mean the 
actor had the intention to hit the other person,365 but that it could also mean 
various other things,366 which were all interpretations of data opera in this 
context. In all these possibilities, the thrower was aware of the presence of the 
slave and, therefore, was responsible and liable. These forms of risky behaviour 
could be qualified as ludus noxius, and, thus, the view of the compilers could 
have been that therefore participation in such a mischievous/cruel sport 
constituted negligence (culpa).367
An interesting question is whether the compilers of Justinian’s compilation 
considered D. 9.2.9.4 to be an application of  the rule of  D. 50.17.203 
(generalised as a maxim by Justinian). Could one argue that the slave, who 
crossed the sports field intempestive, suffered damage as a result of his own 
fault and, therefore, is not considered to have suffered any damage? This 
is indeed possible. Is it plausible that the compilers did so? Possibly; but, 
strangely enough, they did not include this ‘own negligence’ of the injured 
party in another fragment about javelin throwers included in the Institutes and 
showing resemblance with that of D. 9.2.9.4,368 namely, Inst. 4.3.4. Apparently, 
365 See literature mentioned in section 2.4.4, on page 68.
366 For example: throwing only to frighten that person, throwing just to show the thrower’s 
capacity not to hit the person; the possibilities were discussed above.
367 One can also argue that already throwing javelins in a public place, and thereby killing 
a slave, would make liable based on (the first chapter) of the lex Aquilia, as a dangerous game (at 
a wrong place) would justify negligence (culpa); a similar view is held by Knütel 2001, p. 357.
368 According to Grüber 1886, p. 32, the rule of Ulpian in D. 9.2.9.4 must even be taken 
with the restriction made in Inst. 4.3.4; - The Institutes have an introductory character. Because of 
the complexity of the Digest for students, Justinian decided an introductory textbook had to be 
prepared. This task was assigned to Tribonian, Theophilus and Dorotheus. Justianian instructed 
them to make the Institutes based on earlier introductory works of the early Empire, i.e. the 
Institutes of Gaius, but also to adjust it to their time; see Tellegen-Couperus 2003a, p. 136. A large 
part seems to be more or less literally copied from Gaius’ Institutes. Inst. 4.3.4 is, however, not 
copied from the Institutes of Gaius. Obviously, at the time of the Institutes of Gaius (ca. 161 AD) 
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the ‘own negligence’ was not that important that it had to be included in Inst. 
4.3.4. The fragment of Inst 4.3.4, included in book IV, title III. De lege Aquilia, 
reads as follows:
Itaque si quis, dum iaculis ludit vel exercitatur, transeuntem servum tuum traiecerit, 
distinguitur. Nam si id a milite quidem in campo eoque, ubi solitum est exercitari, 
admissum est, nulla culpa eius intellegitur: si alius tale quid admisit, culpae reus est. 
Idem iuris est de milite, si is in alio loco, quam qui exercitandis militibus destinatus 
est, id admisit.369
Therefore, if someone, while playing or exercising with javelins, pierces your slave 
while he is passing by, a distinction is made. For if this was done by a soldier in a 
field where one usually practised, no negligence [culpa] is considered of him; if 
anyone else should commit such an act, he is liable for negligence [culpa]. The 
same is in accordance with the law to a soldier, if he committed the act in any 
other place than that designated for military exercises.
With a broader formulation at the beginning, this fragment is not only appli-
cable when a person was playing (in a game), as stated at the beginning of the 
fragment of D. 9.2.9.4, but also when practising with a javelin.370 For the case 
of the piercing of someone’s slave, a distinction is made, and this is a different 
distinction from the one in D. 9.2.9.4. Firstly, if the damage was caused by a 
soldier practising in a field where it was usual to do so (i.e. an exercise field), 
he had no negligence (culpa). If someone else (i.e. a civilian) did so, he would 
have culpa.371 The same goes, i.e. there would be culpa, in the case where a 
soldier pierced a slave in some place other than one designated for military 
Ulpian was probably not even born yet. Possibly, Inst. 4.3.4 is derived from or at least inspired by 
Ulpian in D. 9.2.9.4.
369 On this fragment, see, e.g., De Robertis 2002, p. 217f.
370 According to MacCormack 1974, p. 214, Justinian made explicit and brought into force 
one of the assumptions underlying Ulpian’s decision. He made the question of culpa and liability 
subject to the question of the right to be in the field and throw javelins there; he took the soldier 
as an example.
371  Beinart argued that in this case damnum iniuria datum meant non iure and not culpa 
aut dolo. Liability was not negligence, but acting without right, iniuria (also Watson 1962, p. 212). 
It is on the ground for the exercise of his right that the soldier who performs javelin exercises in a 
place where practising is permitted, is not liable for killing a passing slave (Inst. 4.3.4; nulla culpa 
eius invenitur). On the other hand, if it is someone else, not a soldier, then that person would be 
liable (culpae reus). According to Beinart, whether either was truly at fault is not investigated 
but presumed. The jurists thought in terms of culpa but still applied earlier solutions. They 
tried to justify the solutions found in earlier concepts (i.e. iniuria) on the basis of culpa. Hence, 
they introduced what virtually amounted to presumptions of negligence. Inst. 4.3.4 would be 
an attempt to illustrate both the earlier meaning of iniuria as mentioned in Inst. 4.3.1 and the 
meaning of culpa (Inst. 4.3.3). See Beinart 1953, p. 290ff.
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exercises. Justinian set out specific situations and for each situation he gave a 
ruling as to whether there was culpa or not.372 Only in one situation, namely, 
the soldier who threw in a field designated for that purpose, could the thrower 
be exonerated from liability.373
Justinian has deleted the motivation of liability of Ulpian (quia non debuit …)374 
in this text and by doing so he changed the criterion of culpa, bringing it back 
from prudence or imprudence (depending on the place where the javelin was 
thrown, in a field or somewhere else) to the mere question whether the person 
was a soldier or not, basing the ratio on exercises common to soldiers.375 A 
confirmation for such reasoning can be found in the Paraphrasis Institutionum 
of Theophilus. If the soldier committed the act (at the Campus Martius or) in 
a place where it is the custom for soldiers to exercise, and thereby a slave was 
killed by a javelin, the striker will not be liable.376 However, if it was a private 
person and he killed in this place, then he will be liable, as it was not custom-
ary for a private person to exercise in arms.377 Apart from the new distinction 
in Inst. 4.3.4 as to the status of the thrower,378 the question as to whether the 
thrower had thrown intentionally has disappeared.379
Also the next fragment of the Institutes, Inst. 4.3.5 (case of a tree pruner), is 
relevant here as both concern the culpa requirement. Contrary to classical 
Roman law, where such a link did not exist between the case of the javelin 
thrower (D. 9.2.9.4) and the case of the tree pruner (D. 9.2.31), in Justinian law 
there was a link between these cases. In the latter case, the question whether 
the tree pruner had culpa and was liable depended on the place where the 
accident happened and the further relevant circumstances. Also D. 9.2.9.4 
372 MacCormack 1974, p. 214; one similarity between this text and D. 9.2.9.4 is that both 
texts concern the question of culpa; also Kunkel 1929, p. 176; according to Beinart 1953, p. 290f., 
this text, when studied from the perspective of a developed theory of culpa, is unsatisfactory, 
liability being imputed in cases where there might have been no fault (i.e. the civilian), and vice 
versa (i.e. the soldier).
373 Also Rossi Masella 1951, p. 146.
374 Also Schipani 1969, p. 455.
375 Schipani 1969, p. 458.
376 The question still was whether a poena could be required based on the first chapter 
of the lex Aquilia. This is also a civil law sanction, as the criminal law liability is not given in the 
event of only the negligent killing of a free person; see C. 9.16.1 (a soldier killed another soldier), 
Mommsen 1955, p. 839; Knütel 2001, p. 359.
377 See Theophilus, Paraphrasis Institutionum, 4.3.4, edn. 2010, p. 762ff. (with English 
transl.); - On Theophilus, the Paraphrasis Institutionum, and the authorship of the Paraphrasis 
Institutionum, see Lokin 1976, p. 337ff.
378 See on this point, Schipani 1969, p. 455 nt. 10, for further references; - According to Van 
den Heever 1944, p. 58, public policy changed as the recollections of a citizen army became dim; 
Justinian conceded the privilege, so qualified, only to soldiers.
379 See also Rossi Masella 1951, p. 146f.
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dealt with the culpa requirement and provided a specification of culpa for 
an individual situation. An act could involve culpa at one time and not at 
another. Also in Inst. 4.3.4 the place of the act (practice area or not) was used 
as a criterion.
In the Institutes, the case of the tree pruner (Inst. 4.3.5) directly follows the 
case of the javelin throwers (Inst. 4.3.4).380 The compilers saw a connection 
between the fragments and, therefore, placed the fragments immediately next 
to each other, making this connection more explicit than in classical Roman 
law. D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.31 still included decisions made in an individual case 
on an individual basis. Besides, these decisions were given by two different 
jurists (Ulpian and Paul) and, therefore, were not, strictly speaking, (directly) 
connected with each other in classical Roman law. The two fragments in the 
Institutes, however, are part of a more or less systematic treatise for educational 
purposes. Moreover, they are promulgated together as law. As to the content, 
the treatment of Justinian in Inst. 4.3.5 is in large part the same as the content 
in D. 9.2.31. However, whether the land was public or private was not consid-
ered to be decisive, only whether there was a path. A number of possible events 
are distinguished, and for each case Justinian establishes whether or not there 
was negligence (culpa) on the side of the tree pruner.381
Soon after Justinian completed his Latin codification Greek translations, 
excerpts and summaries appeared,382 because the Byzantine lawyers were 
Greek-speaking and were hardly able to read Latin anymore.383 These 
writings did not have any formal force of law. This Greek tradition is the true 
beginning of Byzantine law.384 The Basilica (τὰ βασιλικὰ νόμιμα, the imperial 
laws) was a collection of Greek texts of rules from Justinian’s codification 
which still applied, and which was completed in final form in 900 under 
emperor Leo the Wise.385 The Basilica reordered Justinian’s codification in 
sixty books, subdivided into titles. Due to the amount of legal texts and the 
lack of knowledge of the Latin language in the unclear mass of Greek texts, the 
overview was lost. In the Basilica, texts concerning the same content or issues 
380 This is also the case in Theophilus’ Paraphrasis Institutionum, edn. 2010, p. 764.
381  MacCormack 1974, p. 214.
382 See also Stolte 2005a, p. 65f.; - General information on Byzantine law written in this 
section can also, more extensively and profoundly, be found in Van der Wal & Lokin 1985, esp. 
p. 38ff., 81f.
383 Brandsma 1996, p. 2; see also already Van der Wal 1976, p. 7f.
384 See Stolte 2005b.
385 See Van der Wal & Lokin 1985, p. 8f.; on the Basilica, see also, e.g., Lawson 1930, p. 486ff.; 
1931, p. 536ff.; Jolowicz & Nicholas 1972, p. 503f.
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are included under one title. Those texts were Greek summaries, sometimes 
translations of full texts, of passages of the Digest, the corresponding title(s) of 
the Codex, the Novel(s) and in some cases of the Institutes. The function of the 
Basilica was to make the law of Justinian more accessible. They did not have the 
force of law, but just constituted a new order of the compilation of Justinian.386 
Around those fragments of the Basilica, so-called scholia, were written. Besides 
new scholia, which were written after the creation of the Basilica, also old 
scholia originating from the Justinianic period were written around the main 
text of the Basilica.387 These scholia originated from legal education given by 
professors (antecessores) at the law schools of Berytus and Constantinople.388 
The texts of the Basilica, the ‘old’ scholia and the aforementioned Paraphrasis 
Institutionum of Theophilus give an explanation of the fragments of the Digest. 
They can provide better insights into Justinian law and into the way these 
fragments were understood in the sixth century. 
The fragment below (B. 60.3.9) from the Basilica could be considered as a tool 
to read Justinian’s compilation. Although the wording of the text of Basilica 
text is slightly different, the content is more or less the same as that of D. 
9.2.9.4: ‘So, if people who were playing389 with a javelin  killed someone, there 
is place for the lex Aquilia. But not if they were playing with the javelin in a field 
[no liability],390 because in that case, one should have refrained from crossing 
the field at an inappropriate time, except for the case when the thrower in-
tentionally aimed at the person, because in that case the person is held liable 
by the lex Aquilia.’ Interesting is the fact that the latter exception is linked by a 
scholion391 to the Basilica text 60.3.10 (=D. 9.2.10): because [participating in] a 
harmful game is regarded/imputed as negligence (culpa).392 Furthermore, in 
another scholion reference is made to Inst 4.3.4.393 According to this scholion, 
the meaning of the passage of the Basilica is that, according to the distinction 
of Inst. 4.3.4, when a military man killed a passing slave, while playing or ex-
ercising with a javelin, and if this happened in the usual place of exercise, the 
soldier was not held liable by the lex Aquilia. But the soldier was liable if this 
 
386 De Jong 2008, p. 76.
387 Van der Wal & Lokin 1985, 90f.
388 Brandsma 1996, p. 3.
389 See also BS 3101/12-14 (scholion 11 ad B. 60.3.9).
390 This is explained by BS 3101/22-23 (scholion 14 ad B. 60.3.9) in such a way that they 
were soldiers, - according to the distinction in Inst. 4.3.4 - from which this principle originates.
391  BS 3101/12-14 (scholion 11 ad B. 60.3.9).
392 See BT 2752/7-9.
393 See BS 3101/15-18 (scholion 12 ad B. 60.3.9).
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happened somewhere else, or if he was a private person. The reason is that 
exercising with arms in private was not allowed.394 
2.5 Ulpian’s reply in the barber case
2.5.1 The text of D. 9.2.11pr.
Ulpianus libro octavo decimo ad edictum
Item Mela scribit, si, cum pila quidam luderent, vehementius quis pila percussa in 
tonsoris manus eam deiecerit et sic servi, quem tonsor habebat, gula sit praecisa 
adiecto cultello: in quocumque eorum culpa sit, eum lege Aquilia teneri. Proculus 
in tonsore esse culpam: et sane si ibi tondebat, ubi ex consuetudine ludebatur 
vel ubi transitus frequens erat, est quod ei imputetur: quamvis nec illud male 
dicatur, si in loco periculoso sellam habenti tonsori se quis commiserit, ipsum 
de se queri debere.
Apart from some minor differences in textual editions, which will not be discussed 
in detail,395 three remarkable peculiarities have to be examined. Firstly, the word 
habebat. The littera Florentina contains the word habebat,396 as also the later (hu-
manist) edition of Torelli does.397 The same verb and conjugation can be found in 
various manuscripts of the vulgate,398 of which one, Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Barb. 
lat. 1459, reads tonsor habebat in manu.399 However, the Basilica text (B. 60.3.11pr.) 
contains a Greek version of radebat (ὁ κουρευόμενος δοῦλος).400 The same verb and 
conjugation (radebat) can be found in the editions of Haloander and H. a Porta.401 
394 Kunkel 1929, p. 175, – who apparently considered this scholion as an old scholion – 
regarded this last phrase as a police consideration, which could well fit in the time of Justinian.
395 The edition of Haloander (edn. of 1550, fo. 256v) reads ‘eandem’ instead of ‘eam’, 
‘quocunque’ instead of ‘quocumque’ and a verb was inserted, namely, ait, after Proculus, so that it 
reads Proculus ait. The final insertion is, although not made in the vulgate edition cf. edn. Kriegel 
1844, p. 191, was made in the vulgate edition with the Accursian gloss in edn. of 1487, fo. 162v.
396 See fo. 148v of the facsimile edition of the littera Florentina.
397 See edn. of 1553, I, p. 238; according to Gebauer-Spangenberg 1776, p. 171, after this 
example was written in the littera Florentina, another person wrote an r, and after he read tonsor 
adebat changed it into tonsor habebat.
398 cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 191; see, e.g., Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Ottobon. lat. 1605, fo. 124r 
and Ms. Torino, Bibl. Naz., E. I.4, fo. 139v; more references are made by Gebauer in Gebauer-
Spangenberg 1776, p. 171.
399 Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Barb. lat. 1459, fo. 88r.
400 BT 2752/13; Mommsen agrees with this emendation, see Mommsen & Krüger 1962 
(editio maior), I, p. 280.
401 See ed. of Haloander (edn. of 1550, fo. 256v) and edition of H. a Porta (edn. of 1551, 
p. 700); also in edn. Contius 1576, col. 1061; a later edition of the Digestum Vetus (edn. 1581, 
p. 700) even reads tradebat; - According to H. Brenkman, Apparatus ad D. 9.2, note habebat (1) 
ad D. 9.2.11pr. (edn. Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 263), the word radebat was not only found by 
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The second peculiarity concerns the word adiecto. In the littera Florentina a letter 
‘a’ is missing, and so written as praecisadiecto.402 The edition of Torelli contains 
the same word (praecisAdiecto).403 Furthermore, an emendation is made in the 
littera Florentina. An ‘E’ is inserted by hand so one could read praecisadeiecto. In 
later editions also other different combinations exist, namely, praecisa adacto,404 
praecisa adiecto,405 praecisa deiecto406 and praecisa abiecto.407
 
A final peculiarity concerns the word illud. In the littera Florentina it was written 
as illum.408 However, the littera vulgata409 contains the word illud, as do also the 
later humanist editions of Haloander410 and Torelli411 and, according to Brenk-
man, other scholars earlier than Torelli. According to Brenkman and later also 
Gebauer-Spangenberg, the reading illum was a mistake.412 
Haloander, but also by Robertus Stephanus, Henricus a Porta and others.
402 See fo. 148v of the facsimile edition of the littera Florentina.
403 See edn. of 1553, I, p. 238.
404 Edn. Contius 1576, col. 1061; see also VIR I col. 1078. The reading adacto was also followed 
by the littera vulgata; see H. Brenkman, Apparatus ad D. 9.2, note adiecto (2) ad D. 9.2.11pr. (edn. 
Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 263f.). Later, J. Hoffmann (1710–1739) provided reasons for the 
preference for this reading in his  Meletematum ad Pandectas, ad D. 9.2, §6. The reading adiecto 
cultello is completely incompetent and against the Latin way of speaking; furthermore, it was 
not in accordance with the mind of Ulpian: the ball was not added to the razor, but to the hand 
of the barber. Hoffmann believed that in general the reading has to be cultello adacto, because of 
the connection with and the meaning of the verb adigere (which was used in combination with 
weapons by ‘old writers’ (veteres) such as in Vergilius, Aeneis, IX.431). This reading may also have 
come into being because of scribal errors.
405 cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 191; Mss. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 4450, fo. 93r (emendated reading); 
Padova, Bibl. Univ. 941, fo. 88v.
406 See, e.g., Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1406, fo. 80v. This manuscript has been 
qualified as the earliest manuscript of the vulgate tradition (second half of the 11th century), 
and thus closer to the vulgate archetype than any other manuscript; see Radding & Ciaralli 2007, 
p. 171, 197f. On Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1406, see extensively Radding & Ciaralli 2007, p. 
195ff., 215ff.
407 See, e.g., Ms. Leipzig, Univ. bibl. 873, fo. 76v and possibly also in Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 
4450, fo. 93r (first reading; before emendation into adiecto); more references are made by 
Gebauer in Gebauer-Spangenberg 1776, p. 171; - Also ‘abiecto’ in the vulgate edition with the 
Accursian gloss (in edn. of 1487, fo. 162v) and in the edition of Haloander (edn. 1550, fo. 256v).
408 See fo. 148v of the facsimile edition of the littera Florentina.
409 cf. edn. Kriegel 1844, p. 191.
410 See edn. of 1550, fo. 256v.
411  See edn. of 1553, I, p. 238.
412  See H. Brenkman, Apparatus ad D. 9.2, note illud ad D. 9.2.11pr. (edn. Van den Bergh/
Stolte 1977, p. 264); Gebauer-Spangenberg 1776, p. 171. 
chapter two80
2.5.2 Translation of D. 9.2.11pr.
Ulpian in his eighteenth book on the edict
Also Mela writes that413 if, when some people were playing with a ball, (some)
one hit the ball quite hard414 and knocked it against the hands of a barber,415 
who, as a result cuts the throat of a slave, whom the barber was holding,416 
with the positioned small knife,417 whichever of them is negligent (culpa) is 
held (liable) under the lex Aquilia. Proculus [says]418 the negligence (culpa) is 
the barber’s; and certainly if he was shaving there, where people customarily 
played games or where there often was crossover,419 this is attributed to him.420 
Although one could also not improperly say that421 he who entrusts himself to a 
barber who held his chair in a dangerous place, ought to blame this on himself.422
413  Feenstra/Spruit in: Spruit et al. 1994, p. 715, translate this passage as ‘Zo schrijft Mela 
dat’; - In a more interpretive way Thayer 1929, p. 13, who translates ‘Mela gives another case’; 
d’Ors et al. 1968, p. 381, do not translate Item.
414  In the Basilica text 60.3.11pr. [BT 2752/12-16], a Greek equivalent for the Latin word 
vehementius is missing. Interesting is the definite way of formulating the final phrase of this 
Basilica text: ‘even though one would say very correctly’ (εἰ καἰ τὰ μάλιστα καλῶς λέγει τις). 
415  According to the VIR II, col. 140, the verb ‘deicio’ means ‘proprie deorsum iacere’, in this 
case therefore to throw the ball downwards into the hands of the barber.
416 Feenstra/Spruit in: Spruit et al. 1994, p. 715: ‘die de barbier onder handen had’; 
differently Thayer 1929, p. 13: ‘the throat of the slave being shaved by the barber’; d‘Ors et al. 
1968, p. 381f.: ‘que a un esclavo al que el barbero estaba afeitando’; Otto, Schilling & Sintenis 1839 
(reprint 1984), p. 792: ‘… einen Sclaven rasierenden Barbiers’; Watson 1985: ‘whom the barber 
was shaving’; Schipani 2005, p. 241: ‘un servo che era dal barbiere’.
417  Feenstra/Spruit in: Spruit et al. 1994, p. 715: ‘door het reeds daarop geplaatste 
scheermes’; adiecto is not translated by d’Ors et al. 1968, p. 381f.; Otto, Schilling & Sintenis 1839 
(reprint 1984), p. 792: ‘dass durch die Bewegung des Messers …’; Watson 1985: ‘by the jerking of 
the razor’; Schipani 2005, p. 241: ‘dal rasoio ad essa accostato’; Scott 1973, p. 327, translates the 
previous passage as follows: ‘… the hand of the barber who is shaving at the time, in such a way 
that the throat of the latter is cut by the razor’.
418  Differently Otto, Schilling & Sintenis 1839 (reprint 1984), p. 792: ‘[hingegen sagt]’.
419 Thayer 1929, p. 13: ‘where there was heavy traffic’; Feenstra/Spruit in: Spruit et al. 1994, 
p. 715: ‘waar druk verkeer was’; Scott 1973, p. 327: ‘where there was much travel’; Otto, Schilling 
& Sintenis 1839 (reprint 1984), p. 792: ‘wo häufig Menschen vorübergingen’; Watson 1985: ‘where 
there was much going to and fro’; Schipani 2005, p. 241: ‘dove il passaggio era affolato’.
420 Slightly different Feenstra/Spruit in: Spruit et al. 1994, p. 715: ‘valt hem terecht een 
verwijt te maken’; d’Ors et al. 1968: ‘hay motivo para imputarle la responsabilidad’; Thayer 1929, 
p. 13: ‘he is partly responsible’; Scott 1973, p. 327: ‘he is in a certain degree responsible’; Otto, 
Schilling & Sintenis 1839 (reprint 1984), p. 792: ‘kann ihm Schuld beigemessen werden’.
421  Differently Thayer 1929, p. 13: ‘there is much to be said for the view’; d’Ors et al. 1968, p. 
382: ‘aunque también se dice acertamente que’.
422 See also Heumann & Seckel 1907 (reprint 1958), p. 486, s.v. queri: de se queri debere 
means ‘etwas sich selbst zuschreiben müssen’; no reference is, however, made to D. 9.2.11pr.; 
differently d’Ors et al. 1968, p. 382: ‘sólo él tiene la culpa’.
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2.5.3 Inscriptio 
The context of D. 9.2.11pr.
Just as D. 9.2.9.4, this fragment is derived from the eighteenth book of Ulpian’s 
commentary on the edict (of the praetor); see section 2.4.3. The text of D. 
9.2.11pr. was on the actio legis Aquiliae, because in a case where a slave is killed, 
the first chapter of the lex Aquilia is relevant.423 Lenel confirms that this text 
originally derives from a context of the lex Aquilia. In his Palingenesia, Lenel 
placed this fragment in book eighteen of Ulpian’s commentary on the edict, in 
the part dealing with the first chapter of the title on title Ad legem Aquiliam.424 
Also, the compilers of Justinian (527–565) incorporated this fragment in 
(Justinian’s) Digest under the title Ad legem Aquiliam (D. 9.2).
Mela
The fragment is written by Domitius Ulpianus,425 who cites Fabius Mela.426 
With regard to the latter’s life, no exact date of birth and death can be estab-
lished. However, some indications of time are found in fragments of the Digest. 
Ulpian cites Mela as an authority of an opinion of Aquilius Gallus (who was a 
contemporary of Cicero and was praetor in 86 BC);427 Ulpian also cites Mela 
as an authority of an opinion of Servius Sulpicius Rufus (ca. 105–43 BC).428 Ac-
cordingly, Mela must have lived after or in the same period as Aquilius Gallus 
and Servius Sulpicius Rufus. Because Ulpian first cites Mela and subsequently 
Proculus in D. 9.2.11pr., we can deduce that Mela lived prior to Proculus or that 
he was his contemporary.429 Finally, Africanus cites Mela in two fragments, D. 
46.3.39 and D. 50.16.207. Accordingly, Mela must have lived either in the same 
period as Africanus or just before. In scholarly literature it is generally accepted 
that Mela lived in the same time period as Labeo.430
The origin of Mela is uncertain. Possibly he came from Spain, or from another 
area influenced by the Celtics, especially Gallia Cisalpina. In any event, it is 
plausible that he did not come from Italy, i.e. the region south of the Po.431 Mela 
was literarily active during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius. No title of his 
423 See Gai. D. 9.2.2pr.
424 Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, II, col. 523f., pal. nr. 614. 
425 For a discussion about Domitius Ulpianus, see section 2.4.3.
426 Long 1870a, p. 1011; Brassloff 1909 (RE 6), col. 1830f.; Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 116.
427 Ulp. D. 19.1.17.6.
428 Ulp. D. 33.9.3.10.
429 Long 1870a, p. 1011.
430 ibid.; Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 116.
431  Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 116.
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work has remained. From Africanus D. 46.3.39 it becomes clear that the work 
of Mela mentioned by him consisted at least of ten books. Obviously, his works 
are directly or indirectly used by later authors, as becomes clear from their 
excerpts in the Digest (see, e.g., the above-mentioned fragments).
Proculus
The second jurist mentioned in this fragment is Proculus.432 Neither his nomen 
gentile nor his origin can be established with certainty.433 Proculus lived during 
the Principate; possibly he was born between 12 and 2 BC and he died after 
the year 66 AD.434 He was one of the first leaders of the school of the Procul(e)
iani, and after whom the school is also named. Proculus was a student of 
Nerva (pater) and succeeded him as head of the secta started by Labeo after 
Nerva (pater), who died in 33 AD.435 He lived in the same period as Nerva 
(filius). Proculus must have been an important jurist.436 Moreover, the fact 
that the school is named after him confirms that he must have been a jurist of 
importance in those days. Proculus’ most important work is the Epistolarum 
libri VIII, which was meant in the first place as a manual for educational 
purposes.437 Part of his work is indirectly handed down to us via Justinian’s 
Digest, through which 33 extracts from Proculus’ eight or eleven books of 
Epistulae have survived.438 Also, one fragment ex posterioribus Labeonis is thus 
handed down to us (D. 33.6.16).439
432 On Proculus, see Long 1870b, p. 541; Mayer-Maly 1957 (RE 45), col. 1234; Honoré 1962b, 
p. 472ff.; Krampe 1970, esp. p. 1ff.; Seidl 1973, p. 1227ff.; Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 123ff.
433 See on this topic the literature mentioned in the previous footnote.
434 Honoré 1962b, p. 485ff.; Spruit 1994, p. 169; see also Rodger 1972, p. 404 nt. 9; elaborated 
and slightly different Kunkel 1967 (reprint 2001), p. 126.
435 See also Pomp. D. 1.2.2.52.
436 This was the view of Pomp. D. 1.2.2.52 (‘sed Proculi auctoritas maior fuit, nam etiam 
plurimum potuit’).
437 Spruit 1994, p. 169.
438 According to the Index Florentinus, Proculus wrote eight books. However, according to 
D. 18.1.69 he wrote at least eleven books. See Long 1870b, p. 541; Mayer-Maly 1957 (RE 45), col. 
1234; Krampe 1970, p. 8.
439 On this fragment Mayer-Maly 1957 (RE 45), col. 1237f.
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2.5.4 Exegesis according to classical Roman law
Introduction: the case of D. 9.2.11pr.
The case concerns some people who were playing with a ball (pila).440 The 
pila was a little ball made of cloth rags, filled with hair or feathers, weighing 
about one kilogram. According to tradition, the ball was struck by hand only.441 
Near the place where people were playing, a barber set his chair. People of the 
lower classes were shaved by these itinerant barbers in the open air,442 while 
for wealthier people elegant barbershops were available.443 Romans, freeborn 
and slaves were frequently shaven after passing their youth. The barbers were 
street-seller barbers who travelled with chairs at race-tracks and market places, 
440 This was also the situation in the case described in Alfenus D. 9.2.52.4. The fact that the 
Romans played ball can be seen in Seneca, De beneficiis II.17.3-5; II.32; V.8.4; VII.18; on ball games 
in ancient Rome, see also McDaniel 1906, p. 121ff., and sources mentioned. He also discussed 
the different sorts of balls used by the Romans, the game trigon (see below) and the fragment of 
Varro Serapi as recorded by Nonius Marcellus, De compendiosa doctrina. II. De honestis et nove 
veterum dictis, 104.28-30 (see Lindsay 1964, I, p. 149: expulsim, dictum a frequenti pulsu. Varro 
Serapi: ‘recte purgatum scito, quom videbis Romae in foro ante lanienas pueros pila expulsim 
ludere’); see also gloss quis pila ad D. 9.2.11pr. in Gothofredus/Van Leeuwen 1663; McDaniel 1906, 
p. 125, questions the traditional view that these words signify ‘hitting repeatedly against a wall’; 
he argues that one can hardly doubt that the fronts of the butcher-shops, according to ancient 
fashion, were open; and that any play against whatever wallspace there may have been [on the 
supposition, for instance, that at some time in the day their fronts were boarded up; nt. 3] would 
have interrupted traffic; on the game which Brenkman called ‘il calcio’, see Brenkman, Apparatus 
ad D. 9.2, note pila (a) ad D. 9.2.11pr. (edn. Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 263). 
441 Wollschläger 1976, p. 132; see also Jansen 2002b, p. 204. On ball games in Rome, see 
also Mau 1896, col. 2832ff.; Norman Gardiner 1955, p. 230ff.; Reinmuth 1964, p. 817f.; Harris 
1972, p. 75ff.; Marquardt 1980, p. 841ff.; Schneider 1929, col. 1680ff. (sphaeristerium): especially 
the Comitium and Marsfield were favourite places to play ball; see Seneca, Epistulae 104.33 (in 
comitio pila lusit); Horatius, Sermones I.6.126; II.6.49 (Campus).
442 See also Wollschläger 1976, p. 133; - Already the humanist Marquardt Freher (1565–
1614) – on M. Freher, see, e.g., Stintzing 1880, p. 680ff., 736 – made the remark that Rome was 
a busy city in Antiquity and barbers would put their chairs on streets and public roads; see M. 
Freher, Verisimilium libri duo, ad D. 9.2.11pr. This is proven by some literary fragments mentioned 
by Freher; see Martialis, Epigrammata, VII.60(61).7-10 and Horatius, Epistulae, I.7.50ff., from 
which it clearly emerges that barbers shaved persons outside; this conclusion could also be 
inferred from Juvenalis, Satires, VI.214f. From Martialis’ Epigrams it appears that the grimy shop 
of the barber monopolised whole streets (together with the tavern keeper, the cook and the 
butcher) of Rome as one big shop. The Emperor Domitianus tried to change this situation in 
his municipal policy; in 92 AD he issued an edict in which he forbade stalls protruding into the 
street, thereby restoring the peace in the streets of Rome; see Ker 1979, p. 465; Shackleton Bailey 
1993, p. 127; Galán Vioque 2002, p. 354.
443 Carcopino 2002, p. 209ff.; also Wacke 1977, p. 13; 1979, p. 277; 1991, p. 363; Zimmermann 
1996, p. 1012; Knütel 2001, p, 355; on barbers, hairdressers and beard fashions in Antiquity, see 
Mau 1899, col. 3f., 30ff.; Marquardt 1980, p. 597ff., 604ff.; Blanck 1996, p. 67ff., p. 82ff.
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clearly to shave where people were present and/or passed by, in this way trying 
to maximise their profits.444 
When humanists tried to understand the context of the case of D. 9.2.11pr., 
G. Noodt remarked that a practice such as what occurred in this case was 
unknown in his own days and also quite unusual in the area where he lived. 
He even called D. 9.2.11pr. ‘an elegant example that did not occur very often’. 
However, he made the same remark that it used to be quite usual and com-
mon in Rome.445 Also U. Huber called the case ‘rare’.446 Later, J.L.E. Püttmann 
(1730–1796) even wrote that although some will laugh after reading the case 
of Article 146 CCC (the received version of the barber case),447 they will stop 
laughing after realising that the case really occurred in Rome (based on the 
text of D. 9.2.11pr. and the normal practice as it appears from the fragment of 
Martialis).448 
Obviously, in D. 9.2.11pr. the barber’s customer was someone from the first 
category (i.e. someone of the lower classes), viz. a slave. At a certain moment, 
one of the ball-players hit the ball quite hard. The ball hit the hands of the 
barber, who was engaged in shaving the beard of the slave449 and therefore 
holding a small knife in a certain position.450 As a consequence, the throat of 
the slave was cut and the slave died.
In the following legal conflict two persons were involved: the master of the 
slave and the barber. The barber was sued before the praetor and for this reason 
he consulted a jurist. The consultation obviously concerned the applicability of 
the actio legis Aquiliae. He probably asked whether he was liable and/or wheth-
er he was at fault (culpa). It is useful to remember that from the perspective of 
the litigating parties and their jurists/lawyers, the central question (quaestio) 
444 See U. Huber, Eunomia Romana, ad D. 9.2.11pr., nr. 2 (edn. 1724, p. 408).
445 G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII.  See also J. van der Linden, Annotatio 
ad Voet D. 9.2, nr. 17.
446 However, according to Huber, this case could be used (by analogy) to solve other cases; 
see U. Huber, Eunomia Romana, ad D. 9.2.11pr., nr. 1, p. 408: Casus in hoc loco l. xi. propositus, 
est historia sine dubio, rara quidem; sed cujus analogia ad alios similes extendi poterat: ideoque 
decisioni utiliter admovendus.
447 Art. 146 of the criminal code of Charles V will be discussed in chapter four.
448 J.L.E. Püttmann, Adversariorem juris universi, liber I, 16.6, p. 249f.
449 Many authors regard habebat as interpolated and believe that it has to be radebat; see, 
e.g., Longo 1958, p. 65; Von Lübtow 1961, p. 106; this conjugation is already used, in Greek, in B. 
60.3.11, as mentioned in section 2.5.1, on p. 79.
450 Also the words adiecto cultello are suspected as being interpolated; see Schulz 1954, 
p. 41; Longo 1958, p. 65; Von Lübtow 1971, p. 106 (a redundant gloss). According to Beseler 1930, 
p. 31, adiecto does not fit, and adiecto cultello should be between sic and servi. Furthermore, he 
qualifies adiecto cultello as superfluous. Differently Albanese 1950, p. 144, who does not consider 
it as an interpolation and who reminds us of the theme of strict interpretation of occidere; Longo 
1958, p. 65, also proposes to add alieni after servi (so it becomes sic alieni servi).
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of the conflict involves a matter of quality (status qualitatis).451 Three decisions 
of jurists were mentioned. The decisions were given in different times, as the 
jurists lived in different periods (as discussed before).452 Because a slave was 
killed, the first chapter of the lex Aquilia had to be applied. To hold someone li-
able under the lex Aquilia, the damage had to be the result of a direct act of  the 
wrongdoer. This would be the case, if he had committed the act directly with 
his body (corpore). Apparently the act, according to Ulpian, could be qualified 
as killing (occidere), but it is uncertain whether this also holds for the reply of 
Mela, as probably a part of Mela’s original text is missing.453 Possibly, as some 
authors suggest, Mela was discussing the question whether the action should 
be granted as an actio directa or as an actio in factum?454 In the part of Mela’s 
reply that was quoted by Ulpian, it seems as if there was sufficient causal con-
nection between the act of either the ball-player or the barber and the damage 
to justify an actio legis Aquiliae (directa).455
The decision of Mela
The decision of Mela, as summarised by Ulpian, was that in quocumque 
eorum culpa sit, eum lege Aquilia teneri. Some authors – mainly, although 
not exclusively, writing in the first half of the twentieth century – consider 
in quocumque eorum culpa sit as interpolated.456 The argument Mela used, 
namely, that whichever of them had culpa was liable under the lex Aquilia, 
can be considered to be obvious.457 By such a formulation a concrete decision 
451  See Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, V.10.38-40; - From the perspective of the judge, the 
question was, of course, whether the accused person should be condemned/punished or not.
452 According to MacCormack 1974, p. 215, the case of D. 9.2.11pr. was a stock and much 
discussed case in classical law; differently Zwalve 2008, p. 16, who argued that the example could 
have been derived from the standard cases used as materials in Roman schools for rhetoric, as it 
would be a typical case to practise in utramque partem dicere. As there is something to be said for 
all points of view, one can – unhindered by any knowledge – argue whatever one wants. 
453 MacCormack 1974, p. 223, states that the text probably has been preserved only in an 
abbreviated version: there is, according to MacCormack, no recorded final decision by Ulpian and 
the report of Mela and Proculus appears truncated; - See Kunkel 1929, p. 177f.; Ziliotto 2000, p. 136.
454 See Pollock 1929, p. 615; Kunkel 1929, p. 177f.; Lawson 1968, p. 88f.; also Albanese 1950, 
p. 144, believes the problem in this case was ‘la corporalità del danno’; already Powell 1951, p. 208, 
argues that whether the player or the barber had culpa, and thus was liable under the lex Aquilia, 
or not, it was a direct action. In the case of the barber, if he was liable at all, because the wound 
was inflicted by the instrument in his hand; in the case of the ball-player, the question could be 
relevant because it could have been evaluated that there was no direct contact between the ball-
player and the slave; see Powell 1951, p. 208 nt. 47.
455 MacCormack 1975, p. 48; Watson 1984, p. 242 nt. 4; Zimmermann 1996, p. 1011, however, 
notices that the ball-player could hardly have caused the damage directly (corpori), but then he 
only provides the question whether Mela was contemplating an actio in factum without answering 
it; - Differently Beseler 1930, p. 32.
456 Albertario 1923, p. 506f. nt. 4; Beseler 1930, p. 31; Albertario 1936, p. 87 nt. 1; Schulz 
1954, p. 42; Schipani 1969, p. 331f.; on this topic, see also Piro 2004, p. 91.
457 Rotondi 1922, p. 487, and Schipani 1969, p. 330, argue that it is possible that eum 
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is avoided.458 Besides, the fragment seems to have concerned the liability 
of the barber and of the slave, but not of the ball-player; strangely enough, 
because under the lex Aquilia the latter would be the first possible responsible 
person since the damage could not have occurred without his act. Possibly, 
Mela pointed this out and the compilers changed the text into in quocumque-
teneri: any of the people involved can be held responsible, depending on their 
negligence (culpa).459 
From the facts it became obvious that a number of people independently 
from each other contributed to the joint result that a slave was killed by their 
actions.460 Mela stated that whoever acted with culpa was liable under the lex 
Aquilia. The word eorum does not refer to the several ball-players,461 but just to 
one player, namely, the one who hit the ball, and to the barber.462 The phrase in 
in this text does not refer to quocumque but to the preceding quis (the ball-player). However, 
as they correctly state, it is not plausible that Mela first notices/uses the term culpa in order 
subsequently to exclude the legal importance of it; - ‘Wertlos’, according to Von Lübtow 1971, p. 
107. According to Von Lübtow, Mela would have given an actio in factum against the ball-player 
because there was no direct physical act. In that perspective, one has to see the fact that he 
suspected the words lege Aquilia as being a post-classical interpolation and wanted to replace 
them by in factum actione; see Von Lübtow 1971, p. 106f.
458 Rotondi 1922, p. 487.
459 ibid., p. 487f. According to Rotondi, in the actual redaction of the text the responsibility 
of the barber at the end is excluded in practice (see A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, ad D. 
9.2.11pr.). Differently Albanese 1950, p. 144, who argues that in quocumque eorum in the original 
text (the text without all interpolations) refers to one of the ball-players, and not to the ball-
player, barber or slave as could be understood from the actual text; also already Coppa-Zuccari 
1909, p. 32, argues that it was the ball-player who (according to Mela) was held by the lex 
Aquilia. The reference of eum to the ball-player emerges from the antithesis of the first part of 
the decision (eum Aquilia teneri) with the second, namely, the decision of Proculus (Proculus in 
tonsore esse culpam). Furthermore, Coppa-Zuccari rightly states that Mela, in his responsum, 
does not suppose that the barber shaved at a dangerous place (namely, one used for playing 
ball). However, this factor cannot be implicitly decisive for the exclusion of the negligence of the 
player and for the recognition of the negligence of the slave and the barber. 
460 Van den Heever 1944, p. 58.
461 See Schipani 1969, p. 331.
462 Albanese 1950, p. 144, argues that the original (genuine) text did not allow the actio 
legis Aquiliae against the tonsor. The barber did act corpore because of adiecto cultello, but the 
ball-player activated the act. After stating that no actio legis Aquiliae was possible against the 
tonsor, the text mentioned the possibility of an actio utilis against the ball-player. Actio utilis, 
because the act was performed non corpore; the compilers changed it into the normal action 
based on the lex Aquilia and thus deleted the related relevant question of the corporality of 
the act/the question of occidere; differently Schipani 1969, p. 332; Watson 1984, p. 242 nt. 4; - 
According to Powell 1951, p. 208, the liability of the ball-player was considered by the jurists; 
but it would not have been considered as an alternative to that of the barber, in spite of the 
ambiguity in in quocumque eorum culpa sit. If both were negligent, the master of the slave has 
an action against both; see Lawson 1968, p. 89; Powell 1951, p. 208: ‘The fact that we do not know 
the decision reached by the jurists about the liability of the ball player, does not mean that his 
liability can be ruled out on the ground that the culpa of the barber, if proved, would exclude the 
liability of the ball player. Proof of the culpa of the barber would make the barber liable, but the 
ball player could still be liable for his own act.’
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quocumque – teneri seems to mean that either the ball-player or the barber, but 
not both, might be liable.463 It seems to indicate that Mela held the essential 
question to be one of culpa, but also that he felt unable to determine whether 
culpa should be imputed to the ball-player or to the barber.464 Whether the 
barber or the ball-player had culpa and was thus liable must have been the 
main problem for the three jurists.465 The remainder of the existing fragment, 
however, is only about the liability of the barber and the ‘contributory negli-
gence’ of the injured person, while the ball-player is not mentioned anymore.
Some authors argue that Mela considered the ball-player to be negligent.466 The 
first indication would be the use of the comparativus vehementius,467 instead 
of the more neutral vehementer.468 However, the fact that the ball-player threw 
463 MacCormack 1975, p. 48; differently Wollschläger 1976, p. 131; Longo 1958, p. 65, has 
replaced the phrase in quocumque eorum culpa sit, eum lege Aquilia teneri by tonsorem lege 
Aquilia non teneri; Longo, just like Rotondi 1922, p. 487f., qualified all the references to the motive 
of culpa as interpolated as well as the foundations of decisions based on the motive of culpa. 
Therefore, he also considers another part of the fragment, esse culpam - de se queri debere, as 
interpolated; see Longo 1958, p. 64; already Beseler 1930, p. 31, regarded culpa sit and esse culpam 
as interpolated; see also Von Lübtow 1971, p. 116, who deleted the references to culpa as post-
classical glosses (he deleted in quocumque eorum culpa sit and replaces in tonsorem esse culpam 
et sane by et tonsorem teneri).
464 MacCormack 1975, p. 48; Wacke 1977, p. 14; on this topic, see also Ziliotto 2000, p. 135f.; 
- As Ulpian referred to the view of Proculus, who was a younger jurist than Mela, one can deduce 
that Proculus’ view (that the barber was liable) was not defended by Mela; see Krüger 1912, p. 160 
(Proculus berichtigt Mela) and Knütel 2001, p. 356; the latter argues that if that is true, it is not 
unprobable that Mela already pleaded for the third solution as descibed in D. 9.2.11pr.
465 According to Kunkel 1929, p. 177, the fact that this case concerned more contributing 
acts to the rising damage connects it with the following texts (D. 9.2.11.1ff.); - According to Piro 
2004, p. 92, the case as described by Mela, and as discussed by the three jurists, is complicated 
by a set of variables: the excessive behaviour of the player, the negligent behaviour of the barber 
in placing his chair at such a dangerous spot, the superficiality of the client in not having 
considered the risk; therefore the relevance of the culpable component plays a crucial role in the 
dynamics of the event.
466 Tassin 1912, p. 50; Jansen 2002a, p. 104; 2002b, p. 204. See also De Robertis 2000, p. 74; 
differently Knütel 2001, p. 355f., who argued that from the word item it can be inferred that the 
same basic idea as in the previously discussed case of the javelin thrower applies here: sports 
activities at a sports field (apart from the intentional infliction of harm) do not lead to the 
reproach of negligence, even in the case when in the heat of the battle or in trying to measure 
one’s own strength, a third party is injured.
467 According to Longo 1958, p. 64, 66, vehementius is interpolated and has to be deleted 
from the fragment. This is understandable when following his theory. As stated in note 463, 
Longo wanted to change the text of D. 9.2.11pr. so that Mela explicitly stated that in this case 
the barber was not held liable by the lex Aquilia (‘… tonsorem lege Aquilia non teneri’). Longo 
is, namely, of the opinion that the original classical fragment could not have permitted an actio 
utilis against the ball-player (differently in that perspective Albanese 1950, p. 144, who argues 
that the fragment could have permitted an actio utilis against the ball-player); therefore, the word 
vehementius has no important role anymore and has to be deleted; - On the word vehementius, see 
also Cannata 1966, p. 15; according to Del Castillo Santana 1994, p. 31, vehementius corresponds 
with tam vehementer, which appears in other texts (see Ulp. D. 19.2.13.4; Gai. Inst. 3.219).
468 Jansen 2002a, p. 104; 2002b, p. 204; - The case once described by Mela is entirely 
attributed to Ulpian in the Greek text of the Basilica. Furthermore, as stated above, the word 
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the ball rather hard, possibly somewhat more forcibly than was (normally) 
customary, does not necessarily constitute culpa. This was something that 
could be expected in the neighbourhood of fields where people were used 
to playing ball. In a game, it is normal that the ball flies out of the play area. 
Spectators of plays have to take into account such circumstances near a 
(playing) field.469 A second indication can be found in the nature of the ball 
game. Possibly it was a game called Trigon,470 played with nine people who 
threw or hit balls to each other (more than one ball at the same time). It was a 
hard and fast game.471 Therefore, players could be blamed if they did not take 
enough care when choosing an appropriate place to play. Less likely, because 
it seems contrary to tradition which stated that the ball (pila) was struck by 
hand only, it could also have been a hockey-like game that was played using 
sticks.472 This may follow from the words pila percussa of which the literal 
meaning is ‘hit ball’.473
The decision of Proculus
The second jurist, Proculus, only stated that the negligence (culpa) was to be 
imputed to the barber. It is not likely that Proculus would have decided this 
way easily, i.e. without any consideration on the specific circumstances of 
the case.474 Proculus (and Mela) would have determined whether there was 
culpa, and hence liability, by an assessment of the particular state of events in 
the particular case. The question asked was: did these circumstances allow a 
constitution of culpa?475 Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the reason ad-
vehementius was deleted. Thereby, a change in perspective was made: not the question whether 
the player or the barber was liable, as was the case in Mela’s decision, but the question whether 
the barber or the client was liable becomes the core issue. See also Schipani 1969, p. 329f. In 
addition, nor is the name of Proculus mentioned in the fragment. The whole fragment is 
attributed to Ulpian, who believes that the barber is liable, even though he mentioned that 
another opinion circulates, namely, that the person who entrusted himself to the barber was 
held responsible.
469 Wacke 1977, p. 14; 1979, p. 277; 1991, p. 364; Castresana 2001, p. 103.
470 See Radke 1939, col. 129; a different view is taken by Zwalve 2008, p. 15, who argued that 
it could have been soccer (follis).
471  Jansen 2002a, p. 104; 2002b, p. 204.
472 See Harris 1972, p. 99ff.
473 Wacke 1979, p. 277; 1991, p. 363; Castresana 2001, p. 103.
474 The ball was made of cloth rags filled with hair or feathers, weighed about a kilo and 
was struck by hand. Injuries would not be mortal; possibly this was such a circumstance; the 
killing was made possible due to the circumstance that a barber was shaving nearby; also see 
Wollschläger 1976, p. 132.
475 MacCormack 1974, p. 216; - According to Hausmaninger 1996b, p. 252, the barber 
apparently had – being an expert – special duties of care, and he rather than the ball player 
had to recognize the danger, to warn him and to evade it. Ulpian only agreed with Proculus for 
the case in which the barber starts to shave his customer at a place where one usually played or 
where there was heavy traffic.
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vanced by Ulpian for the liability of the barber (et sane – imputetur)476 also was 
already the reason provided by Proculus.477 As a consequence, it is uncertain 
whether this part of the text has to be considered Proculus’s or Ulpian’s. It is 
possible that the decision was made by Proculus and that Ulpian argued differ-
ently, namely, that the slave should not have entrusted himself to a barber who 
placed his chair in such a dangerous place.478 However, it seems more plausible 
that the reason Proculus decided as he did was deleted by the compilers and 
that the reason included in D. 9.2.11pr. was the reason provided by Ulpian. The 
final part of the text (quamvis - queri debere) will be discussed below.
When taking into consideration another decision of Proculus, D. 9.2.7.3, in this 
case an action against the barber would be excluded since the barber was the 
one qui impulsus est.479 In that case a person injured another person because 
of a third person who pushed the first one. Proculus held that the one who was 
pushed (qui impulsus est) was not liable, because that person did not unlaw-
fully inflict any damage. However, in the barber case, Proculus would have 
evaluated the specific circumstances of the case differently and considered 
the barber to be negligent.480 In particular he considered the position of the 
476 As to this part of the text (et sane – imputetur), Beseler 1913 p. 114, suggested two 
interpolations. He holds the view that between sane – si two words have disappeared, namely, 
‘ita est’. He also argues that the words est quod ei imputetur are inserted by Tribonian (or by 
someone earlier than him); differently Schipani 1969, p. 334, who also discusses the phrase est 
sane-imputetur.
477 An affirmative view seems to emerge from Ziliotto 2000, p. 138, and Piro 2004, p. 
104, 123, who present this argument as Proculus’. Furthermore, Piro argues that Ulpian did not 
technically provide something new, but limited himself to connecting to the opinion of Proculus 
by underlining the unforgiveability of the one who let himself be shaved by a barber who put 
his chair in such a dangerous place. In fact, she argues that Ulpian’s contribution went in the 
direction of a more thorough investigation into the conduct underlying the causal chain.
478 See, e.g., Paschialidis 2008, p. 352f., who adds that the doctrine of contributory 
negligence would bar recovery. He adds that Proculus’ view appears to be in tune with the view 
of Aristotle that it is impossible to treat oneself injustly. Thus in Proculus’ view an action is 
granted against the barber who, although acting justly, had committed an injustice.
479 Schipani 1969, p. 332. He mentions another possibility, namely, a comparison 
(analogy) with another decision of Proculus, namely, D. 9.2.27.11; according to Van den Heever 
1944, p. 58, Proculus holds the view that the barber is liable, since he cut the slave’s throat 
(occidere), negligently, albeit inadvertently – unlike the mere pulsus (as in D. 9.2.7.3); - On 
this topic, see also Piro 2004, 91ff., p. 104f., 141ff. She argues that in D. 9.2.11pr. the (denial of 
liability of the ball-player) and the attribution of responsability to the barber is not made by a 
mechanical application of the principle of (necessary) direct causality, but an investigation, in 
order to achieve a certain traceability of the conduct of the event, needs to be supplemented by 
an assessment of behavioural patterns (of the actors in the case) that have contributed to the 
determination of the damage.
480 See also Piro 2004, p. 142f., and esp. nt. 277, who argues: ‘nella sua valutazione il giurista 
abbia esteso la riflessione alle circostanze concrete relative alle due fattispecie, ritenendo di 
speciale natura la posizione del barbiere – alla cui perizia col rasoio il cliente si affida totalmente 
– che deve mostrare un’attenzione per la situazione in sé che non trova corrispondente ne caso 
della caduta per spinta altrui; ne conseguirebbe, cosí, che l’agere del barbiere è stato un agere 
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barber who shaved in a dangerous place and the fact that erroneous throws 
can be made (by mistake) during any ball game. Finally, it is not certain what 
kind of action Proculus would have allowed against the barber, an actio legis 
Aquiliae or an actio in factum.481 A solution to the latter cannot be found in the 
fragment handed down to us. 
The decision of Ulpian
Finally, Ulpian agrees with Proculus, but limits the possibility of negligence 
of the barber in a way that if the barber was shaving in a place where people 
were used to playing or where there was a lot of crossover, he indeed was to 
blame.482 This can probably be explained in such way that Ulpian wanted to let 
the existence of culpa on the side of the barber depend on the circumstances of 
the case.483 Although, Ulpian continues, it is not improper to say that whoever 
entrusts himself to a barber working with his chair in a dangerous place, ought 
to blame himself.484 Some authors deduce from this that Ulpian did not want 
to exclude a third possibility under certain circumstances. The injured has a 
duty to preserve himself from damage.485
Moreover, some Romanists regarded the whole phrase quamvis-finis as 
spurious or interpolated.486 The barber cannot be relieved from his liability due 
to contributory negligence of the slave, because not the slave but his master 
was the injured party.487 In any event, the fragment ipsum de se queri debere is 
considered to be interpolated.488 The slave can no longer be blamed for what 
iniuria, colposo, e dunque sanzionabile in via diretta [references deleted, EvD]; mentre nel 
comportamento del soggetto caduto rovinosamente su di un altro può non ravvisarsi iniuria.’
481 MacCormack 1975, p. 48f.; on this topic also Ziliotto 2000, p. 138.
482 De Robertis 2002, p. 189, argues that it concerned an objective liability based on the 
‘temerarietà nell’esposizione a rischio’, namely, that the barber placed his sella tonsoria in a place 
of sports competitions and in the course of carriages; Monro 1898, p. 14, suggests that the phrase 
ubi transitus frequens erat concerned the players themselves or else that the writer is for the 
moment not thinking about the game at all. On this phrase also Lawson 1968, p. 89.
483 Also Kunkel 1929, p. 178. According to Powell 1951, p. 211, it is also possible that Ulpian 
gave alternative reasons for the barber’s culpa.
484 To come to such a conclusion one has to make certain assumptions, as already rightly 
stated by Pollock 1929, p. 616. The danger had to be equally obvious to the barber as to the slave. 
Consequently, the game, as a condition of imputing culpa to either of them, had to be carried 
on in an accustomed and convenient place; Schulz 1954, p. 41f., marks this whole part, et sane – 
debere, as an interpolation. 
485 Jansen 2002b, p. 205; reference is made to Pomp. D. 50.17.203.
486 Beseler 1922, p. 540; also Cannata 1971, p. 8, mentions this part as an alteration (a 
glossema). According to Schipani 1969, p. 328, 419ff., it is a post-classical or Byzantine reflection, 
a (scholastical) gloss.
487 Beseler 1922, p. 540; differently Schulz 1954, p. 42.
488 Beseler 1930, p. 31; Von Lübtow 1971, p. 107 (naïve gloss); differently Mayer-Maly 1974, 
p. 130; Wollschläger 1976, p. 131.
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happened to him, since he was dead.489 Mayer-Maly argued differently. Even 
after someone’s death, it was possible to ascribe to him certain acts as well as 
contributory negligence (Mitverschulden).490 Furthermore, it would still be 
possible to ascribe the acts of a slave as well as his negligence to the master 
of that slave. That would be in conformity with the general principles that 
governed the relationship between slaves and their masters in those days.491
Unlike what is commonly affirmed, the words de se queri debere plausibly have 
a more neutral meaning.492 Ulpian probably adopted these words from Gaius, 
especially from his Res cottidianae.493 Ulpian more often used a different phrase 
to indicate the same, viz. sibi imputare debet, but in D. 9.2.11pr. he used de se 
queri debet. Despite the fact that the meaning of the words de se queri debere 
was the same in both Gaius’ and Ulpian’s works, it cannot be concluded with 
certainty that Ulpian followed Gaius.494 In D. 9.2.11pr. the phrase ipsum de se 
queri debere is only used in the metaphorical sense of the word. Just as sibi ibi 
imputare,495 it means that the slave killed was to be blamed for that himself.
Since the negligence of the slave had to be (legally) imputed to the master, it 
was the master himself who had to complain only to himself about the damage 
which came about as a result of the imprudence of his slave. 
Interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr.: causal connection (I)
Various attempts were made to interpret the last part of D. 9.2.11pr. Firstly, 
some authors explain this fragment with a theory of causation.496 Which act 
489 See Beseler 1930, p. 31; Von Lübtow 1971, p. 107, suggests replacing ipsum de se queri 
debere with dominum servi lege Aquilia agere non posse. However, Von Lübtow also argues that 
est quod ei imputetur: quamvis nec illud male dicatur is interpolated and suggests replacing it with 
sed ergo puto. Furthermore, he even wants to add the word servus after tonsori and to delete the 
following quis. The latter part was earlier suspected of being interpolated as already Beseler 1930, 
p. 30, wanted to change this part, however, slightly different from Von Lübtow, as according to 
Beseler se quis has to be servus quis suum.
490 Mayer-Maly 1976, p. 248; according to Luig 1969, p. 193f., from the words est quod – 
male dicatur one can deduce that Ulpian balanced between upon whomever of the two persons 
(barber or slave) the responsibility fell. The faults of both were considered; it was a problem of 
‘konkurrierenden Verschuldens’; differently Aumann 1964, p. 6f.; Wollschläger 1976, p. 134.
491 Mayer-Maly 1976, p. 248.
492 Also Wollschläger 1976, p. 133f.
493 Mayer-Maly 1974, p. 130; 1976, p. 236ff. See on this expression in the sources of Gaius: 
Grupe 1897, p. 219; Kübler 1921, p. 534; Kunkel 1925, p. 288 nt. 1; Wieacker 1934, p. 70.
494 Mayer-Maly 1974, p. 130.
495 cf. Heumann & Seckel 1907 (reprint 1958), p. 253, s.v. imputare: imputare means 
‘jemandem etwas anrechnen’, ‘jemandem zur Schuld an-/zurechnen’; this is a favourite 
expression of Ulpian’s; see Medicus 1962, p. 324 nt. 16; Luig 1969, p. 203 nt. 84; on this topic also 
Aumann 1962, p. 19 nt. 2.
496 Differently MacCormack 1982, p. 277ff. (‘by emphasizing the consideration of fault, the 
jurist is able to avoid a difficult causal problem’); see also Piro 2004, p. 91f. (discussion of various 
views in secondary literature).
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precisely has determined the slave’s death? At first sight one would say the act 
of the barber. However, the nexus would be broken if some other cause, in the 
absence of which the damage would not have occurred, intervened between 
the fault (culpa) of the defendant and the damage.497
Interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr.: causal connection (II)
There is another way of explanation, which is different, but nevertheless 
somehow connected to the previous. It can be argued that the true explanation 
of D. 9.2.11pr. is that where the negligent action of two persons jointly caused 
the death of one of them, the Romans were reluctant to regard the result as 
imputable to the survivor, since the inference of a causal connection between 
the survivor’s conduct and the death had been shaken (see Paul. D. 9.2.45.3).498 
Interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr.: causal connection (III)
A final, slightly different, but related interpretation is that it was the customer 
who had the last opportunity to avoid the accident by taking reasonable care, 
and should therefore be held liable.499 His intervention would break the chain 
of causation that linked the negligence of the barber to the injury.500
Interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr.: concurrence of negligence
Secondly, some argued that the text reflects a theory based on an idea of 
concurrence of negligence. Two persons acted with culpa. However, there 
was no such thing as a division of liability in Roman law. This seems to be an 
unsolvable problem, because one of the parties involved would have to bear 
full responsibility.501 Was there really a comparison of faults of both persons? 
According to Aumann, there was not. He is of the opinion that any fault of the 
injured party leads to a denial of liability of the party that caused the injury.502 
497 Cohen 1956, p. 324; Buckland, McNair & Lawson 1974, p. 372f.; Buckland & Stein 2007, p. 587.
498 Van den Heever 1944, p. 58. He adds that while the action was purely penal, the 
tendency was to excuse acts which unexpectedly had fatal results; when the action became 
mainly reipersecutory this reluctance disappeared and those who jointly caused the loss were 
jointly and severally liable.
499 See also Monro 1898, p. 14f.
500 Zimmermann 1996, p. 1012.
501 Schipani 1969, p. 420; see also, differently, Del Castillo Santana 1994, p. 30f., who does 
not see a concurrence of culpa; this would be contrary to the decision of Mela in this case and to 
the decision of Ulpian in D. 9.2.9.4, from which it can be concluded that only one of the persons 
is culpable; see also Wacke 1991, p. 364; on this topic also Corbino 2008, p. 176ff., writing on p. 
178 that ‘la discussione segue un logica che tende ad individuare – tra i possibili – colui al quale 
l’evento va imputato. Il concorso di colpa si risolve con un giudizio di prevalenza’.
502 See Aumann 1964, p. 18ff.; according to Aumann 1964, p. 7, the reason that the liability of 
the wrongdoer is cancelled in D. 9.2.11pr. is because of the fact that the slave carelessly brings himself 
into a dangerous situation (if foreseeable); he neglects to avoid the damage (cf. Paul. D. 9.2.31).
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Other scholars, however, argue differently and believe a comparison related to 
the question of whose negligence is  preponderant, has to be made.503 In this 
view, a little fault would not cause a denial of liability.
Interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr.: culpae compensatio
Thirdly, some authors advanced the idea that (the last phrase of) the text is an 
example of culpae compensatio.504 When both the wrongdoer and the injured 
were at fault (culpa), the injured party could not obtain an actio (and so the 
wrongdoer was not ‘liable’, or maybe more precisely, would not have to pay 
any poena). Because of the negligence of the injured the wrongdoer was not 
seen as ‘schuldvoll causal’.505 The inattentiveness of the wrongdoer would be 
compensated by the inattentiveness of the injured.506 In secondary literature 
authors have argued that the true legal basis of culpa-compensation is that 
the neglegentia of the injured questions the causal connection between the 
culpa of the wrongdoer and the damnum.507 The barber is not liable because 
of the act of the slave, who entrusted himself to a barber in loco periculoso, 
eliminating the causal connection between the throwing of the ball and the 
accident of the slave.508 However, someone is in culpa or he is not; this question 
503 See Luig 1968, p. 194f.; on this topic also Wacke 1991, p. 364; Zimmermann 1996, p. 1012; 
Travis Laster 1996, p. 213f.; Castresana 2001, p. 104; Kaser & Knütel 2003, p. 221; Jansen 2007, p. 658f.
504 Pernice 1867, p. 60; Grüber 1886, p. 33, 229, 284; Levison 1891, p. 44f.; Wendt 1892, 
p. 152; Endemann 1893, p. 57; Ruhm 1898, p. 13f.; Coppa-Zuccari 1909, p. 31ff.; Tassin 1912, p. 53; 
Rossi Massela 1951, p. 189ff.; Schulz 1954, p. 41ff.; Von Lübtow 1971, p. 106f., 136; Kaser 1975, p. 355, 
nt. 57; differently Plog 1896, p. 60f.; Monro 1898, p. 14; Keirse 2003, p. 21; - See also Zitelmann 
1925, p. 55, 57; Longo 1958, p. 65f.; Scott 1984, p. 168. According to Albanese 1950, p. 145, it is not 
possible to establish whether the criterion of culpae compensatio which emerges from D. 9.2.11pr. 
is classical or not. According to Van den Heever 1944, p. 58, in this case there could be no culpa-
compensation because the slave is not a party to the suit, nor does a right of action devolve from 
him upon his master; however, the act of the slave preceded the act of the barber. Following 
the theory of the causal connection that would be broken, the last act had to be qualified as the 
cause. It is therefore not explicable why the barber would not be liable. Maybe the Roman jurists 
also excluded the liability of the wrongdoer if the act of the injured was the indirect cause. See 
Van Nierop 1905, p. 34.
505 Pernice 1895, p. 98.
506 Pernice 1867, p. 61. The Roman jurists covered such comparison by only questioning 
the culpa of the wrongdoer. They denied the culpa both in cases when there was no causal 
connection despite the negligence of the wrongdoer, as also when there was no negligence at all; 
see Pernice 1895, p. 98f.
507 Pernice 1867, p. 60; see also Mommsen 1853,  p. 157, 164; Rossi Masella 1951, p. 193, who 
doubted this interpretation because - should the nexus also have been broken by the injured’s 
negligence if the wrongdoer acted intentionally?; differently Coppa-Zuccari 1909, p. 33, Wollschläger 
1976, p. 124f. For an overview of the different theories on the foundation of culpa-compensation, see 
Von Leyden 1902, p. 22ff.; Rossi Masella 1951, p. 192ff.; differently Lawson 1968, p. 89.
508 Pernice 1867, p. 60; Von Bar 1971, p. 123; - According to Coppa-Zuccari 1909, p. 33, de se 
queri debere does not mean that the slave has to impute the damage exclusively to himself; such 
an interpretation would be in contradiction to the phrase ‘sane, si ibi tondebat’.  It only means 
that due to the negligence of the injured, the possibility of an actio legis Aquiliae is excluded, and 
the responsibility of the barber is excluded.
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cannot be answered ex post.509 Because one person (wrongdoer or injured) is 
in culpa, that does not mean that the other person is not.510 Besides, the text 
does not at all discuss two culpae, as will be discussed below.
As stated above, it is probable that more recent scholars have invented and 
tried to attribute the theory of culpae compensatio to the Roman jurists, and 
have attempted to force that theory into the Roman sources. Probably, Roman 
law, both classical and Justinian law, did not know cases of compensation of 
culpa.511 Only fragment D. 9.2.11pr. could be examined for the existence of the 
use of this theory in jurisprudence. However, it is evident that for the three 
jurists culpa could only be imputed to one of the persons involved. In particular 
Ulpian, who might have been dependent on a more antique source (quamvis 
nec illud male dicatur), who is the only one who envisaged negligence on 
the side of the victim, did not approach the problem in the sense that it was 
necessary to verify whether both parties were negligent (culpa) but rather to 
raise the question of who of the two parties (wrongdoer or the injured) acted 
culpably (culpa).512 Mela and Proculus did not consider the negligence of the 
injured  at all. 
Interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr.: assumption of risk
Fourthly, an exclusion of delictual liability could be based on an assumption 
of risk.513 First, Ulpian holds the barber liable; however, he adds that another 
solution would also be defensible (si in loco ... queri debere). In that case, 
apparently under special circumstances (e.g. contempt of the warning of the 
barber), an act of the injured at his own risk (Handeln auf eigene Gefahr) could 
be accepted.514 It is not clear whether this has to be interpreted as consent to 
potential damages or as assumption of risk.515 The reasoning for the last solution 
509 Levison 1891, p. 44.
510 ibid., p. 45, where Levison argues that the culpa of the slave could be qualified as ‘das 
überwiegende Moment’. The denial of compensation is only based on the ‘schuldhafte Tätigkeit’ 
of the injured, so in correspondence with the maxim of D. 50.17.203.
511  See Valditara 1994, p. 862, and on this topic also the literature mentioned.
512  Valditara 1994, p. 862.
513  Thayer 1929, p. 67; Powell 1951, p. 212; Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 30; Travis Laster 1996, 
p. 212; Looschelders 1999, p. 12; Castresana 2001, p. 76; - According to Valditara 1994, p. 862, the 
decision of Ulpian implicated the awareness of risk at the side of the customer and by this his 
implicit acceptance. The hypothesis in the decision of Ulpian is not unlike that of the boxer or 
wrestler who accepted the possibility of damaging effects of his actions; see also Mayer-Maly 
1974, p. 130, 134; also Lawson 1968, p. 89.
514  Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 30; the behaviour of the slave (‘Handeln auf eigene Gefahr’) 
could be imputed to his master; see Mayer Maly 1976, p. 247ff.
515  Wollschläger 1976, p. 133; Travis Laster 1996, p. 212, distinguishes between assumption 
of risk in its primary and secondary form. In the former, the customer evaluated the situation 
and accepted the risks inherent in the activity, effectively saying that the level of safety that the 
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is that because the injured placed himself in danger, the duty of care-taking on 
the side of the wrongdoer is removed (Risikoübernahme).516 D. 9.2.11pr. in such 
a case would give an example of a person acting at his own risk, exactly as in 
Paul. D. 9.2.28pr.-1, in which it is stated that a plaintiff is barred if he could have 
avoided the danger.517 The wrongdoer, who did not give a warning,518 is released 
from his liability if the injured was aware or could have been aware of the risk. 
 By availing himself of the services of this specific barber, it can even be 
argued that the customer voluntarily exposed himself to the risk that the 
shaving might cause an injury. It is this aspect of assumption of risk that made 
it unreasonable to grant an actio legis Aquiliae to the plaintiff.519 Neither the 
barber nor the injured had therefore been at fault; both acted in a somewhat 
risky way and therefore had to bear the consequences.520 One could object 
that it was not the master of the slave who placed himself in the chair of the 
barber, but his slave. Could the slave just pass on his act and the risk he took to 
his master? Indeed,521 as the master constantly had to bear this risk, also when 
no barber was involved.
barber provided was acceptable. In this case, neither the barber nor the customer would be at 
fault: the customer made a rational evaluation with regard to the risk, and the barber provided 
what the customer wanted. In the latter, the customer’s acceptance of the risk of being shaved 
at such a dangerous place was so unreasonable that he was effectively to blame for his injury. 
The barber was negligent, too. This secondary form functions as contributory negligence: both 
parties are to blame, blocking the tracing of causation to the barber; therefore, the master of the 
slave cannot recover his damages.
516 Also Wacke 1979, p. 277; 1991, p. 364 and Castresana 2001, p. 103f., interpret this fragment 
with the criterion of anticipation of danger. The barber should have foreseen the danger, even 
though he was used to exercising his profession in the vicinity of a game or some other crowded 
place. However, an argument against the liability of the barber could be that it was the slave’s 
own fault if he had entrusted himself to a barber who put his chair in such a dangerous spot, 
since, if the barber could have anticipated the danger, the same could be expected from the slave.
517  In the same sense Hausmaninger 1996a, p. 30.
518  One could ask whether or not the barber should have warned the customer of the 
danger. According to Zwalve 2008, p. 18, this question is even more acute in Roman society 
because a barber could (sometimes) have known that he was shaving someone else’s property 
and that he therefore had a duty of care (zorgplicht) towards the owner of the slave (which is 
independent from the acceptance of risk on the part of the slave). Zwalve 2008, p. 18, brought 
this duty to warn of imminent danger in Roman law in immediate connection with the general 
duty of care (see D. 9.2.31).
519  Wollschläger 1976, p. 133; Zimmermann 1996, p. 1013; Castresana 2001, p. 77; Jansen 
2002b, p. 208f.; support can be found in another text, namely, D. 9.2.7.4.
520 Wollschläger 1976, p. 133; Zimmermann 1996, p. 1013.
521  Also according to Mayer-Maly, this question has to be answered positively. The 
inattentiveness of the slave harms his owner. Mayer-Maly argues that this is a modification of 
the ‘Argumentationsfigur’ de se queri debet; see Mayer-Maly 1974, p. 130; Travis Laster 1996, p. 
213, mentioned also the possible interpretation of reading Ulpian’s final statement as a result of 
contractual liability. The slave who engaged a barber’s services for money created a contract of 
locatio conductio; such an option has, however, no textual basis in the text nor does the context 
of the fragment (Palingenesia) give rise to such an interpretation.
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Interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr.: determinant role of culpa
Fifthly, one could argue that negligence (culpa), in the context of the lex 
Aquilia, played the role of a determinant of liability. In the law of delict, the 
concept of culpa had a causal as well as an evaluative role. The case of the 
barber is the best example of the causal role, which mirrors the function of 
blame in Antiphon’s Second Tetralogy (as discussed in section 2.4.4).522 The 
first part of the fragment, attributed to Mela, gives no concrete clue as to which 
party is liable in this case. Mela only stated that the person who was at fault 
was liable. According to Ibbetson, this is very much the common assumption 
behind the speeches of Antiphon, namely, that blameworthiness (culpa) was 
the scalpel that cut through cases of causal ambiguity. The other two Roman 
jurists, however, said who was at fault, Proculus that it was the barber while 
Ulpian tried to reason why this might have been so. To which of the possible 
causes the cutting of the slave’s throat should be imputed? Subsequently, 
Ibbetson stated that a concrete consequence of the approach was the general 
principle of Pomponius in D. 50.17.203;523 in classical Roman law, however, 
this would not apply, presuming this was no general principle but part of a 
concrete case (concerning the law of legacies) as explained in the second 
section of this chapter (2.2).
Probably this fragment also dealt with the culpa requirement and contained 
a specification of culpa for an individual situation. In that perspective it is 
useful to take a closer look at the manner in which the argument of Ulpian 
is presented. Ulpian considers a number of specific situations: whether the 
barber shaved in or near a place where ball games were customarily played 
or where passers-by frequently crossed over, or whether it was the slave who 
entrusted himself to a barber who put his chair in a dangerous place.524 If the 
barber set up his business in close proximity to a dangerous place, namely, a 
ground where people frequently played games, he had culpa and was account-
able for the death of his customer. By doing so a careful attempt was made to 
draw a line: no fault would be attributable to the barber if he did not shave in 
a place where people were used to playing games or where people frequently 
crossed over.525 The reply of Ulpian is just an argumentation in which he takes 
certain circumstances into consideration in order to determine whether or not 
the ball-player had culpa. Again it appears that the particular situation in this 
case, which could be interpreted from a modern perspective as a problem of 
contributory negligence,  is solved without the use of such a concept.
522 Ibbetson 2004, p. 115.
523 ibid., p. 116.
524 MacCormack 1974, p. 216.
525 Zimmermann 1996, p. 1008.
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Because of the penal character, and because of the wording of the actio legis 
Aquiliae, the only question was whether the barber had culpa. The basis for 
the claim remained the punishing reaction to socially undesired behaviour; 
the fact that the injured party could be compensated with some money was 
just a side effect.526 Classical lawyers always regarded the actio legis Aquiliae 
as a purely penal action.527 In (late) classical law the sum of the litis aestimatio 
where it exceeded the sum of the loss of the victim was not divided into a penal 
and reipersecutory part, but was totally regarded as a poena.528 Even if the sum 
the wrongdoer had to pay was identical to the value of the victim’s damage, 
the action was still considered penal in classical law.529
If the iudex was convinced that the requirements of the formula were met, 
the wrongdoer had to pay the poena.530 The final statement of Ulpian (quamvis-
fine) does not imply any change of the poenal liability of the barber.531 One 
could argue that the fact that the slave should not have entrusted himself to 
a barber who put his chair in such a dangerous place, does not change the 
question whether the barber had to be punished or not. The only question 
remained whether the barber, under the circumstances of the case, could be 
considered as having acted with culpa.532 However, it is not certain whether 
it is sufficient to base the denial of liability only on the penal character of the 
lex Aquilia. Besides, possibly Ulpian was also in doubt because the slave also 
created a certain risk leading to the conclusion that the negligence of the 
barber no longer plays a role here. It was, as it were, disregarded by the ‘bringing 
oneself into a dangerous situation’, so wasting the possibility to sue with the 
actio legis Aquiliae for his master.
526 See Wallinga 2009, p. 1399, who justly adds that it was just the medieval restitution 
theory of Thomas Aquinas which created a fundamental different basis for delictual liability. 
This will be explained in the next chapter.
527 On the actiones mixtae in Justinian law, see Inst. 4.6.16-19 (esp. Inst. 4.6.19; the actio 
legis Aquiliae as a mixed action). On these texts, see Ankum 1983, p. 4ff. 
528 Ankum 1982, p. 38f.
529 ibid., p. 29, 38f.; on the penal nature of the actio legis Aquiliae, see also recently Sirks 
2009, p. 303ff.
530 Wollschläger 1976, p. 135; a possibility to give the barber an inferior punishment was not 
possible; the iudex had no possibility to reduce the poena due to the negligence of the injured.
531  Recently Jansen 2007, p. 659, reminds us that ‘Vielmehr war ihr Deliktrecht am 
Gedanken einer angemessenen Sanktion für ein erlittenes Unrecht ausgerichtet; bei einem 
solchen sanktionorientierten Ansatz konnte es überhaupt nur auf die Frage ankommen, ob der 
Schädiger vorwerfbar etwas falsch gemacht hatte, oder ob ihm angesichts des Verhaltens des 
Geschädigten kein Vorwurf zu machen war’. 
532 One of those circumstances indeed was the negligence of the slave. In this case that was 
not enough to release the barber from his liability. Supposedly, the circumstances were such that 
they excluded liability of the barber, not because of contributory negligence of the injured, but 
because the requirements for the lex Aquilia were not fulfilled. See also Wollschläger 1976, p. 137.
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2.5.5 Post-classical development ( Justinian law)
When considering D. 9.2.11pr. as part of Justinian’s compilation, it is super-
fluous to distinguish the opinions of the jurists included in this fragment 
(Mela, Proculus, Ulpian) because the text became part of the promulgated 
law of Justinian. Analysing the argumentation in this fragment the following 
picture results. The person at fault (culpa) was liable. Firstly, this could be the 
ball-player, if he acted intentionally (see D. 9.2.9.4) or if he played in a place 
where people did not customarily play.533 Secondly, it could be the barber, if he 
shaved at a place where people customarily played or where there was a lot of 
traffic.534 However, he who entrusted himself to a barber who put his chair in 
such a dangerous place ought to be blamed himself. A conclusion might be that 
the possible liability of the barber is nullified, and only the ball-player could 
be held liable (which is not mentioned in the fragment) or that no one would 
be liable.535 The last part, in which the decision is made that he who entrusts 
himself to a barber who has put his chair in such a dangerous place ought to 
be blamed himself,536 can be explained in combination with D. 50.17.203 dis-
cussed above. Because he who suffers damage by his own fault, after having 
entrusted himself to a barber who put his chair in such a dangerous place, is 
not considered to have suffered any damage.
2.6 General treatment of all relevant cases in Justinian law
Introduction
In later (medieval) times scholars saw a connection between the texts dis-
cussed in this chapter. Was such a connection already present in Justinian 
law?537 It seems to me that such a coherence is definitely feasible, especially 
between D. 9.2.9.4, D. 9.2.11pr. and D. 50.17.203 (D. 9.2.52.1 seems to me a differ-
ent kind of case and a more complicated one). Apparently, a kind of principle 
existed by which someone just cannot claim damages if he caused his injury 
533 A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.11pr.  
534 Perhaps this liability could be set on the basis that the incident could have been 
avoided if the barber had taken reasonable precautions; Paschialidis 2008, p. 360f., considered 
this case an example of the approach of Byzantine jurists of culpa as αἰτία (responsibility).
535 See, on the ratio of D. 9.2.11pr., A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.11pr.
536 According to Luig 1969, p. 194f., in case of preponderant negligence of the injured the 
liability of the barber would be excluded.
537 The problem is that no interpretation of Justinian law as such is handed down to us, 
except possibly the old scholia which originated from legal education provided by professors 
(antecessores). The Corpus Iuris was only studied again in Western Europe at the beginning of 
the 12th century, but then in the light of a new socio-legal context.
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due to his own fault. This is more or less the principle as stated in D. 50.17.203. 
Such an attitude leads to the unreasonableness of punishing a wrongdoer. 
This possible way of thinking of the compilers is, of course, totally different 
from that of the classical Roman jurist themselves, who concentrated on the 
wrongdoer and just asked whether or not he ought to be punished in that case 
and whether or not the requirements for an action were fulfilled.
Penal character
Because of the penal character, and because of that the wording of the actio 
legis Aquiliae, the only and final question in classical Roman law was whether 
the wrongdoer (e.g. the barber) had been at fault (culpa). If the iudex was 
convinced that the requirements of the formula were fulfilled, the wrongdoer 
had to pay the poena. A possibility to give the wrongdoer an inferior punish-
ment was not possible; the iudex had no possibility to reduce the poena due 
to negligence of the injured. The final statement of Ulpian in D. 9.2.11pr. 
(quamvis-debere) does not imply any change of the penal liability of the barber. 
The fact that the slave should not have entrusted himself to a barber who put 
his chair in such a dangerous place does not change the question whether the 
barber had to be punished or not. Had the barber, under the circumstances 
of the case, been at fault (culpa)? One of those circumstances was indeed the 
negligence of the slave. In this case this was not enough to release the barber 
from his liability. Supposedly the circumstances were such that they excluded 
his liability, not because of contributory negligence of the injured, but because 
the requirements for a successful actio legis Aquiliae were not fulfilled. In that 
respect another remark is important, namely, that in classical Roman law no 
balancing of culpable behaviour of the two parties was possible, but only an 
assessment of the culpable behaviour of the wrongdoer. The view that in case 
of preponderant negligence of the injured the liability of the barber would 
be excluded is therefore not correct and for this view insufficient ground is 
found in the sources. 
One compilation
In Justinian’s time all relevant texts discussed in this chapter became part of 
the same compilation. Therefore, the relevant texts (D. 9.2.52.1, D. 9.2.9.4 and 
D. 9.2.11pr.) could possibly be explained in combination with D. 50.17.203. 
Especially, the final phrase of D. 9.2.11pr. (he who entrusts himself to a barber 
who has put his chair in such a dangerous place ought to be blamed himself) 
can be considered as an application of the more general rule of D. 50.17.203: 
because the person who suffers damage as a consequence of his own fault, 
entrusting himself to a barber who put his chair in a very dangerous place, is 
not considered to have suffered any damage.
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Some remarks have to be made about changes in Justinian law. The ‘new’ 
fragment of Inst. 4.3.4 did not fundamentally change the decisive criterion at 
stake, i.e. of culpa. Justinian used the case of D. 9.2.9.4 as an example and made a 
modified version in Inst. 4.3.4. Compared to D. 9.2.9.4, Justinian deleted Ulpian’s 
motivation of liability (quia non debuit …) in Inst. 4.3.4 and by doing so he took 
another point of departure as he changed the criterion of culpa, deducing it 
from prudence or imprudence to the mere question whether the person was a 
soldier or not.538 As discussed in section 2.4.5, based on the Basilica and some 
scholia, this apparently did not lead to a problem of interpretation in Justinian 
(or Byzantine) law.
Also the next fragment of the Institutes, Inst. 4.3.5 (tree pruner) is relevant. 
The compilers of the Institutes placed the case of the tree pruner directly after 
the case of the javelin throwers in the Institutes, and thereby saw a connec-
tion between these fragments, a connection stronger than in classical Roman 
law. The two fragments in the Institutes are part of a more or less systematic 
treatise for educational purposes. Moreover, they are promulgated together as 
law (together with the Digest). In Inst. 4.3.5, a number of possible events are 
distinguished, and for each case Justinian establishes whether or not culpa is 
to be placed on the side of the tree pruner.
All or nothing?
Finally, there could be no consequences of such ‘contributory negligence’ 
other than a denial of claims based on insufficiency in the requirements for 
an actio legis Aquiliae. It is commonly believed that when contributory neg-
ligence of the injured occurred, he had no possibility to obtain an actio legis 
Aquiliae (the all-or-nothing approach). In that respect, only an all-or-nothing 
approach was possible in classical Roman law as well as in post-classical (and 
Justinian539) times. It is inconceivable that a restriction of the obligation to pay 
full compensation, in the sense that the wrongdoer was only liable for part of 
the damage,  was recognised as a general rule in Justinian law. There are just 
a few scattered texts in the Digest in which the behaviour of the injured party 
results in a restriction of the (amount of) damages which the wrongdoer had 
538 Besides the new distinction in the Institutes as to the status of the thrower, the question 
as to whether the thrower intentionally threw also disappeared.
539 Although the procedure per formulam did not exist any longer, the all-or-nothing 
approach remained to exist in the law at the time of the application of the cognitio procedure in 
matters of private law. The all-or-nothing approach was inherent to the writings of the (classical) 
jurists – some of them were even explicitly made authoritative in the Lex Citandi of 426, e.g. 
Ulpianus (see D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr., which clearly envisage an all-or-nothing approach as 
already elaborately discussed in this chapter). These writings became incorporated in Justinian’s 
Digest, and so the all-or-nothing approach was co-inherited along with the substantive rules 
enclosed in the writings of the (classical) jurists.
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to pay, and they are not in the law of delicts. Certain consequential losses are 
concerned, not caused by the act of the wrongdoer, but only by wrong behav-
iour of the injured party. These cases appear only in contract law: Neratius D. 
19.1.11.12 and Paul. D. 19.1.45.1.540 
In the first case (D. 19.1.11.12), a buyer of a slave is sued by an actio noxalis. 
The buyer can either hand over the slave or pay an amount of money. In both 
cases, according to Neratius, the buyer can only get the damages back from the 
seller with the actio empti which would have accrued to him if he had chosen 
the economically best option. If he chose to pay the monetary fine, but hand-
ing over the slave would have been more advantageous for him, the seller only 
had to pay him the amount of the value of the compensation for handing over 
the slave. The rest of the disadvantage of the monetary fine had to be borne 
by the buyer himself.541
In the second case (D. 19.1.45.1), someone sold a vacant lot that belonged 
to a third person and the purchaser built upon it. Subsequently, the owner of 
the property recovered his lot (through an eviction). If the buyer brought an 
actio empti against the seller, the latter was – in principle – also liable for the 
expenses made by the buyer with respect to the purchased item.542 According 
to D. 19.1.45.1, the owner who brought an action against the possessor in order 
to recover his property could be barred by an exception on the grounds of bad 
faith (exceptio doli), unless he was willing to pay the building expenses. When 
the possessor omitted to bring forward this exceptio doli, and thus did not claim 
the damages regarding the building costs, the actio empti was restricted to the 
payment of the purchase price, as it is the better view that this was not part of 
the vendor’s risk.543 Thus the latter was not liable for those expenses.
In these two cases, the negligence of the injured party only regarded the 
increase of the damages. These consequential damages were not imputed to 
the other party. However, these exceptional casuistic decisions do not provide 
sufficient proof to assume a general rule, implying a restriction of the range of 
the compensation existed,544 and surely not for the classical period.
A general rule containing a restriction of the obligation to pay full compensa-
tion, in the sense that the wrongdoer was only liable for part of the damage, 
540 Luig 1969, p. 193; see Medicus 1962, p. 322f.; Aumann 1964, p. 14ff.  
541  See Aumann 1964, p. 14f.
542 ibid., p. 15.
543 ibid.; - One could see that Paul. in D. 19.1.45.1 is very careful when writing magis est.
544 See further on this topic Aumann 1964, p. 16f., and Medicus 1962, p. 322ff.; differently 
Jörs 1927, p. 119 (‘im gegebenen Falle nicht oder nicht in vollem Umfang in Anspruch genommen 
werden’).
chapter two102
cannot be derived from the wording of D. 50.17.203.545 There are no traces of 
these exceptional casuistic decisions being generalised in post-classical times. 
One may assume that the compilers, in case of damage resulting from the act 
of the injured person, in principle adopted the view that in such a case the 
wrongdoer had no duty to pay any compensation (all-or-nothing approach). 
No dogmatic foundation for the view that a restriction of liability of the wrong-
doer existed can be found in the text of Pomponius, nor did Pomponius ever 
refer to mutual blame (beiderseitige Schuld).546
Medieval scholars (Johannes Bassianus et al.) were the first to consider con-
causality and concurrences of negligence in case of damnum iniuria datum 
and Aquilian liability.547 These scholars constructed their theory of culpae com-
pensatio among others on the main texts discussed in this chapter. Such a theory 
could not yet be found in Justinian law.548 As discussed above, the conduct of the 
injured party in delictual cases is still not considered as ‘contributory negligence’. 
The reason why this was not so, and especially not in cases of damnum iniuria 
datum, should be sought in the penal character of the lex Aquilia.
2.7 Concluding remarks
The central question in this chapter is what were the consequences of the conduct 
of the injured party to the liability of the wrongdoer in Roman law of Antiquity. In 
this chapter the view, commonly held in present-day literature, that in classical 
Roman law the injured party could not recover his damages when his contribu-
tory negligence contributed to the occurrence of the damage is rejected.549 To 
understand the approach of the Roman jurists to ‘contributory negligence’, the 
question has to be considered from an appropriate perspective. A distinction has 
to be made between the situation in classical Roman law and in Justinian law.
First of all, at the beginning of this chapter it was made plausible that D. 
50.17.203 had no general validity in classical Roman law but only concerned 
a case about a legacy. The compilers extracted D. 50.17.203 from its original 
545 Aumann 1964, p. 31; Medicus 1962, p. 323f.
546 Aumann 1964, p. 31, stated that in post-classical Roman law, the conceptual 
understanding of the culpae compensatio came to the foreground. He also based his conclusion 
on a study of Paul. D. 18.1.57.
547 In the same sense Castresana 2001, p. 77.
548 Much later, the Pandectists based their theory of Schuldkompensation on the Roman 
jurisprudence.
549 Unless the wrongdoer had acted intentionally.
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context in Pomponius and designated it as a ‘regula’. Because the compilers 
placed the sentence as a general rule in the Digest (D. 50.17.203), it could be-
come one of the bases for the later medieval theory of contributory negligence. 
Someone who suffered disadvantage resulting from his own negligence, in a 
legal sense, was not considered to have suffered any loss for which damages 
could be claimed. Although in some cases the facts could give rise to damages, 
the injured would have no remedy because of his ‘contributory negligence’.
Secondly, with regard to the approach of legal practice in dealing with what (in 
the law of delicts) we would now call ‘contributory negligence’ of the injured 
party, in classical Roman law as well as in post-classical Roman law contribu-
tory negligence was not known as a specific legal notion. The Roman jurists 
did not question negligence on both sides, but merely enquired whether the 
injury, considering the circumstances, was due to the negligence of either the 
wrongdoer or the victim. Therefore, and this conclusion is also affirmed by 
my investigation of the sources, it is plausible to argue that a theory of culpae 
compensatio was not present among classical Roman jurists, but was anachro-
nistically forced into their decisions by medieval and modern scholars. 
That the classical Roman jurists as well as the jurists in Justinian’s time did 
not question negligence on both sides, but merely enquired whether the in-
jury, considering the circumstances, was due to the negligence of either the 
wrongdoer or the victim, can for example be seen in the case of the javelin 
throwers. The classical jurists solved the problem of ‘contributory negligence’ 
by interpreting the elements of damnum iniuria datum, especially the element 
of culpa. Roman jurists approached the culpa requirement in a casuistic man-
ner, as they did with all legal problems. They did not try to subsume the facts 
of the individual case under a standardised test. The jurists asked themselves 
whether the defendant had been at fault if he did not behave as he should 
have. It is useful to acknowledge that  in the cases I studied the problem was 
the status qualitatis. This has to do with quality: an act is not permitted or ap-
propriate everywhere, e.g. the question whether the javelin thrower acted as 
he should have depended on the evaluation of all circumstances of the case 
and tended to be determined from an objective point of view. Therefore, it 
has to be pointed out that there are often no technical theories behind the 
reply of the classical jurists. Roman jurists were practically oriented, which 
can be seen, for example, in Alfenus’ reply in D. 9.2.52.1. As described before, 
the situation changed in Justinian law in the sense that the fragments were 
possibly connected with each other and the idea of D. 50.17.203 was regarded 
as a general underlying principle (except possibly for D. 9.2.52.1). The concept 
of culpae compensatio probably did not develop in Justinian law, but was a 
novelty of medieval scholarship. The all-or-nothing approach was retained 
and would be in force until the lex Aquilia lost its penal character (only in 
early modern times).
chapter three
MEDIEVAL IUS COMMUNE
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Subject and purpose of this chapter
The renaissance of the twelfth century (1070–1225) brought about an intel-
lectual revival in Western Europe.1 From the beginning of the twelfth century 
Bologna, in the north of Italy, was the centre of legal scholarship. In this city, 
the authoritative texts of Roman and canon law were studied and taught.2 Two 
periods can be distinguished in the medieval study of Roman law: the period 
of the Glossators, starting with Irnerius (ca. 1055–1130) at the beginning of the 
twelfth century in Bologna until the end of the thirteenth century, and the pe-
riod of the Commentators, which roughly covers the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. Within the study of canon law we can distinguish between the ear-
lier period of classical canon law, in which the Decretum Gratiani (1140/1145) 
was interpreted, and the period from the beginning of the thirteenth century 
when the law of the decretals took over the leading role in canon law. In this 
chapter, the contributions to the concept of contributory negligence of the 
Glossators, Commentators and canonists from these periods will be discussed.3 
Strangely enough, no profound study has been made yet on the development 
of the concept of contributory negligence in medieval scholarship. How did 
the medieval jurists solve cases of ‘contributory negligence’? It appears that 
the so-called doctrine of culpae compensatio, which might have its origins in 
medieval (Roman) legal scholarship, could provide the solution. Also in this 
chapter, clarity will be provided with regard to the question of whether the 
1 On this period, see Haskins 1927; Paré, Brunet & Tremblay 1933; Genzmer 1941, p. 298ff.
2 See on this topic, e.g., Bellomo 1995, p. 58ff., 65ff., 112ff.
3 With contributory negligence, the negligence of the injured party that led to the 
origination of the initial damage is meant, not the worsening of the damage by lack of self-care, 
as Descamps 2005, p. 61f., seems to include. His conclusion that contributory negligence led to a 
diminution of liability (in ius commune) has to be considered in this light.
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medieval scholars formulated such a theory, and if so, whether they used it to 
solve problems of contributory negligence in cases of damnum iniuria datum. 
The main subject of the chapter is the role of the conduct of the injured 
party. What is new is the fact that medieval scholarship attributed legal sig-
nificance to the act of the injured party, which was not the case in Roman law. 
The questions which will be dealt with are: Did the Glossators, Commentators 
or canonists have a general theory on contributory negligence which applied 
to all delicts, and if so, what was the range of application of that theory? Were 
these theories, dealing with contributory negligence, also applied to cases of 
damnum iniuria datum? Who was the first scholar to do so? Was the doctrine 
only applied to the negligence of both parties or was the seriousness of the 
contributions also taken into account? Did the ‘all-or-nothing’ approach of 
Roman law of Antiquity still apply?
As mentioned above, the first jurists to study the various parts of the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis were the Glossators. The intellectual activity of the Bolognese 
glossators was linked to their teaching. They wrote i.a. glossae, words or short 
fragments between the lines or in the margins of the text of the Corpus Iuris, 
to clarify and explain certain words and sentences. Apart from explaining the 
content of texts, the Glossators tried to harmonise possible contradictions 
within the Corpus Iuris. When trying to eliminate these contradictions, the 
Glossators produced references to other texts which were supposed to support 
or reject a certain solution for the contradiction.4 Moreover, they sometimes 
felt obliged to adapt the Roman texts to the needs of daily practice. It is 
important to note that the medieval Roman scholars considered the cases 
described in the Corpus Iuris as very colourful contemporary problems, as if 
the Corpus Iuris represented the law in force. The method of the Commentators 
differs from the method of the Glossators, since the Commentators no longer 
produced glosses. They mainly worked in two ways: by giving on-going 
comments on the Corpus Iuris Civilis and on the Gloss (Commentaria), and by 
expressing legal opinions (consilia).5 In this period, one can notice an early 
reception of the learned law (ius commune) into legal practice.6 The writings 
of the Commentators will be discussed in order to see whether they include a 
4 On the working method of the Glossators, see Otte 1971.
5 Fried 1960, p. 143.
6 On German law before the reception of the learned law, see Aumann 1964, p. 31ff., who 
concludes that the influence of the injured party’s own conduct on the obligation to compensate 
was essentially treated similarly to the way it was treated by Roman jurists. The requirements 
for the rise of the obligation to compensate were considered as not being fulfilled in a case of 
contributory negligence. The entire liability was then cancelled. Only when the wrongdoer 
acted on purpose would the injured party’s own conduct not be taken into account for liability 
purposes; see Aumann 1964, p. 37. 
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continuation and a further reflection on the doctrine of culpae compensatio, 
and also whether new approaches were pursued and whether new concepts 
arose. 
The contribution of canon law to the problem of contributory negligence 
is especially interesting, as its approach to this problem differed from the 
approach of medieval Roman legal scholarship. I will verify whether or not a 
general idea on culpae compensatio existed and subsequently if such a theory 
was actually applied in the law of delicts. Some cases of accidental homicide, 
in which the injured party obviously played a role in the actual occurrence of 
the damage, will be discussed. Furthermore, whether canon law applied the 
doctrine of culpae compensatio, and if so, whether it was further refined or 
not, and/or whether there were new or other ways in which the problem of 
contributory negligence was solved will also be discussed.
3.1.2 Structure and method
With regard to medieval Roman law, the sedes materiae on this subject can be 
found in the same texts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis as mentioned in the previous 
chapter7 but, as will appear below, also in some other texts or even in entire 
titles in the Corpus Iuris Civilis which apparently gave rise to discussion of the 
subject by the medieval Romanists, such as title C. 3.35, and some texts in the 
Digest, such as D. 16.2.10pr. and D. 24.3.39.8 Firstly, the glosses (glossae) will 
be dealt with in the next section (3.2). The Glossators (and also the Commen-
tators) treated the question of whether the wrongdoer was liable or not in a 
scholastic way, meaning that they drew distinctions between various situations 
to determine in which situation the wrongdoer was liable and in which situa-
tion he was not. Therefore, after a short review of the relevant texts from the 
Corpus Iuris, these distinctions have to be discussed to see for what reason they 
were made. Offering the easiest accessibility is the so-called Ordinary Gloss 
7 The order in which the materials from the periods of the Glossators and the Commentators 
will be presented in the next section (3.2) differs from the order followed until now, viz. the 
sequence the fragments have in Justinian’s compilation, except for Inst. 4.3.4, which will be dealt 
with in connection with D. 9.2.9.4.
8 For medieval legal scholarship, the starting point is the littera vulgata of the Corpus Iuris 
and not the littera Florentina. The Glossators were not familiar with the littera Florentina (see 
Sass 1963, p. 224). The littera Florentina is probably the oldest manuscript of the Digest still 
existing, stemming from the 6th century. It is speculated that a copy of the littera Florentina/
Pisana became known in the 12th century. This copy, generally known as the Codex Secundus, 
laid the foundation of the tradition of the littera Bononiensis (i.e. the Digest vulgate). See 
Dondorp & Schrage 2010, p. 14. The differences between the two editions, with regard to the 
relevant fragments, were discussed in the previous chapter, and mainly concern grammar and 
spelling. 
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(Glossa Ordinaria) of Accursius (ca. 1182–1263),9 which became the standard 
commentary on the Corpus Iuris. It was printed in many editions from the 
early modern period onwards. More problematic are the pre-Accursian glosses, 
which for the greater part were never published in so far as they were not used 
by Accursius. Therefore, this study will be supplemented by an investigation 
of various manuscripts. Unfortunately, it was only possible to examine about 
twenty-five manuscripts of the Digestum Vetus on microfilm.10 Besides glosses, 
the Glossators produced other writings dealing with Roman law, which are 
more easily accessible in a printed form, e.g. Summae,11 Lecturae, Brocarda 
and Dissensiones. The same sections will also include the contributions of the 
Commentators to the discussion on the doctrine of contributory negligence 
in a selection of relevant fragments derived from their commentaries, mainly 
found in printed editions.12 These include the most important writings from the 
school of Orléans which flourished at the beginning of the fourteenth century. 
Therefore, the ‘Commentators’ include both Italian as well as French jurists 
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The contributions of the jurists of 
the school of Orléans (the ultramontani) will be discussed so far as relevant.13 
In section 3.3, the contributions of canon law and canon lawyers to the 
problem of contributory negligence will be discussed. With regard to medieval 
canon law, the sedes materiae on this subject can mainly be found in three 
decretals incorporated in the Liber Extra (1234), i.e. X 5.12.8, X 5.12.9 and X 
5.16.6 and in one fragment incorporated as regula 86 in the title De regulis iuris 
of the Liber Sextus (1298), i.e. VI 5.12.86 (the counterpart of D. 50.17.203). For 
this study, not only these fragments were investigated, but also a selection of 
glosses and commentaries, mostly available in printed form.
The chapter will conclude by making some comparative remarks on other 
medieval works which, strictly speaking, lie outside the Romano–canonical 
tradition (section 3.4), e.g. Byzantine law, the Sachsenspiegel, the Bible (Old-
9  The glossator Accursius, a student of Azo’s, was a professor at Bologna. On the story of 
Accursius’ life, see Genzmer 1945, p. 223ff.
10  Microfilms of a selection of manuscripts of the Digestum Vetus could be consulted at 
the VU University Amsterdam and at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History in 
Frankfurt am Main. In this study, reference is only made to manuscripts when they contain 
pre-Accursian glosses. In the case of Accursian glosses, the siglum is only mentioned if it is not 
Accursian himself. Furthermore, only the texts transcribed from manuscripts will be given in 
footnotes; printed sources will in principle not be written down in their entirety in footnotes, 
unless necessity so demands.
11  On Summae, see, e.g., Fitting 1906, col. 87ff.
12  There is no fundamental contradiction between the Glossators and the mos italicus (the 
Italian method, i.e. of the Commentators), but rather a gradual transition, which to some degree 
was prepared by the school of Orléans in the 13th century; see Koschaker 1966, p. 87.
13  On the school of Orléans, see, e.g., Meijers 1918/1919b, p. 108-132, 443-488; 1920/1921, 
p. 460-518; Bezemer 1997; Duijnstee 2010.
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Testament) and Old-Scandinavian law; by doing so, I will show that of other 
systems more or less contemporary to that of medieval ius commune some took 
the same approach, while others chose a different approach. The chapter will 
end with some concluding observations in which the above questions will be 
answered (see section 3.5).
3.2 Medieval Roman legal scholarship
3.2.1 Introduction
According to the Glossators, when someone inflicted damage on someone else’s 
property, the injured party (the master who suffered damage, not the slave) 
could petition for an actio legis Aquiliae. The act causing the damage had to be 
unlawful (iniuria), the damage had to be inflicted as a result of the negligence 
(culpa) of the wrongdoer,14 and there had to be a causal connection.15 
According to the medieval scholars, starting with the Glossators,16 neg-
ligence could be constituted at three moments. Negligence might precede, 
coincide with or follow the act.17 An example of a case in which negligence 
follows an act is the case of D. 9.2.8: a physician operated well but was negligent 
in his after-care service. The Glossators understood culpa in the lex Aquilia to 
imply culpa lata, levis and levissima.18 Furthermore, culpa and dolus in the lex 
Aquilia were punished equally;19 culpa levissima was not punished less than 
dolus.20 The examples used by the Glossators were taken from Roman law, as, 
for example, the case of the javelin throwers (D. 9.2.9.4).21 
Did the notion of culpa have a different meaning for the Commentators?22 
14  See also Rasi 1968, p. 750f.
15  See also Descamps 2005, p. 27.
16  The development of a general theory of culpa was not achieved by the Glossators; see 
Von Mehren & Gordley 1977, p. 569.
17  Descamps 2005, p. 63f.
18  See, e.g., Wilhelmus de Cabriano, Casus Codicis, ad C. 3.35.4-5; Summa Vindobonensis, 
IV.3; - On culpa in medieval Roman scholarship and on the tripartite division of culpa into lata, 
leuis and leuissima, see Talamanca 1960, p. 523ff. and Descamps 2005, p. 71ff. The medieval 
Roman legal scholars considered the notion of culpa as the lack of appropriate care (diligentia) 
required in various situations; see Parisi 1992, p. 91.
19  See Corpus legum sive Brachylogus, III. XXII. 7 (edn. Böcking 1929, p. 116). This legal book 
of French origin was probably composed in the first quarter of the 12th century; see Vinogradoff 
1961, p. 72.
20 Martinus in an addition/gloss at Summa Vindobonensis, IV.3: Sed Martinus dicit non 
minus ex culpa etiam leuissima, si commisit, quam ex dolo.
21  Medieval scholars used the inductive method to extract rules from the cases found 
present in the Corpus Iuris.
22  More specifically, according to Ibbetson 2003, p. 506, it seems that at first sight neither 
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A starting point for an answer to this question can be found in D. 9.2.31, on 
which the criterion for culpa (levis), namely, what can be foreseen by a diligent 
person, could be based. Additionally, according to the commentary of Bartolus 
de Saxoferrato (1313–1357)23 on D. 16.3.32, liability consists in any deviation 
from the diligence of a careful person (quod cum a diligente provideri poterit).24 
However, a further investigation into the notion of culpa and especially into the 
role of the contributory negligence of the injured party seems to be necessary.25 
It is important to note, and this will be shown below, that in medieval 
Roman scholarship the contributory negligence of the injured party seems 
to be regarded as reproachable misconduct that could be sanctioned by a re-
fusal to grant a claim for damages.26 Thus, the contributory negligence of the 
injured party began to be considered a possible legal problem.27 Two possible 
important starting points to solve the problem of contributory negligence in 
the medieval period can be identified. Firstly, the idea of culpa compensation 
and, secondly, the rule of D. 50.17.203.28 These two possible starting points 
will be discussed in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Before a possible application of 
the doctrine of culpae compensatio can be discussed further, it is necessary to 
find out whether such a doctrine existed at all.
the Glossators nor the Commentators made any attempt to go further than Paul (in D. 9.2.31) 
in elaborating the notion of culpa in the lex Aquilia; see also Engelmann 1965, p. 18; both 
authors refer to Bartolus, Commentaria, ad D. 16.3.32, esp. nr. 7 (who cites and refers to Petrus 
de Bellapertica): … culpa est deuiatio ab eo, quod bonum est, quod per diligentiam hominis potuit 
praeuideri. Nam eo ipso, quod deuiat ab eo, quod bonum est, siue in faciendo malum, siue in 
omittendo bonum scienter uel ignoranter: ista est culpa, et ideo dixi: quod per diligentiam hominis, 
etc. ad differentiam casus fortuiti, qui praeuideri non potest … However, this commentary of 
Bartolus and other commentaries of medieval civilians show that they did attempt to develop 
the notion of culpa; see Hallebeek 2001, p. 74ff. On the work of the Commentators on the notion 
of culpa, see also Parisi 1992, p. 117f. and 1994, p. 331, including the contribution of Revigny who 
regarded culpa as the general criterion of liability encompassing both cases of intentional dolus 
and of literal, non-intentional culpa). On Bartolus’ system of culpa/dolus, and the six kinds of 
culpa distinguished by him, see Parisi 1992, p. 118ff. and 1994, p. 331f.
23 Bartolus studied in Bologna and was a student of Cinus de Pistoia’s. He became a 
professor at the universities of Pisa and Perugia and was the most important representative of 
the school of the Commentators; on Bartolus, see, e.g., Woolf 1913 and Van der Kamp 1936.
24  See Hallebeek 2001, esp. p. 76f.; Descamps 2005, p. 76f.; - However, in his commentary 
on title D. 9.2 Bartolus did not examine extensively the notion of culpa. Only in his commentary 
on D. 9.2.11.2 did he deal with the concept and solely in terms of ambiguous causation. See also 
Ibbetson 2003, p. 506. 
25 Even König 1954, who wrote an unpublished dissertation titled ‘Das allgemeine 
Schadenersatzrecht im Mittelalter im Anschluss an die lex Aquilia’, does not discuss this topic.
26 Also the medieval jurists understood the obligation to pay compensation for damages as 
a penal sanction; see Jansen 2007, p. 530f., 660.
27  Jansen 2007, p. 660. 
28 In the same sense Luig 1969, p. 198.
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3.2.2 Starting point 1: the doctrine of culpae compensatio
The contribution of the Glossators: origins of the doctrine of culpae compensatio
The Roman jurists did not treat concurrent negligence in a dogmatic way; the 
Glossators, however, did.29 They took the respective negligence of both parties 
into account. If two parties acted negligently to some extent, sometimes 
compensation for their negligence was granted. In that respect D. 39.2.40.1 
is relevant: because of a defect in a party-wall, the wall fell down and led to 
damage. According to D. 39.2.40.1, one common owner does not have to pay the 
other anything since it was through a defect in jointly owned property that the 
damage occurred. Sabinus argued that if the wall collapsed due to too heavy 
weight, placed upon it by both parties, both were equally at fault. In the event 
that one of them lost more property or property of greater value than the other 
party, neither of them would be entitled to bring an action against the other, 
since they had both placed the same burden on the party-wall. 
Indeed, according to the (Accursian) Gloss, when both parties were the 
cause (causa) of the damage to the same extent, the negligence of both parties 
had to be compensated.30 However, it was not appropriate to compensate culpa 
by dolus. Only dolus could be compensated by dolus and culpa by culpa.31 The 
fact that the negligence of party A was nullified by the negligence of party B 
was called culpae compensatio in later times.32
Two allegations were frequently put forward in support of the later called 
doctrine of culpae compensatio, namely, D. 16.2.10pr. and D. 24.3.39. Although 
the concept of culpae compensatio was present, the term was not yet used 
as such (this was an invention of nineteenth-century Pandectism, as will be 
shown later). The doctrine was built on the words ipso iure compensatione 
neglegentiae facta of D. 16.2.10pr. and the sentence Paria enim delicta mutua 
pensatione dissoluuntur of D. 24.3.39.33 According to the gloss paria enim ad 
29 In the same sense Wollschläger 1976, p. 117.
30 Gloss onera ad D. 39.2.40.1. 
31  See D. 4.3.36; see gloss quamuis ad D. 2.10.1.2.  
32  Luig 1969, p. 197; Zimmermann 1996, p. 1030; Jansen 2002a, p. 105f.; 2002b, p. 205.
33 See also Thomas 2001, p. 352f.; according to Wollschläger 1976, p. 117, the ‘gemeinrechtliche’ 
concept of ‘Kulpakompensation’ is embossed after the expressions compensatio doli, compensatio 
neglegentiae and compensatio criminis. He refers to Eisenbach’s De compensatione circa maleficia, uel 
quasi, occasione legis xxxvi. Dig. de dolo malo (also extensively discussed in the next chapter); on this 
work, see also Aumann 1964, p. 53ff.; Luig 1969, p. 215; according to Kaser & Knutel 2003, p. 221, based 
on the rule of D. 50.17.203, since the gloss, the so-called theory of ‘Kulpakompensation’ developed 
into the later dominant opinion in the ‘gemeine Recht’, that each instance of contributory negligence 
of the injured party excluded any claim for compensation, unless the actor acted deliberately.
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D. 24.3.39, a delictum could be compensated by another delictum.34 Similar, 
but more elaborate, is the Accursian gloss dolo compensando ad D. 2.10.3.3,35 
according to which dolus is compensated by (another) dolus (see D. 4.3.3636 
and D. 18.1.57.3). A delictum is compensated by (another) delictum (see D. 
24.3.39), negligentia by negligentia (see D. 16.2.10pr.)37 and pena by pena (see 
D. 50.17.154).38 Apparently, the same sort or degree of negligence had to be 
attributed to both parties, otherwise there could be no culpae compensatio.39
As to the origin of the doctrine of culpae compensatio, it is not clear whether the 
Glossators themselves already formulated their doctrine as a general theory to 
the entire law of obligations or even to the law of delicts and what the range of 
application of that theory was. Possibly they already formulated the beginning 
of the concept of culpae compensatio and not only applied it to cases of mutual 
insults or adultery (D. 24.3.39) but also to cases in which the negligence of the 
injured person contributed to the occurrence of the damage.40 Some scholars 
even argue that the concept of culpae compensatio obtained an independent 
position in Roman law and the ius commune, next to the so-called compensatio 
delictorum (which had an explicit regulation in the Digest). With compensatio 
delictorum two similar delicts could be cancelled out by mutual compensa-
tion.41 In both concepts (that of culpae compensatio and that of compensatio 
delictorum), the wrongdoer and the injured party were considered to have 
acted in a reproachable way. However, it seems that the two situations are dif-
ferent. In the case of compensatio delictorum, two delictual acts produced two 
different injuries. In the case of culpae compensatio, one injury is inflicted by 
two different acts: the act of the wrongdoer and the act of the injured party.42
34 Accursian gloss paria enim ad D. 24.3.39; see also the Accursian gloss deteriore ad D. 2.7.2.
35 Accursian gloss dolo compensando ad D. 2.10.3.3.
36 A cross reference to this text already occurs in the margins next to D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 
9.2.11pr. in Ms. Trier SB, 838/1634, fo. 98vb and fo. 99ra.
37  See also Accursian gloss ipso iure ad D. 16.2.10pr. 
38 However, according to the aforementioned gloss dolo compensando ad D. 2.10.3.3, no 
compensation of pudicitia by pudicitia could take place; see D. 48.5.2.5 and D. 48.5.14(13).5.
39 Also Luig 1969, p. 199; - According to Accursian gloss ipso iure ad D. 16.2.10pr., if one 
person injured another person negligently (culpa), and in another event the latter wounded 
the former intentionally (dolus), a compensation could take place. Not, as in the (last situation 
described in the) case of D. 9.2.9.4, when the negligent act of one person and the intentional act 
of another person concern the same event.
40 Luig 1969, p. 199.
41  Jansen 2002a, p. 106; 2002b, p. 205; D. 24.3.39: Paria delicta mutua pensatione dissolvuntur. 
Concrete examples could be found in D. 16.2.10pr. and D. 18.1.57.3.
42 Jansen 2002a; p. 106; 2002b, p. 205. In the next subsections, I discuss whether or not the 
theory of culpae compensatio is applied by the Glossators to cases of contributory negligence in 
cases of damnum iniuria datum; according to secondary literature, the idea of culpae compensatio 
was applied to the situation of the contributory negligence of the injured party at a later date; see 
medieval ius commune 113
The contributions of the Commentators
According to the doctrine of compensation of faults as just described, when 
two people wounded each other in a quarrel, and it was not clear who had 
provoked the quarrel, the delicta of both persons would be cancelled out (set 
off) by way of mutual compensation.43 Also, if two people committed an act 
with dolus, they could not sue each other because the dolus of both parties was 
mutually compensated.44 This compensation did not take place upon request 
of one of the litigating parties, but ipso iure.45 Of course this was different if 
one of the parties committed a second delict or repeatedly acted with dolus.46 
A new consideration was made by Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400),47 according to 
whom the word ‘compensation’ was sometimes used in the true meaning of the 
word, and sometimes not. A compensation of debts (debita), as in D. 16.2.10pr. 
(ipso iure), is a compensation in the true sense of the word, i.e. when claims 
cancel each other out. In the event of a compensation of delicts, however, it 
would not mean a compensation in the true sense of the word (compensatio), 
but some kind of acknowledgment (confessio); this is the case in D. 24.3.39 in 
which the two delicts cannot really cancel each other out.48
Jansen 2002a, p. 106; 2002b, p. 205; see also Pernice 1895, p. 90ff.; in the next section it will be 
argued that possibly Paulus de Castro was the first to do so.
43 See, e.g., Corvinus, Digesta per aphorismos strictim explicata, edn. 1642, p. 171f., with 
references; Bartolus, Commentaria, ad D. 16.2.10pr.; see also R. Fulgosius, In primam Pandectarum 
partem commentariorum, II, ad D. 16.2.10pr.
44 Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 4.3.36. An example of a legal application of this rule to a 
specific case can be found in Jacobus de Ravannis, Lectura super Codice, ad C. 8.4.1:  Dicitis quod 
ex interuallo non possum te expellere: immo quia compensatur dolus cum dolo, et paria crimina 
mutua compensatione tolluntur, ut ff. de do. l. Si duo [D. 4.3.36] et ff. so. ma. l. Virum [=Viro; D. 
24.3.39]; dicunt quidam uerum est, dolus latens cum dolus latenti potest compensari secus est in dolo 
qui est in uiolentiane deterius contingat dolus cum dolo in eodem facto commissus compensatur, 
unde licet unus haberet maius damnum et alius minus. Licet non inspiceremus: immo dolus cum 
dolo compensabitur, nisi in continenti, sed ubi ex interuallo, ut expense non compensatur dolus cum 
dolo, sed damnum cum damno, quia ex deiectione primus est obligatus, ex secunda secundus, et 
non debitum cum debito compensaretur, unde agenti ex una obligatione compensaretur debitum ex 
alio, sed dolus cum dolo non compensaretur non in continenti dictum est uim ui repellere ubi certum 
est quod uis patitur uiolentiam. …
45 See on this topic Pichonnaz 2002, p. 337ff.
46 See the additio of Alexander de Imola on Bartolus, Commentaria, ad D. 16.2.10pr. 
47  Baldus studied Roman law as a student of Bartolus’, and he studied canon law under 
Federicus de Petruciis. He taught at Perugia, Pisa, Florence, Pavia and Padua.
48 Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 24.3.39; - A crimen is opposed by way of an exceptio; see, e.g., 
Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in primam Infortiati partem, ad D. 24.3.39: Sed hic erat crimen 
in modum exceptionis oppositum, et ideo dolus dolo compensatur. ...
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The situation became more complicated when – with regard to the same 
event – one party acted with dolus and the other with culpa. Already Baldus 
argued that in such a case no compensation should take place.49 He stated that 
a compensation ipso iure could only occur when culpa or dolus were equal on 
both sides.50 As to this compensation, dolus was considered more serious than 
culpa, and culpa in acting more serious than culpa in refraining. The situation 
was different when totally different obligations (diversas obligationes) oc-
curred, because then dolus and culpa were compensated to the same extent.51 
It seems that in the last case, as far as the amount of the two claims agree, a 
compensation can place place: for example, when one claim was 100 and the 
other 80, 80 can be compensated and a claim for 20 will remain.
Apparently, cases in which acts concerned the same matter and cases in which 
acts concerned different matters have to be distinguished. It seems that a 
compensation of delicts on both sides was only possible when two persons 
committed a delict with dolus with regard to the same matter. If two persons 
committed different delicts with dolus, no compensation could take place and 
therefore both persons were punished because they both acted with dolus.52
To conclude, regarding the situation is most relevant in cases in which the 
injured party contributed to the occurrence of his own loss, i.e the situation in 
which one person acted with culpa and the other with dolus, could both ‘blame-
worthy acts’ be compensated by setting one off against the other?53 Jacobus 
Butrigarius (ca. 1273–1348)54 argued that in the event two persons acted with 
regard to the same matter and one party acted with dolus and the other with 
culpa (or negligentia), dolus absorbs culpa, and so the person who acted with 
49 Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 16.2.10pr.
50 Possibly Paulus de Castro had a different view as he seems to be convinced that culpa 
could be compensated by dolus. It could be that his commentary has to be understood in such a 
way that the intentional act and the culpable act concern different cases; see Paulus Castrensis, 
In secundam Digesti Veteris partem, ad D. 16.2.10pr.
51  Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 16.2.10pr.
52  See J. Butrigarius, In primam e secundam veteris Digesti partem, I, ad D. 4.3.36.
53 The situation in which the actions of two persons do not regard the same case is different 
(no compensation for actions done with dolus or culpa in that case); see for that situation, e.g., R. 
Fulgosius, In primam Pandectarum partem commentariorum, II, ad D. 16.2.10pr.; J. Butrigarius, In 
primam et secundam veteris Digesti partem, II, ad D. 16.2.10pr. See also J. Bertachinus, Repertorium, 
s.v. compensatio; Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in secundam Digesti Veteris partem, ad D. 
16.2.10pr.; also Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in primam Infortiati partem, ad D. 24.3.39. This 
theory of compensatio delictorum can also be placed in a procedural perspective as Angelus 
Aretinus de Gambilionibus (†1450) does; see Angeli de Aretio, In quattuor Institutionum, ad Inst. 
4.13pr., nr. 29.
54 Jacobus Butrigarius was an Italian jurist, a professor of Roman law at Bologna, who stood 
in the tradition of the Commentators as he was a student of Bartolus’.
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culpa was not held liable, but the person who acted with dolus was.55 Albericus 
de Rosate (1290–1354/1360)56 agreed when he stated that if one person acted 
with dolus and the other with negligentia with regard to the same matter, no 
compensation could take place, since dolus was considered to be more serious.57 
3.2.2.1 The case of the javelin throwers
The view of the Glossators
The facts of this case were discussed in the previous chapter. In summary, some 
people were javelin-throwing58 and in doing so killed a slave. The Glossators 
treated the question whether the wrongdoer was liable or not in a scholastic 
way, i.e. they made distinctions between various situations to determine in 
which situation the wrongdoer would be liable and in which situation he 
would not. To find out for what reason these distinctions were made and 
whether or not a doctrine such as culpae compensatio was applied, these situ-
ations and distinctions have to be discussed.
The first Glossator who seems to explicitly argue on the problem of 
contributory negligence of the injured party is Johannes Bassianus (†1197).59 
He formulated the view that culpa (of the wrongdoer, i.e. the javelin thrower) 
55 J. Butrigarius, In primam et secundam veteris Digesti partem, II, ad D. 16.2.10pr.
56 Albericus de Rosate was an important 14th-century practising lawyer who belonged to 
the school of the Commentators.
57  Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in secundam Digesti Veteris partem, ad D. 16.2.10pr.; - An 
exception was made with regard to the fact that dolus was considered more serious than culpa: 
in a criminal case, dolus or culpa on the side of one party did not cancel out the dolus or culpa 
of the other party. The criminal cases brought by the State and these were no longer accusatory 
procedures. These ideas of Alexander de Imola have to be regarded purely theoretically. See 
Alexander de Imola, Consilium LXXVII, nr. 12f.
58 ‘Somewhere’, see gloss ad iaculantibus in Mss. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1405, fo. 77v; 
Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, fo. 106vb; Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 2511, fo. 76r; Paris BN, 
lat. 4459, fo. 90va; Bamberg, Jur 11, fo. 115rb (with siglum az.); London BM, Royal 11.C. III, fo. 93r; 
München Clm 3887, fo. 92ra; Torino BN, E.I.4, fo. 139va; Paris BN, lat. 4458, fo. 72rb; Stockholm 
KB, B 680, fo. 101v: (sc.) alicubi; - Affirmation can be found in gloss aiaculantibus with siglum az. 
in Biblioteca Vaticana, Ottobon. lat. 1605, fo. 124ra: scilicet alicubi (later changed into alibi quam) 
ut consuetus est., and gloss occisus in Ms. Padova BU, 941, fo. 88rb: in loco non solito ad ludendum, 
according to which the first situation distinguished in D. 9.2.9.4 was that of javelin throwers not 
playing at a place where it was not customary to play. The second situation described in D. 9.2.9.4 
would be that of a field for javelin-throwing; see gloss ad campo in Mss. Leipzig, Univ. Bibl., 873, 
fo. 76v; Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, vat. lat. 1406, fo. 80v: scilicet iaculatorio. 
59 Johannes Bassianus, a professor at Bologna, lived at about the end of the 12th century 
(Rose 1857, p. 332) and took an important position within the tradition of the Bolognese 
glossators. He was a student of Bulgarus’ and at the same time the master of Azo; - Information on 
the medieval civilians (Glossators and Commentators) mentioned in this chapter can be found 
in Von Savigny 1956, esp. volumes IV/V/VI; Cortese 1995; Lange 1997; Lange & Kriechbaum 2007; 
therefore, no references to these general works will be made each time, but only if necessary to 
a specific point; additional literature will be mentioned where necessary.
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could be compensated by culpa (of the injured party, i.e. the slave) and be 
neutralised: for that reason the javelin thrower was relieved from his own 
culpa.60 Consequently, it may be assumed that he was also relieved from any 
liability. Furthermore, Johannes Bassianus noted that if the thrower threw 
at the slave intentionally, the act could be seen as performed with dolus.61 
He argued that culpa nullifies culpa, but culpa (of the injured party) does 
not nullify dolus.62 Accordingly, if the injured party acted negligently, his 
negligence (culpa) was set off against that of the wrongdoer, and thus the 
injured party could not claim compensation from the wrongdoer.63 
A similar case about javelin throwers, already mentioned above, is Inst. 4.3.4.64 
In Inst. 4.3.4, a situation is described in which a person acts lawfully (iure): the 
soldier while exercising in his exercising ground, or where such practice is usu-
ally conducted, and who killed a slave who passed by.65 Later Glossators do not 
60 Gloss quia non debuit with siglum Io. ad D. 9.2.9.4 in Mss. Paris BN, lat. 4459, fo. 90va; 
Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, fo. 106vb; Biblioteca Vaticana, Barb. lat. 1459, fo. 88rb; Biblioteca 
Vaticana, Ottobon. lat. 1605, fo. 124rb; Leipzig 877, fo. 96va; London BM, Royal 11.C. III, fo. 93ra; 
Bamberg, Jur 11, fo. 115rb; München Clm 3887, fo. 92ra; Torino BN, E.I.4, fo. 139va; Troyes 135, fo. 
95vb; Paris BN, lat. 4458, fo. 72rb; Trier SB 838/1634, fo. 98vb [siglum: Accursius]; Stockholm KB, 
B 680, fo. 101va: Ergo culpe culpa compensata dissoluitur, ut infra de compe. Si ambo [D. 16.2.10pr.] 
et infra so. ma. Viro [D. 24.3.39]; adopted by Accursius in his gloss quia non debuit ad D. 9.2.9.4; 
Johannes Bassianus refers to D. 16.2.10pr. and D. 24.3.39. These two fragments also contain a 
certain compensation: D. 16.2.10pr. is an example of a set-off of mutual obligations between 
associates (socii), compensatio neglegentiae, and D. 24.3.39 contains a compensation of delicta.
61  Apparently, dolus and data opera are synonymous. See also gloss ad data opera in Ms. 
Paris BN, lat. 4461, fo. 101v: id est in dolo; also Scott 1984, p. 168 nt. 18.
62  Gloss tenebitur ad D. 9.2.9.4: Quia dolus praeponderat. Azo. Et sic nota quod hoc casu 
solus dolus uenit in Aquilia non culpa, ut infra eodem Si putator [D. 9.2.31], et infra de aq. re. do. 
Homo liber § Item [D. 41.1.54.1-2]. Et est ratio ut dixi, quia culpa culpam abolet, set non dolum, ut 
infra eodem Qui foueas § Hec tamen actio [D. 9.2.28.1] secundum Io[annem] [Bassianum]; see 
also a gloss in Biblioteca Vaticana, Ottobon. lat. 1605, fo. 124rb: dolus preponderat culpe, and in 
the same Ms., a gloss with siglum az. next to gloss tenebitur (the gloss at the beginning of this 
footnote): Nota quod dolus preponderat culpe. 
63 Also Wieling 1970, p. 223; the glosses damnum ad VI. 5.12.86 and commentum ad VI 1.21.1 
are also relevant in this perspective, and will be discussed in the section on canon law; Azo, 
Brocarda, fo. 189v, explains that it is the preceding culpa that neutralises the following culpa; so 
the culpa of the injured party has to precede the culpa of the wrongdoer; in that case the later 
culpa (i.e. the culpa of the wrongdoer) is neutralised. There are also references to various texts in 
the Authenticum.
64 See also a gloss to Summa Vindobonensis, IV.3 (Itaque si quis …).  
65 See already the Summa Trecensis, the oldest anonymous Summa on the Codex, from 
the middle of the 12th century (Genzmer 1987, p. 30; see also Kantorowicz & Buckland 1969, 
p. 146ff.); see Summa Trecensis XIII.2: … aut cum rationabiliter excusatur, ut miles qui in campo 
iaculatorio stans [seruum] transeuntem interfecit …; - A somewhat different starting point is 
given by the author of Lo Codi (ca. 1170), also an anonymous Summa of the Codex, originally 
written in the Provençal language. The relevant part concerns the problem of the limits of the 
lex Aquilia. In describing situations in which there is no culpa of the wrongdoer and therefore 
no delictual liability, the following example is also given. A soldier was crossing a place where 
other soldiers were used to crossing over, and during a game he or his horse killed or inflicted 
damage on a person. According to the author of Lo Codi, if the soldier did not inflict the damage 
medieval ius commune 117
seem to have made new explanations with regard to Inst. 4.3.4 that can help us 
with the problem of contributory negligence.66 This is not really surprising as 
Inst. 4.3.4 does not include any reference to the injured party; the Glossators 
therefore had no firm, clear rule to argue on as to the role of the injured party. 
Nevertheless, Johannes Bassianus did consider such contributory negligence 
in his gloss to Inst. 4.3.2/4 (this gloss was not included in the Glossa Ordinaria). 
If the slave crossed a place that was not used as a campus, both parties acted 
culpably (the thrower and the slave). Apparently, Johannes was asked whether 
in such a case the negligence of the thrower and the contributory negligence of 
the slave could be set off against each other and be compensated (as apparently 
was the case in normal practice in other areas/cases). Johannes gave a nega-
tive answer, because the thrower was considered to have thrown the javelin 
intentionally (dolus),67 and dolus consumes negligence (culpa).68 
This theory was adopted by Johannes Bassianus’ student Azo (ca. 1150–1220),69 
who applied the theory to the case of D. 9.2.9.4: the thrower was not liable, 
because the slave should not have crossed the field of the javelin throwers 
(also on the field of Mars70) at an inappropriate time.71 Only in the exceptional 
intentionally, he was not obliged to provide compensation. See Lo Codi, III.31.7.
66 They only emphasised that a distinction is made in Inst. 4.3.4: If a soldier, throwing in a 
field where one usually practised, killed a slave, he would not be considered to act with culpa, 
unless he acted intentionally (data opera); see Accursian gloss nulla culpa ad Inst. 4.3.4: nisi data 
opera factum est ut ff. lex idem Si obstretix in fi. [D. 9.2.9.4] et l. Nam [D. 9.2.10]. If anyone else 
(i.e. not a soldier) threw a javelin and killed a slave, the damage could not be imputed to the 
victim, and the thrower would be liable for culpa; see gloss reus ad Inst. 4.3.4: quia hoc non est ei 
deputatum arg. in aut. ut hi qui ob. p. res mi. § Sin uero tacuerit [Nov. 72.4 (Coll. 6.2)] collatione 
uim et ff. eodem Idem iuris in finalis [D. 9.2.8]; according to a gloss to Summa Vindobonensis, IV.3, 
it was considered necessary that the thrower (not being a soldier) had the essential abilities for 
throwing. If someone nevertheless killed someone, and thus lacked such abilities, that person 
would be liable for culpa; furthermore, a soldier would also be liable for the killing of a slave when 
practising in any place other than a field designated for military exercises.
67  Later, Accursius also distinguishes between an act with dolus, one with culpa and one 
which is neither malicious nor negligent; see Accursian gloss distinguitur ad Inst. 4.3.4: utrum 
commiserit dolo, uel culpa uel non.
68 Johannes Bassianus, Glossa in Institutiones, Ms. Leiden ABL 3, fo. 16v: De lege Aquilia. Resp. 
Iniuria autem et cetera et ibi Si alius hoc tale quid amisit, et cetera [Inst. 4.3.2 and 4.3.4], scilicet non 
seruum qui per talem locum transsiuit. Culpam committit. Queritur ergo non fit compensatio culpe 
cum culpa. Solet enim culpa cum culpa compensari, ut ff. de compensation. Si ambo [D. 16.2.10pr.]. 
Resp. hic ab una parte dolus est, scilicet quod in transeuntem iaculum transmisit, dolus aut culpam 
exedit. …
69 Azo was an influential glossator, a professor at Bologna and the master of Accursius.
70  Gloss ad campum iaculatorium in Ms. Troyes 135, fo. 95v: etiam in campo Mart[io].
71  See also gloss ad intempestiue in Ms. Troyes 135, fo. 95v: id est non idoneo tempore and, 
slightly different, in Ms. Padova BU, 941, fo. 88r: scilicet non suo tempore; Azo stated in his 
Brocarda, fo. 20r, that the slave has to be considered culpable (culpa) because he made this 
journey at an inopportune time, or acted intentionally (culpa est quia non debuit intempestiue 
facere aut quia data opera hoc fecit, D. 9.2.9.4).
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situation described above, in which the thrower threw intentionally and the 
injured (the slave) acted negligently, could the injured party claim compen-
sation. While providing a justification for the solution in that situation, Azo 
formulated a (new) general rule, namely, that when one person acts with culpa 
and the other with dolus, the act with dolus would be considered to be more 
serious than that with culpa (and thus the javelin thrower would be liable in 
the case of D. 9.2.9.4).72 This view is also held by his contemporary Roffredus 
Beneventanus (ca. 1170 – after 1244),73 who made similar remarks, but beyond 
the context of this case.74
Another novelty Azo introduced was that it had to be distinguished whether or not 
the intentional act preceded the negligent act. In this case, the negligence (culpa) 
of the slave, i.e. crossing the field of the javelin throwers at an inappropriate time, 
preceded the intentional act (dolus), i.e. throwing at the slave on purpose. In such a 
case, the rule dolus preponderat culpe75 applied and the thrower was held liable,76 
viz. by means of a direct action based on the lex Aquilia.77 
72  Gloss ad tenebitur with siglum az. in Mss. Paris BN, lat. 4459, fo. 90va; Paris BN, lat. 4451, 
fo. 75ra; Bamberg, Jur 11, fo. 115va; Padova BU, 941, fo. 88rb; Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, 
fo. 106vb; München Clm 3887, fo. 92ra; Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 101va: quia dolus culpa<e> 
praeponderat; see also Ms. Leipzig 877, fo. 96va; Azo, Summa Codicis, III.35.8; see also gloss data 
opera in Padova BU, 941, fo. 88rb: arg. quod dolus praeponderat culpe; culpa fuit servi, quod ipse 
transiuit per campum ludentium, sed cum ille qui dolo eum interfecit tenetur aquilia; - According 
to Azo, dolus could be compensated by dolus (see D. 18.1.57.3 and D. 24.3.39), but culpa lata is not 
compared (comparatur) with dolus; see Azo, Brocarda, fo. 18r: dolus dolo compensatur; dolo non 
comparatur lata culpa; - See also Hugolinus in gloss cessat ad D. 9.2.9.4 in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4461, 
fo. 101va (see n. 79 below).
73  Roffredus studied law in Bologna and Arezzo, and taught at the University of Naples.
74  Roffredus Beneventanus, Libelli iuris civilis. De actio directa legis aquiliae, uers. Tertium 
quod culpa, fo. 96v. 
75  See gloss (ad D. 9.2.9.4) in Ms. Troyes 135, fo. 95vb: Set quaeritur numquid dolus 
preponderat culpe. Distingue, quod aut dolus precedit culpam aut sequitur. Si precedit, distingue 
quod aut ratione culpe peruenit uel adest doloso, aut nichil adest. Si aliquid adest, tenetur dolosus, 
infra de edilic. edicto Vendicantem [D. 21.2.17]. Si nichil adest, non tenetur, supra de edendo l. 
Argentarius § Cum autem [D. 2.13.10.3]. Aut culpa precedat dolum, et tunc dolus preponderat, ut 
hic fecit et in l. Si officium § fi. [probably l. Si obstetrix i.e. D. 9.2.9.4].
76  Gloss ad eum iaculatus with siglum az. in Mss. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, fo. 106vb; 
Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 2511, fo. 76r; Leipzig 877, fo. 96va; Troyes 135, fo. 95v; München Clm 
3887; Trier SB, 838/1634, fo. 98v; Padova BU, 941, fo. 88rb: uel/scilicet ludendo; - See Azo, Summa 
Codicis, III.35.8.
77  Gloss ad Aquilia (tenebitur) with siglum azo in Mss. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, fo. 
106vb; Leipzig 877, fo. 96va; München Clm 3887, fo. 92ra; Troyes 135, fo. 95v; Padova BU, 941, fo. 
88rb: directa; - See also gloss ad utique Aquilia tenebitur (ad D. 9.2.9.4) in Ms. London BM, Royal 
11.C. III, fo. 93r: quamuis in hanc loco et hoc enim non uideatur abesse culpam iacularentur. Id est 
uerum si per lusionem occisus <fuerit>, Aquilie locus est; also, slightly different, in Ms. Leipzig, 
Univ. Bibl., 873, fo. 76vb: Quamuis in hoc loco iacularentur. Vere si per lusum occisus fuerit tenetur.
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Hugolinus († after 1233)78 restated that in the situation in which people are 
throwing javelins on a javelin field, and someone crossed at that inappropriate 
time, the thrower was not liable under the lex Aquilia and that the culpa (even 
levissima) of the thrower was compensated by the culpa of the slave crossing 
the field. In addition, he also came to the conclusion that if the slave had not 
acted culpably, his master might bring an action. This could be the case if the 
slave did not know the place was a campus iaculatorium.79
Accursius added one more decisive criterion with regard to the case of the 
javelin throwers: whether or not the slave took part in the game had to be taken 
into account. If the slave took part in the game (i.e. a normal game, not an illicit 
game)80 and damage was inflicted on him, the damage would be considered 
a result of the permissible game and not imputable to anyone.81 If one of the 
participants in a game suffered damage, no fault (culpa) could be constituted: 
whether a game in which the elimination of an opponent was the goal or a 
game in which no damage should be inflicted, such as a ball game, did not make 
any difference.82 In the case as described in D. 9.2.9.4, the slave, crossing over 
the field, took no part in the game.83 Therefore, another distinction had to be 
made: if the javelin throwers were playing in a place where it was not customary 
to play, i.e. not a campus iaculatorium, the thrower was liable pursuant to the 
lex Aquilia. But if the slave was crossing over a campus iaculatorium, the lex 
78  The glossator Hugolinus was another pupil of Johannes Bassianus’, and a contemporary 
of Azo’s. He was a professor of Roman law at Bologna.
79  Gloss cessat with siglum h. (Hugolinus) ad D. 9.2.9.4 in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4461, fo. 101va: 
Immo uidetur quod habet locum, quia in Aquilia tenetur quis de leuissima culpa, ut infra e. In lege 
[D. 9.2.44pr.]. Set dic cum fuerit in culpa compensari culpam cum culpa et infra de compensat. Si 
ambo et infra solutio. m. fo. Viro [D. 24.3.39]. Atque si autem ponatur seruum non fuisse in culpa 
hinc poterit agere forte quia ignorabat per locum illum aliquid esse solutum iaculare. Cum autem 
dolus est, ab altera parte; licet iste sit in culpa, aget similiter, quia praeponderat dolus culpe. 
80 See gloss nam with siglum az. ad D. 9.2.10 in Mss. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, fo. 
106vb (no siglum); Paris BN, lat. 4459, fo. 90va (no siglum); München Clm 3887, fo. 92ra (no 
siglum); Paris BN, lat. 4451, fo. 75ra; Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 101va; Bamberg, Jur. 11, fo. 115va: 
Non enim ludi sunt appellandi ex quibus nascitur occasio criminandi, ut supra in prima oratio<ne> 
prope finem; - According to Rasi 1968, p. 760f., he who participated in a sport activity and inflicted 
damage on a third party did not have any responsibility, provided participation was permitted 
(not all games were allowed; see Rasi 1968, p. 761 nt. 96) and it was a manifestation according to 
the normal rules or the specific rules for that particular game and that there were no intentional 
excesses.
81  Accursian gloss nam ludus ad D. 9.2.10: Immo non est ludus ex quo crimen oritur ut 
supra in proemio circa fi[nem] [D. 9.2.9.4 first sentence] alius si esset per ludum etiam nocitum, 
dummodo ei, qui est de ludo: ludo imputatur ut infra eodem Si ex plagis § fi. [D. 9.2.52.4]. 
82  See already Placentinus, Summa Codicis, III.35; Rasi 1968, p. 762.
83  Accursian gloss seruus ad D. 9.2.9.4: Qui non erat de ludo alius; secus ut infra eodem titulo 
Si ex plagis § fi. [D. 9.2.52.4]. Item in non solito loco ad ludum; see also gloss seruus ad D. 9.2.9.4 
in Ms. Troyes 135, fo. 95vb: non ludens, alius sicut infra Si ex plagis Cum pila [D. 9.2.52.4]. [siglum 
illegible].
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Aquilia was not applicable, since he should not have crossed a field of javelin 
throwers at an inopportune time (i.e. when the throwers were throwing).84
Odofredus (†1265),85 when discussing the second situation as described in 
D. 9.2.9.4, connected this case to the text of D. 9.2.10: the thrower who killed 
the slave certainly acted with culpa or dolus, required for liability under the 
lex Aquilia, because taking part in a dangerous game was also considered to 
constitute culpa.86 Also Odofredus, based on the last part of D. 9.2.9.4, argued 
that although the slave acted culpably by crossing the campum iaculatorium, 
the player who threw a javelin intentionally at the slave acted with dolus, and 
dolus had to be considered to be more serious than culpa.87
The view of the Commentators
Introduction
With regard to the cases of the javelin throwers (D. 9.2.9.4 & Inst. 4.3.4), the 
following summary of the relevant views of the Commentators can be given. 
84 See Accursian gloss sed et si per lusum a iaculantibus ad D. 9.2.9.4: Scilicet alicubi; ubi 
consuetum non est. Et dicas quod ibat iste seruus per alium locum, non per campum iaculatorium; 
alius haberet locum inferior § Sed si cum alii [D. 9.2.9.4 second sentence]; see also gloss sed si 
per lusum iaculantibus in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Palat. Lat. 737, fo. 70ra: <id> est campo non 
iaculatorio. [no siglum] and gloss ad iaculantibus in Ms. Troyes 135, fo. 95v: non datum in campo 
iaculatorio; see already Azo in gloss sed a iaculantibus in Ms. Leipzig 877, fo. 96va: ubi factum 
culpa sequitur; scilicet alicubi. azo; - Although Accursius did not first argue, with reference to D. 
9.2.10, that while the slave is not a participant and while the game was a game causing damage 
(ludus noxius), there could be reason for Aquilian liability, this could be an implicit idea. See also 
Henricus de Baila in gloss with siglum Yr. ad D. 9.2.10 in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 2511, fo. 
76r: Enim si per lusum occisus fuit, locus est acquilia. 
85 Odofredus was a pupil and follower of Hugolinus’, and a professor of Roman law at 
Bologna.
86 Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto veteri ad D. 9.2.9.4, fo. 273r; Engelmann 1965, p. 209, 
argued that Odofredus believed that playing a dangerous game at a prohibited place was to 
be considered as acting with culpa; he referred to Odofredus ad D. 9.2.9.4 and to the phrase 
‘barbitonsor non tenetur, nisi posuit in loco, in quo ponere debebat’. Engelmann argued that since 
taking part in a dangerous game was considered to constitute culpa, the unfolding situation 
had to be attributed to the player, so that the ‘culpa praecedens’ was not the violation of the 
prohibition as such, but the playing at a place where it was dangerous to do so and therefore 
was prohibited; - See also a gloss in Ms. Trier SB, 838/1634, fo. 98vb: ludum noxium in culpa esse. 
An allegation in this manuscript seems also relevant: D. 47.2.50.4, in which it is stated that a 
dangerous game may not be left unpunished (non debet impunitus esse lusus tam perniciosus).
87  Scott 1984, p. 168f., rightly stated that from the texts there is no clear evidence regarding 
the position of the plaintiff ’s acting intentionally to create his own harm in conjunction with a 
(solely) negligent defendant; furthermore, he stated that in D. 9.2.11pr. the person who allowed 
himself to be in a place he knew was dangerous, was guilty of more than culpa. His state of mind 
may be analogous to that described in the words data opera in D. 9.2.9.4. The author suggested 
that, in spite of the ‘dearth of authority’, the same ratio applies: in this case the dolus of one party 
would always eliminate the culpa of the other party; Scott finds support in the gloss tenebitur ad 
D. 9.2.9.4 (‘quia culpa culpam abolet, sed non dolum’).
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They made a distinction between the situation in which the injured party did 
not take part in the game, and the situation in which the injured party did so. 
In this last situation, it was presumed the damage was not inflicted intention-
ally, unless there was proof to the contrary.88
In the first situation, in which the injured party took no part in the game, 
the civilians who played with a lance and wounded or killed somebody were 
liable. According to Johannes Faber (†1340),89 this would also apply if they 
played in a field designated for that purpose. They would act culpably because 
apparently it was not customary that civilians threw javelins.90 Johannes Faber 
argued that it would be different if the civilians played a suitable game, for 
example a ball game, or a public competition. If civilians played with bows,91 
and in a public place, Faber was of the opinion that the same applies if they 
wounded or killed someone and therefore they would not be held liable, be-
cause this was often done by young people and workmen.92
More elaborate on the reason for culpability are the commentaries of 
Nicasius de Voerda (ca. 1440–1492)93 and Henricus de Pyro (1403–1473).94 If 
someone took part in a game not permissible to him, by reason of the person 
(ratione personae) or by reason of the wrong place (ratione loci), and killed 
somebody, he was held liable (for homicide). The reason is that his negligence 
(culpa) preceded the damage-causing act.95 The permissibility of the game 
seems to be based on the criterion of ratione loci: did he do the right thing in 
the right way but in the wrong place? Therefore, the permissibility of the game 
seems to have depended on the question whether the place was designated 
for such a purpose. If the players were playing with a crossbow or shooting 
(with arrows) in a place not designated for this purpose and killed someone, 
the person who shot the arrows was liable.96 Someone would not be liable if 
88 See Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in primam Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 9.2.52.4.
89 Johannes Faber (Jean Faure), professor at Montpellier, belonged to the school of Orléans.
90 J. Faber, Commentarii in quatuor Institutionum libros, edn. 1557, fo. 111r.
91  See on arca and balistae in the 13th and 14th centuries (albeit in the southern area of 
Toscana) De Luca & Farinelli 2002, p. 455ff.
92  J. Faber, Commentarii in quatuor Institutionum libros, edn. 1557, fo. 111r.
93 Nicasius de Voerda was a professor at Cologne. He qualified in arts and theology at the 
University of Louvain, and acquired a doctoral degree in canon law at the University of Cologne; 
on Nicasius Voerda, see, e.g., Von Eisenhart 1896, p. 91f.; Cobban 1999, p. 19.
94 Henricus Brunonis de Pyro, doctor legum, studied in Paris, Cologne and Bologna, taught 
at Cologne and Louvain and later became a Carthusian. On Henricus de Pyro/Piro, see, e.g., 
Feenstra 1996, p. 3ff.
95 According to Nicasius de Voerda, Super Institutionibus, ad Inst. 4.3.2, the same would 
apply to a cleric if he took part in a game not permitted to him and thereby he killed someone. In 
my opinion, this is an example of liability ratione personae; Voerda possibly thought of X 5.12.8.
96 Henricus de Pyro, Super Institutis, ad Inst. 4.3.
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he was playing in a place designated for this purpose.97 In that case, it was 
dangerous to cross that field where one played with artillery. As to the person 
who crossed the unsafe field, the blame was to be imputed to him. Of course, 
an exception had to be made in the event the players threw intentionally or 
the person using the artillery aimed at a person intentionally, as dolus is more 
serious than culpa.98
The role of the injured party
Up to now, these solutions are only explicitly discussed from the perspective 
of the culpability of the wrongdoer. However, a number of Commentators 
made some remarks on the role of the injured party as well. With regard to D. 
9.2.9.4,99 Baldus mentioned that nobody is obliged to cross over a dangerous 
place. If someone nevertheless does so and the crossing ends in an undesired 
way, this is to be imputed to the victim.100 Florianus de Sancto Petro († 1441)101 
called it an ‘ethical rule’ that if someone crosses a dangerous place, negligence 
is imputed to him; based on this rule, the care to be observed includes not 
exposing oneself to danger.102 
Consequences of contributory negligence
It is not until Paulus de Castro (ca. 1360/62–1441)103 that the consequences of 
such contributory negligence were made explicit. Paulus de Castro remarked 
that if culpa of the slave could be established, the thrower was not liable, 
because the culpa of the thrower was compensated by the culpa of the slave. 
The situation would be different if the thrower threw intentionally because in 
that case no compensation took place, since dolus was considered to be more 
97  It seems that in such a case no culpa was established beforehand, based on ratione loci. 
However, to resolve the ambiguity in this text one has to assume that the wrongdoer nevertheless 
acted culpably, because the act of the injured party is implicitly compared with it, and at the end 
even explicitly compared with it (dolus vs. culpa). Otherwise, if no culpability of the wrongdoer 
existed on other grounds, the remark that the injured party acted dangerously and had to blame 
himself would be superfluous.
98 Nicasius de Voerda, Super Institutionibus, ad Inst. 4.3.2; Henricus de Pyro, Super Institutis, 
ad Inst. 4.3. Apparently, according to Henricus, even when someone played a game unknown to 
him, and in playing that game killed another person, he was liable.
99 Unfortunately, Bartolus does not comment on D. 9.2.9.4 (nor on D. 9.2.11pr.).
100 Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2.9.4; Commentaria, ad D. 9.2.29pr.
101  Florianus de Sancto Petro (Sampieri) was a Bolognese doctor and the master of 
Antonius de Mincuccius.
102 Florianus de Sancto Petro, Super nono libro Digesti veteris, ad D. 9.2.9.4: …. Nota ex 
isto tex[to] [i.e. D. 9.2.9.4, EvD] moralem regulam que uult imputari ey qui transit per locum 
periculosum facit infra e[adem] l[ege] Item Mella in prin. [D. 9.2.11pr.]. Et ex hoc sumitur cautela 
quod quis non debet se exponere periculo. …
103 Paulus de Castro was a student of Baldus de Ubaldis’. He belonged to the tradition of 
the Commentators, and he was a professor of law at Avignon, Siena, Padua and Florence.
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serious than culpa.104 Although this theory was already mentioned in the Gloss, 
it was not further elaborated; besides Paulus de Castro also Albericus de Rosate 
applied the same theory to this case. Finally, Florianus and Albericus remind 
us that anyone who plays a dangerous game also acts with culpa.105
3.2.2.2 The case of the barber
The view of the Glossators
Already in the Summa Vindobonensis, an early work erroneously ascribed 
to Irnerius,106 the importance of the case of D. 9.2.11pr. to the problem of 
contributory negligence in the medieval period was mentioned. The author 
of the Summa Vindobonensis brought up a fictitious case in which a person 
inflicted more damage on himself than on someone else: this person killed 
an animal owed to him and so inflicted the damage on himself. In this case, 
the injured party rather than any other party had to be blamed. This, so the 
anonymous author argued, was comparable to the barber’s case in which 
someone entrusted himself to a barber who put his chair in a dangerous place. 
The damage suffered by the injured party could not be claimed under the lex 
Aquilia.107 The author of the Summa Vindobonensis referred to the case of the 
barber (D. 9.2.11pr.) who put his chair near a place where people were playing 
with a ball. As described before, in this case one of the ball-players threw the 
ball quite hard108 and hit the hand(s) of the barber,109 as a result of which the 
throat of a slave was cut by the barber’s knife.110 
104 Paulus Castrensis, Auenionicae Praelectiones in Digestum Vetus, ad D. 9.2.9.4. See also 
R. Fulgosius, In primam Pandectarum partem commentariorum, I, ad D. 9.2.11pr. When reading 
Fulgosius’ commentary one comes to the following conclusion. While people were playing with 
javelins they killed a slave. Apparently, Fulgosius believed that in such a case both the thrower 
and the (passing) slave acted culpably; the culpability of the thrower was, however, more serious 
and thus after being set off against the culpability of the slave is the only culpability that still 
remained. Therefore he was liable. It is not clear what Fulgosius meant with ‘more serious’ 
negligence: dolus, or just culpa lata or culpa levis.
105 Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in primam Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 9.2.9.4; see 
also Florianus de Sancto Petro, Super nono libro Digesti veteris, ad D. 9.2.9.4.
106 See Cortese 1995, p. 135.
107 Summa Vindobonensis, IV.3.
108 Differently in Azo, Summa Codicis, III.35.8: et pilla uehementer percussa; in Placentinus, 
Summa Codicis, III.35: fortiter.
109 See also gloss ad tonsor habebat in Ms. Leipzig, Univ. Bibl., 873, fo. 76v: in manibus.
110  Vivianus Tuscus (13th century) wrote a casus to D. 9.2.11pr. Casus were examples used 
by the Glossators to illustrate the texts/cases of the Corpus Iuris to their students; see Coing 1973, 
p. 328; Cortese 1995, p. 18. Vivianus’ casus deals with two persons, Titius and Mevius, playing a 
ball game. One of them hit the ball against the hands of a barber who was just shaving a slave. The 
barber cut the throat of the slave, killing him. Who could be held liable: the ball-thrower or the 
barber? Vivianus responded that the ball-thrower should be liable, unless the barber had culpa, 
in which case non agitur; see Vivianus, Casus ad D. 9.2.11pr., in the edition of Corpus Iuris of 1618, 
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It is interesting that Placentinus († 1192)111 argued that a fault (culpa) could 
be attributed to various persons: the lusor, the deiector, the barber if he was 
shaving in a place were many people were used to crossing over (or where 
one customarily played;112 see D. 9.2.11pr.),113 and also the person who was 
being shaved, because he entrusted himself to a barber who put his chair 
in such a dangerous place. The Glossator explicitly looked at the role of the 
injured party. The consequence of such contributory negligence becomes 
clear from the following. Placentinus stated that if the ball-player threw the 
ball negligently or intentionally (with culpa or dolus), he would certainly be 
liable. Apparently, according to Placentinus, the contributory negligence of 
the injured party had to be regarded as relative: he was negligent in a certain 
position to another person. The behaviour of the injured party is only to be 
regarded as contributory negligence against certain actors in the case, and 
not against other actors. The phrase ‘de se queri debet’ had to be considered 
as referring to the barber.114 In Placentinus’ opinion, first of all an action had 
to be brought against the barber, while the culpa of the injured party (in 
col. 1062. This example provided by Vivianus is interpreted by Engelmann in such a way that 
the barber was coincidentally hit by the ball. The barber acted with culpa if he had seen people 
playing there. In the event that he had not seen people playing, all damage had to be considered 
as inflicted due to casus; Engelmann 1965, p. 209; - However, Engelmann suggests imagining 
the case in another way: Because people were playing in a square, it is obviously dangerous and 
reckless to shave there. When, however, no accident happened, and subsequently a horse passed 
by chance and hit the barber, who harmed his client because of that, the barber was considered 
to have inflicted the damage by casus. He was not liable, although he acted culpably (in choosing 
to shave in a square) and (although) the damage could also have resulted as a consequence of his 
carelessness.
111  Placentinus, one of the most important glossators of the 12th century, was a professor 
of Roman law at Bologna and Montpellier; on Placentinus, see, e.g., De Tourtoulon 1972.
112  In the paraphrase of D. 9.2.11pr. in the sixth volume of the Corpus Iuris of Daoyz 
(ludens pila..), it is stated that the ball-player was held liable under the lex Aquilia, unless the 
barber acted with culpa, which was the case if he shaved in a place where people usually played 
games or where there was intense traffic; in fact, the consuetudo is used to excuse someone (the 
thrower) from culpa; see a pre-Accursian gloss ad consuetudine in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4461, fo. 
101va: consuetudo uidetur hic aliquem excusare a culpa.
113  See also gloss ad imputatur in Mss. Leipzig, Univ. Bibl., 873, fo. 76v; Biblioteca Vaticana, 
vat. lat. 2511, fo. 76r: scilicet tonsori; - A pre-Accursian gloss explicitly stated that it was the barber 
or the thrower who acted culpably; see gloss ad eorum culpa sit with siglum az. in Ms. Paris BN, 
lat. 4461, fo. 101va; Troyes 135, fo. 95vb; München Clm 3887, fo. 92r; Leipzig, Univ. Bibl., 873, 
fo. 76v: uel tonsoris uel pilla deiacentis sensus culpa est. (last three words only in Ms. Leipzig, 
but there without siglum); - Later, Accursius, in the Glossa Ordinaria, more generally stated that 
whoever acted culpably was liable under the lex Aquilia, gloss teneri ad D. 9.2.11pr. Apart from 
this statement, which is more explanatory than pioneering, Accursius does not seem to add 
anything new.
114  Gloss ad D. 9.2.11pr. with siglum p. (Placentinus) in Ms. Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 101va: 
Quid dicem de eo qui deiecit pilam dolo vel culpa certe tenebitur et quod dicitur de se queri debere 
hoc quantum ad tonsorem intelligatur and (anonymous) gloss ad D. 9.2.11pr. in Ms. München Clm 
3887, fo. 92ra: Aliud dicemus de eo qui deiecit pilam dolo uel culpa. Certe tenebitur. Et quod dicetur 
‘de se queri debet’, hic quantum ad tonsorem intelligatur.
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relation to the barber) had to be compensated (by the culpa of the barber). 
Possibly, and subsidiarily, the master of the slave had the possibility to bring 
an action against the deiector,115 as the contributory negligence did not regard 
this relation.
The view Placentinus held seems to have been partly followed by Azo, who 
stated that both the thrower and the barber could have committed the delict 
(of damnum iniuria datum) in a situation as described in D. 9.2.11pr. However, 
the injured party could only claim his damages from one of these persons.116 
Azo seems to have given a different possible consequence to the contributory 
negligence of the slave. He argued that the barber was not liable, and perhaps 
neither the deiector or the percussor, unless the latter acted intentionally,117 
because the person who entrusted himself118 to a barber who put his chair in 
such a dangerous place119 (i.e. where one customarily played or where there 
was a lot of crossing-over)120 was responsible himself.121 In this way, Azo left 
open the possibility that the contributory negligence of the injured party was 
opposed to the negligence of the deiector or the percussor, and in that way 
cancelled out their liability.
A more restrictive interpretation was made by another (anonymous) 
Glossator who explicitly explained this final phrase of D. 9.2.11pr. in such a 
way that both acted negligently, firstly the barber, since he was shaving in a 
115  Placentinus, Summa Codicis, III.35. Placentinus also makes a comparison with D. 
9.2.52.1 (… culpa enim penes eum tantum residet qui prior flagello percusserat, sicut supra est penes 
eum qui in loco prohibito se tonsori commiserat). In the case of the shopkeeper, the culpa lay with 
the person who first struck with the whip, as in this case where a person entrusted himself to a 
barber at an forbidden place; - According to an anonymous gloss, the act of the barber excuses 
[the act of] the thrower; see Mss. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, fo. 106vb; Biblioteca Vaticana, 
Palat. Lat. 737, fo. 70ra; Trier SB, 838/1634, fo. 98vb and 99ra; (partly in) London BM, Royal 11.C. 
III, fo. 93ra; Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 101va: Hic alterius factum alterum excusat, ut factum tonsoris 
lusorem. In pari causa potiorem esse causam defendentis. Differently, gloss de se queri debere 
ad D. 9.2.11pr. in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4461, fo. 101va:  Si liber sit tonsor ab honere culpe exempto, 
cuius in prima pari causa poterior est conditio rei quam actoris, secundum I[rnerium]; also in Ms. 
München Clm 3887, fo. 92ra, where it is ascribed to Azo; from this gloss it can be concluded that 
the negligence of the barber was nullified by someone else’s negligence (the negligence of the 
injured party).
116  See the allegation of Azo to D. 47.7.6pr., e.g., in Ms. Bamberg, Jur 11, fo. 115va and 
Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 101va.
117  Apparently, an anonymous Glossator in Ms. Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, vat. 
lat. 1406, fo. 80v, used this text to make a more general remark: Nota hic dolo dolo (lege: dolus) 
compensatur, ut infra de compen. Si ambo [D. 16.2.10pr.] famosibus.
118  Gloss ad se quis ad D. 9.2.11pr. in Ms. Trier SB, 838/1634, fo. 99ra: scilicet sciens.
119  Gloss ad tondebat ad D. 9.2.11pr. in Ms. Trier SB, 838/1634, fo. 99ra: scilicet sciens.
120 See gloss ad in loco periculoso in Padova BU, 941, fo. 88va: distinctione supra dicta.
121  Azo, Summa Codicis, III.35.8; - In this respect, an allegation in Mss. Padova BU, 941, 
fo. 88va/Bamberg, Jur. 12, p. 188, is especially relevant, namely, to D. 50.17.203. Also another 
allegation, found in several manuscripts, seems relevant, namely, D. 4.2.21pr.
chapter three126
dangerous place,122 and secondly the slave entrusting himself to that barber. 
The negligence of both persons had to be compensated, and the (master of the) 
slave could not bring a claim against the barber.123 And it seems then that this 
became the prevailing view; unfortunately, no decisive decision was explicitly 
taken on the question of the relative or absolute influence of the contributory 
negligence of the injured party.
Based on the final phrase of D. 9.2.11pr. several (other) possibilities were 
provided as a basis for the way to deal with the problem of contributory 
negligence. The first solution is formulated by Irnerius, who stated that the 
defendant would not have acted culpably if the plaintiff himself had to be 
blamed.124 The conduct of the injured party is therefore not really considered 
as contributory negligence, but just taken into consideration when determin-
ing the culpability of the wrongdoer’s act.
A second solution is that because the slave (or, better, his master) himself 
had to take the blame, he was considered guilty of his own delict.125 This is 
very interesting, since apparently one of the solutions to the problem of 
contributory negligence was to qualify the act of the injured party as a delict 
itself. Seemingly, the Glossators made a parallel here with the compensation 
theory: if it appears that the other party (the barber) also acted negligently 
and committed a delict, both delicts, i.e. both culpable acts, were compensated 
and the barber would not have to pay any compensation to the injured party.126
A third interpretation of the final phrase of D. 9.2.11pr. is written by 
Johannes Bassianus, who explained why the slave himself had to be blamed.127 
122  Later, Odofredus argued that whether the barber (dominus barbitonsor) would be held 
liable under the actio legis Aquiliae depended on the question of whether he acted with culpa 
or dolus. The barber was not held liable unless he put his chair in an inappropriate place; see 
Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto veteri ad D. 9.2.9.4, fo. 273r. It is interesting that Odofredus 
explains the last sentence of D. 9.2.11pr. by referring to D. 50.17.203.
123  Gloss in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4451, fo. 75ra: Immo melius quia uterque fuit in culpa, et qui se 
tonsori commiserit, et qui in loco pericoloso tonso<rauit>, unde culpa culpa compensatur, sic infra 
solu. ma. l. Viro [D. 24.3.39] et infra de compensa. Si ambo. [D. 16.2.10pr.]. No siglum is written 
after this gloss; however, considering the frequent glosses of Azo (Azo’s Apparatus) and the 
fact that the glosses surrounding this gloss seem to have been written by the same scribent, it 
probably stems from Azo (or  possibly his master Johannes Bassianus).
124  Irnerian gloss poterit ad D. 9.2.28.1 (edn. Besta 1896, p. 96): quasi reus in culpa non 
sit, cum petitor de ipso queri debeat; - A different view seems to come from a gloss (to the final 
sentences of D. 9.2.11pr.) in Ms. Torino BN, E.I.4, fo. 139v: scilicet rei nequaquam dampnum datum 
est, stating that in such a case there is just no damage to an object at all.
125  See gloss ad ipsum de se queri debere in Ms. Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, vat. lat. 
1406, fo. 80v: scilicet teneatur.
126 See gloss ad quis nec illud male dicatur in Ms. Padova BU, 941, fo. 88v: ergo tonsor non 
tenebitur reparare.
127  See also Summa Vindobonensis, IV.3 in which it is stated that no action could be 
brought against the other person based on the lex Aquilia if someone entrusted himself to a 
medieval ius commune 127
If the slave (consciously) exposed himself to danger, as seems to have been 
the case in D. 9.2.11pr., this was imputed to him.128 However, the act would not 
be imputed to the slave if the dangerous situation could not have possibly 
been known to him, i.e. if he was blind or a stranger (peregrinus). In the case 
of D. 9.2.11pr., the barber was liable in the event that he shaved a blind person. 
Accordingly, his negligence was not overlooked, and the owner of the slave 
retained a claim. However, the barber’s negligence had no consequences when 
a slave was aware of the danger of the situation.129 It is not clear whether the 
negligence of the ‘conscious’ slave was more serious than the barber’s because 
the gloss does not (explicitly) answer this question.130 At last the acceptance 
of risk found its way into the Glossa Ordinaria of Accursius, who stated that an 
act was imputed to the injured party who put himself in a dangerous situation 
(as in this case and in D. 13.6.23).131
barber who put his chair in such a dangerous spot; - According to Rasi 1968, p. 763, the customer 
who asked to be shaved near a playing field is an example of an injured party who indicates 
his willingness to assume risks in a particular situation (and in such a case he could not claim 
damage from someone else). Of course, this was different if the wrongdoer did not act with 
culpa, but with dolus, sc. the intention to harm, taking advantage of the particular situation. See, 
e.g., Azo, Summa Codicis, III.35.8; - According to Rasi 1968, p. 764, even though the Glossators did 
not discuss this matter in particular in the cases of the tree pruner (D. 9.2.31), of the participants 
in the ball game and of the tonsor, it seems that the risk taken by the injured party excluded 
liability of the wrongdoer.
128  Azo did not generalise the exclusion of liability of the barber; see Azo, Summa Codicis, 
III.35.8; - This is subsequently assumed by Accursius, who also continues with the risk criterion 
for persons who put themselves in danger; see Schipani 1969, p. 421; - Interesting also is an 
(anonymous) interlinear gloss ad de se queri debere in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 2511, fo. 
76v: debuit in tonsore debet premonere ne ibi sedere.
129  According to Rasi 1968, p. 764f., when the injured party contributed to the damage 
or provoked the damage by his own action or omission, the responsibility of the wrongdoer 
was diminished or even eliminated. The error (of the wrongdoer) or the infirmity had no legal 
relevancy since the culpa had to be identified precisely in the error and in the infirmity, unless a 
fortuitous case or a case of force majeure was encountered.
130 See the gloss queri debere ad D. 9.2.11pr.; according to Luig 1969, p. 200, based on the 
context this can, however, be answered positively.
131  Accursian gloss queri debere ad D. 9.2.11pr.: Cum ipse hoc sciuit, non ita si ignorauit, 
caecus forte uel peregrinus. Io[annes Bassianus] notat etiam hic quod imputatur ei, qui se posuit 
in periculum, ut infra commoda lege fi. [D. 13.6.23]. This gloss continues in Ms. Biblioteca 
Vaticana, Ottobon. lat. 1605, fo. 124va (with a reference sign): item no[ta] quod culpa cum culpa 
compensatur, ut infra de compensa. Si ambo [D. 16.2.10pr.]; - According to Rasi 1968, p. 764 nt. 107, 
there could be no doubt that there would have been uncertainties about this in practice, given 
the inequality of the cases, even in the case submitted to the domini bononienses; see Quaestiones 
dominorum bononiensium (collectio gratianopolitana) XCIII (p. 226): Quidam bos perterritus, 
currens in nocte per uiam, interfectus est a Martino putante feram bestiam esse; modo dominus 
bouis agit aduersus Martinum lege Aquilia de boue interfecto; ille uero uult se tueri, quia putauit 
feram bestiam esse. Queritur si possit. The domini did not solve the problem. Only the question 
was put forward; the answer was missing. Apparently, this means it concerned a case for which 
there was no easy resolution.
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The view of the Commentators
Baldus made a short remark, namely, that someone should not perform his 
occupation at a random place, but at a proper place.132 Florianus de Sancto 
Petro explained why the barber was liable. He argued that although the barber 
was not at fault for the resulting delict (the killing of the slave), the fact that he 
practised his craft at such a dangerous place did result in an act of negligence 
(as stated above, culpa can establish itself in a negligent preceding act). He 
ought not to have employed his activities anywhere, but just at a suitable and 
proper place. The situation would change if he had informed his customer of 
the danger of the place. If a slave ‘knowingly’ entrusted himself to a barber who 
shaved at such a dangerous place, the act must be imputed to himself.133 Ac-
cordingly, the victim himself had to be blamed. According to Raphael Fulgosius 
(1367–1427),134 the barber in D. 9.2.11pr. would not, however, be released from 
liability if the person to be shaved was blind135 or if the victim was a stranger 
(or a forensis), because it was not presumed that a stranger would know the 
local customs or rules.136 Fulgosius generally formulates that the person who 
culpably (culpa) inflicted damage on someone was to be held liable, unless an 
act of the equally culpable (culpa) injured party occurred.137 Liability would 
still be established if the wrongdoer acted with dolus and the injured party 
with culpa, or when both parties coincidentally acted culpably (culpa), and 
the culpability of the act of one party was more serious than the culpability 
132  Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2.11pr. See also Zwalve 2008, p. 19. One has to remark, as 
is written in the edition of 1577, that strangers could not know the customs of a place: Peregrini, 
et aduene possunt ignorare consuetudines locorum (in italics under nr. 1).
133  Florianus de Sancto Petro, Super nono libro Digesti veteris, ad D. 9.2.11pr.
134  Raphael Fulgosius was a commentator who studied under Bartolomaeus de Saliceto, in 
Bologna, and Castellioneus. He became a professor in Pavia, Piacenza and Padua.
135  R. Fulgosius, In primam Pandectarum partem commentariorum, I, ad D. 9.2.11pr. 
Fulgosius argued that also the thrower would be liable when acting with culpa, with an actio 
in factum (with reference to D. 9.2.7.3). Although it is not clear, it seems to me that this is just a 
remark without any link with the contributory negligence of the injured party.
136  See also Florianus de Sancto Petro, Super nono libro Digesti veteris, ad D. 9.2.11pr.
137  In such an event, the barber was not liable when the slave acted with culpa, because 
the culpa (of the barber) would have been compensated; see Paulus Castrensis, Auenionicae 
Praelectiones in Digestum Vetus, ad D. 9.2.11pr.: Pro seruo meo occiso facto plurium ille tenetur, qui 
reperitur in culpa, nisi esset ipse seruus in culpa fuerit quia tunc culpa compensatur. ... Zwalves’ 
remark (Zwalve 2008, p. 19) that Paulus de Castro’s commentary on the Digest lacks a commentary 
on the title of the lex Aquilia is, in this sense, not correct since this commentary occurs in Paulus 
de Castro’s  Auenionicae Praelectiones; Albericus de Rosate’s view in his Commentarii in primam 
Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 9.2.11pr. is not clear to me. According to Albericus de Rosate, the 
person who acted culpably in the game (the ball-player), or who made a bad choice in choosing 
a dangerous place to put his chair (the barber), is liable on the ground of the lex Aquilia; and it is 
imputed to the person who knowingly put himself in danger (the slave). It seems that he could 
not decide who was liable, and that he did not exactly know what the result of the slave’s action 
was. Zwalve 2008, p. 19, pointed out that there are three possibilities, depending on the answer to 
the question of who of the three was negligent (the player, the barber or the customer himself).
medieval ius commune 129
of the act of the other party. It seems as though Fulgosius regarded dolus as a 
more serious form of culpa; in that way one has to regard his remark that li-
ability would still be established if the culpability of the wrongdoer was more 
serious than the culpability of the injured party: the first is dolus, the latter is 
culpa. Consequently, no maior culpa doctrine is applied here (this doctrine 
will be discussed in the next chapter).138
3.2.2.3 The case of the shopkeeper
Glossators
Introduction
It is generally accepted that according to medieval scholarship there are cases 
in which inflicted damage seems to be unlawful, but in fact is not and for that 
reason does not lead to liability. One such case, in which a wrongdoer is not 
liable, is if the act was committed in self-defence, provided there was no excess 
of defence139 or deliberate intention (dolus).140 The case of the shopkeeper, 
the facts of which are described in the previous chapter, could be an example 
of such an action in self-defence. To review the case in brief: a shopkeeper’s 
lantern141 was taken away by a passer-by142 at night;143 the shopkeeper ran after 
him,144 and the passer-by started to beat the shopkeeper with a whip, which 
led to a brawl during which the shopkeeper knocked out an eye of the man 
who had taken the lantern. It is interesting that the Glossators considered this 
case as a contemporary problem and resituated it in their time: e.g. Odofredus 
138  Fulgosius refers to D. 9.2.9.4.
139  See Rasi 1968, p. 759f., and the literature quoted. A different situation occurs in 
the event of excess of defence. See also Pope Innocentius III in X 2.13.12, according to whom 
satisfactio has to be done if the normal measure of defence is exceeded.
140  See Rasi 1968, p. 757ff.
141  Placed on a stone alongside a path; later, Accursius added a short gloss; see gloss 
tabernarius ad D. 9.2.52.1: in semita id est in uia. It could also be that it was placed in the middle 
of the path; see the (anonymous) gloss ad in semita in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Barb. lat. 1459, 
fo. 101ra: id est uel media. According to another gloss, the stone was placed at a public place; see 
gloss ad D. 9.2.52.1 in Ms. Torino BN, E.I.4, fo. 144v: id est in loco publico.
142  An extraneus, according to gloss ad quidam in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1405, fo. 
80v; legally qualified as a thief (fur) or a robber (raptor) by Placentinus; see gloss with siglum p. 
ad sustulerat in Ms. Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va: Expone immo: fur uel raptor; later, Odofredus 
qualified the passer-by as a fool (quidam fatuus); see Lectura super Digesto veteri ad D. 9.2.52.1; 
- It was indeed the taking away of the lantern that gave the occasion to this case; see gloss with 
siglum p. ad D. 9.2.52.1 in Ms. Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va: Immo fuisset lucerne qui occasionem 
dedit huic rei, ut supra e. Itaque. [D. 9.2.4pr.]. 
143  See also gloss ad noctu in Mss. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 2511, fo. 79v; Biblioteca 
Vaticana, vat. lat. 1405, fo. 80v; Torino BN, E.I.4, fo. 144v: id est de nocte.
144  The thief tried to run away; see also gloss ad fugientem with siglum az. in Ms. Paris BN, 
lat. 4451, fo. 77v: id est fugere volet fur. 
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referred to the shopkeeper as a tabernarius parisius (a shopkeeper from 
Paris).145 D. 9.2.52.1 states that if the shopkeeper did not attack the passer-by 
intentionally, he was not considered to have caused the damage unlawfully 
(iniuria), since whoever struck first with the whip carried the blame (culpa).146 
However, in the event that the shopkeeper had not been hit147 first by the 
passer-by,148 but started the brawl in order to get the lantern back, it seems 
that the damage was considered to have been inflicted as a result of the culpa 
of the shopkeeper. 
Several Glossators dealt with this case. Some argued that to cause damage 
with iniuria means doing so without justification (nullo iure). If damage was 
inflicted culpably, the lex Aquilia was applicable, unless the act was excusable 
because it was performed lawfully (iure).149 Such a lawful act occurred when 
one acted to protect one’s own body.150 In D. 9.2.4pr., it is stated that if someone 
kills another who is lying in ambush to kill him, he will not be held by the lex 
Aquilia, as natural reason permits him to defend himself against danger. The 
same view is held by the Glossators, already by a gloss ascribed to Irnerius, in 
which it is stated that the person in question was excused and the killing was 
considered to be lawful.151 
A different approach, without reference to the term iniuria, is taken by the 
author of Lo Codi: if damage was inflicted without the negligence (culpa) of the 
wrongdoer, it did not have to be compensated. So when someone in defending 
himself inflicted damage on someone else, the wrongdoer did not have to com-
pensate the damage because every person was free to defend his own body.152 
Several requirements
With regard to the problem of self-defence in the tradition of the ius commune, 
145  See Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto veteri, ad D. 9.2.52.1, fo. 277r and also later (the 
commentator) Florianus de Sancto Petro, Super nono libro Digesti veteris, ad D. 9.2.52.1.
146  In Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Palat. Lat. 737, fo. 73vb a gloss ad D. 9.2.52.1 states: Nota 
culpam eius esse qui prior uapulasset (Note that the culpa is of the person who hit (the other) first).
147  See also gloss uapulasset with siglum az. ad D. 9.2.52.1 in Mss. Paris BN, lat. 4461, fo. 
105vb (without siglum); London BM, Royal 11.C. III, fo. 96vb; Biblioteca Vaticana, Barb. lat. 1459, 
fo. 101r; Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1405, fo. 80v; Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 2511, fo. 79v (with 
siglum ac.); Biblioteca Vaticana, Borgh. 225, fo. 91rb; Ms. Torino BN, E.I.4, fo. 144va (with siglum 
ac.); Bamberg, Jur 11, fo. 120ra; München Clm 3887, fo. 96ra; Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va: id est 
uerberatus esset. 
148  Gloss ab eo non prior uapulasset with siglum h. (Hugolinus) in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4461, 
fo. 105vb: qui sustulerat lucernam. 
149  Rogerius, Summa Codicis, III. XXIV.1; - On Rogerius, see (also) Kantorowicz & Buckland 
1969, p. 122ff.
150 See Summa Vindobonensis, IV.3; Rogerius, Summa Codicis, III. XXIV.1.
151  Gloss igitur iniuria ad D. 9.2.5 in Besta 1896, p. 94: … iure facis, ut insidiantem occidendo …
152  See Lo Codi, III.31.7.
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three requirements for a successful defence153 are distinguished:154 the purpose 
had to be defence, not vengeance and as a consequence, no other way of 
defence was allowed (the requirement of necessity);155 the defence had to be 
an immediate reaction upon a direct attack (not after a period of time); and, 
finally, the person defending himself must not exceed the limits of necessary 
defence.156 If these requirements were fulfilled, the wrongdoer was not liable 
and no culpa was attributed to the wrongdoer. These requirements will be 
discussed in the course of this chapter.
If someone’s property was stolen, the owner was not allowed to hit the thief. 
This was already stated in the case of the shopkeeper (D. 9.2.52.1), since the 
shopkeeper would have acted with culpa if he had hit the thief first (and in 
doing so provoked a brawl) and this was the case if the thief did not mean to 
hit the shopkeeper and did not approach the shopkeeper. One could argue 
that it should have been permitted to kill the thief as it was night. However, 
an anonymous gloss – by means of a fiction – argued that this is not the case: 
because the thief was carrying the lantern one must assume that it was day-
time. So the rule that one was allowed to kill a thief at night, even when he 
defended himself with a weapon, did not apply here. This rule did not apply 
in daylight, but only at night; if there was lighting at night, one has to pretend 
that it was daytime.157 
Although it would be permitted for the shopkeeper to kill a thief who 
approached him with a weapen (the fear of weapons is sufficient), it is not 
permitted when he could have seized him but rather preferred to kill him. 
In that case, if the attacker (i.e. thief) was seized and killed,158 the killing was 
153  See already D. 43.16.1.27 (vim vi repellere licere) and D. 4.2.12.4 (nam cum liceat … vim vi 
repellere). The familiar form (vim vi repellere licet) – as a summary of different statements – was 
probably only formulated in the Middle Ages; see Diósdi 1963, p. 187.
154  See Jansen 2004, p. 122f.
155  See already D. 9.2.45.4: Qui, cum aliter tueri non possent, damni culpa dederint, innoxii 
sunt: vim enim vi defendere omniaque iura permittunt. 
156  A legitimate action in self-defence was also allowed between animals; see Petrus, 
Exceptiones legum romanorum, III, cap. 50; Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto veteri ad  D. 9.1.1.11, 
fo. 276v; Rasi 1968, p. 759; on the basis of self-defence, and the application in Roman law, 
ius commune and the early modern period, see, e.g., Jansen 2004, p. 121ff., and the literature 
mentioned there, and also esp. for the last requirement, see Massetto 1958, p. 1128.
157  Gloss ad D. 9.2.52.1 with siglum az. in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 2511, fo. 79va: 
Ex hoc uerbo dicunt quidam quod non debeo aliquem percutere, nisi primo ipse me percutiat, quia 
data opera facit, quod falsum est. Et quod dicitur tabernarium esse in culpa si primo percussit, dico 
uerum esse, ubi ille qui lucernam sustulerat nolebat eum percutere, nec ad hoc uenerat, scilicet 
potius cum lucerna fugiebat. Set numquid non licet furem nocturnum occidere, et si non se defendat 
telo, cum non possum aliter periculum rerum mearum euitare? Resp. Hic habetur pro diurno 
propter lucernam quam portabat.
158  An elucidation is added by Azo; see gloss ad eripere/rixatus esset with siglum az. ad D. 
9.2.52.1 in Mss. Leipzig 877, fo. 100rb; München Clm 3887, fo. 96r; Troyes 135, fo. 99v; Biblioteca 
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considered unlawful and the killer (i.e. the shopkeeper) was held liable.159 
The attack (of the shopkeeper) had to be in defence, not to take vengeance, 
which would be the case when the shopkeeper ran after his attacker in order 
to prevent his taking away the lantern; if the shopkeeper plucked out an eye of 
the thief with his finger before he was hit, the blame was on him.160 
The situation changes slightly if the owner of the object was first hit with an 
object by the thief, as in D. 9.2.52.1 (namely, by a blow with the whip), because 
in that case the owner was allowed to strike the thief.161 The Glossators argued 
that the shopkeeper clearly acted in defence, and that the act of knocking out 
an eye was not done in vengeance (if the latter was the case, the shopkeeper 
was liable). It is presumed that the shopkeeper acted in self-defence (and 
not in vengeance) because he performed the act (of knocking out an eye) 
immediately after the attack. He did this in order to prevent the attacker 
from further attacking him. The legal presumption was that when the act was 
done immediately after the attack, it was done in self-defense (rather than 
in vengeance).162 In addition to this, in C. 8.4.1, the possessor who lawfully 
possesses is allowed to use a moderate degree of force to repel any attack 
of violence exerted against him for the purpose of depriving him of his 
possession.163
Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, fo. 111r: si quoque ei occulum effodisset. 
159  As in D. 9.2.4.1, D. 9.2.5pr. and D. 9.2.52.1; see Azo, Summa Codicis, III.35.5. 
160 Gloss data opera (reconstructed) with siglum az. in Mss. München 3887, fo. 96ra; 
Padova BU, fo. 88r; Troyes 135, fo. 99v; Paris BN, lat. 4461, fo. 105vb; Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. 
lat. 1408, fo. 111r; Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 2511, fo. 79v; Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va: Si 
defendendi non etiam ulciscendi causa hoc factum sit; the gloss continues (in a different hand) 
in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4461, fo. 105rb: sicut istud debet intelli<gi> cum semper audeatur data opera 
facere, puta cum uere post eum ut ille impediretur et lumine exeret ad equauisse ei et cum digito sibi 
deberi effodit cum ipse non esset percussus set causam mali dedisse uidetur.
161  See gloss ad D. 9.2.52.1 in Ms. Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va (see n. 164 below).
162  See also D. 9.1.1.11. In the study of manuscripts this text, as well as C. 9.12.6, is often 
mentioned; sometimes reference is made to D. 9.2.9pr. and D. 9.2.45.4; - See gloss nisi data opera 
with siglum az. ad D. 9.2.52.1 in Mss. Paris BN, lat 4459, fo. 94rb; London BM, Royal 11.C. III, fo. 
96vb; Paris BN, lat. 4451, fo. 77vb; Bamberg, Jur 1, fo. 120ra (no lemma found); Biblioteca Vaticana, 
vat. lat. 1405, fo. 80vb (no lemma found); Biblioteca Vaticana, Borgh. 225, fo. 91rb (no lemma 
found); Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va; München Clm 3887, fo. 96ra; Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, 
vat. lat. 1408, fo. 111ra: ad casum prepositum restringuitur responsio, secundum Jo[annem] 
B[assianum]. Non enim quia quis faciat incontinenti uidetur facere ad uindictam hoc ipso. Scilicet 
quia si facit incontinenti uidetur quod ideo faciat ne aggressor iterum insurgat in eum; see also the 
addition in Ms. München Clm 3887, fo. 96ra: et sic [ex] quo incontinenti praesumitur defensionem 
item contra probare; gloss penes with siglum az. in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Borgh. 225, fo. 91rb: 
Liquet ergo quod ad tutelam sui corporis fecerat non ad uindictam, alioquin teneretur. Sumetur 
tamen et actio, arg. ex hoc loco, quia, si incontinenti facit quis, presumitur facere ad defensionem. 
Vnde et si faciat incontinenti, ad uindictam dicetur non teneri quis iuris presumptione. Semper 
uideatur ad defensionem facere, potius quam ad uindictam. 
163 Accursian gloss nisi data ad hoc opera ad D. 9.2.52.1: id est uindictam: et sic ex quo 
incontinenti fecit presumitur quod ad sui defensionem fecerit ut agressor interim eum non inuadat 
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It was permissible to take back the object, provided that this was done imme-
diately after the theft. This requirement of immediacy seems to be accepted 
in various glosses.164 Also, when someone attacked another with a weapon (in 
this case the thief who started to hit the shopkeeper with a whip),165 it was 
permissible to resist, using weapons (it was permitted to repel violence with 
violence),166 provided action was taken immediately and not after some time 
had elapsed, as stated in D. 43.16.3.9.167
The situation, however, can be somewhat more complicated. When 
someone, not a thief, was approached by a person holding a sword, but not yet 
striking,168 and he killed this person, he would not be considered to have killed 
unlawfully, because someone who killed his attacker under fear of weapons 
(i.e. of death) would not be liable.169 The fear of approaching weapons was 
sufficient to justify the use of violence.170 However, if one threw a stone in 
defence and this stone did not hit the attacker but a passer-by, the thrower 
nisi contra probetur ut hic supra si quadrupes pauperiem fecisse dicatur lex i § Cum arietes [D. 
9.1.1.11], secundum quosdam. Et sic post contra probari: ut hic secundum Joannem, licet quidem 
contra. Et adde quod notatur C. unde ui lege prima [C. 8.4.1]. After a slightly different version of 
this gloss, in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Barb. lat. 1459, fo. 101rb, an addition follows by a different 
hand with siglum cy. (Cyprianus): dic ut per glossam etc. 
164 Gloss ad D. 9.2.52.1 in Ms. Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va: Ex his sumitur intelligendum 
quod si alius tibi rem tuam auferret. Ideo eum percutere non debes, set in continenti auferre prioris 
nisi re primo percutiatur ita quod dolorem inferat ut hic de flagelli percutione dicit. Sic quod oculum 
effodisset.
165 According to Azo, the phrase ‘in quo dolor inerat’ had to be interpreted in such a way 
that the whip had to be considered the cause or instrument of the infliction of pain, i.e. that pain 
can be caused by this whip; see gloss dolor with siglum az. in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Borgh. 225, 
fo. 91rb: Hoc est causa uel instrumentum inferendi doloris, id est quo flagello poterat dolor inferri; 
- The passer-by had a whip in his hand, something painful was enclosed in the whip, or more 
precisely: something painful in its effect (see gloss ad in quo dolor inerat in Bamberg, Jur. 11, fo. 
120r: per effectum); Accursius added in a gloss that (it is said that) there is pain in a whip because 
it causes pain to others; see gloss inerat ad D. 9.2.52.1: nota quod dolor dicitur inesse flagello ex 
eo quod alii infert dolorem.; an (anonymous) gloss in Ms. Padova BU, 941, fo. 91v, clarifies that it 
would have been an instrument to cause pain: id est, aliquid quod erat instrumentum in causa 
doloris; see also gloss dolor with siglum az. in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4451, fo. 75ra: Id est causa doloris 
uel: qui dolorem inferebat.; - According to Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto veteri ad D. 9.2.52.1, fo. 
277r, however, it was a baculum (staff).
166 See Azo, Summa Codicis, III.35.3-4.
167  Accursian gloss rixatus esset ad D. 9.2.52.1: Et sic eum prius percusserit, collige ergo hec et 
ex superiori. Resp. arg. quod non debes aliquem percutere ad defendendum, nisi prius te feriat. Sed 
contra est, ut infra de ui et de ui armata l. iii § Eum igitur [D. 43.16.3.9], et hic sic euenit de facto. 
168 Today this would be called a pre-emptive strike; see, e.g., Buruma 2003, p. 116f.
169 According to Odofredus, no poena had to be paid if someone acted to defend himself. 
All leges permit countering violence with violence; see Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto veteri 
ad D. 9.2.52.1, fo. 276v: ... [uideri] et ita uim ui repellere licet. Item habetis sufficit terror armorum 
accedit, supra eo. l. Scientiam § Qui cum aliter [D. 9.2.45.4]; see also D. 43.16.1.27 and D. 43.16.3.9.
170  See also the canonist Henricus de Segusio (Hostiensis), Summa. De damno dato. 
Quando locum habet hec actio, edn. 1537 (reprint 1962), fo. 266r.
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would be held liable. The reason is that the use of violence was only allowed 
against violence, just for defence purposes and not for revenge.171
A different question is whether the situation changed if an owner hit a thief 
intentionally. This situation seems to have been taken into account in the 
case of D. 9.2.52.1 and in the glosses on this text. If the shopkeeper inflicted 
the damage on the thief intentionally,172 he would obviously be held liable 
under the lex Aquilia.173 Some clarification is needed to really grasp this 
exception, and Azo provides the explanation: such an intentional act could 
be spoken of in the case where the shopkeeper intentionally tried to hit the 
passer-by (e.g. if he struck in order to knock out an eye). The shopkeeper also 
acted intentionally if it had been possible to take back the lantern without 
knocking out the eye of the thief. This argument seems to include a fiction: if 
the shopkeeper could have taken the lantern back without knocking out the 
eye, but nevertheless did so, his act is considered to be intentional. However, 
this was not the case if it had been impossible to spare the thief without danger 
to himself or to his belongings.174 Azo made a distinction in case of intention: 
such an intentional act is permissible in order to defend oneself, but not in 
order to take vengeance.175 
A final remark made by Accursius is that it was not allowed to protect one’s 
belongings by employing violence which exceeds a moderate intensity.176 
171  Apart from the aforementioned commentary of Odofredus on D. 9.2.52.1, see also 
Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto veteri ad D. 9.2.3, fo. 272r, in which he states that it is permissible 
to kill someone who is ambushing you, because ratio naturalis permittit se defendere; - According 
to Rasi 1968, p. 759, see gloss uellet ad D. 9.2.52.1, the Glossators seem to be very generous in 
qualifying defence of the body as legitimate; they judged differently, i.e. more reservedly, in cases 
of protection of property.
172  The gloss (data opera) effodisset ad D. 9.2.52.1 in Mss. Paris BN, lat 4459, fo. 94rb; 
Biblioteca Vaticana, vat. lat. 1405, fo. 80v (without the final two words/siglum); Biblioteca 
Vaticana, vat. lat. 1408, fo. 111ra; Biblioteca Vaticana, Borgh. 225, fo. 91rb; London BM, Royal 11.C. 
III, fo. 96v; München Clm 3887, fo. 96ra; Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va; Bamberg, Jur. 11, fo. 120ra 
adds: ad uindictam, secundum az[onem].
173  Placentinus explained that the shopkeeper did not have to kill the other or strike out 
an eye because of the fact that the other took the lantern; see Placentinus, Summa Codicis, III.35. 
See also gloss ad D. 9.2.52.1 in Ms. Stockholm KB, B 680, fo. 105va: Nonne potuit occidere iure 
minime licet fur, uel raptor etiam quia eum deprehendat. p[lacentinus].
174  Gloss data opera with siglum az. in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4451, fo. 77vb: § Hoc intelligas cum 
tabernarius potuit ab eo lucernam extraquere sine suum oculum effodisse [lege: effodendo]. Alius 
quando si non potuit ei parcere sine periculo sui et rerum suarum licuit eum interficere, ut supra e. 
l. Itaque § Lex [D. 9.2.4.1]. 
175  Gloss nisi data opera with siglum az. in Ms. Biblioteca Vaticana, Borgh. 225, fo. 91rb: Id 
est, nisi, cum uellet eum percutere, dedit operam, ut ita eum percuteret ut oculum erueret. Licet enim 
dare operam ut percuteret eum <causa> defendendi, se non ulciscendi. 
176  Accursian gloss uellet ad D. 9.2.52.1: … per quod uides quod incipit tabernarius 
inquirere rixam. Ergo non licet ob tutelam rerum mearum inferre uim. Resp. hoc: quia non fuit cum 
moderamine. 
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Protection of personal belongings using moderate violence was allowed. No 
culpa would be attributed to a person who acted as any normal person would 
in order to protect his own body or his personal belongings.177 
Commentators
The Commentators took as starting point the Roman rule that if someone 
killed the person who provoked him,178 in self-defence or in trying to protect 
his belongings, the killing did not occurr with iniuria and there was no liability 
based on the lex Aquilia.179 Also, the Commentators were of the opinion that it 
would not be sufficient to argue that the wrongdoer hit his opponent because 
the latter started the fight (i.e. he was the attacker).180 That was not sufficient 
to exclude liability; it was also required that the wrongdoer could not have 
possibly behaved in a different way, without the use of violence.181 Only in that 
case did he not act culpably (with culpa).182
According to Raphael Fulgosius, in a case of self-defence one did not have to 
wait until being hit, the fear of violence was sufficient.183 However, the person 
under attack should have no other possibility to avoid inflicting damage on 
the attacker. In the event a defensive attack was, nevertheless, necessary, it was 
not permissible to exceed a certain degree of force, because in that case the 
damage would always be inflicted unlawfully.184 In addition, Fulgosius argued 
that in the case of the shopkeeper, there even was no justified suspicion that 
the shopkeeper would be hit. The shopkeeper had no reason to suspect that 
the thief would hit him and the shopkeeper was not entitled to knock out the 
eye of the thief.185
177  See also Summa institutionum ‘Iustiniani est in hoc opere’ III.19-20.
178  The canonist Panormitanus is of a slightly different opinion and argued that if 
someone attacked another because of provocation, a mild punishment should follow: Nicolaus 
de Tudeschis (Panormitanus), Commentaria, ad X 2.25.8, nr. 17f.
179  See Corvinus, Digesta per aphorismos strictim explicata, edn. 1642, p. 169. Corvinus’ 
work is an example of the special type of legal literature which was used until the 19th century 
and can be considered an additional tool to find the sedes materiae related to a certain topic. 
180 Also interesting is Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, V.8, stating that ‘acts proceeding 
from anger are rightly judged not to be done of malice forethought; for it is not the man who acts 
in anger but he who enraged him that starts the mischief ’ (translation by Ross 1954, p. 127).
181  Bartolus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2.45.4.
182  See also Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2.45.4.
183  See R. Fulgosius, In primam Pandectarum partem commentariorum, I, ad D. 9.2.52.1.
184  A. Corvinus, Digesta per aphorismos strictim explicata, edn. 1642, p. 170.
185  R. Fulgosius, In primam Pandectarum partem commentariorum, I, ad D. 9.2.52.1.
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A new relevant circumstance: the time of the theft
One of the related issues discussed by scholars of the school of Orléans was the 
question as to what extent a person was liable for the killing of a thief, and if it 
made a difference whether the thief acted at night or during the daytime.186 In 
that respect, one has to keep in mind D. 9.2.4.1, which contained a paraphrase 
of the law of the Twelve Tables, the provision that one was permitted to kill a 
thief caught in the night, provided one gave evidence of the fact by shouting 
aloud; someone was only allowedto kill such a thief caught in the daytime 
if the latter defended himself with a weapon, though only if he provided a 
warning by shouting.
One of the jurists of the school of Orléans, Johannes Faber mentioned an 
interesting case in this perspective. While a man lay in bed with his wife he 
heard a thief on the roof of his house. In a clear and loud voice he shouted to 
his wife (so that the thief could hear him well), ‘Wife, you want to know how 
to get as many coins as I have in this house. You know I have been a thief and I 
climbed on the roofs of houses at night. Then when the moon shone brightly, 
I said “Lord of fortune” and stepped upon the beam of light, and then I settled 
my hash and climbed up and down.’187 The thief believed the story, waited 
until he thought the couple was asleep and then, following the story of the 
man, stepped through the window, and was killed.188 Was such a deception 
permitted? Comparing D. 9.2.4.1, it was permissible to kill the thief at night. 
And therefore it was much more strongly permissible to trick him. But the man 
should have cried out at the moment he heard the thief fall down, as you also 
have to make an outcry in the event of killing. 
On the other hand, and here Johannes Faber referred to D. 9.2.11pr., the thief 
had no obligation to believe (the story of) the man. Apparently, Faber envis-
aged a similarity between the last part of D. 9.2.11pr. and this case. In the case 
of the barber, the fragment ends with the remark that one could say that the 
slave who entrusted himself to a barber who put his chair in such a dangerous 
place ought to be blamed himself. In this case, one could say that a thief who 
entrusted himself to such a silly story also had to be blamed himself.189 
186  See, e.g., Petrus de Bellapertica (ca. 1250–1308) in his Lectura Institutionum, edn. 1536, 
p. 303f.; see also J. Faber, Commentarii in quatuor Institutionum libros, edn. 1557, fo. 110v/111r.
187  J. Faber, Commentarii in quatuor Institutionum libros, edn. 1557, fo. 111r. 
188  ibid.
189  ibid.
medieval ius commune 137
A central place in the theory of self-defence was taken by C. 8.4.1, which con-
tains the crucial words inculpatae tutelae moderatio.190 Various Commentators 
argued that self-defence had to be a necessary defence that happens with 
moderamine inculpatae tutelae.191 For a successful appeal for self-defence there 
were three restrictive requirements made by the commentators Bartolus and 
Baldus: circa causam (the motive has to be defence, not vengeance), circa 
tempus (immediate repulsion of a violent attack) and circa modum (the way 
in which someone defends himself has to be moderate).192
With regard to the case of D. 9.2.52.1, the Commentators wondered whether 
it could be considered self-defence when someone hits his attacker immedi-
ately upon the attack. They gave an affirmative answer, because in this case 
it was presumed that the person attacked reacts in order to prevent another 
attack.193 Besides, the person who initiates an attack on another was always 
considered to have acted culpably.194
When someone under attack wounded the attacker before being hit, he 
was considered to have acted in self-defence. After someone was hit, it was not 
permissible to strike the attacker, because that would be considered revenge 
rather than self-defence. A blow already given can no longer be prevented, 
unless the attacked person coincidentally inflicted a blow and by that blow 
prevented further blows from his attacker. Later, in a reply to a problem of 
(daily) practice, a so-called consilium, the sixteenth-century Italian jurist 
Aymon Cravetta (1504–1569)195 argued that if the attacker ran away immedi-
ately after he hit the other person, and the injured person wounded his attacker 
nonetheless, this act would be considered to have been done out of vengeance. 
It would be different if the attacker did not run away and the injured person 
expected to be hit again. In conclusion, only in the case where the attacker did 
not immediately run away would such an act be seen as an act of self-defence.196
190 On the requirement of moderamen inculpatae tutelae in Italian criminal law of the 14th 
century, see Dahm 1931, p. 125ff.
191  See, e.g., A. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, De defensionibus a reis faciendis, §8 
(edn. Kantorowicz 1926, p. 180); Bonifacius de Vitalinis, Tractatus de maleficiis, Qui alium possit 
offendere, nr. 2 (edn. 1598, fo. 375r); Cinus, Commentaria, ad D. 1.1.3, nr. 1 (edn. 1547, fo. 2v); 
Alberricus de Rosate, Commentarii in primam Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 9.2.45, 4, nr. 2; Baldus, 
Consilia, II, cons. 237, nr. 2 (edn. 1575, fo. 67v/68r); Dahm 1931, p. 125; Schmitt-Lermann 1935, 
p. 23; Wacke 1989, p. 480. 
192  Wacke 1989, p. 481; Jansen 2004, p. 122ff.; see also Dahm 1931, p. 126; Schmitt-Lermann 
1935, p. 24.
193  See, e.g., Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in primam Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 9.2.52.1.
194 Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2.52.1; see also Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2.52, and 
also R. Fulgosius, In primam Pandectarum partem commentariorum, I, ad D. 9.2.52.1: In glos[sa] 
uellet, ibi[dem] rixam, not[a] quod in dubio presumitur culpa ex parte eius qui rixam inciperet. ...
195  Aymon Cravetta was a celebrated professor of law at several Italian schools.
196 A. Cravetta, Consilia sive responsa, cons. 119, nr. 8 (edn. 1611, p. 214).
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A comparison with the case of D. 9.1.1.11
In case of doubt, when it was not clear who struck first, according to Bartolus, 
it was presumed that the culpa lay with the person who first provoked the 
incident.197 In that respect, the text of D. 9.1.1.11 as well as the commentaries 
on this text are relevant. In the case of D. 9.1.1.11, two rams or two bulls fought, 
and during the fight (rixa) one animal killed the other. Can the owner of the 
dead animal bring an action? Quintus Mucius argued that an action could not 
be brought if the aggressor was killed, but if the dead animal was not guilty of 
provocation, an action could be brought. According to Baldus, the dead animal 
had not acted in provocation but was attacked, and therefore it was presumed 
that it had acted in self-defence. This defence is permitted by natural law.198 
But what if it was not clear which animal or person was attacked? The gloss 
sibi to D. 9.1.1.11 states that in such a case both had to be exculpated.199 This gloss 
refers to D. 9.2.45.3 concerning the case of two slaves leaping over burning 
straw. If they collide with one another, and both fall and one is burned to death, 
no action can be brought when it is not known which of them was overthrown 
by the other. Therefore, whenever it was not clear which person attacked first, 
the survivor would not be punished, presuming the one killed attacked first 
(unless depending on the character of the deceased the contrary was proven 
by the testimony of character witnesses). When someone committed a delict, 
an offence (offensa) was always presumed (namely, starting a fight), unless the 
wrongdoer could prove otherwise (i.e. that he had acted in self-defence). This 
also applied when two people were fighting in a forest and one of them got 
killed. In case of doubt, both would be held liable instead of being acquitted.200
197  Bartolus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2.52.1.
198  Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.1.1.11.
199 Gloss sibi ad D. 9.1.1.11, with reference to D. 9.2.45.3; this would be the case, according 
to Richardus Malumbra, when both were killed (see Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in primam 
Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 9.1.1.11). Unfortunately, there is little left of the writings of Richardus 
Malumbra. Only by means of the works of other medieval civilians have we some information 
about him. We do know that he wrote additions to the Gloss. Albericus de Rosate, in his 
Commentarii, would have cited him literally; see Meijers 1920/1921, p. 491; Lange & Kriechbaum 
2007, p. 601f.
200 Baldus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.1.1.11; on this topic also Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii 
in primam Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 9.1.1.11; - In Bartolus’ and Albericus’ commentaries on 
D. 9.1.1.11, they describe a case of two persons who made peace but later would still hit each 
other. Would one of them then be liable for a breach of the peace? If it was not clear who hit 
first, neither of them would be. But if one of them started to break the peace, and the other 
after that, the former was liable. See Bartolus, Commentaria, ad D. 9.1.1.11 and Albericus de 
Rosate, Commentarii in primam Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 9.1.1.11; see also Paulus Castrensis, 
Auenionicae Praelectiones in Digestum Vetus, ad D. 9.1.1.11: Item alleg[atur] quod se ipsum uidetur 
interficere, qui dat causam ut ab altero interficiatur. ... (Someone who gives the reason (causa) for 
which he is killed by someone else, is considered to be responsible for his own death.)
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3.2.3 Starting point 2: the rule of D. 50.17.203
According to the rule of D. 50.17.203, someone who suffered damage as a result 
of his own negligence is not considered to have suffered any damage. It is 
not until the time of Bulgarus (†1166)201 that the last title of the Digest, 50.17. 
de diversis regulis iuris, was studied systematically.202 Bulgarus discussed D. 
50.17.203 in his apparatus to the title de regulis iuris.203 He tried to interpret 
the meaning of this text by providing an example of a case in which this rule 
is applied.204 In my study, I found this text D. 17.2.52.18 in most commentaries 
on D. 50.17.203 as an example of the content of the rule of D. 50.17.203. 
The text on D. 17.2.52.18 concerns a partner in all goods (socius omnium 
bonorum) against whom a judgment was rendered for having insulted someone 
(so it was an actio iniuriarum). The question was whether the partner, after 
having paid the poena, could claim payment back from the community. 
The answer provided in D. 17.2.52.18 is that if the partner had been unjustly 
condemned, he would be entitled to recourse. However, if the injury resulted 
from some illegal act he had committed, he had to bear the entire loss. This 
coincides with what Aufidius states was the opinion held by Servius: in the 
case of two general partners, against one of whom a judgment was rendered 
for not having appeared in court, the latter could not recover the amount of 
the judgment from the community; but if the partner appeared and suffered 
an unjust decision, he had to be reimbursed by the community.
Suppose one of the partners stole an object (for example, a horse), and 
brought it into the community. Then, that partner was sued and had to return 
the object. Furthermore, he had to pay a fine. Could he claim this from his 
associate? According to Bulgarus (and Bertram of Metz (1180–1212205)), one 
has to make a distinction: did the other partner know about the furtum or 
not? If the associate was unaware of the theft, the partner could only claim 
the whole value of the stolen object, but not the poena.206 The last part seems 
201  The glossator Bulgarus was one of the Quattuor Doctores, the most important pupils of 
Imerius’, the founder of the Bolognese school of law. On Bulgarus, see (also) Kantorowicz & Buckland 
1969, p. 68ff.
202 Stein 1968, p. 699.
203 Bulgarus, De Diversis regulis iuris antiqui commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203 (edn. Beckhaus, p. 154).
204 More or less the same example was used by Bertrandus Metensis at a later date; see 
Bertrandus Metensis, De regulis iuris, ad D. 50.17.203 (edn. Caprioli, 198, p. 211).
205 See on Bertram (Berthold), bishop of Metz, e.g., Ewig 1955, p. 168, with references, and 
on Betram of Metz and his apparatus on the regulae iuris, see Kuttner 1957, p. 501ff.
206 According to Bulgarus, if it was the partner’s own culpa, the blame was his and he had 
no possibility to claim the poena. The same could be said about a creditor who lost a trial against 
the debtor through his own negligence, as in D. 46.3.95.11. Such a creditor could obtain nothing 
from the mandator by the actio mandati, because he himself was to blame for not having been 
able to assign his rights of action to the mandator; see Beckhaus 1967, p. 154 (explicatio; added in 
the editio Augustiniana (edn. Antonius Augustinus of 1766)).
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to refer to the situation mentioned in D. 17.2.55: if a party who committed an 
illegal act is sued, he can either surrender only what he misappropriated, or he 
can do this with a penalty. He can give up the stolen object alone if the other 
partner was ignorant of the fact that he had placed it with  the property of the 
partnership. However, if the other partner was aware of the fact, he will also 
be liable to the penalty, for it is but just that he who participated in the profit 
should also share in the loss (D. 17.2.55).207 However if the other associate was 
aware of the delict, e.g. a theft, because the thief had informed him, then the 
partner who committed the theft had recourse against his associate also for 
part of the poena. 
Other cases in which someone endeavours to impute causes to someone 
else, to fatum or to vis maior, are mentioned by Johannes Bassianus. He 
described the case in which someone tried to impute the risk of a res given 
in depositum or the loss suffered in a societas to somebody else’s culpa. But 
this person had to blame himself even more for not having chosen a cautious 
depositarius or a cautious socius. This is also the case when an object given 
in commodatum, locatio or pignus was lost as a result of vis (maior) or casus. 
Apparently, negligence is then to be found in the negligent choice of the person 
who took an object into custody. 208
Also, Accursius mentioned D. 17.2.52.18 as an example of D. 50.17.203, but 
he extended it to contractual liability. Instead of his partner, one of the asso-
ciates was sentenced by the judge due to a contract because the partner did 
not come to trial, but had he been present, he would have been absolved. The 
sentenced partner had no recourse against the community, as would be the 
case if he were convicted for furtum or some other delict. Accursius also gave 
another important example. A person crossed over a place where there was 
no road, neither public nor private; while crossing over, a branch of a tree fell 
on him, and in that case the lex Aquilia was not applicable (as in D. 9.2.31).209 
Under those circumstances (where there was no roadway?), this act could 
be considered to be the person’s own fault, and thus the victim would not be 
considered to have suffered any damage. Therefore, D. 50.17.203 applied to the 
claim of the one whose corporeal possessions were damaged (action based 
207 Later, the commentator Dynus de Mugello also referred to this text while stating that 
the damnum was imputed to someone else here due to the latter’s participation. The maxim 
of D. 50.17.203 does not apply when culpa can be attributed to someone else; this also appears 
in Rainerius de Forlivio (†1358), Lectura super Digesto Novo, fo. 153v (see also the next section 
on canon law). If it was not possible to impute the damage to someone else, the principal rule 
applied (D. 50.17.203) and the damnum was imputed to the injured party. See Dynus de Mugello, 
De regulis iuris, edn. 1518, fo. CXXVr.
208 Johannes Bassianus, Commentum, ad D. 50.17.203, in Caprioli 1963, p. 238.
209 Accursian gloss Quod quis ad D. 50.17.203 (-204).
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on the lex Aquilia) at the end of the gloss Quod quis, and so directly concerned 
the question of liability.210
Other examples are given by Odofredus: an instituted heir who refused an 
inheritance211 and subsequently was regarded as having suffered a loss due to 
his own negligence (as in C. 6.27.6), and a creditor who concluded a pactum de 
non petendo with a debtor out of his own free will (as in D. 2.14.7.10).212
The rule of D. 50.17.203 is also discussed by various Commentators in commen-
taries on De regulis iuris.213 The Accursian gloss provided six examples of this rule 
(see previous paragraph). First of all, Dynus de Mugello (ca. 1250–1298/1303)214 
wrote a commentary on D. 50.17.203 which he reproduced in the following 
manner: Damnum quod si quis sua culpa sentit sibi debet et non alii. Accordingly, 
if someone suffers damage due to his own negligence, the damage must be 
attributed to himself and not to another. Dynus provided several examples 
of this maxim, among which the example of the partner (socius), which was 
already mentioned by the Glossators (see above). Furthermore, Dynus dis-
cussed the case of a procurator who was condemned because of his own fault 
and who paid the poena, as the fault had to be attributed to him and not to his 
principal (D. 3.3.46.5). Also in another case, if the payment by a procurator or 
manager of another’s affairs was undue, the loss had to be imputed to him and 
not to the principal (D. 3.5.24).215 Another example of the rule of D. 50.17.203 
is given by Jacobus Butrigarius, namely, of a party that, after having accepted 
arbitration, had to comply with the decision of the arbiter in the matter under 
dispute, no matter whether this decision was just or unjust (D. 4.8.27.2). 
Therefore, if a party suffered any damage, the blame was on that party, having 
agreed to arbitration.216 Furthermore, when a person lost a trial, he had to pay 
the costs (of the lawsuit) to the victorious party except for expenses incurred 
210 Jansen 2007, p. 664.
211  More precisely, it concerns an inheritance with a slave, appointed as an heir, to whom 
liberty was granted under a condition. The slave was guilty of negligence and failed to fulfil the 
condition. Therefore, the slave forfeited both his freedom and the estate through his own fault; 
see C. 6.27.6.
212  Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Novo, ad D. 50.17.203, fo. 202rb; Odofredus also 
applied the rule of D. 50.17.203 in the case of the malae fidei possessor who made improvements 
on somebody else’s land; see Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto Veteri, ad D. 12.6.33, fo. 39ra.
213  As stated before, this regula can also be found in the canon law compilation of Pope 
Bonifacius VIII, i.e. the Liber Sextus (1298). Commentaries on the relevant fragment, VI 5.12.86, 
will be dealt with in the next section.
214  Dynus de Mugello was a professor of law at Bologna in the 13th century; he was the 
master of Cinus de Pistoia (1270–1336).
215  Dynus de Mugello, De regulis iuris, edn. 1518, fo. CXXIIIIv/CXXVr. 
216 J. Butrigarius, In primam et secundam veteris Digesti partem, ad D. 4.8.27.2: Quod quis 
sua culpa sentit non uidetur sentire, et sibi habet imputare.
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by that party due to his contumacy (contumax)217 if he remained absent at the 
trial or failed in his proof. This case was already mentioned in the earlier com-
mentaries of Wilhelm Durand (1237–1296)218 and Panormitanus (Nicolaus de 
Tudeschis, 1386–1445)219 and later by Philipphus Decius (1454–1536).220 Finally, 
a surety could not recover interest from the principal if it was paid due to the 
negligence (culpa) of the surety himself.221 In all these cases, the victim suffered 
damage because of his own negligence (culpa). Remarkably, in the commen-
tary on D. 50.17.203 Albericus de Rosate made no references to the lex Aquilia, 
nor any reference to the contributory negligence of the injured party in this 
respect.222 Accursius appears to be the only one who made this connection.
3.2.4 Concluding remarks
Recapitulation
As mentioned in the previous chapter, D. 50.17.203 in classical Roman law 
had nothing to do with a situation in which both wrongdoer and victim were 
negligent, or with delictual liability.223 The compilers placed this fragment in 
D. 50.17, and subsequently Accursius linked it to the law of delicts in his gloss 
Quod quis ad D.50.17.203 by the allegation of D. 9.2.31.224 In gloss Quod quis 
ad D. 50.17.203, Accursius explained that an injured party’s own negligence 
217  See also D. 48.19.5pr.: obviously a person who did not obey notices or the edicts of 
Governors.
218  See Durantis, Speculum II.III.4; Durantis wrote this ordo iudiciorum, the Speculum 
iudiciale (1271), which was of great practical importance as these ordines were applied in the 
canonical courts. In addition, his Speculum was the most widely used procedural treatise of 
the Middle Ages. Durantis studied canon law in Bologna under Bernardus Parmensis and later 
taught at Modena. Pope Clement IV (1265–1268) made him auditor generalis of the Rota, and he 
became bishop of Mende in 1286.
219  Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 2.14.5; Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus) 
was the last great canonist in the medieval tradition. He studied canon law in Bologna and Padua. 
He taught canon law at Bologna, Parma and Siena. In 1421, he was named Auditor generalis of the 
Camera Apostolica. Panormitanus was elected Archbishop of Palermo in 1434. In 1440, he was 
named cardinal by the antipope Felix V.
220 Ph. Decius, De regulis iuris, edn. 1564, fo. 210v; Philippus Decius (1454–1536) belonged 
to the school of the Commentators; he was a famous Italian jurist and canon lawyer.
221  Ph. Decius, De regulis iuris, edn. 1564, fo. 211r; - Various examples of the rule of D. 
50.17.203 are also given by Hippolytus de Marsiliis (1451–1528) in his Singularia, nr. 350.1.
222 The examples of the rule deal with, e.g., bail, solicitors, interests and mandates; see 
Albericus de Rosate, Commentarii in secundam Digesti Novi partem, ad D. 50.17.203, fo. 291v and 
292r; also Ph. Decius explains D. 50.17.203 by giving examples of the application of this rule (of 
which the last two were taken from Albericus). Furthermore, he refers to the case of the procurator 
(D. 3.3.46.5, the case just discussed above). See Ph. Decius, De regulis iuris, edn. 1564, p. 210.
223 Also in the parallel regula iuris in canon law the commentary refers to one person 
acting culpably; see gloss damnum ad VI 5.12.86 (this gloss will be discussed in  section 3.3.6).
224 The older commentaries of Bulgarus and Bertrandus Metensis only cite the problem of 
the socii.
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deprived him of the right to claim damages from someone else. D. 50.17.203 
could be read in the sense that it only concerned the negligence of the injured 
party (quod quis sua culpa damnum sentit); however, the Glossator did not 
understand it to concern only cases in which the negligence of the injured 
party was the only factor and in which the negligence of the wrongdoer was 
not in discussion at all.225 Furthermore, the application of D. 50.17.203 was 
extended, as it will be interpreted differently in coherence with other texts 
from the Digest: when one party acted intentionally (dolus), the negligence 
of the other party (culpa) would be irrelevant.226 Already Johannes Bassianus 
(in gloss quia non debuit ad D. 9.2.9.4) considered that D. 9.2.9.4 dealt with 
mutual negligence (as explained above in section 3.2.2.1), and Accursius took 
over this approach in his gloss.227
The Gloss did not provide explicit proof whether or not the Glossators believed 
that culpae compensatio could only be applied to cases of contributory negli-
gence in which both parties had been negligent to the same degree. It has been 
argued that an assumption in this sense can, however, be made. The general 
rule of culpae compensatio would be that if the contributory negligence of the 
injured party amounted to the same degree as the negligence of the wrongdoer, 
compensation could take place. A small degree of contributory negligence 
would not lead to compensatio and thus neither to the deprivation of the pos-
sibility to claim compensation for damages/fine. According to this view, an 
exception to this general rule was made in cases of preponderant contributory 
negligence, which would certainly lead to the  denial of an eventual claim.228 
The Gloss, however, did not mention this. Plausibly, this refinement was made 
by the successors to the Glossators (instigated by the canonists).
Unfortunately, as to the contributory negligence of the injured party, no exten-
sive commentaries are given by the Commentators discussed in the preceding 
225 See gloss non repetet ad D. 10.2.44.5, gloss Quia non debuit ad D. 9.2.9.4 and Quod si quis 
ad D. 50.17.203. In the same sense, Lange 1955, p. 72.
226 In the event that two persons acted wrongfully with regard to one case, but one acted 
with culpa and the other with dolus, no compensation could take place. Furthermore, dolus was 
considered to be more serious than culpa. See (Accursian) glosses omnimodo ad D. 19.1.45.1, 
tenebitur ad D. 9.2.9.4, ipso iure ad D. 16.2.10pr. and culpa tua ad D. 17.1.26.7; see Lange 1955, p. 72.
227 See also Jansen 2007, p. 659f.; - The rule of D. 50.17.203 as well as the examples of the 
rule of D. 50.17.203 discussed above were mainly examples of the injured party’s own negligence 
(‘Eigenes Verschulden’, only the injured party had been negligent), and not of contributory 
negligence (‘Mitverschulden’, both parties have been negligent). However, these glosses show 
that D. 50.17.203 did not apply only to situations in which negligence was due exclusively to the 
behaviour of the injured party, but that it made it possible to extend the rule to the second area, 
that of contributory negligence. 
228 Luig 1969, p. 199.
chapter three144
subsections; only Paulus de Castro mentioned it briefly. In the cases of the 
javelin thrower and the barber, the culpa of the wrongdoer was compensated 
by the culpa of the injured party. However, if the wrongdoer acted intentionally, 
no compensation took place because dolus was considered to be more serious 
than culpa. Additionally, there are some new concepts, which I will discuss 
now, that arose in this period.
On the concept of culpa admixta
The origin of the concept of culpa admixta can be found in the contractual 
sphere. Defining culpa admixta is difficult. The words culpa admixta (literally 
‘mixed fault’) give a legal qualification to the act of the injured party in 
situations in which a hurtful action by a wrongdoer is mixed with a fault 
of the injured party. The Consilia of Marianus the Elder (1401–1467)229 and 
Bartholomaeus Socinus (1436–1507)230 are relevant. According to consilium 
156, in the case of an agreement to buy the future production of salt (qualified 
as locatio conductio) in return for annual payments,231 because of  the 
negligence (culpa) of the Pope and the Camera Apostolica, a payment had to be 
made to the conductor for the amount of interest due. Therefore, the absence 
of (contributory) negligence on the side of the locator (or venditor) was 
considered a prerequisite for the admissibility of a claim for compensation. 
However, if there was admixta culpa on the side of the locator (or venditor), 
e.g. if he prevented the salt production from being received by the conductor, 
he would be liable for the total interest sum.232
After the application of the term culpa admixta in a contractual sphere, 
this application was expanded to the extra-contractual sphere by Cravetta who 
used it in the situation in which the wrongdoer killed the initiator of a fight, 
and where there was culpa admixta on the side of the person killed. Cravetta 
mentioned in a consilium a case in which someone started a quarrel and was 
killed during the fight, and who was considered to have acted with culpa be-
cause he had started the fight. Negligence (culpa) was attributed to the person 
who started or provoked a fight. The wrongdoer who killed whomever started 
the fight was not liable, because there was culpa admixta on the side of the 
injured party.233 In other words, the wrongdoer was not held liable when the 
229 Marianus Socinus (the Elder) was a professor of canon law at Padua and Siena.
230 Bartholomaeus Socinus, the son of Marianus, studied law under his father and under 
Thomas Doctius, in Bologna under Tartagnus and Barbitia, in Pisa under Franciscus Aretinus. He 
became a professor at Siena, Pisa, Bologna and Padua.
231  See Socinus, Consilia, edn. 1579, cons. 156. nr. 1, fo. 7v.
232 Socinus, Consilia, edn. 1579, cons. 156. nr. 21, fo. 9r; Luig 1969, p. 200.
233 A. Cravetta, Consilia sive responsa, cons. 119, nr. 11 (edn. 1611, p. 215), with reference to 
Socinus’ cons. 156.
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injured party brought danger or risk on himself, because in that case the damage 
would also result from the contributory negligence of the injured party.234 
Another case mentioned by Cravetta is the following. Someone said in 
a arrogant way that someone else should beware of buying some things. 
That person responded that he had bought them before. This led to a fight, 
started by the injured party himself, who died during the fight. In this case, 
the injured party would have been considered to have died because of his own 
negligence.235
The concept of culpa admixta was adopted by Hippolytus Bonacossa 
(1514–1591), who stressed the fact that no liability for any damage exists in the 
event of culpa admixta of the injured party.236 Thenceforward, this concept is 
noticeably cited in relation to the rule of D. 50.17.203, the counterpart of the 
same text in canon law (VI 5.12.86) and the idea of culpae compensatio until 
the eighteenth century.237 The use of this term in the legal sources shows that 
by applying the fragment from De Regulis Iuris, jurists noticed that it regarded 
a problem of mutual blame.238
Later, another concept developed out of the same perception, i.e. the 
concept of a culpa communis. Franciscus Niger Cyriacus (†1637)239 argued that 
when two persons both acted culpably in the same way and their negligence 
was related to the same event, as each deceived the other, their respective faults 
(culpa mutua) were compensated (ipso iure) and no claim for compensation 
for damages could be granted to either of them.240 The respective faults were 
not really cancelled, however, by way of compensation in the true sense of 
 
234 A. Cravetta, Consilia sive responsa, cons. 119, nr. 11 (Et quod dicitur de eo qui suscipit 
in se periculum, quod non tenetur quando culpa partis illud euenit); also interesting are two of 
his references here: Bartolus, Commentaria, ad C. 4.33.4 and Baldus, Commentaria, ad C. 4.33.4. 
Further references can be found in Cravetta’s work (edn. 1611, p. 215).
235 A. Cravetta, Consilia sive responsa, nr. 11 (edn. 1611, p. 215).
236 H. Bonacossa, Quaestiones criminales. De damno dato, uers. ‘damnificans’: Damnificans, 
non tenetur pro aliquo damno ex statuto. Quando damnum habet admixtam culpam damnificati 
...; see also Massetto 1958, p. 1109.
237 Luig 1969, p. 200; see also Jansen 2007, p. 660; the question of culpa admixta is 
addressed again in the early modern period; see M. Venturini, Decisiones Rotae Florentinae, decis. 
45 nr. 19f. and Stucke & Stucke, Consilia sive responsa, esp. cons. IV nr. 827  (both are discussed in 
the next chapter).
238 Luig 1969, p. 200f. See also chapter four, especially the section on the usus modernus.
239 Franciscus Niger Cyriacus was a lawyer in Mantua.
240 Luig 1969, p. 201; see also Bartolomaeus à Salyceto, Commentaria in Digestum Vetus, ad 
D. 16.2.10pr., F. Cyriacus, Controversiae forenses, controv. 197, edn. 1644, n. 21ff. and also esp. nr. 
23: Si vero sit culpa, vel dolus communis, sed in negotio, vel re ad tertium spectante, et contra terium; 
tunc quia laborans uno vitio non potest illud, alteri obiicere, hinc inde pariter cessat culpae, vel doli 
allegatio ...
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the word (compensatio), but by means of melting together (confusio); though 
figuratively speaking this cancellation was also called compensation.241
In conclusion, one can state that the term culpa admixta was used to qualify 
the behaviour of the injured party in a way that led to the exclusion of liability 
of the wrongdoer. In this way contributory negligence led to a denial of claim 
without a discussion of the degree of the negligence of each party. The use of 
the term culpa admixta (or culpa communis) shows that the damage which 
occurred was considered the common responsibility of both parties.
3.3 Canon law
3.3.1 Introduction
In addition to secular legal scholarship, the law of the Church, i.e. canon law, was 
important for the development of the legal concept of contributory negligence. 
As shown above, in medieval Roman legal scholarship the contributory 
negligence of  the injured party seemed to be regarded as reproachable 
misconduct that could be sanctioned by a refusal of the claim for damages (more 
precisely: poena). If both the wrongdoer and the injured party acted negligently, 
sometimes compensation for their negligence was granted. The idea emerged 
that the negligence (culpa) of the wrongdoer could be compensated by the 
negligence (culpa) of the injured party. However, the approach to this problem 
of ‘contributory negligence’ by the canonists differed from the approach by 
medieval Roman legal scholarship as depicted above. In this section, this 
different approach of medieval canon law will be discussed, focusing on the 
development of the legal concept of contributory negligence in canon law. 
Firstly, it will be ascertained whether or not a general idea on culpae compensatio 
existed and, if so, whether such a theory was actually applied in the law of 
delicts. For a better understanding, some general remarks will be made about 
negligence and causation in canon law, then examples of accidental homicide 
will be discussed. Finally, some conclusions as to the contribution of canon law 
to the concept of contributory negligence will be presented.
In the twelfth century, Gratianus compiled his Concordia discordantium 
canonum, a compilation of normative texts of canon law, with the purpose 
241  F. Cyriacus, Controversiae forenses, controv. 197, edn. 1644, nr. 30ff. Baldus in his 
commentary on D. 24.3.39 speaks of confessio (I consulted the edition of 1577), while Cyriacus 
seems to refer to Baldus’ words including confusio. This version seems to make more sense 
indeed.
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of harmonising contradictions between the canones by using the sic et non 
method of Abaelardus. After this compilation came into being, new papal 
constitutions (decretales) were promulgated which were later recorded in 
new legal collections such as the Liber Extra (1234) and the Liber Sextus (1298). 
Many popes meddled in all areas of law, with the argument and the excuse 
of avoidance of sins (ratione peccati).242 With regard to medieval canon law, 
the sedes materiae on the subject of contributory negligence can be found in 
three decretals incorporated in the Liber Extra (1234), i.e. X 5.12.8 and X 5.12.9, 
X 5.16.6, and in one fragment incorporated as regula 86 in the title De regulis 
iuris of the Liber Sextus (1298), i.e. VI 5.12.86 (the counterpart of D. 50.17.203). 
3.3.2 Negligence and causation in canon law
As in medieval Roman law, also in medieval canon law the wrongdoer was only 
liable when he was at fault (culpa).243 The construction of a general theory 
of culpa was undertaken firstly by canonists and then by philosophers and 
theologians.244 The notion of culpa in canon law was slightly different from the 
notion in medieval Roman law, because in canon law the theological notion 
of sin (moral concept of fault)245 was also taken into account.246
According to the philosophy of Aristotle, which influenced the intellectual cli-
mate in the thirteenth century,247 blame did not merely follow from an action, 
but also depended on the mental state of the actor during that action; only if 
242 For example, in the Liber Extra of Gregory IX, the Church claimed jurisdiction in the 
field of criminal law for illicit acts such as adultery and rape (X 4.7; X 5.16), bigamy (X 1.21), 
calumny (X 5.2), injurious libel (X 5.36), false witness (X 5.20), physical violence (X 5.36), 
homicide (X 5.12) and theft (X 5.18); see Bellomo 1995, p. 76.
243 X 5.36.9: If loss is caused by your own fault (culpa), it is right that you make amends for it.
244 Von Mehren & Gordley 1977, p. 569.
245 The notion of sin was already present in the Judeo-Christian tradition. This can be 
seen in the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), where culpa already had an ethical 
dimension (Augustine’s writings can be found online at http://www.augustinus.it (last visited 
on 1 May 2013)). In post-classical development of Roman law, influences from Greek philosophy 
and Christianity changed the notion of culpa. At a certain point in time, the subjective element 
of moral blameworthiness came to the foreground; see Aumann 1964, p. 25; see also Stein, 
in: Parisi 1992, p. x, who writes that  ‘the canon lawyers attempted to link the legal notion of 
culpa with the moral notion of fault, thus leading to an individualization of the former and the 
accentuation of the subjective elements of wrongdoing. Theologians got in on the definition of 
fault. Judicial discretion came to be recognized as the means for reconciling the moral and legal 
notions of liability’.
246 On the notion of sin in canon law and the relation between crimen and peccatum, see 
Katz 1881, p. 1ff.; Kuttner 1935, p. 3ff. On the concept of fault in medieval Roman and canon law, 
see also Parisi 1992, p. 104ff.
247 In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas interpreted Aristotle to accommodate ideas taken 
from Roman and canon law; see Gordley 1995, p. 131ff.
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the act was voluntary would the actor be held responsible.248 Therefore, an act 
could not be imputed to a wrongdoer unless he could be blamed for it, at least 
to a certain extent.249 According to Aristotle and his approach of commutative 
(corrective) justice, if a person caused a loss to another person, he ought to 
restore equality or – more modern – pay compensation.250 In the thirteenth 
century, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) used Aristotle’s theory of human respon-
sibility to explain the conclusions of the canonists. By the time Aquinas wrote 
about this, the canonists decided that a person who injured another person 
through negligence or lack of due diligence was not only morally guilty, but 
also stood under a moral obligation to compensate the victim.251 According 
to Thomas Aquinas, an actor is liable if he voluntarily caused harm, meaning 
harm caused either intentionally or negligently.252 A person owed compensa-
tion because he ‘gained’ at another’s expense in the sense that he fulfilled his 
will with another’s resources.253 Aquinas’ theory of restitution is based on a 
statement by St. Augustine, later part of the Decretum Gratiani (C.14 q.6 c.1) 
and the Liber Sextus (VI 5.12.4): unless a man restores whatever he took away, 
his sin254 will not be forgiven.255
At the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century, the canonists 
developed their own notion of culpa that was not exactly the same as ‘acting 
without due care’, in the meaning it was endowed with in Roman law.256 
 According to the canonists, the lex Aquilia was based on the general 
proposition that an action was available for damages caused through fault 
(culpa), which in Roman law includes both negligent and wilful misconduct.257 
According to the canonists, however, culpa has a more extensive meaning. 
248 Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, III.1; Ibbetson 2005, p. 9f.
249 Hallebeek 2006, p. 331.
250 This applies when one person’s loss is balanced by another’s gain, but also, by analogy, 
in a case of physical assault and homicide, as they can also be considered as a gain to the actor 
and as a loss to the victim; see Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, V.4
251  Gordley 1995, p. 140; 2006, p. 196.
252 See on this topic also Parisi 1994, p. 331.
253 Gordley 1995, p. 138.
254 The ‘taking away’ was interpreted very broadly by the theologians: not only theft, but 
also killing, the mutilation of someone’s body, destroying someone’s property and damaging 
someone’s reputation. In all of these cases, the wrongdoer took something away from the victim, 
and he violated the eighth of the Ten Commandments, i.e.  Thou shalt not steal (Exodus 20:15). 
See Broers 2012, p. 61.
255 See Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 62, art. 2 ad 2 (edn. 1897, p. 42f.); 
Broers 2012, p. 61; extensively on the development of the theory of restitution, see Weinzierl 
1936; 1939; Wolter 1985, esp. p. 26ff., 30ff., 36ff.
256 This will be discussed below.
257 Von Mehren & Gordley 1977, p. 569.
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Already the early canonists (the decretists) had constructed a doctrine 
on liability for the unintended consequences of unlawful acts; they based 
themselves on several texts in the Decretum Gratiani, three of which are the 
most relevant for our discussion. The first text on which the doctrine rested 
is St. Augustine’s statement that no one can be blamed for having done what 
is good and lawful (propter bonum et licitum).258 According to the second text, 
D.50 c.50, a provision from the Council of Worms (868), a person who cut 
down a tree which in falling crushed a passer-by while the tree pruner was 
carrying out some necessary work only had to do penance if he had acted 
wilfully or negligently. In a third text, D.50 c.37, a priest threw stones and 
thereby killed a boy. According to the decision of Pope Urban I,259 the priest 
should do penance for this homicide but would not be suspended from his 
functions, as was usually applied to those who were guilty of homicide.260 The 
early canonists considered that a priest was not liable if he threw the stone 
for a reason (causa) or a good reason (iusta causa) and threw with diligence, 
in a place where people were not walking.261 Later, canonists explained that 
the priest had a reason to throw the stone if he was engaged in a lawful activity 
rather than in an unlawful one. If the priest threw the stone to chase a wild boar 
or a pig out of a field of grain, he was not guilty, unless he had been careless. In 
conclusion, according to the canonists culpa could exist either when acting in 
contravention of legal provisions or when doing something permissible but 
without using the required diligence (acting with less care than what might 
be expected was considered as acting with negligentia).262 Thereby, engaging 
in an unlawful activity could bring about the basis for liability.263
Did the canonists use a certain kind of causation theory? With regard to 
causation, the most relevant text in Roman law in the Digest is D. 9.2.30.3. The 
text describes a case in which a man sets fire to stubble or thorns in order to 
258 See C.23 q.5 c.8; Gordley 2006, p. 190.
259 Urban’s pontificate was from 222 to 230 AD.
260 Gordley 2006, p. 190; Kuttner 1935, p. 202, mentions D.50 c.39 instead of D.50 c.37 as 
the third text on which the doctrine of the earlier canonists rested; in D. 50 c.39 someone had 
struck another person who, due to that, fell from his horse and broke his neck.
261 Gordley 2006, p. 190.
262 Kuttner 1935, p. 201, 225f.; Bussi 1937, p. 205; Gordley 2006, p. 190f., 196; see also 
Dondorp 2001, p. 102; Hallebeek 2006, p. 332; on the distinction between res licita and res illicita, 
see Kuttner 1935, p. 200ff.; see also gloss bonum ad C. 23 q.5 c.8 and dederunt ad X 2.20.9; - 
Interesting is Covarruvias who mentioned the general theory of the canonists with reference to 
Thomas Aquinas, i.e. that culpa can occur either when acting in contravention of legal provisions 
or when doing something permissible without using the diligence one should use. See Diego 
Covarruvias a Leyva, Opera Omnia. Pars II. § IV. De homicidio casuali, nr. 1. 
263 He who engaged in unlawful activity was liable for all consequences; see Engelmann 
1965, p. 211ff.
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burn them up and the fire escapes further afield and spreads and burns an-
other’s crops or vineyard. If he did so on a windy day, he is guilty of mischief, 
for he who even provides the opportunity is deemed to have done the harm. 
The latter phrase is of major importance as it became the startingpoint for 
causality in the medieval period of ius commune. The medieval Roman scholars 
seem to have accepted a causal connection which is very long, with many links.
Although the canonists based the assessment of liability on the two ele-
ments of damnum and culpa without mentioning the causal relation between 
the damage and the act that caused the damage as a separate requirement, 
this way of assessment indirectly forced the canonists to consider the problem 
of causation.264 In some cases found in the decretals, the causal connection 
between the damage-causing act and the damage itself is severed as a result of 
the additional negligence of others, including the injured party. As a general 
rule, the canonists argued that the person who provided the occasion for the 
damage to occur had to be considered to have caused it.265 This argument was 
used in the twelfth century to account for the punishment of accidents with 
a fatal outcome (homicidium casuale).266 Ultimately, the reason why someone 
was punished was because of his own illicit act, even when the act caused the 
death of another person by chance.267
The canonists made a distinction between the terms causa and occasio. The 
fault (culpa) of the wrongdoer had to be the cause (causa) and not merely the 
occasio of the damage (damnum). An occasio is not a cause (causa) unless it is 
direct (directa), proximate (proxima), immediate (propinqua), or immediate 
and tending/oriented towards this outcome (propinqua et ad hoc tendens) 
rather than remote (remota).268 In this sense, the element of fault with regard 
to an action was approached in terms of causality.269 The above-mentioned 
adage (qui occasionem damni dat, damnum dedisse videtur)270 now needs 
264 Von Mehren & Gordley 1977, p. 570; Parisi 1992, p. 106f.; - According to Luig 1969, p. 201, 
a range of cases where the causal connection between the damage-causing act and the damage 
itself is severed as a result of the additional negligence of others, including the injured party, can 
be found in the decretals; on this Kuttner 1935, p. 193ff.  
265 Qui occasionem damni dat, damnum dedisse videtur (adage derived from D. 9.2.30.3); - 
See also gloss bonum ad C.23 q.5 c.8 and gloss dederunt ad X 2.20.9. A more elaborate treatment 
of this adage can be found in Massetto 1958, p. 1129f., also including a discussion of the later 
development of this adage in the early modern period.
266 On the exceptions to this adage, see Bussi 1937, p. 206f.
267 See Dondorp 2001, p. 102.
268 Von Mehren & Gordley 1977, p. 570.
269 See also Parisi 1992, p. 115.
270 The person who created the opportunity that could lead to damage is also deemed 
to have caused the damage; see W. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, lib. IV, partic. IV, De Iniuriis et 
damno dato, § 2 sequitur, nrs. 14 and 15. The latter number/fragment concerned the case of B 
who threw rubbish in front of A’s door, and subsequently A was fined by the public authorities 
for contravening some kind of statute dealing with waste removal. A was allowed to recover this 
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further explanation. With causa, the canonists only aimed at a proximate or 
immediate cause (causa proxima or propinqua), not to a remote cause (causa 
remota).271 The contrast between propinqua and remota gradually took the 
place of the contrast between causa and occasio. Therefore, causa proxima 
refers to the act that caused the harm, causa remota to the act that occasioned 
the loss.272 
Also in practice this causal way of dealing with causation was applied, as 
becomes clear from the Consilia of Marianus the Elder and Bartholomaeus 
Socinus who refer to the meaning of the term ‘occasio’ in the statutes of Pistoia, 
where it was stated that if someone brought about an occasio that led to damage, 
he was obliged to provide compensation.273 According to Socinus, two situations 
can be distinguished. The first concerns a causa proxima, in which case the 
statutes are clear; and the second concerns a causa remota, in which case it was 
not clear whether the effect could be imputed to the causa or not. He referred 
to Johannes Andreae (ca. 1270–1348),274 who argued that sometimes a certain 
fine from B on account of the fact that B’s act occasioned A’s loss; see also König 1954, p. 22ff.; 
Zimmermann 1996, p. 1023. The most extensive interpretation of the adage can be found with 
Albertus Gandinus († after 1305). Gandinus discussed a provision of statutory law which stated 
that murder should be punished by destroying the property of the murderer. Apparently, in a 
certain case the house of the muderer was demolished, but during that activity the adjacent 
residence was detroyed by a falling wall. According to Gandinus, if the goods are not confiscated 
by the authorities, the murderer will be liable. Applying the adage very extensively, Gandinus 
argued that although the murderer did not himself demolish the house, he is nevertheless 
considered to have caused the damage: by committing a murder, he created the situation that 
was eventually to result in the damage to the residence of his neighbour. See A. Gandinus, 
Tractatus de maleficiis, De bonis malefactorum, §12 (edn. Kantorowicz 1926, p. 355f.) and the 
English paraphrase of Hallebeek 2001, p. 95. On the adage, see also the juristic encyclopaedist 
Bertachinus (†1497), Repertorium juris, ad occasio damni and his commentary ad damnum.
271  Kuttner 1935, p. 190, 195ff.; Bussi 1937, p. 204; Massetto 1958, p. 1129f., Luig 1969, p. 
201; see also Descamps 2005, p. 98f.; Jansen 2007, p. 668f.; on the (philosophical) origin of this 
theory, see Lange 1955, p. 163, and Feenstra 1956, p. 472f.; - The causa finalis is first subdivided 
into causa propinqua and causa remota by Petrus de Bellapertica; see Lange 1955, p. 163; Feenstra 
1956, p. 472; Kurtz-Eckhardt 1977, p. 31, Bruck & Möller 1980, p. 151; - The distinction between 
causa propinqua/proxima and remota is already made by Thomas Aquinas; see Schütz 1895, p. 
107; Kurtz-Eckhardt 1977, p. 31.
272 See Kuttner 1935, p. 196f.; Bussi 1937, p. 204; Parisi 1992, p. 107; also Von Mehren & 
Gordley 1977, p. 569ff.
273 See already Roffredus Beneventanus’ Quaestiones sabbatinae, quaestio 22 (Si aliquis 
occasione alterius exigatur inuitus an habeat actionem contra eum cuius occasione fuit exactus). 
He mentions a case of someone from Pistoia (informatus) who owed a debt to a Florentine, 
but was unwilling to pay the debt. Another man from Pistoia, Sempronius, went to Florence 
with his merchandise; the just-mentioned creditor from Florence grabbed Sempronius, robbed 
and hit him. Sempronius wanted to sue the informatus, because his act (indirectly) caused  his 
damage. He wanted to bring an action because the civitas of Pistoia determined that he who 
suffers damage because of the occasio of someone else has to be compensated by the person who 
gave the occasio for the damage. 
274 Johannes Andreae was the most renowned and successful canonist of the later Middle 
Ages. Johannes studied law in Bologna: Roman law under Martinus Sillimanus and Riccardus 
Malumbra; canon law under Egidius Fuscarariis and Guido de Baysio. He taught canon law at 
Bologna and Padua.
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effect could result from a certain causa remota.275 However, according to Socinus, 
one had to interpret the statutes restrictively in this respect. When such a cause 
(causa) in its entirety had no relation with the consequence, it was not possible 
to conclude that the cause produced the consequence nevertheless.276
 This ‘theory’ of causation could be used to solve cases in which there was 
contributory negligence. The contributory negligence of the injured party was 
seen as contributory causation (co-causation), and therefore in such cases one 
had to decide whether the wrongdoer or the injured party had produced the 
causa proxima.277 If the causa proxima could be attributed to the wrongdoer, 
the injured party received full compensation; if the causa proxima could be 
attributed to the injured party, he received no compensation at all.278 Appar-
ently, in the latter case the damage is not imputable to the wrongdoer even if 
his action was one of the causes.279
According to the secondary literature, a small error made by the injured 
party would only result in an irrelevant causa remota.280 This thought is trou-
bling, as it seems to consider causation here in the meaning of negligence 
(causa remota as ‘remote negligence’). Some authors, however, made an ex-
ception in the case where the wrongdoer acted with malicious intent (animus 
malignandi), because in such a case every occasio replaced the causa proxima 
275 See additio of the canonist Johannes Andreae ad Speculum Iudiciale van Durantis ‘Cum 
quis dicitur’.
276 Socinus, Consilia, edn. 1579, cons. 156. nr. 21, fo. 9r.
277 Luig 1969, p. 201; also interesting is 5 Comp. 5.6.2 (not part of the later Liber Extra): 
While eating, clerics threw peach pits at each other as a joke, and later also water and dirt. One 
of them threw a little stone and injured an archdeacon below the eye, but not very severely. 
However, the injury got worse because of the carelessness of the injured party (horse-riding) 
and as a result of that he died. Pope Honorius forbade the cleric to receive major orders, but 
forgivingly allowed him to continue to ‘serve the Lord with psalms and sacred canticles’; see also 
Kuttner 1935, p. 194f.
278 Wacke 1978/79, p. 11; 1979, p. 276; 1991, p. 362f.; it was just a little later that the maior or 
gravior culpa was considered. It is, however, not clear to me in what period of time the author 
situated this development.
279 Jansen 2007, p. 669, argued that in this thought it is only consistent to reformulate the 
rule of VI 5.12.86 (Damnum, quod quis sua culpa sentit, sibi debet, non aliis, imputare), as a rule 
of imputation. Modified as a rule of negligence, this thought found entry in the later period of 
ius commune and specified the theory of culpae compensatio. See Mevius, Decisiones super causis 
praecipuis, I, decisio 221, nt. 7 (discussed in the next chapter).
280 It seems that causation and negligence were not unlinked in this period, nor in the 
period of early modern times, and that the terms are sometimes used alternately to identify 
behaviour which makes for responsibility. See also Luig 1969, p. 201 nt. 71, who holds that the 
dogmatic development of the doctrine of contributory negligence could have been delayed by 
this interchangeability insofar as when applying the causation in fact only affirmation or denial 
(all-or-nothing) was possible, and that the recognition of different levels of negligence could also 
lead to a partition of damage, as Wolff ultimately does. Also Kaufmann 1958, p. 79, remarks that 
the treatment of contributory negligence in the early modern period gives a rather mixted picture, 
and that this should not lastly be attributed to the deficient separation of causation and fault.
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and thus led to responsibility.281 In this way, an objectively inadequate causal 
connection is supplemented by a culpable disposition/attitude, which did not 
have to include the intention to kill, a general culpa was sufficient.282
3.3.3 Accidental homicide: early canonists
The question of when exactly negligence (culpa) had to be imputed is dis-
cussed by various decretists.283 Often the above-mentioned example of D.50 
c.37, in which a person died from injuries suffered from being struck by a 
stone, is given. In such a case the reason why the stone was thrown had to be 
established. Throwing stones at people was illicit, unless there was a particular 
reason to do so, e.g. self-defence. A victim might be struck by a rock thrown 
in order to chase away birds or pigs.284 In such a case culpa could not be es-
tablished out of the act itself (which was lawful), and if the actor had been 
sufficiently careful in the act (in this case he had warned the passers-by), he 
committed no wrong even if he caused damage (in this case if someone had 
been struck).285 
 
If an accident with deadly outcome was accidentally caused by someone, 
according to Bernardus Papiensis (†1213)286 it was necessary to distinguish 
whether the act was permitted by law and whether the wrongdoer acted with 
due care. If he did, the wrongdoer was not to be blamed (no culpa).287 If his 
281  Kuttner 1935, p. 198; Luig 1969, p. 201.
282 Kuttner 1935, p. 198.
283 Kuttner – in his famous book Kanonistische Schuldlehre – concluded that Huguccio, 
in his Summa Decreti (1188), considered negligentia a wrong, to be punished more harshly as 
the severity of the concequences increased. Huguccio tried to explain why a number of texts in 
Gratian’s Decretum determine that clerics had to be punished for their actions, when these actions, 
by accident, led to the death of another person; see Kuttner 1935, p. 227; Dondorp 2001, p. 101. 
284 See, e.g., Goffredus Tranensis, Summa super titulis decretalium, De homicidio, nr. 1, fo. 211v.
285 Dondorp 2001, p. 101; therefore, according to Huguccio, in a case of negligent 
wrongdoing, one could be at fault either for having undertaken the activity at all because it was 
criminal or excessively dangerous (culpa praecedens), or for having performed a permissible 
activity in an unsafe manner (culpa interveniens); see Von Mehren & Gordley 1977, p. 458f.; see 
also Kuttner 1935, p. 225.
286 Bernardus Papiensis (Balbus) studied in Bologna under Bazianus, Gandulphus and 
(perhaps) Huguccio. He taught at Bologna and spent time in Rome working in the curia. In 1191, 
he became bishop of Faenza. In 1198, he was postulated to the bishopric of Pavia. Bernardus was 
the most important 12th-century canonist after Huguccio; - The short bibliographical information 
provided on canon lawyers in this section is based on the bio-bibliographical listing of Pennington; 
see http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/biobibl.htm (last visited on 1 May 2013).
287 See, e.g., D.50 c.50; - According to canon law (D. 50 c.37 and 1 Comp. 5.10.9 [X 5.12.8]), 
accidental homicide would deprive a cleric of his office, unless dispensation was granted; see 
Bernardus Papiensis, Summa decretalium, V.10.7. However, dispensation was not required when 
the accidental homicide took place without any preceeding negligence. When negligence was 
indeed present, dispensation could take three shapes. Large dispensation (dispensatio magna) 
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action was not permissible or if it was permitted but he did not act with due 
care, he acted culpably (with culpa) and the damage could be imputed to 
him.288 Bernardus Papiensis explicitly stated that the case of 1 Comp. 5.10.10 
(X 5.12.9) was different from the case of 1 Comp. 5.10.9 (X 5.12.8), because in 
the first case the killing was due to culpa of the injured party, in the latter to 
culpa of the wrongdoer.289
One of the texts used by the decretists to construct their doctrine on liability 
for unintended consequences of unlawful acts, as mentioned before, is D.50 
c.50. This fragment of the Decretum Gratiani contains a provision from the 
Council of Worms (868), including a case about a tree pruner, who, while 
he was carrying out some necessary work, cut down a tree, and as a result 
a passer-by was crushed. This person only had to do penance if he acted by 
voluntas or by negligentia. This would not be the case, however, if the passer-by 
acted without proper care (incuria) and walked under a tree at an unexpected 
moment; in that case, the tree pruner would not be liable for manslaughter.290
The Summa ‘Animal est substantia’ (written between 1206 and 1216), formerly 
known as Summa Bambergensis, a – rather romanistic – commentary on the 
Decretum,291 is of particular interest. From this anonymous work it appears 
that culpability (culpa) could reveal itself in many different ways. According to 
the author of Animal, culpability could exist because of the act (ratione operis), 
the manner of performing the act (ratione modi agendi), the place (ratione loci) 
or the time (ratione temporis) of occurrence of the act. When someone acted 
would allow those who had received major orders to serve in minor orders (X 5.12.8). Major 
dispensation (dispensatio maior) would allow them to continue to serve in their own major 
order (D.50 c.37), while the most extensive dispensation (dispensatio maxima) would take 
away the impediment to being promoted to a hierarchically higher order (X 5.12.9). Voluntary 
homicide, on the other hand, which was unjust, unnecessary and was performed without any 
urgent coercion could not be dispensated at all. See Goffredus Tranensis, Summa super titulis 
decretalium, De homicidio, nr. 11, fo. 213v.
288 See also 1 Comp. 5.10.9 (X 5.12.8); - Bernardus Papiensis, Summa decretalium, V.10.5; see 
also Goffredus Tranensis, Summa super titulis decretalium, De homicidio, nr. 1, fo. 211v.
289 Bernardus Papiensis, Summa decretalium, V.10.5: ... nec obloquitur sequens hic 
capitulum, scil[icet] Lator [1 Comp. 5.10.10 (X 5.12.9)], quia hic culpa occidentis, ibi culpa occisi 
mors interuenit. De his hos uersus habe: 
   Si licitus, cautus, non est culpabilis actus; 
   In reliquis culpam reor et pro crimine mulctam. (dactylic hexameter, EvD) … 
290 D.50 c.50: Item ex Concilio Guarmatiensi. Sepe contingit, dum quis operi necessario 
insistens arborem inciderit, ut aliquis subtus ipsam ueniens deprimatur. Et iccirco, si uoluntate uel 
negligentia incidentis arborem factum est, ut homicida penitenciae debet omnino submitti. Quod 
si non uoto, sed incuria illius, non hoc eum sentencia contingit. Si enim dum ille operi necessario 
fortassis incumberet, iste insperatus occurrit sub arbore et sub ipsa oppressus est, incisor arboris 
non tenetur pro homicida.
291  See http://www.medcanonlaw.nl/Animal_est_substantia/Introduction.html (last visited 
on 1 May 2013).
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in contravention to any provision and thereby inflicted damage on someone 
else, the wrongdoer was always considered to have acted culpably. The author 
of Animal referred to Roman law, more specifically to D. 9.2.11pr.: the case of 
the barber who put his chair near a public field where people where playing 
a ball game. If the customer was killed after a ball hit the barber’s razor, the 
barber would be liable, because he shaved where he should not have done so 
(ratione loci).292 It is curious that the negligence of the injured party was not 
mentioned. According to Luig, the reason for this was that the negligence of 
the injured party was less than the negligence of the wrongdoer, and therefore 
unremarkable.293
Furthermore, the Apparatus mentioned that with regard to the question 
of (Aquilian) liability for damage, culpa could be compensated by culpa, with 
reference to D. 9.2.11pr. With regard to the question whether a cleric could be 
granted a higher ordination, this was different, because in that case culpa could 
never be compensated by culpa. The author of Animal referred to 1 Comp. 
5.10.9 (X 5.12.8) and also stated that when the wrongdoer and the person killed, 
both acted culpably; even if the culpability of the wrongdoer was less serious, 
he could never ascend to a higher rank.294 
The author of Animal est substantia denied the wrongdoer the ordination 
to the priesthood, without taking into account the amount of negligence on 
either side. From the text in Animal it becomes clear that not every kind of 
contributory negligence on the side of the person injured absolved the wrong-
doer from his responsibility, not even when his contributory negligence was 
considerable. It may be concluded that the importance of canon law, at least in 
the commentary of the author of the Animal on D.50 c.50, regarding contribu-
tory negligence lay in the fact that the problem of the scope of contributory 
negligence (the question of minor culpa) was explicitly discussed for the first 
time in the legal development of the Romano-canonical tradition.295
292 He had not acted culpably – neither because of the act nor because of the manner of 
performing the act in this case; see also Kuttner 1935, p. 226.
293 Luig 1969, p. 202.
294 Animal est substantia ad D.50 c.50 (edn. E.C. Coppens): … Et nota quod in lege quantum 
ad dampnum culpa bene compensatur culpe, ff. Ad legem Aquiliam. Item Mela [D. 9.2.11pr.]. At 
quantum ad promotionem numquam dicerem quod culpa compensanda sit culpe. Nam etsi ille qui 
occisus est fuerit in culpa et alius qui fecit homicidium similiter etiam forte in minori, numquam 
tamen deinceps poterit promoueri, extra. De homicidio. Continebatur [1 Comp. 5.10.9 (X 5.12.8)]. …
295 Luig 1969, p. 203.
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3.3.4 Accidental homicide: two cases from the Liber Extra
3.3.4.1 The case of X 5.12.8
Introduction
Two decretals, X 5.12.8 and X 5.12.9, seem relevant regarding contributory 
negligence.296 The first text I want to discuss is a decretal from Pope Alexander 
III297 issued somewhere between 1159 and 1181298 contained in the Compilatio 
prima (1 Comp. 5.10.9) and the Liber Extra (1234), namely, X 5.12.8:
Idem Cusentinensi Archiepiscopo. Continebatur in literis tuis, quod, quum diaconus, 
praesentium lator, et quidam alii clerici a uineis ecclesiae opere consummato 
redirent, leuiandi laboris gratia quendam ludum imitati sunt uiatorum, proiicientes 
baculos suos in longum; studebant enim iacere in directum, et alter alterius fustem 
ferire. Cuius ludi, sicut asserunt, solet esse conditio, ut, qui alterius baculum 
percuteret, quasi uictor, pro equo alio, cuius baculus percussus est, uteretur; sed 
praefati clerici, equitandi licentia non utentes, sola erant iactione contenti, ut, dum 
alacrius ad baculos suos concurrerent, laborem itineris non sentirent. Quidam 
autem laicus, sicut praedictus diaconus asserit, dum baculum eiusdem diaconi 
percussisset, incautus in eum equitaturus insiliit, et sic a falce illius diaconi, qua 
erat accinctus, mortale uulnus accepit, de quo post dies octo exspirauit. Ideoque 
mandamus, quatenus eundem diaconum sine licentia Romani Pontificis ad 
superiorem gradum non adscendere, uel in diaconatus officio nullo unquam 
tempore ministrare permittas, sed eum dispensatiue ministrare in subdiaconatus 
officio patiaris.299
The same [Pope Alexander III] to the Archbishop of Cosenza (Italy). In your 
petition it is stated that a deacon, the applicant of this petition, and other clerics, 
after completing their work at the church-owned vineyard, would have returned, 
[and,] as a relief after work, for pleasure simulated a certain game pilgrims used 
to play. While throwing their sticks at a spot far away, they practised throwing 
in a certain direction, and moreover that one stick would touch the other’s. The 
rule of the game, as we consider it, used to be that, whose stick hit someone else’s 
stick,300 as if he were a victor, for reward was allowed to use the other as a horse, 
i.e. the one whose stick was hit; but the above-mentioned clerics did not make 
296 Kuttner 1935, p. 241f.; Luig 1969, p. 202.
297 The pontificate of Pope Alexander III, born Orlando Bandinelli, was from 1159 to 1181.
298 Jaffé 1851, p. 798, nr. 8921.
299 Friedberg 1881, col. 796.
300 Petrus Pantoja de Ayala (†1584) explained it in such a way that the stick of one person 
should hit the other one’s in the air; see his Comment. ad D. 11.5.2, nr. 45.
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use of this possibility to horse ride, but were satisfied with the throwing,301 in a 
way that, while they swung their sticks quite excitedly, would not feel the effort of 
the journey. A certain layman, however, as the above-mentioned deacon stated, 
while he had hit the stick of the same deacon, jumped on him with imprudence 
(incautus) in order to ‘horse ride’, and in this way he received a fatal injury by 
the sickle of that deacon, which he (the deacon) had fastened [to his belt], as a 
result of which the layman died after eight days.302 Therefore, we order that you 
(i.e. bishop of Cosenza), insofar as the same deacon will not ascend to a higher 
rank without the permission of the Roman pontifex (the Pope) and you will never 
permit him to exercise the office of deacon, permit him, by way of dispensation, 
to serve in the office of subdeacon.303
Facts of the case: an exciting game
Reading the text of X 5.12.8, one immediately wonders what kind of game the 
clerics were playing. Apparently, the game, which travellers used to play, was 
very widespread. It was known under the Greek name commonovolon. The 
word commonovolon is probably a corruption of the word condomonobolon,304 
the game of jumping with a leaping pole,305 as mentioned in (and permitted 
by) C. 3.43.1.4.306
301 A later addition gives a different wording which also makes sense, namely, iactatione 
(with the gesture).
302 Another translation of the contents of X 5.12.8 can be found in Schilling & Sintenis 
1838, p. 735f., and Kuttner 1935, p. 241 (German), Bellini 2003, p. 375 (Italian); a somewhat 
different summary can be found in Katz 1881, p. 19: ‘Mehrere Geistliche und Laien kehren mit 
Sicheln vom Weinberge zurück. Auf dem Rückwege spielen sie ein Spiel, bei dem ein Jeder sich 
bemüht, mit seiner Sichel die Sichel des Andern niederzuschlagen, und dann nach Art eines 
Reiters sich auf den Rücken des Besiegten zu schwingen. Ein Laie springt auf den Rücken eines 
Geistlichen, der seine Sichel über die Schulter trug. Er springt in das Messer hinein und stirbt in 
Folge der Verletzung.’
303 The case of X 5.12.8 was also expounded by Bernardus Parmensis (†1266) in the casus 
(to X 5.12.8) as reproduced in the Glossa ordinaria.
304 Or contomonobolon, as the reading in the old edition of Kriegel 1887, p. 217f. 
305 According to the Great Dictionary of the Greek Language of Dimitrakos, κοντομονόβολον 
resembles the contemporary game of pole-jumping; it was performed by acrobats and balancers 
of the Byzantine amphitheatres  to leap across moats and to jump over bodies of enraged 
beasts with the use of a long pole (stick), in the hippodrome (racetracks); reference is made 
to the fragment in Justinian’s Code. See also Zamora Manzano 2011, p. 93: El monobolon 
(μονόβολον) que consistía en el salto sin pértiga o libre, el otro tipo de salto en el que ésta si se usaba 
condomonobolon (κονπομονόβολον). See also already Glück 1809, p. 326: ‘Contomonobolos ist 
das Springen mit Hülfe einer Stange oder Springstocks.’ He referred to I. Cuiacius (saltus conto 
suffultus) <Paratitla, ad C. 3.43; see edn. 1751, p. 345, EvD>, P. de Ayala [<Comment. ad C. 3.43, nr. 
5 (edn. 1733, col. 1086): Contomonobolos saltus etiam, non singularis et simplex, sed cum conti seu 
sudis adminiculo …] and Th. Balsamon (<scholion ad Photius’ Nomocanon, tit. XIII, cap. 29, edn. 
1615, p. 243: saltus>, EvD). However, Glück also referred to G. Pancirolus <Thesaurus variarum 
lectionum, lib. I, cap. 47; see edn. 1610, p. 59, EvD), who stated that ‘Contomonobulum ludus est 
conti et ipsius semel iaculandi’.
306 Also D.35 c.1 is especially relevant as it concerns the prohibition for clergy to play dice 
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While the players threw their sticks at a spot far away, they practised 
throwing far away, i.e. in a certain direction (straight ahead), and tried to 
touch another’s stick, but apparently with some kind of armour to protect the 
armpits,307 to make it more difficult to hit the stick.308 Hundreds of years later, 
Petrus Pantoja de Ayala (†1584)309 seems to refer to this game of throwing 
sticks.310 As appears from X 5.12.8, the clerics did not completely practise the 
game as it used to be practised, since they did not use the possibility to horse 
ride (the more dangerous part of the game).311 
Interpretations of the canonists
Various canonists gave interpretations of the papal decision by providing 
possible explanations for the declared culpability of the deacon in question. 
In general, as I have mentioned before, canonists argued that in a case of ac-
cidental homicide, the homicide had to be imputed to the wrongdoer if his 
culpa existed either (1) by acting in contravention of legal provisions or (2) by 
doing something permissible, but without using due diligence.
and get drunk; see on this text as well as the later commentaries on this text Hallebeek 2012, p. 
145ff. Furthermore, according to C 3.43.1<.4> (which became known around ca. 1205), no one is 
allowed to gamble except in five types of games and for no more than one solidum. According to 
authentica Interdicimus just after C. 1.3.17, clerics were even forbidden to play or watch a board 
game or to visit any spectacle. See also J. de Breitenbach, Repetitio ad X 5.12.9, fo. 8r: … ubi quinque 
ludi admittuntur, scilicet Comelon. Et est ludus ubi iactus uel lapis in longum protrahitur. Sicut 
forte est ludere ad paletum, uel sagittare. Hydolomonon. Et est ludus ubi iactus uel lapis in breue 
spatium retrahitur. Sicut forte est ludus pilarum. … The game comelon was a game of throwing a 
spear for distance, as was maybe also the case with paletum or with the shooting of arrows. The 
same formulation can be found (under a slightly different term, i.e. comonbelon) with DuCange 
et al., Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, II, col. 459b. s.v. comonbelon: deinde vero ordinent 
quinque ludos; Comonbelon, id est, ludus, ubi lapis in longum projicitur; Comondiaulion, id est, 
ludus, ubi lapis vel palus in breve spacium projicitur; - The constitution Alearum lusus (C. 3.43.1, 
dating from 529) of Justinian was originally a Greek constitution but summarised and translated 
into Latin in the Middle Ages. See Hallebeek 2012, p. 154, 158, who argues that the translation 
into Latin was probably done by Petrus de Cardona.
307 DuCange et al., Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, VI, col. 108b. s.v. palectus: vel 
Palettus, Armorum genus, quod palmulam lusoriam, Gall. Palette, referret, sic appellari videtur. …
308 Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 1; Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, 
ad X 5.12.8, nr. 1.
309 Little information is available on Pedro/Petrus Pantoja de Ayala (or: Ajala); a short 
description can be found in Jöcher 1750 (repr. 1960), col. 166; Vidal y Diaz 1869, p. 543f.
310 Pedro Pantoja de Ayala mentioned the game of throwing sticks in his commentary on D. 
11.5.2, nr. 40 and compared it with the game of his own time called tirar bohordos (throwing lances 
at a wooden board while riding on a horse and trying to keep the lance sticking upright in the wood 
or going through it; see on the game of bohordos Del Mar Agudo Romeo 1993, esp. p. 20f.).
311  Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, start and nr. 1.
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(1) The culpa could be sought in the following way. The game could be 
considered dangerous and therefore participation was prohibited for clerics312 
or the game described was unbecoming of a cleric313 (since taking part in 
a dangerous game was regarded as acting culpably314) or the horse-riding 
condition was not suited for a cleric.315 Furthermore, some argued that the 
custom attached to the game was forbidden or that participation in the game 
was prohibited because of the intermingling with a layman.316
(2) Even if the game with its horse-riding condition was allowed (licitus), the 
deacon’s act was not performed with due care.317 Firstly, his sickle was disguised 
and therefore totally invisible, and he should have been aware that this could 
be dangerous because of the horse-riding custom of the game. Secondly, he 
should have removed the sickle from his belt, knowing the customs of the 
game.318
There seems to have been a difference of opinion between Panormitanus who ar-
gued that it was permitted for clerics to play a game for relief and pleasure,319 but 
argued that the game was nevertheless not allowed because of the intermingling 
312  See Bernardus Parmensis in gloss eiusdem Diaconi; Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, 
ad X 5.12.8, nr. 5; - In general, in cases where injuries were inflicted during a game, and led to a 
fatal outcome, the canonists raised the question whether the game was permitted or prohibited. 
Dangerous games were considered res illicitae; see Kuttner 1935, p. 240, in accordance with the 
Roman fragment in D. 9.2.10 (ludus noxius in culpa est).
313  See Bernardus Parmensis in gloss ludum ad X 5.12.8.
314  According to Bellini 2003, p. 375, this game was dangerous because of its similarity 
with dice, and it was forbidden by the Church as such, especially when practised by religious 
people (religiosi).
315  Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8 (begin) and see also Johannes Andreae, 
Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 4.
316 Sinibaldus Fliscus, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8; Bernardus Parmensis in gloss eiusdem 
Diaconi and gloss Romanis Pontificis ad X 5.12.8; Henricus de Segusio, Summa. De homicidio 
uoluntario uel casuali. Qua pena feriatur, fo. 242v; Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, 
nr. 5; Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 1ff., and see also additiones a and b 
of Alexander de Nevo (ca. 1419–1485) to this fragment of Nicolaus de Tudeschis. See also, e.g., 
Felinus Sandeus, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8. See also Breitenbach, Repetitio ad X 5.12.9, fo. 7v. 
317  See Bernardus Parmensis at the end of the casus (to X 5.12.8); Henricus de Segusio, 
Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 1f.; see also the Italian theologian and Dominican Sylvester 
Mazzolini da Prierio (1456/57–1523) in his Summa Summarium (1514), a manual for confessors, 
who argued that despite the fact that the game was allowed (licitae), it was not performed with 
due care. Because the deacon knew the customs of the game, he should have removed the 
sickle. See Sylvester de Prierio, Summa Summarium. Rursus de homicidio secundo, inquantum est 
casuale, nr. 5.
318  Gloss Romanis Pontificis ad X 5.12.8; Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 6. 
See also Katz 1881, p. 19: ‘Die gl. Romani imputirt dem Geistlichen culpa, weil er wissen musste, 
dass es bei diesem Spiel Sitte ist, auf den Rücken des Andern zu springen, und er daher die Sichel 
nicht über die Schulter nehmen durfte.’
319  On this topic, see also Felinus Sandeus, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9.
chapter three160
with a layman, and others who argued that the game was permitted even with 
such a condition, but the deacon nevertheless acted culpably because, knowing 
the custom of the game, he did not remove his sickle. 
But what would have been the case if the (sub)deacon clearly had refused 
permission to be used for a horse ride? Could any negligence be imputed to him 
then? Hostiensis (Henricus de Segusio, ca. 1200–1271)320 argued that because 
of the game the deacon should have considered the possibility that someone 
could jump on him. However, according to Parnormitanus, he could have doubt 
on this matter; nevertheless, a decision was better taken in favour of the cleric.321 
Hostiensis argued that even though the deacon had not given permission to the 
layman to jump on him to horse ride, he nevertheless should be judged to be at 
fault because he should have been aware of the custom of the game: the layman 
did no wrong, because the custom of the game allowed him to horse ride. The 
fact that clerics did not make use of the horse-riding rule does not excuse the 
deacon. He acted culpably all the same, because he should have been aware of the 
fact that someone could jump on him and he should have taken precautions.322 
 
An interesting argument is put forward by Sinibaldus Fliscus (†1254),323 who 
states that the deacon can also be considered to have acted culpably because 
the sickle was disguised. The sickle was girded in such a way that it was invisible 
to others, and therefore the layman who jumped on the cleric was excused by 
law since he could not possibly have seen the sickle (so no contributory negli-
gence on his side occurred). Furthermore, if horse-riding was a custom in this 
game, the loser had to remove the sickle so the winner could ride on his back. 
Despite the fact that clerics made no use of the possibility of horse-riding, the 
act of the deacon could still be imputed to him. He had been careless since he 
could have given up his right to horse ride, but did not have the right to take 
away that right from other players.324
320 The decretalist Henricus de Segusio (Hostiensis) studied law in Bologna. He received 
the bishopric of Sisteron, became archbishop of Embrun and, in 1262, received the cardinalate 
from Pope Urban IV in the form of the bishopric of Ostia whence he was later called Hostiensis.
321  Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 3. 
322 Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 1; see also Antonio a Butrio, 
Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 6.
323 Pope Innocent IV was born in Genoa before 1200. Born Sinibaldo dei Fieschi 
(Fliscus), he studied law in Parma and perhaps in Bologna.  He worked as a jurist at the papal 
curia beginning in 1226 and was for some time the auditor of the court of audientia litterarum 
contradictarum. He was made a cardinal by Pope Gregory IX in 1227. He was elected Pope in 1243 
and held the pontificate until his death in 1254.
324 Sinibaldus Fliscus, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8 and see also Johannes Andreae, 
Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 1.
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On irregularity
In canon law, an irregularity (namely, irregularitas ex delicto) prevented the 
priest from canonically performing the sacraments and the other duties of his 
office.325 Irregularity can have three effects: the prohibition of promotion in 
the law of ordination, the prohibition to exercise an office (without removal of 
the degree of consecration) and deposition from the present ordination and 
office.326 The institute of irregularity was intended to safeguard the dignity of 
the Church, by the selection of a clergy of an irreproachable state. In order not 
to give offence to the faithful, not in order to punish the guilty person,327 the 
Church prevented ordination and promotion in cases where ordinees did not 
have sufficient external dignity.328
Persons who wanted to be promoted to holy orders (subdiaconate, diaco-
nate or priesthood) even though they had been involved in a casual homicide 
had to be given dispensation.329 Dispensation could be given by the Pope (later 
delegated to the Penitentiary) to persons who pursued an ecclesiastical career 
but were considered irregular and thus incapable of acting in an ecclesiastical 
office. After a papal dispensation they could continue with or enter into their 
ecclesiastical career despite their defect.330 Candidates for an ecclesiastical 
office could not be illegitimate, they had to be old enough, bodily defects were 
not allowed, they had to be qualified enough to be able to act in the office and 
had to have a good reputation.331 Persons who did not meet these requirements 
were considered irregular. Such irregularity was suspendable by a papal dis-
pensation, which cancelled the irregularity.332 
The case of X 5.12.8 deals with an irregularitas ex delicto because homicide 
(homicidium) was concerned. Committing a crime led to the non-fulfilment 
of the requirement ‘to have a good reputation’. The dispensation had to be 
granted by papal authority because it concerned the holy orders; with regard 
to minor orders the local bishop could grant dispensation suo iure.333  Indeed, 
325 Kjeldsen 2009, p. 2.
326 See, e.g., Breitenbach, Repetitio ad X 5.12.9, fo. 3r, and on fo. 4r. See also Metz 1954, p. 96, who 
writes: ‘… irrégularité, qui entraîne l’interdiction d’accéder aux ordres ecclésiastiques, d’avancer 
aux ordres supérieurs s’il en a déjà reçu ou d’exercer les fonctions dont il a été investi.’
327 According to Metz 1954, p. 96, ‘… elle ne constitue pas une peine …’ and on p. 97: ‘Mais 
la mesure prise à son egard n’a pas un caractère pénal.’
328 See Kuttner 1935, p. 187f., 232ff.; Metz 1954, p. 96f.
329 See Göller 1911, II, p. 3 (bulls of Pius II and Paul II); Salonen 2001, p. 62. Certain grants 
of absolution, dispensation or special licenses in matters reserved to the Pope were dealt with by 
the Penitentiary, i.e. those especially delegated by the Pope to the poenitentiarius maior or to the 
office in general; see also Göller 1907, I, p. 100ff.
330 Salonen 2001, p. 67.
331  On these requirements, see also Salonen 2001, p. 178ff.
332 Salonen 2001, p. 68.
333 See also Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 2; see also Diego Covarruvias 
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only in the case of an accidental homicide could dispensation be granted but, 
with regard to the major or holy orders, only by the Pope. Furthermore, the 
(arch)bishop could not give dispensation iure suo, but only as commissarius 
of the Pope, since as to the holy orders only the Pope could grant dispensation 
and a bishop could grant dispensation iure suo only for the minor orders.334 
Contributory negligence of the deacon?
In this case, despite the imprudence (incautus) of the layman, the deacon 
was considered responsible and was degraded (to the position of subdeacon). 
Therefore, one could argue that, despite the contributory negligence of the 
injured party, the wrongdoer was held responsible because the contributory 
negligence was less serious than the negligence of the wrongdoer. However, 
the commentaries of the decretalists do not explain X 5.12.8 in this way.335 They 
directly focused on the question of the negligence of the deacon,336 the most 
relevant question in the appeal to the Pope. It has been unjustly suggested in 
the secondary literature that the fact that one aimed directly at the question 
of the negligence of the deacon was because of the lack of a partial solution 
in case of contributory negligence (still an all-or-nothing approach337) and 
that therefore the jurists tended to attribute the ‘sole guilt’ to the party that 
acted with the highest degree of negligence.338 The source (X 5.12.8) does 
not necessarily lead to this conclusion. The question of the negligence of 
the deacon was the only relevant issue in this trial and more specifically the 
question whether the deacon could still be promoted and/or exercise his 
function as a deacon, for which all relevant circumstances had to be taken into 
account. The question submitted to the Pope was not the question of which 
a Leyva, Opera Omnia. Pars II. § III. De abortu, bello et homicidio, nr. 5, who – among others – 
refers to Siete Partidas I.6.15.
334 Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.8, nr. 3f.
335 Luig 1969, p. 202.
336 Kuttner 1935, p. 241; according to Kuttner, some decretalists argued that the game 
was not permitted, however most decretalists were of the opinion that it certainly existed as a 
permissible game but that the deacon acted without the necessary care: he had to put his sickle 
aside or warn the other players; see Kuttner 1935, p. 241, esp. nts. 1 and 2 in which transcriptions 
of parts of these (early) decret(al)ists are given. Comprehensive research of the relevant 
manuscripts of the decretists and decretalists on this topic would clarify the matter, but lies 
beyond the scope of this study.
337 X 5.36.3 could indicate differently (division of damage); however, it is not clear 
whether this text is used in cases where both parties acted negligently nor whether this text 
has been generalised by the decretalists; see Lange 1955, p. 73; therefore, it can be assumed 
that the approach was still all-or-nothing. A different view has been taken by Kiefer 1989, p. 33, 
who argued that the idea of the division of damage according to the degrees of negligence first 
appeared in canon law, but without evidence of generalisation. In that respect, he refers to X 
5.36.3 and states that Exodus 21:35-36 was the model for this (this text will be discussed later).
338 Argued by Luig 1969, p. 202.
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of the two parties had to be held liable for the accident, but only whether the 
culpability of the deacon was at stake.339 
3.3.4.2 The case of X 5.12.9
The second text I want to discuss is a decretal from Pope Alexander III issued 
between 1161 and 1168340 contained in the Compilatio prima (1 Comp. 5.10.10) 
and the Liber Extra (1234), namely, X 5.12.9:
 
Idem Exoniensi Episcopo. Lator praesentium P. clericus nobis uiua uoce proposuit, 
quod, quum quadam die casu cum quodam clerico luderet, contigit, quod ille proiecit 
istum ad terram, cuius cultellus, quem ad latus suum habebat, in alterum incidit, 
et fortuito casu occubuit uulneratus. Ideoque mandamus, quatenus, rei ueritate 
comperta, si ita res se habuit, et alia iusta causa non impedit, praedictum P. libere 
permittas ad sacros ordines promoueri.341
The same [=Pope Alexander III] to the bishop of Exeter. The applicant of this 
petition, a cleric P., orally expounded his view to us that, when a certain day it 
occurred that he played with another cleric and he had pushed him, [and] that 
the other cleric threw him to the ground; the knife he had [attached] to his side 
cut the other (the cleric who threw him) accidentally wounding him [so that] 
he died on the event. And therefore, if it is proven to be true, and if the case 
happened in this way, and [if] no other valid reason obstruct this, we order, that 
you, bishop, are free to promote the aforementioned P. to a higher ordination.342
From a modern perspective, X 5.12.9 can also be considered to be a problem of 
contributory negligence. One could argue that the responsibility of the wrong-
doer (the cleric P.) is cancelled out because of the preponderant contributory 
negligence of the injured party (the other cleric).343 This, however, cannot be 
concluded from the commentaries of the decretalists.344 
339 Regarding the question whether the deacon could be promoted to a higher rank, 
the negligence of the injured party was brought up and was taken into account, in this case 
leading to the conclusion that the deacon could not ascend to a higher rank. This conclusion is 
confirmed by some commentaries on the text discussed above (esp. those of Innocent IV and of 
Hostiensis).
340 Jaffé 1851, p. 820, nr. 9273.
341  Friedberg 1881, col. 797.
342 Another translation of the contents of X 5.12.9 in German can be found in Schilling & 
Sintenis 1837, p. 736, and Kuttner 1935, p. 242.
343 Luig 1969, p. 202f.
344 According to Kuttner, the injured party acted culpably, but the wrongdoer did not act 
culpably at all; see Kuttner 1935, p. 242, where also parts of transcriptions of early decretists/
decretalists on this point can be found. With regard to the promotion of a cleric who killed 
someone, and thereby acted culpably, according to Animal ad D.50 c.50, no culpae compensatio 
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Various interpretations of X 5.12.9
As already stated above, an accidental homicide without a preceding culpable 
act could not be imputed to the wrongdoer. In this case, the Pope concluded 
that the accidental homicide was certainly not caused by any negligence of 
the cleric (Bernardus Parmensis345 named him Petrus).346 Various canonists 
provided divergent reasons to explain this solution. An accidental death could 
not be imputed to someone who did not act culpably (aliqua culpa),347 and to 
support the conclusion that the cleric was not culpable in this case, the de-
cretalists considered the cleric to have acted with due care and to have taken 
the necessary precautions.348 
 
First of all, they preconceived that the cleric was allowed to play with another 
cleric.349 Most decretalists argue that the game was allowed because it was a 
chess game or some other smooth, harmless recreational game (not a noxius/
harmful game).350 A diverting game was indeed not forbidden for clerics.351 If 
a game had been forbidden, taking part in such a game would be imputed to 
the wrongdoer himself (as in X 5.12.8). But chess or other insignificant games 
were not forbidden to clerics. A brief look at the relevant legal rules provides 
us with the following information. Clerics were forbidden to play or watch a 
board game or to visit any spectacle (see authentica Interdicimus, just after C. 
1.3.17352). Already Pope Innocentius III (1160/61–1216),353 in the decretal Inter 
dilectos of 1209,354 complained about the established practice of French clerics 
could take place (see chapter three, p. 155).
345 Bernardus Parmensis (Bottono, de Botone) was born in the late 12th or early 13th 
century, and studied canon law in Bologna under Tancred. Later he taught canon law in Bologna. 
By 1247, he was also a papal chaplain.
346 See casus ad X 5.12.9.
347 Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nrs. 1 and 3.
348 Finally, Covarruvias (1512–1577), who belonged to the school of early modern 
Scholasticism, questions why the two cases in which someone killed accidentally (X 5.12.8 
and X 5.12.9) resulted in a different verdict. According to Covarruvias, the difference lay in the 
culpability: the wrongdoer in X 5.12.8 acted culpably, since he did not act with due care, because 
he did not take precautions as he should have. The wrongdoer in X 5.12.9, however, did take 
precautions and therefore no irregularity occurred (the carefulness seems to justify the act). See 
Diego Covarruvias a Leyva, Opera Omnia. Pars II. § IV. De homicidio casuali, nr. 8.
349 Gloss luderet ad X 5.12.9; Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 3; Henricus 
de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9; Isaac would have played with Ismaël (C.32 q.4 c.2); see also 
Genesis 21; Joseph would have played with his brothers (C.22 q.2 c.18); see also Genesis 44. 
350 Sinibaldus Fliscus, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9; J. de Breitenbach, Repetitio ad X 5.12.9, fo. 
5v; on chess in medieval Europe, see Van Egmond & Mostert 2001.
351  See Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9 (see below). On a ludus solatiosus 
see also additio a of Zacharias Ferrerius (1479–1524) ad Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad 
X 5.12.9; J. de Breitenbach, Repetitio ad X 5.12.9, fo. 5r.
352 Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 2.
353 Pope Innocentius III, born Lotario dei Conti di Segni, held the pontificate from 1198–1216.
354 Potthast 1874 (reprint 1957), p. 316, nr. 3662.
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to game. He strongly disapproved of this habit, calling it a perverse custom, 
which should rather be qualified as depravation.355 Furthermore, in canon 16 of 
the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 (later adopted as a decretal in the Compilatio 
quarta of Johannes Teutonicus as the decretal Clerici (4 Comp. 3.1.4) and 
adopted in the Liber Extra in X 3.1.15), gambling was prohibited. Clerics should 
not gamble or play dice, nor be present when such games were played.356 
In the case of X 5.12.9, because of the ‘push’, some decretalists argue that it 
concerned a game of wrestling or similar game,357 but they came to the same 
conclusion, namely, that this game was permitted also to clerics (for the pur-
pose of displaying courage and tenacity; see D. 11.5.2.1).358
Secondly, one argued based on the facts, since it was the other cleric who threw 
him on the ground, and so it was not the act of the cleric Petrus that produced 
the damage.359 Therefore, the cleric could not possibly have taken precautions 
in order to avoid injuring his companion,360 as he could not have foreseen that 
someone would throw him on the ground.361 
Thirdly, one argued that it was rather normal to wear a small knife because 
of its usefulness in cutting bread and that it was more commonly used than a 
sickle (as in the case in X 5.12.8);362 it was even argued that the small knife was 
in its sheath.363 Cutting bread is an act performed on a daily basis. It would 
have been different if a sword was involved.364 To wear a knife on a belt with 
355 Around 1210 this decretal was adopted in the Compilatio tertia of Petrus Beneventanus 
(†1219/20), namely, 3 Comp. 5.14.4, and later it was adopted in X 5.31.11. See also Hallebeek 2012, p. 152.
356 Canon 16 in Alberigo & Jedin 1973, p. 243; Hallebeek 2012, p. 153. 
357 Later, also Pedro Pantoja de Ayala seems to have taken this interpretation of the facts 
of the case and just stated that two clerics were wrestling; see his Comment. ad D. 11.5.2, nr. 46.
358 Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 4; Diego Covarruvias a Leyva, Opera 
Omnia. Pars II. § IV. De homicidio casuali, nr. 8.
359 Gloss proiecit istum ad terram ad X 5.12.9; Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 
5.12.9, nr. 2; Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9; Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, ad X 
5.12.9, nr. 4; Sylvester de Prierio, Summa Summarium. Rursus de homicidio secundo, inquantum 
est casuale, nr. 6.
360 See Sinibaldus Fliscus, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9.
361 In cases of casus, where the cleric could not have foreseen certain events (such as the 
fact that someone would throw him on the ground?), he did not act culpably. This would be 
different if certain consequences could be foreseen but nevertheless the wrongdoer did not act 
accordingly; see Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 1f.
362 Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 2; Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, 
ad X 5.12.9, nr. 3; Breitenbach, Repetitio ad X 5.12.9, fo. 5v.
363 Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 1ff.; Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, 
ad X 5.12.9, nr. 4; unfortunately, I could not find the reference made by the two just-mentioned 
canonists to Panormitanus. See also Breitenbach, Repetitio ad X 5.12.9, fo. 5v, who also mentioned 
the fact that the small knife was in its sheath (Potest etiam dici quod iste clericus habebat cultellum 
in uagina).  
364 Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 3, who referred to X 3.1.2. This 
chapter three166
the sharp side downwards was also the custom, and therefore not putting it 
away was not malicious.365 
Fourthly, some argued that the throwing of the cleric to the ground was not part 
of the (original) game of chess,366 but happened unexpectedly and therefore 
this struggle did not occur upon mutual agreement.367 Of course the situation 
would have been different if the cleric had deliberately played the game of 
wrestling (ex deliberatione), because in that case he should have put aside his 
knife, and since he did not do that, his act could be imputed to him,368 at least 
he could not be regarded as having acted without culpa. If there had been 
mutual agreement on the game of wrestling, the person who was thrown to 
the ground should have put his knife aside, and the omission of that would 
have been imputed to him.369 
Two remarks are interesting with regard to the problem of ‘contributory negli-
gence’. Firstly, the remark of Bernardus that it was not the cleric thrown to the 
ground who acted culpably, but the person who threw him (D. 9.1.1.11 is used 
as an argument).370 Secondly, the remark of Hostiensis is interesting for the 
fact that wearing a knife on one’s belt was customary and therefore the other 
cleric should have been aware of that and have acted with care, so this should 
not be imputed to the cleric Petrus.371 
The issue of dispensation
The end of X 5.12.9 is not quite clear and can be explained in two different ways. 
The central question, discussed by the canonists, is what the Pope exactly de-
text of X 3.1.2 (Clerici arma portantes et usurarii excommunicentur) is interesting as a sword 
seems to be part of the more general ‘arma’, and therefore would lead to the excommunication 
of the cleric; - Differently Sylvester de Prierio (1456–1523), in his Summa Summarium. Rursus 
de homicidio secundo, inquantum est casuale, nr. 5, uses the word sword (gladium) which, in my 
opinion, indeed changed the situation.
365 See also Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 4.
366 See also J. de Breitenbach, Repetitio ad X 5.12.9, fo. 5v.
367 Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 1f.; Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, 
ad X 5.12.9, nr. 3; Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 4. See also Nicolaus de Tudeschis, 
Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 2.
368 Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 4.
369 Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 2; - In that case the thrower would 
not have acted culpably because throwing the other to the ground is the main aim of wrestling; 
see also the later P.P. de Ayala, Comment.  ad D. 11.5.2, nr. 46.
370 Gloss Romanis Pontificis ad X 5.12.8: ... et ille potius ingessit se, proiiciendo alium ad 
terram: et sic non fuit in culpa, sic 12 q.4 Inter caetera, in fin. [C.22 q.4 c.22 §2]. Sed ille, qui ipsum 
proiecit, fuit in culpa, arg. ff. Si quadr. pau. fe. dica. l.i § Cum arietes [D. 9.1.1.11]. ...
371  Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 2.
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cided in this decretal: did he just determine what the content of ius commune 
is or did he grant dispensation? 
Some jurists372 apparently argued that the phrase ‘that the bishop is free 
(libere) to promote the aforementioned P. to a higher ordination’ meant that 
a (personal/subjective) right (of the bishop to decide on this matter) based 
on the ius commune is concerned.373 Accordingly, Nicolaus de Tudeschis 
argued, based on the Gloss, that the cleric could be promoted based on the 
ius commune, since he was not hit by any irregularity because he did not act 
with a certain negligence (aliqua culpa). The bishop would not be free to 
grant a promotion if a dispensation was necessary. But here the cleric was 
promoted based on the law and a dispensation was unnecessary.374 According 
to Hostiensis, from the last sentence of X 5.12.9 it may be concluded that the 
cleric Petrus, who in this case of accidental homicide acted in a way that was 
permitted, could be promoted without need for dispensation. He could even 
continue to practise in the same function he already had. 375
Others argued that libere meant free, namely, after dispensation by the 
Pope (i.e. an exception for an individual case).376  However, as already stated by 
Johannes Andreae, the possible promotion of the aforementioned P. to a higher 
ordination by the bishop was not free (libere) if dispensation was needed to 
be provided first (by the Pope, EvD).377
 
Concluding remarks
Two canonists explicitly commented on the position of the injured party. 
After it was already stated by Bernardus Papiensis in his Summa decretalium 
372 Alanus and Vincentius, according to Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 3.
373 See gloss libere ad X 5.12.9.
374 Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 4; see also Antonio a Butrio, 
Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 5.
375 Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9,nr. 3; and implicitly gloss Romanis 
Pontificis with siglum Ber. (Bernardus) ad X 5.12.8.
376 Bernardus Parmensis in gloss libere ad X 5.12.9 (who just referred to ‘alii’ without 
mentioning which canonists hold this view); - According to Kuttner 1935, p. 242f., the 
decretalists examined whether the solution of X 5.12.9 was not in contradiction with that of X 
5.12.8. According to them, this is not the case because in X 5.12.9 the negligence was put on the 
injured party, who threw the other party to the ground. Furthermore, in X 5.12.9 the game was 
permitted and the person whose knife cut another person did not act negligently because it was 
not possible to have foreseen such a turn (of events). Otherwise, the guilt of the wrongdoer has 
to be assumed, and the decision of Pope Alexander has to be considered as a dispensation.
377 Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 3f.; - Of course, the removal of one 
impediment (e.g. the accidental homicide without preceding culpa) does not lead to the removal 
of another (e.g. another crime which he committed). The removal of one impediment does not 
directly mean that the cleric in question could be ordained, because there could be another 
impediment  on the side of the cleric (if it has a legitimate reason)  which prevents such an 
ordination. See Antonio a Butrio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 2.
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that in the case of 1 Comp. 5.10.10 (X 5.12.9), the fatal accident was due to the 
negligence of the deceased, the same comment was now made by Bernardus 
Parmensis, in a gloss to X 5.12.8, who argued that the killing was due to the neg-
ligence (culpa) of the injured party (who threw the other onto the ground).378 
One has to keep in mind that the question in this case before the Pope was 
only whether the cleric did or did not act with negligence and whether the 
cleric could or could not be promoted (and if dispensation was necessary). 
The conclusion that due to the lack of a possibility to distribute the damages 
over both parties in case of contributory negligence (which was not at all at 
stake here) the jurists tended to attribute the ‘sole guilt’ to the party that acted 
with the highest degree of negligence can only be taken with care (analogous 
interpretation). 
Hostiensis argued that the other cleric should have been aware that wear-
ing a knife attached to a belt was customary, and therefore he should have been 
careful.379 It seems that therefore the ‘contributory negligence’ led to the sole 
guilt on the side of the injured party. One could argue, as some modern scholars 
do, that the liability of the tortfeasor in question is cancelled out because of the 
preponderant contributory negligence of the injured party. Although the ques-
tion of liability was not at all at stake in the legal case brought before the Pope 
if one looked at it from that modern perspective; the majority of the commen-
taries of the decretalists I consulted do not follow such a theory. However, the 
just-mentioned comments of Bernardus Parmensis and Hostiensis, who were 
two influential persons, could indeed indicate that this theory was applied.380
3.3.5 Contributory negligence according to the law of decretals
3.3.5.1 The case of X 5.16.6
Introduction
Another case, already mentioned earlier in this chapter because it was fre-
quently cited by the Commentators, is a decretal of Pope Innocentius III of 
1208381 contained in the Compilatio tertia (3 Comp. 5.8.1) and the Liber Extra 
(1234), namely, X 5.16.6. According to this fragment, a husband could not blame 
his wife for adultery if it was proven that he also committed adultery.
378 Gloss Romanis Pontificis ad X 5.12.8.
379 Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 2.
380 Gloss Romanis Pontificis ad X 5.12.8; Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.12.9, nr. 2.
381  Potthast 1874 (reprint 1957), p. 289, nr. 3387.
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Innocentius III. Turonensi Archiepiscopo. Intelleximus tam per literas uenerabilis 
fratris nostri Pictauiensis episcopi, quam per ea, quae coram dilecto filio Andrea 
subdiacono et capellano nostro, super hoc auditore concesso, proposita pro partibus 
exstiterunt, quod, quum S. laicus H. uxorem suam a maritali consortio sine causa 
rationabili depulisset, idem episcopus dioecesanus eorum, audiens, mulierem 
eandem cum quodam adultero fornicari, eam et illum uinculo excommunicationis 
adstrinxit, quae, tandem adulterum abiurans, absolutione recepta coram episcopo 
memorato praedictum uirum sibi restitui postulauit. At ille, huiusmodi obiiciens ei 
adulterium, de quo prolem genuisse dicebat eandem, et quod ab ipso non expulsa, 
sed spontanea recessisset, restitutionem sui proposuit ei esse minime faciendam; 
quod mulier memorata prorsus inficians, replicauit in ipsum, quod fuerat forni-
catus, et de fornicatione sobolem procrearat, propter quod tali exceptione uti non 
poterat contra ipsam. Quum autem, utrique parti probandi haec facultate concessa, 
praefata mulier per quosdam testes eiusdem uiri adulterium probauisset, quos uir 
ipse dicebat tanquam minus idoneos reprobandos, tandem ab eo fuit ad nostram 
praesentiam appellatum. Quocirca fraternitati tuae per apostolica scripta mandamus, 
quatenus, nisi tibi constiterit, uel per euidentiam rei, uel per confessionem legitimam 
mulieris, quod adulterata sponte fuisset adulterii etiam, quod uir dicitur commisisse, 
probatione cessante, ipsum recipere compellas eandem. Quodsi praedicto modo de 
mulieris fornicatione constiterit, nisi testes, per quos uiri adulterium est probatum, 
fuerint reprobati, quum matrimonii ius in utroque laesum consistat, et paria delicta 
mutua compensatione tollantur: nihilominus eum cogas, ut eam recipiat, et maritali 
affectione pertractet; alioquin mulieri praedictae silentium imponere non postponas. 
[Dat. Lat. VI. Kal. Maii Ao. XI. 1208.]382
Innocentius III to the archbishop of Tours. Not only from the letter of our respect-
able brother the bishop of Poitiers have we understood, but we also understand 
from the things that were said in the presence of the beloved son Andreas, our 
subdeacon and our chaplain, who is admitted as an auditor into this case, that 
the following intention has come into being: when layman S. repudiated his wife 
H. without a reasonable reason from the marital union, their diocesan bishop, 
hearing that the wife committed adultery with a certain adulterer, restrained her 
and the adulterer with excommunication; if the wife at last renounced the adulterer 
after she received absolution, in the presence of the aforementioned bishop, the 
latter requested that her aforementioned husband return to her. But he argued 
that if the husband, nevertheless, blamed her for the adultery, from which a child 
was born, and she was not repudiated by him, but voluntarily departed from him, 
the husband did not have to take her back; the wife totally denied and replied to 
382 Friedberg 1881, col. 807.
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him that the husband committed adultery and by means of this illicit sexual act 
had a child, and therefore the husband could not have any right to any exception. 
Then, nevertheless, while the competence to prove this is granted to both parties, 
the aforementioned wife by certain witnesses of the same man had proven his 
adultery, of whom the man pretended that these witnesses had to be refused as less 
suitable; after all it was the husband who brought an appeal to ‘our presence’ (i.e. 
to the Pope). Therefore by way of this apostolic writing we order your fraternity, 
unless it is certain for you by the clearness of the case or by the lawful confession 
of the wife that the adultery the woman committed was committed of her own 
accord, while the evidence for the husband’s adultery had no effect, you order the 
husband to take her back. But when it is proven, in the aforementioned way, that 
the wife committed adultery, unless witnesses by whom the adultery of the man 
is proven were refused, that to both spouses damage is inflicted based on marital 
law, and both equal delicts are cancelled out by way of mutual compensation, 
nevertheless you force him to take her back, and to treat her with marital affec-
tion; otherwise383 you will not postpone to silence the aforementioned woman.384
Facts of the case
The wife was considered to be deprived (of her possession of her marital 
rights) because after having left the house she wanted to return, but was not 
allowed to do so.385 In this conflict the husband objected that the wife had 
committed adultery and she replied that he had also committed adultery386 
and that because of that circumstance he could not defend himself as he did. 
The voluntariness of the adultery of the wife could be evident, because her 
adultery was committed in public or a child was born,387 or it became clear from 
a confession of the woman (in iure and by her own free will).388 
383 This means the adultery of the woman was proven but her witnesses to prove her 
husband’s adultery had been refused, so the adultery of the man could not be proven; see, e.g., 
also Bernardus Parmensis in gloss alioquin ad X 5.16.6 (and also Johannes Teutonicus in his 
apparatus ad alioquin): Id est, si constiterit de adulterio mulieris, et non uiri.
384 In that case, the man was not obliged to take her back; - A translation of the Latin text 
in German can be found in Schilling & Sintenis 1837, p. 747f.
385 See gloss spontanea ad X 5.16.6.
386 Already Goffredus Tranensis (†1245), in the first full apparatus on the Decretales 
Gregorii IX, affirmed that when a wife was accused of adultery by her husband, she could object 
that the husband also committed (a similar kind of) adultery; see Goffredus Tranensis, Summa 
super titulis decretalium, De adulteriis et stupro, nr. 3, fo. 215v.
387 Gloss euidentiam ad X 5.16.6.
388 Gloss confessionem ad X 5.16.6; see also Laurentius Hispanus, Apparatus glossarum, 
ad 3 Comp. 5.8.1 (X 5.16.6), ad per confessionem legitimam: Spontaneam, arg. xxxi. q. ii. Lotharius 
[C.31 q.2 c.4] et in iure et presente aduersario. 
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What was the legal problem in this case? The case of X 5.16.6 obviously con-
cerned a case in which the woman brought a remedy to enforce a marriage 
contract. It concerned a remedy known as restitution of conjugal rights.389 The 
woman had to prove that she had been in possession and that she was deprived 
of her possession by her husband without process of law. If she succeeded in 
this, she would be entitled to restitution, unless it was shown she deprived 
herself of her right.390 If the woman won the lawsuit, the man had to accept 
the woman as his legitimate spouse and treat her with marital affection.391 In 
this case, by leaving the house she did not lose the quasi-possession of her 
husband, because she could have retained it by her mere intention; however, 
because the man did not permit her to come back, she was considered deprived 
(of her possession). 
The requested restitution of the woman cannot be refused with the ar-
gument of adultery, unless it was committed by the woman in public (the 
criterion of ‘public and manifest fornication’392). Despite the fact that the 
woman went away of her own free will, she had to be considered deprived of 
her possession because she wanted to return and was not permitted to do so, 
and therefore she could claim restitution.393 .
 
Various views on X 5.16.6
Canonists argued that when the evidence produced by the woman to prove 
that the man committed adultery succeeded, the fact that the woman also 
committed adultery (an act with dolus) would be compensated by the fact that 
the man committed adultery (also an act with dolus).394 When both parties 
committed adultery, the intentional act of both parties (dolus) was compen-
sated.395 A compensation of crimes was regarded as permitted because equal 
delicts were cancelled out by way of mutual compensation.396 This leads to the 
389 cf. Danahue 2007, p. 36.
390 See Donahue 2007, p. 36.
391  On the restitution of conjugal rights, see Helmholz 1974, p. 67ff.
392 See Tancredus, Summa de matrimonio, 33 (edn. Wunderlich 1841, p. 73f.) – also 
mentioning other exceptions –  and also Donahue 2007, p. 36. 
393 However, according to Johannes Teutonicus (ca. 1170–1245), there are many exceptions 
as a result of which the claim of the deprived woman nevertheless had to be denied; see Johannes 
Teutonicus, Apparatus glossarum, ad 3 Comp. 5.8.1 (X 5.16.6) (edn. K. Pennington, available at 
http://faculty.cua.edu/Pennington (last visited on 1 May 2013)).
394 Laurentius Hispanus in his gloss ad probatione cessante ad  3 Comp. 5.8.1 (X 5.16.6): 
Nam si probetur dolus dolo compensabitur, infra c. sequenti, supra eodem titulo, Significasti [1 
Comp. 5.13.6 (X 5.16.5)].
395 Gloss cessante ad X 5.16.6.
396 See also gloss of Laurentius Hispanus ad paria delicta mutua compensatione tollantur 
ad 3 Comp. 5.8.1 (X 5.16.6): supra xxxii. q. vi. Nichil iniquius [C.32 q.6 c.1], ff. soluto matrim. Viro 
atque uxore [D. 24.3.39], iuxta illud facinus quos inquiunt et longe equius omnem maliciam actori 
licere quam reo, ff. de doli excepti. Apud Celsum § Marcellus [D. 44.4.4.13]; see also Durantis, 
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conclusion that a husband could not blame his wife for committing adultery 
if he also committed a similar delict of adultery.397
If two parties committed similar crimes (crimina), their crimes were can-
celled out by way of mutual compensation,398 and if both parties acted fraudu-
lently (with dolus), dolus was compensated with dolus.399 The same rule applied 
when both parties acted culpably (with culpa). The respective negligence 
(culpa) of both parties in that case had to be equal. When they were unequal, 
no compensation could take place.400 The same considerations as made by the 
medieval Roman scholars can be recognised here: when one party acted with 
dolus and the other with culpa, no compensation could take place because 
dolus is more serious than culpa.401 One argued that the adultery of one party 
can be compensated by the adultery of the other party, in the same way culpa 
is compensated by culpa, and dolus by dolus.402 The question whether delicts 
could be compensated was also broadly discussed by Johannes Andreae.403 
Many cases were provided, but it is not necessary to discuss all of them. Several 
cases were already mentioned by earlier canonists and by medieval Roman 
legal scholars, such as the case of two partners in a partnership contract (D. 
4.3.36). Where two persons were guilty of dolus, they could not bring an action 
against one another on this ground; the dolus of both parties was compensated; 
similar delicts were compensated by way of mutual compensation. Also, when 
both parties acted with an equal degree of negligence, the negligence of both 
Speculum iudiciale, lib. III, partic. I, De criminibus in modum exceptionis propositis, § 1, nr. 2 and 
also the casus ad X 5.16.6. Note that compensation of delicts (delictorum compensatio), in which 
two different acts produce two different harmful consequences, differs from the main problem 
dealt with in this study. In cases of contributory negligence of the injured party, there are two 
different acts producing one consequence (the damage). In this case, the injured party acted 
wrongfully against himself; see also Van Nierop 1905, p. 16f.
397 See the following works in which one can also find other situations in which the 
husband cannot blame his wife for the adultery. See gloss mutua compensatione ad X 5.16.6; 
Sinibaldus Fliscus, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 1.
398 The man brought forward the adultery of the wife, and then the wife was permitted 
to bring forward the adultery of the man; in this way, both crimina were abolished by mutual 
compensation. See Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 2.25.8, nr. 7. Furthermore, one has 
to be aware that this process was a civil suit, not a criminal one. It is important to distinguish 
facts upon which exception and replication were brought up into more different facts or just one 
same fact. An exception could not be abolished by a replication in the first case, but only in the 
second, i.e. if these facts concerned the same effect, e.g. different adulteries of both partners with 
respect to the same marriage; see Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 2.25.8, nr. 19.
399 Sinibaldus Fliscus, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 2; see also Antonius a Butrio, 
Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 18.
400 See also J. Bertachinus, Repertorium, s.v. ad culpa (with references).
401 Sinibaldus Fliscus, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 4; see also additio d ad Nicolaus de 
Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6.
402 Henricus de Segusio, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 3. On this topic, see also Kéry 2006, p. 641.
403 See (quite extensively) Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 5 and nr. 7.
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parties was compensated.404 These rules applied when the claim of both par-
ties was directed at private interests. X 5.16.6 concerns a civil case directed at 
separation of bed and board, and in proceedings directed at private interests 
equal delicts were cancelled out by way of mutual compensation.405 The com-
pensation applies as to the separation of bed and board, not with regard to the 
imposement of a fine.406
A dissenting opinion can be found with Durantis in his Speculum, where he 
treated the same subject. If two persons called each other names, could they 
accuse each other of that in court? One commonly argued that this question 
should be answered in the negative, because an unlawful act turns aside an-
other unlawful act, and equal delicts were compensated by means of mutual 
compensation. However, Durantis was of a different opinion and stated that 
even if the unlawful acts were equal, both parties could go to court, since the 
unlawful acts would not be compensated but both rather remain existent (see 
D. 48.5.2.5). Besides, some – according to Durantis – argued that no compensa-
tion should take place when the first offender provoked the other to anger by 
words or act and the second offender did wrong to the first by words or act. In 
that case the second offender should not be condemned.407
3.3.5.2 Culpae compensatio
It is interesting to see whether or not the theory of culpae compensatio was 
applied by the canonists. As seen in the previous section, that was the case in 
marital cases. But what about other areas of the law?
In the decision of Pope Gregory IX408 in VI 1.21.1 and in the gloss of Johannes 
Andreae on this text, the plaintiff (the Church) had been at fault (culpa)409 
404 Johannes Andreae, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nrs. 5 and 7; also Antonius a Butrio, 
Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 9.
405 Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 5. No compensation – of dolus 
with dolus, or of a delict with a delict – could take place in a criminal suit. In a civil suit when 
both delicts concerned the same matter (as in X 5.16.6) a compensation could take place, but 
not if the delicts concerned different matters; see Nicolaus de Tudeschis, Commentaria, ad X 
5.16.6, nr. 8f. In the event someone is sued because of a legal fine, the delict of one party is not 
compensated by the delict of the other party. In that respect, D. 48.5.2.5 is relevant; it concerns 
a husband who attempted to prosecute his wife in a criminal case because of adultery. The wife 
argued that he acted as her pander. This did not bar him from bringing the accusation. In such a 
case the act of the husband rendered him liable but did not excuse the wife.
406 Sinibaldus Fliscus, Commentaria, ad X 5.16.6, nr. 5. See also Kéry 2006, p. 642, according 
to whom it is clear that the compensation did not concern the punishment of the crime as such, 
but only the damages or the obligations were compensated.
407 W. Durantis, Speculum, Pars I, De accusatore §1, nr. 11.
408 Pope Gregory IX (Ugolino dei Conti di Segni) held the pontificate from 1227 to 1241.
409 If the Church omitted revoking a judgment or contractus by means of a restitutio in 
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[legal fiction] and could not claim restitution (restitutio in integrum)410 for 
that reason anymore, unless the defendant acted intentionally (with dolus; 
namely, by false accusation or fraud); in that case dolus is considered to be 
more serious than culpa (with reference to the gloss tenebitur ad D. 9.2.9.4).411 
Consequently, the Church, after four years, could claim restitution, in spite of 
her contributory negligence.
Furthermore, as already mentioned by the Commentators, Dynus de Mugello 
ad VI 5.12.65, with regard to the question whether a compensation of delicts 
could take place, argued as follows. In a civil lawsuit, when both parties acted 
culpably (culpa) or intentionally (dolus), a compensation on both sides was 
possible412 regardless of whether they concerned a single event or different 
events. If one acted intentionally and the other person acted culpably in the 
same matter, compensation could not take place because dolus was considered 
to be more serious than culpa. If one party acted culpably in one case and the 
other with dolus in different matters, compensation could take place on the 
claims for an equal amount.413
 
But would this also apply in cases where one party committed a delict, but 
there was contributory negligence from the side of the defendant? An affirma-
tive answer can possibly be found in the Summa on the title De damno dato by 
Hostiensis – which part is very similar to the relevant parts of Azo’s Summa 
integrum (a judicial decree restored the condition of things which existed before the contract by 
which the Church suffered), and did not do so for a period of four years out of negligence, after 
that limitation period (from the time of injury) she was regarded as having acted culpably in not 
revoking the judgment of contractus.
410 In principle, ecclesiastical possessions could not be expropriated. If a priest, with 
the purpose of personal enrichment, sold some objects belonging to the Church, a restitutio 
in integrum could be given. In that case one assumed a legal fiction, namely, that the Church 
was in an identical position as a minor (X 1.41.1); see Wauters 2005, p. 229. On the Church as 
a minor, see also Helmholz 1996, p. 96f. Canon law has accepted the provisions of Roman law 
regarding restitutio in integrum in cases of minors and applied them to churches (see on the use 
of a restitutio in integrum on behalf of the Church X 1.41.1). Minors were protected with regard to 
the administration of property and the obligations which they can assume in reference to third 
parties. Minors cannot make any contracts burdensome to themselves, except under certain 
determined formalities, and with the required authorisation. If they suffered by such contracts 
by the terms of Roman law, during the four years after they reached majority of twenty-five years, 
they could obtain the restitutio in integrum. Churches were assimilated to minors, meaning that, 
in respect to burdensome contracts, they were subject to the same protective measures and 
enjoyed the same privileges as minors. See Boudinhon 1913, p. 331f.
411  Gloss commentum ad VI 1.21.1; see also Wieling 1970, p. 223, also with reference to gloss 
damnum ad VI 5.12.86 (see section 3.3.6).
412  On the question of when culpa can be compensated or when equal delicts can be 
nullified by way of compensation, see also Felinus Sandeus, Commentaria, ad X 2.25.8, e.g., fo. 
16r 2nd col.
413  Dynus de Mugello, Commentarius, ad VI 5.12.65.
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Codicis414  – who argued that in the case where damage was inflicted culpably 
and the injured party also acted culpably, no action could be brought against 
the wrongdoer because the culpa of the wrongdoer was compensated by the 
culpa of the injured party. The injured party could only bring an action if the 
wrongdoer acted with dolus, because in that situation no compensation takes 
place, as dolus was more serious than culpa. Therefore, in these cases (where 
the injured party acted culpably) only actions of the defendant with dolus 
could lead to liability.415
In various other cases, in general cases not dealing with the law of delict or 
in cases of delict in which both persons were laymen and in that case their 
conclusions were generally based on texts of Roman law, the doctrine of culpae 
compensatio of (Roman) law seems to be accepted and to be further refined 
by the canonists in their commentaries on several decretals.416 If both the 
tortfeasor and the injured party acted negligently, no action could be brought 
against the wrongdoer because the culpa of the wrongdoer was compensated 
by the culpa of the injured party. However, with regard to the question whether 
a cleric could be granted a higher ordination, this was different, because in 
that case culpa could never be compensated by culpa. The author of Animal 
referred to 1 Comp. 5.10.9 (X 5.12.8) and also stated that when the wrongdoer 
and the person who was killed both acted culpably, even if the culpability of 
the first was less serious, the cleric could never be promoted to a higher rank.417
3.3.6 The maxim of VI 5.12.86
Despite the fact that in canon law the problem of the scope of contributory 
negligence was discussed explicitly for the first time, the canonists did not seem 
to have pursued this approach. In later developments, questions of contribu-
414  Azo, Summa Codicis, III.35.8.
415  Hostiensis referred to the case of D. 9.2.9.4: the thrower was not held liable because the 
guilt was imputed to the slave who should not have crossed the field at such an inappropriate 
time, unless the thrower intentionally threw a spear at the slave, because playing a dangerous 
game implied culpa. Also the death of the slave in the case of D. 9.2.11pr. had to be imputed to the 
injured person because this person entrusted himself to the barber who put his chair in such a 
dangerous place. Neither the barber – unless the barber cut the throat of the slave intentionally – 
nor the thrower were held responsible; see Henricus de Segusio (Hostiensis), Summa. De damno 
dato. Quando locum habet hec actio, edn. 1537 (reprint 1962), fo. 266r.
416 X 5.16.6, the decision of Pope Gregory IX in VI 1.21.1, Dynus de Mugello ad VI 5.12.65 and 
by Hostiensis in his Summa on the title De damno dato.
417  Although this part of Animal does not refer to the problem of dispensation, it does 
refer to 1 Comp. 5.10.9 (X 5.12.8). As discussed above, the case of X 5.12.8 came to be regarded as 
a case concerning an irregularitas ex delicto. Following this line of thought, a dispensation could 
be granted by papal authority.
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tory negligence were usually solved with the help of D. 50.17.203, which, how-
ever slightly different but probably more precise, found its counterpart in the 
compilation of Pope Boniface VIII,418 i.e. the Liber Sextus (1298) in VI. 5.12.86.419
 
Idem. Reg. LXXXVI. Damnum, quod quis sua culpa sentit, sibi debet, non aliis, impu-
tare.420 The same [=Pope Bonifacius VIII]. Regula 86. One has to impute damage, 
which someone suffers due to one’s own negligence, to himself, not to others. 
Several examples of this maxim are provided by scholars such as Johannes 
Monachus Picardus (†1313), Dynus de Mugello and Johannes Andreae (1270–
1348) in their commentaries as well as by the Glossa Ordinaria on VI 5.12.86, 
which shows421 that the rule of VI 5.12.86 (just as the rule of D. 50.17.203) was 
used in a wide range of cases. The following picture appears.
Although the rule of VI 5.12.86 has its origin in fact in D. 50.17.203, Dynus de 
Mugello referred as general confirmation of this rule to some other Digest texts, 
namely, that of D. 46.8.22.4, D. 14.3.7.2 and D. 10.2.44.5.422 The (other) examples 
of the maxim of VI 5.12.86 are partly the same as those already mentioned by 
the Glossators and by the Commentators in their comments on D. 50.17.203;423 
apart from those, the following examples (of the maxim of VI 5.12.86) can be 
quoted.  A first example of the maxim is the case in which a person who lost 
his trial was not obliged to pay certain costs which took place after the litis 
contestatio to the victor, namely, those which the victor paid or had to pay due 
to his contumacy (disobedience to judicial order).424 Secondly, the already fre-
quently mentioned case of the tree pruner.425 Thirdly, the bailiff who paid un-
due interest and thus suffered damage because of his own negligence (culpa), 
and therefore he could not recover this interest from the debtor.426 Fourthly, 
the case in which a cleric was suspected of an enormous crime. He was in the 
presence of his bishop when the bishop gave sentence in accordance with the 
418  Pope Bonifacius VIII, born Benedetto Gaetani, held the pontificate from 1294–1304.
419 Lange 1955, p. 72f.; Luig 1969, p. 203.
420 Friedberg 1881, col. 1122.
421  See gloss damnum ad VI 5.12.86 and what has been written before the gloss: glo[ssa] 
seq[uens] dicit unde sumpta: et tota instat in exemplis.
422 Sometimes the damnum could be imputed to someone other than the wrongdoer 
(see D. 17.2.55) due to participation in the cause of the damage; in other cases this was not 
possible. In the first case D. 17.2.55 applies, in the second case VI 5.12.86; see Dynus de Mugello, 
Commentarius, ad VI 5.12.86.
423 See, e.g., Dynus de Mugello, Commentarius, ad VI 5.12.86.
424 W. Durantis, Speculum. De expen. § Nunc de expensis, uers. ‘ceterum’.
425 Johannes Andreae, Novella Commentaria, ad VI 5.12.86.
426 The question whether the bailiff could recover from the debtor the interest, paid to the 
creditor, is extensively dealt with by Johannes Andreae in his Novella Commentaria, fo. 14r and v.
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crime: life imprisonment. To evade this judgment and prison, he threw himself 
from his horse on the ground in front of his bishop and thereby was injured and 
died. His death had to be imputed to the cleric himself (C.23 q.4 c.38). Fifthly, 
the case in which a cleric to whom the prospect of receiving a prebend was 
given.427 One has to keep in mind that before there was a vacancy, a cleric was 
already appointed. Only when the person holding the prebend died leading to 
a vacancy, did it become necessary to decide whether or not he could be given 
the prebend. In this specific case, the cleric negligently did not claim it when 
he could have done so, and as a result of this the prebend went to someone else. 
This cleric could not claim from the recipient428 nor could he claim the next 
prebend which became vacant because he had to blame himself for his own 
negligence in that he had not claimed the first vacant prebend (VI 3.4.11).429
That the rule continued to be applied to a wider range of cases than those 
currently understood by contemporary scholars to fall under the scope of the 
problem of contributory negligence can also be seen in some examples from 
the early modern period. This will be shown in the following chapter. 
 In later canon law, it seems likely that a theoretical debate on contributory 
negligence, based on the principles mentioned above, did not occur.430
3.4 Short comparative remarks
3.4.1 Structure and purpose
The cases of contributory negligence in Roman and medieval law have been 
extensively discussed in this chapter and in the previous one. Little attention 
has been paid in the sources of law beyond the learned law as taught at uni-
versities and law schools. As some are remarkably interesting from a compara-
427 The right of someone presented a beneficium by a patron for a beneficium, but who is 
not yet confirmed (ius ad rem petendam, non in re). See Feenstra 1979, p. 15f. Apparently, it is a 
kind of right of expectation that can be placed somewhere between a right in rem and a personal 
right. See on this topic and on the concept of ius ad rem, among others, Landau 1971, p. 81ff.; 
Dondorp 1991, p. 285ff.; 1997, p. 553ff.
428 J. Monachus Picardus, Glossa aurea, ad VI 5.12.86.
429 On the question in VI 3.4.11 whether the cleric who forgot to make an effort to receive 
the first vacancy also limits the power of the executor (of the papal mandate), i.e. whether 
the cleric could apply for the next prebend or whether the (papal) gratia is thereby void, see 
Hitzbleck 2009, p. 68ff.; - Finally, the case of a purchaser of a piece of land who did not show up 
at the trial and lost the land due to eviction, this purchaser could not bring an action against the 
vendor (C. 8.44.8); in the Glossa Ordinaria Johannes Andreae even provided more examples of 
the rule of VI 5.12.86; see casus ad VI 5.12.86 and gloss damnum ad VI 5.12.86.
430 Luig 1969, p. 203f.
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tive point of view, they will  be discussed briefly in this section (3.4). First, a 
‘new’ scholion will be dealt with – a part of Byzantine law, an interpretation 
of the Corpus Iuris, unknown to western European medieval legal scholars. 
Thereafter, I deal with indigenous law. To begin, some examples are given – 
in a chronological manner – which also apply an all-or-nothing approach. 
Then, to conclude, some examples are given which give a different approach 
(a partition of damages).
3.4.2 Byzantine law
Around 1200, Hagiotheodoritès wrote a large ‘new’ scholion on the barber 
case.431 In contrast to the ‘old’ scholia mentioned in the previous chapter, this 
‘new’ scholion can provide some insight into the way the Byzantine lawyers 
interpreted this case positioned in their time. Hagiotheodoritès started to 
explain the decision of Ulpian. Two persons did something wrong, the barber 
and the person who was being shaved. According to Hagiotheodoritès’ record 
of Ulpian’s view, from a procedural perspective the person being shaved was in 
the weakest position (or better, his master): he had to be blamed himself and 
as a consequence (his master) could not obtain an actio against the barber. 
However, Hagiotheodoritès himself argues differently. According to him, 
the barber found himself in the weakest position in litigation and therefore is 
subject to an actio (not specified by Hagiotheodoritès) because of two reasons 
(the ball-player is not considered in the scholion).  Firstly, it would be unjust to 
harm the master (of the slave) and let him bear the loss, since he did nothing 
wrong and he was absolutely unaware of what happened. Secondly, and this 
is hypothetical reasoning, if the injured slave had been a free man, it would 
be more reasonable to prefer, between two evils, to prevent an even greater 
injustice, rather than to punish the lesser evil. If the barber was left unpun-
ished, he could have damaged other persons in the same way. It was important 
to deter the barber from this kind of conduct. Thus, a large number of people 
are protected against possible damage. This is the greater evil that has to be 
prevented.432 Apparently, Hagiotheodoritès is aware that hereby not the ideal 
431  See on this person Graves 1870, p. 324; Van der Wal & Lokin 1985, p. 100; Kazhdan 1991, 
p. 899; see, namely, BS 3104/28-3105/13 (scholion 41 ad B. 60.3.11); a translation of this scholion 
can be found in Lawson 1968, p. 180–183, Lawson & Markesinis 1982, II, p. 45; see also Lawson 
1968, p. 89; Ibbetson 2003, p. 506.
432 Hagiotheodoritès based his argumentation on a rule B. 2.3.200 (=D. 50.17.200): if 
one cannot make a choice without causing damage, the less unjust option should be chosen; 
according to Kunkel 1929, p. 179, the last part of Hagiotheodoritès is – at the core not unjustified, 
but severely exaggerated and yet extraordinarily characteristic for the intellectual world of the 
Byzantines.  Kunkel qualified the argument of public safety as ‘der Gedanke des Polizeistaats 
in der Zivilrechtspflege’. Remarkably, this scholion is the first text in which the failures of two 
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but the less unjust solution is achieved. Furthermore, it can be argued that 
Hagiotheodoritès was also aware of the doubtfulness of the level of justice 
of the all-or-nothing approach when one starts from fault on both sides.433 
However, his solution is still all-or-nothing, and Hagiotheodoritès, despite the 
contributory negligence of the slave, did not deny the liability of the barber.434 
3.4.3 Indigenous law
3.4.3.1 Examples following the all-or-nothing approach
In the laws of the western Goths there are also some provisions dealing with 
the role of the negligence of the injured party. Certain situations are men-
tioned in which the damage does not have to be ascribed to the wrongdoer but 
to the plaintiff ’s own negligence (culpa). These situations are the following. (1) 
If it were uncovered that a freeborn woman voluntarily committed adultery 
with a man, and if, afterwards, he should wish to marry her, he is permitted 
to do so. But if the man should be unwilling, the adultery should be imputed 
persons are explicitly discussed; see also Wollschläger 1976, p. 134. However, in the scholion 
there is more concern with prevention of future harm than with punishment of a wrongdoer. 
According to Lawson 1968, p. 182, Lawson & Markesinis 1982, II, p. 45, the two injustices do not 
seem to be assessed on their moral blameworthiness, but on their capacity to harm.
433 Looschelders 1999, p. 13.
434 The Klagspiegel (ca. 1400–1425) applied compensation of culpa in the case where both 
instances of negligence were equal in degree, and only the intentional wrongdoer was liable. In 
the same sense Knütel 2001, p. 365. The Klagspiegel, de actione legis aquilie, Blatt XCIXv, stated: 
‘Item unterweylen wurt nit clag uß unfleyß wann ein unfleyß  mit dem andern compensiert und 
vergleycht wurt/und auch wo uff ein teyl argerlist und dem andern teyl unfleyß ist/so überwiget 
argerlist den unfleyß/und darumb kompt underweylen allein argerlist in diser clage/und das ist 
darumb/wann der unfleyß ist deshalb enn der den schaden gelitten hat.’ Immediately after, the 
example of D. 9.2.9.4 follows, and in the next paragraph also the case of D. 9.2.11pr. With regard 
to D. 9.2.11pr. the Klagspiegel seems to have applied the same theory (in the event of contributory 
negligence, the wrongdoer is only liable if he acted intentionally) (Blatt XCIXv): ‘... es ist wed<er> 
der scherer/wed<er> der werffer/ noch der schlager schuldig/es sey dann solchs geschehe mit 
fleiß/ wann sollichs mag dem zů gezelt werden/ der sich so gar an ein sorglich oder schädlich 
statt dem scherer empfolhen hat’ (supplemention based on Brunnenmeister 1879, p. 172). See 
also Kiefer 1989, p. 4.
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to her own culpa, namely, that she willingly mingled in adultery.435 (2) If a 
person, after handing over an object to a slave without the knowledge of the 
slave’s master , and if this leads to the disappearance of this object, this has 
to be imputed to the negligence of that person.436 (3) If someone provokes 
an animal and the animal strikes or bites the provoker, the provoker has to 
impute the damage to his own negligence.437 However, although one can see a 
legal qualification of the act of the injured party in these examples, an explicit 
discussion of both acts of the parties in question is additionally made; an all-
or-nothing approach is still followed here. 
In the edict of the Lombard King Liutprand (†744), a case is described in which 
a man is drawing water from a well by means of a crane-like mechanism, and 
in manipulating this without due care (incaute) he knocks over and kills a man 
standing in the well. The wrongdoer is not held liable for homicide nor did he 
have to pay the full compositio, but only one-third, the other two-thirds being 
borne by the dead man (i.e. his heirs) because he should have been aware of 
   On the reception of these cases in the Klagspiegel, see Knütel 2001, p. 363ff. The 
dependency of these parts of the Klagspiegel on Digest fragments was probably brought 
to the attention of the author of the Klagspiegel by Roffredus’ De libellis iuris civilis (as to the 
arrangement, this work is directed after Johannes Bassianus’ Arbor actionum). Roffredus’ De 
libellis iuris civilis is in general the basis for the first treatise (the  work consists of two treatises, 
the first one is on civil law and the second one on criminal law and criminal procedure); see 
Stintzing 1959, p. 360ff. In addition, in the domain of the lex Aquilia, there are also ties with 
Durantis’ Speculum iudiciale recognisable; see Stintzing 1959, p. 399; Knütel 2001, p. 364.
435 See Lex Visigothorum III.4.8: Si ingenua mulier cuicumque se viro adulterio volens 
miscuisse detegitur, si eam ipse uxorem habere voluerit, habeat potestatem. Sin autem noluerit, sue 
inp.utet culpe, que se adulterio volens miscuisse cognoscitur (edn. Zeumer 1902, p. 150).
436 See Lex Visigothorum V.5.6: Quod nesciente domino servo fuerit conmendatum, si id 
perierit, nec dominus nec servus ullum damnum incurrant. Sue enim inputet culpe, qui servo alieno 
res suas conmendaverit domino nesciente. Si vero alicuius rei animal sit, et per fraudem pastorum 
diminutum repperiatur, hec reddere conpellatur. Similis et de commodatis forma servetur, si fraude 
aut malitia consumta aut dissipata noscuntur (edn. Zeumer 1902, p. 229).
437 See Lex Visigothorum VIII.4.18: Si quis vitiosum bobem aut canem vel alium animal 
contra se in ira concitaverit, quidquid passus fuerit, culpe eius, qui hoc pertulerit, oportet adscribi 
(edn. Zeumer 1902, p. 339). See on the just-mentioned legal provisions of the Leges Visigothorum 
also Jansen 2007, p. 658.; - On the development of the laws of the Goths, see Conrad 1962, p. 
56ff.; - Also Mayer-Maly 1976, p. 260, thinks that in Leges Visigothorum III.4.8 and VIII.4.18 the 
thought arises that the damage must be imputed to the injured party’s own culpa. Besides these 
two fragments, Mayer-Maly referred to the Codex Euricianus 283 (a slightly different text than 
that of Lex Visigothorum V.5.6), where he (also) finds the thought of a Verschulden gegen sich 
selbst. The text is about someone who entrusts his belongings to someone else’s slave, without 
knowledge of this by the slave’s master; if they are destroyed, he did not have a claim against 
the master (see also d’Ors 1960, p. 208). He is not regarded as having suffered damaged (nullum 
damnum incurrat); the damage is imputed to his own negligence. See Codex Euricianus 283: 
Quod nesciente domino servis fuerit commendatum, si id perierit, dominus servi nullum damnum 
incurrat. Suae enim inpotet culpae, qui servo alieno res suas commendaverit nesciente. Similis et 
de commodatis forma servetur (cited after Mayer-Maly 1976, p. 260). Already d’Ors 1960, p. 139, 
made the remark that ‘sue inputet culpe’ in Lex Visigothorum III.4.8, which calls to mind the 
similar Codex Euricianus 283 (‘recuerda la similar de’).
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the danger in that position.438 In this case, the contributory negligence of the 
injured party is taken into account (by way of an acceptance of risk) and is 
discounted in the compensation amount, while in medieval Roman law the 
all-or-nothing approach was still used. 
 
The Sachsenspiegel, a description of mainly Eastphalian law, was composed 
by Knight Eike von Repgau between 1225 and 1235.439 In the perspective of 
contributory negligence, Sachsenspiegel II. 48.2 is relevant: ‘If a man leaves his 
grain standing, once all others have taken theirs in, and it is eaten or trodden 
on, no one compensates him.’440 After bringing in the harvest, farmers let their 
cattle, which until that time grazed on closed plots, graze free. Whoever left 
his corn standing on the land in spite of the local custom could not complain 
when the animals ate or trampled it.441 In this case, the injured party caused 
the danger (Gefahrenquelle) and therefore there could be no liability for a 
third person, since the injured party could have prevented the damage by 
harvesting the corn on time.442 The thought behind the rule could have been 
an economic one: when someone harvests his grain too late, it diminishes the 
grain’s economic value. If one person leaves his grain in the field after all oth-
ers have harvested, that person in fact renounces his rights on this object.443 
Possibly, originally this could have been the reason behind the rule, rather 
than a legal reason. Nevertheless, one has to remark that in this case the con-
tributory negligence of the injured party led to a denial of his claim for com-
pensation444 and that also in this case an all-or-nothing approach is followed. 
According to the secondary literature, commentators on Sachsenspiegel II. 48 
438 Liutprandi Leges Anni XXI, cap. 136 (edn. Beyerle 1949, p. 302ff., with German translation); 
see Fried 1960, p. 152; also Conrad 1962, I, p. 163f.; Luig 1969, p. 196; cap. 136 gives the reason 
why the man is responsible himself for two-thirds of the damage: the man who died was not an 
animal, but rather had the reasonable sense which a man should have. He therefore had to see 
for himself at what place he found himself and what weight he had against himself.
439 Richter 2005, p. 119; on the Sachsenspiegel, see also Bellomo 1995, p. 109; Kannowski 
2005, p. 139ff.; Richter 2005, p. 119ff.
440 Translation by Dobozy 1999, p. 107; Aumann 1964, p. 32; Van Wassenaer 1971, p. 12.
441 See Aumann 1964, p. 33; also Van Wassenaer 1971, p. 12; - However, according to 
Aumann, the case did not concern the contributory negligence of the injured party because 
the principle of negligence (Verschuldensgrundsatz als Haftungsprinzip) did not occur until the 
beginning of the influence of Roman law.
442 Aumann 1964, p. 33; also Hammer 1885, p. 72f.; - In general, this can also be found 
in Nicolaus Wurms’ Blume von Magdeburg II.3.98: Schade, der einem von siner vorwarlosunge 
geschyt, darf er keinem scholt gebin (edn. Böhlau 1868). Carelessness (with care the damage could 
have been prevented) of the injured party apparently excluded negligence of a third party. On 
this sentence, see Hammer 1885, p. 72, and Aumann 1964, p. 33.
443 It could also have been the case that someone, after harvest, left some grain outside in 
the field. In that case the grain could be freely taken by persons who were strangers, fatherless or 
widowed (see also Deuteronomium 24: 19-22).
444 See also Kiefer 1989, p. 25.
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seem to have regarded this text as an expression of the thought of D. 50.17.203.445 
This view is indeed supported by Hieronymus Christoph Meckbach in his An-
merkungen on Sachsenspiegel II.48 in 1764: ‘... der nachläßige, der das Geträide 
allein im Felde stehen lassen, empfindet durch seine eigne Schuld den Schaden, 
welcher nicht dem Hirten, sondern dem nachläßigen zuzurechnen ist’.446
 
Another relevant source from German law before the reception of Roman 
law is a decision from ‘Ober-Ingelheimer Haderbuch’ from 23 February 1426. 
In this case, the contributory negligence of the injured party, which was the 
essential contribution to the occurrence of the damage, led to a total denial 
of compensation.447 In the events of this case, the plaintiff placed an oil jug in 
a risky place. The defendant accidentally knocked over the jug when he left 
the room. It is stated that the only person at fault was the plaintiff, although 
according to Ingelheim’s law an objectively harmful act (in this case knocking 
over a jug) made the wrongdoer liable.448
3.4.3.2 Examples including a partition of damages
As discussed before, in Roman and medieval ius commune, no division of dam-
age between parties was made (the all-or-nothing approach). However, this 
idea of division of damage can be found in cases in other old traditions, one 
of them being medieval Irish law, namely, the Bretha Étgid (ca. eighth century: 
‘Judgments Concerning Irresponsible Acts’). This text deals with the various 
circumstances that might surround a homicide or injury, especially those 
circumstances that make the actions of the wrongdoer more or less blame-
worthy.449 Relevant to this is a case regarding woodcutters (Bretha Étgid §30), 
especially the later medieval commentary on it. Appararently, a tree-feller cut 
a tree and the tree fell on a passer-by. The tree-feller was negligent, not having 
shouted a warning when the tree was about to fall. But the idlers also acted 
negligently in hanging around while the tree-feller was at work chopping down 
trees. Therefore, the compensation paid to them was halved.450 So, people who 
have no good reason to be present when accidents occurred only received half 
restitution, i.e. because of their ‘contributory negligence’. 
445 Luig 1969, p. 196.
446 H.C. Meckbach, Anmerkungen über den Sachsen-Spiegel, Anm. zu II. 48 (p. 528); 
according to Luig 1969, p. 196, the reference to D. 50.17.203 and VI 5.12.86 is unmistakable, 
although the Germanist Meckbach did not quote these texts, of course.
447 See also Luig 1969, p. 196; Kiefer 1989, p. 25 nt. 160, refers to this example mentioned by 
Luig as an example of preponderant contributory negligence.
448 Gudian 1968, p. 270; Luig 1969, p. 196.
449 McLeod 1999, p. 6ff.
450 ibid., p. 14.
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Some other cases are also relevant in this respect, although they may not 
exactly concern cases of contributory negligence. Firstly, Exodus 21:35 (later 
included in X 5.36.3) concerned the rule that if someone’s ox injured someone 
else’s ox causing its death, the owner had to sell the surviving ox and share 
the proceeds with the owner of the dead ox; also the dead animal was shared. 
Apparently, the owner of the dead ox received partial compensation.451 The 
ancient authors called this solution a judicium rusticorum, as such was the 
decision of Solomon in the case of the two mothers (1 Kings 3:16-28).452
It seems that such compensation was also allowed in an exceptional case in 
Old-Scandinavian law;453 namely, the Wendisch-Rügianische Landgebrauch, as 
summarised by Normann in 1531.454 In summary, if damage was caused by the 
injured party himself, because he let his animals come close to other animals, 
or to someone else’s stable, or if he put his belongings on the road where one 
would not expect them, and then damage was caused to animals or goods, the 
owners had to bear half the damages.455
3.5 Concluding remarks
In medieval Roman scholarship, the contributory negligence of the injured 
party seems to be regarded as reproachable misconduct that could be 
sanctioned by a refusal of a claim for compensation. Thus the contributory 
negligence of the injured party came to be considered a possible legal problem. 
Two starting points to solve the problem of contributory negligence in the 
451  Also Van Wassenaer 1971, p. 12, 171; according to Exodus 21:36, if it is known that the ox 
has been accustomed to gore in the past, and its owner has not kept it in, he shall repay ox for ox, 
and the dead beast shall be his. In the event the owner knew of the habit of goring, the owner 
had to pay full compensation.
452 Lebreton 1941, p. 5f.
453 Aumann 1964, p. 36; - In old French law, such a rule of division of damages was 
unknown; see Mazeaud-Tunc 1970, para. 1448ff., esp. 1450; Van Wassenaer 1971, p. 12. However, 
according to Mazeaud-Tunc 1970, para. 1455, the all-or-nothing approach of Roman law was not 
expressly incorporated by any author of old French law.
454 Matthäus von Normann, Wendisch-Rügianisches Landgebrauch (edn. Th. H. Gadebusch 
1777, p. 220), tit. 177 al. 4 and 5.
455 Aumann 1964, p. 36; Van Wassenaer 1971, p. 12; - Because Rügen, according to Aumann 1964, 
p. 36, ‘für langere Zeit der dänischen Krone zinspflichtig war, ist ein Einfluß des alten westnordischen 
Rechts nicht ganz ausgeschlossen’. Therefore, see also the Westnordische Obligationenrecht of Von 
Amira 1895, p. 411: ‘Beim Ausmass von Wergelden und andern Ersatzleistungen findet sich im 
norwegischen Recht wie im schwedischen die Frage berücksichtigt, ob der Geschädigte selbst seinen 
Schaden etwa mit verursacht hat. Trifft ihn die Mitschuld – ist er z. B. “selbst sein halber Todtschläger” 
(sjálfr halfr bane sinn) geworden, – so mindert sich die Ersatzschuld um seinen Kopftheil.’ Further 
reseach on this point unfortunately falls outside the scope of this study.
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medieval period were identified. The first starting point is the idea of culpae 
compensatio; the second is the rule laid down in D. 50.17.203.
The doctrine of culpae compensatio has its origin in medieval (Roman) 
scholarship. The Glossators took the respective negligence of both parties 
into account. They applied this doctrine to situations in which both parties 
acted with negligence of the same sort or were negligent to the same degree. 
It seems that the concept of culpae compensatio obtained an independent 
position next to the so-called compensatio delictorum. The doctrine of culpae 
compensatio was only formulated as a general theory by the Commentators, 
who explained it in a more encompassing way than the Glossators, taking into 
account also more procedural law aspects. 
The Gloss does not provide explicit proof whether or not the Glossators believed 
that culpae compensatio could only be applied to cases of contributory negligence 
in which both parties had been negligent to the same degree or whether it also 
applied to cases in which the degree of negligence was not identical. Therefore, 
all kinds of contributory negligence of the injured party, as long as they could 
be qualified as culpa, seem to have cancelled out liability. A comparison of the 
amounts of negligence, and the refinement in the sense that a small degree of 
contributory negligence would not lead to compensatio and thus to the depriva-
tion of the possibility to claim compensation for damages/fine, was probably 
made by the successors to the Glossators at the instigation of the canonists. 
Did the medieval Roman scholars use this doctrine of culpae compensatio to 
solve problems of contributory negligence in cases of damnum iniuria datum? 
D. 9.2.9.4 gave the glossator Johannes Bassianus reason to discuss the contribu-
tory negligence of the injured party. He formulated the view that the culpa of 
the wrongdoer could be compensated by culpa of the injured party.456 However, 
he argued that culpa nullifies culpa, but that culpa (of the injured party) does 
not nullify dolus. Azo gave the reason for this exception: an act done with dolus 
was considered to be more serious than an act done with culpa.457 These formu-
lations by the Glossators were quite abstract. It is not until the commentator 
Paulus de Castro that the consequences of such contributory negligence were 
made explicit. He was the first who explicitly applied these abstract rules to the 
case of D. 9.2.9.4. Although this application of the culpae compensatio theory 
was already  mentioned in the Gloss, it was not further elaborated.
456 Gloss quia non debuit ad D. 9.2.9.4 (see n. 60 above). Johannes Bassianus refers to D. 
16.2.10pr. and D. 24.3.39.
457 Gloss ad tenebitur with siglum az. (see n. 72 above): quia dolus culpa<e> praeponderat.
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Also the case of the barber is interesting as to the consequence of contributory 
negligence, since Placentinus seems to have considered the contributory neg-
ligence of the injured party as relative: he was negligent in a certain relation to 
another person. The phrase ‘de se queri debet’ should be seen as referring to the 
barber. Only if an action was brought against the barber could his negligence be 
compensated by that of the slave. According to Azo, the contributory negligence 
of the slave could possibly exclude liability of all the other actors in D. 9.2.11pr. 
In this way, Azo left the possibility open that the contributory negligence of the 
injured party could be opposed to the negligence of the deiector or the percus-
sor, and in that way cancel out their liability.
In medieval Roman scholarship, there were various opinions on the effects 
of contributory negligence. Firstly, one just took the behaviour of the injured 
party into consideration when determining the culpability of the wrongdoer’s 
act; in this approach, the behaviour of the injured party was therefore not 
really considered as contributory negligence. Secondly, the injured party 
was regarded as guilty of his own delict; the Glossators then made a parallel 
here with the compensation theory, both delicts and both culpable acts were 
compensated. Thirdly, it seems the fact that an injured party exposed himself 
to the danger that caused the injury led to a denial of compensation.
Some Commentators applied the theory of culpae compensatio in a general way 
to solve problems of contributory negligence  in the cases of damnum iniuria 
datum, especially Paulus de Castro. Furthermore, Fulgosius did not add much 
to this prevailing view when he stated that when both parties coincidentally 
acted culpably (culpa), and the culpability of the act of one party was more 
serious than the culpability of the act of the other party, this led to the total 
denial of damages. Fulgosius regarded dolus as a more serious form of culpa; in 
that way one has to regard his remark that liability would still be established if 
the culpability of the wrongdoer was more serious than the culpability of the 
injured party as: the first is dolus, the latter is culpa. Consequently, no maior 
culpa doctrine is applied here.458
Accursius linked D. 50.17.203 to the law of delicts in his gloss Quod quis ad D. 
50.17.203 by the allegation of D. 9.2.31. In this gloss, Accursius explained that 
an injured party’s own negligence prevented him from claiming damages from 
someone else. D. 50.17.203 could be read in the sense that it only concerned the 
negligence of the injured party; however, the Glossator understood that it not 
only concerned cases in which the wrongdoer’s act was not at all in discussion 
458 Fulgosius refers to D. 9.2.9.4.
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(because only the victim’s fault was discussed) but that it also concerned cases 
in which the wrongdoer’s fault was relevant as well. The rule of D. 50.17.203 is 
also discussed by the Commentators, and on its counterpart – VI 5.12.86 – by 
the canonists. It is rather strange that the examples of this maxim are all cases 
where there is only negligence on the side of the injured party, and not of 
contributory negligence, as Accursius opened the door for such an approach.
The canonists also embraced the theory of culpae compensatio, in various areas 
of law, generally in those areas not dealing with the law of delicts or in cases 
of the law of delict in which both persons were laymen. However, with regard 
to the question whether a cleric could be granted a higher ordination, this 
was different, according to the commentary of Animal on D.50 c.50, because 
in that case culpa could never be compensated by culpa. The author of the 
Animal also stated that when the wrongdoer and the person killed both acted 
culpably, even if the culpability of the first was less serious, the cleric could 
never be promoted to a higher rank. 
Two canonists explicitly commented on the position of the injured party. With 
regard to X 5.12.9, Bernardus Parmensis argued that the killing was due to the 
negligence (culpa) of the injured party (who threw the other on the ground). 
One has to keep in mind that the question in this case before the Pope was only 
whether the cleric did or did not act with negligence and whether the cleric could 
or could not be promoted (and if dispensation was necessary). The conclusion 
that due to the lack of a possibility to distribute the damages over both parties 
in case of contributory negligence (which was not at all at stake here) the jurists 
tended to attribute the ‘sole guilt’ to the party that acted with the highest degree 
of negligence can only be taken with care (analogous interpretation). 
Hostiensis argued that the other cleric should have been aware that wearing a 
knife attached to a belt was customary, and therefore he should have been careful. 
It seems that therefore the ‘contributory negligence’ led to the sole guilt on the 
side of the injured party. One could argue, as some modern scholars do, that the 
liability of the tortfeasor in question is cancelled out because of the preponderant 
contributory negligence of the injured party. Although the question of liability 
was not at all at stake in the legal case brought before the Pope if one looked at 
it from that modern perspective; the majority of the commentaries of the de-
cretalists I consulted do not follow such a theory. However, the just-mentioned 
comments of Bernardus Parmensis and Hostiensis, who were two influential 
persons, could indeed indicate that this theory was applied.
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In canon law for the first time in Western legal scholarship some texts 
can be found that support the idea that not a small but a considerable 
contributory negligence on the part of the injured party is relevant from a 
legal perspective.459 However, because of the applied all-or-nothing approach, 
a preponderant negligence of the injured party led to a total denial of guilt 
on the side of the wrongdoer. From the text in the Animal est substantia it 
becomes clear that with regard to the question whether a cleric could be 
granted a higher ordination contributory negligence on the side of the injured 
person did not release the wrongdoer from his responsibility, not even when 
his contributory negligence was considerable. Therefore, one has to conclude 
that the importance of canon law, as to contributory negligence, lies in the 
fact that the problem of the scope of contributory negligence was explicitly 
discussed for the first time (in the Continental Romano-canonical tradition).
Finally, there are some new concepts, or two new ways of dealing with 
contributory negligence, that arose in this period. According to canon law, 
the contributory negligence of the injured party could be seen as contribu-
tory causation (co-causation), and therefore in such cases one had to decide 
whether the wrongdoer or the injured party had produced the causa proxima. 
It seems that the causational contributions of both parties were compared. 
The Socini seem to have applied this theory in their Consilia and they refined 
it in the sense that when a cause (causa) in its entirety had no relation with 
the consequence, it was not possible to conclude that the cause produced the 
consequence anyway. The second concept is that of culpa admixta used to 
give a legal qualification to the act of the injured party in situations in which 
a hurtful action by a wrongdoer is mixed with a fault of the injured party. The 
Socini and Cravetta used the term culpa admixta on the side of the injured 
party in such a way that it led to the exclusion of liability of the wrongdoer. 
Later, e.g. in the work of Cyriacus, another concept was developed out of the 
same perception, i.e. the concept of a culpa communis.
In the tradition of ius commune, one, for the first time, finds a qualification 
of the act of the injured party, and an explicit discussion of both acts of the 
parties in question can be observed. A similar approach is also already present 
in some other medieval sources outside the Romano-canonical tradition, 
where an all-or-nothing approach was also still followed. Neither in Roman 
nor in medieval ius commune was a division of damages made. However, in 
some cases in other old traditions, this idea of the division of damages can be 
459 In the same sense Luig 1969, p. 201.
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found. The contributory negligence of the injured party could lead to partial 
compensation, the so-called solution of a judicium rusticorum, or to a reduc-
tion of damages to the amount of two-thirds. These options were only applied 
in the Continental tradition (and also in English law) in the early modern 
period (see next chapter).
 chapter four
EARLY MODERN PERIOD
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Subject and purpose of this chapter
Between 1400 and 1600 the Renaissance brought about a renewed study of 
Antiquity. In the sixteenth century, a new stream studying Roman law arose, 
the school of legal humanism.1 Besides this new stream, called mos gallicus, 
the old stream (mos italicus) continued with a new, mainly practice-oriented 
legal science routine developed in Germany in the seventeenth century. This 
movement was named after the book Usus modernus Pandectarum by the 
German jurist Samuel Stryk (1640–1710). The Corpus Iuris was considered 
a starting point and, unlike the humanists, the jurists who followed this 
approach did not try to reconstruct classical Roman law. To be able to assess 
the contributions of the humanists and the jurists of the usus modernus, it is 
necessary to outline the main differences between the mos gallicus and the mos 
italicus. This will be done in section 4.2.1. That these different approaches led 
to different answers as to the question of the role of contributory negligence 
of the injured party will be made clear throughout this chapter. In trying to 
reconstruct the original context, theoretically the humanists should have 
come toconclusions similar to those that we reached in chapter two.2 Now did 
they, or did they nevertheless preserve more medieval interpretations than 
one might expect? This part of my study contains new research into many 
humanistic authors and literary sources. Apart from the more frequently read 
1 See Troje 1977, p. 615; - However, as Van den Bergh 1994, p. 49, noted, humanism as a critical-
philological movement in Italy had already started in the 13th century. Humanism penetrated 
legal science relatively late, in the first quarter of the sixteenth century (according to Osler, 
‘Legal Humanism’, available online at: www.rg.mpg.de (last consulted on 1 May 2013), the first 
manifestations of legal humanism can already be detected in Italy in the 15th century). However, 
this view is slightly distorted because in Italy humanists were already working on text-critical 
problems of the Corpus Iuris in the 14th century.
2 Although the Institutes of Gaius were not available to them.
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authors such as Gerard Noodt, there are many others, unfortunately forgotten 
– but not here. However, some of these lesser-known jurists contributed greatly 
to the argument on contributory negligence in the context of damnum iniuria 
datum, as will be shown below.
The main issue in this chapter is (again) the role of the conduct of the 
injured party. In medieval Roman scholarship, opinions on the effects of con-
tributory negligence varied. It was only in the tradition of ius commune that the 
question of how to qualify the act of the injured party in legal terms became 
for the first time explicitly discussed; also for the first time a discussion of the 
acts of both parties concerned can be observed. The medieval approach of 
ius commune to the problem of contributory negligence was an approach of 
all-or-nothing. The question remains whether and if so to what extent this all-
or-nothing idea was received into the early modern period. If it was received, 
a similar question arises with regard to the important doctrine of culpae com-
pensatio. Some slight traces of the maior culpa theory have been found, but the 
majority of medieval jurists did not yet apply this theory. Did this change in 
the early modern period? The central question in this chapter will be why the 
injured party had no right to claim compensation. New questions arise in this 
period, such as: does the (extent of the) role/effect of contributory negligence 
of the injured party depend on the kind of damage compensation asked for by 
the injured party? Is a reduction of the compensation amount at all possible?
As stated in the previous chapter, in other legal traditions outside the 
Romano-canonical tradition, especially (medieval) indigenous law, the idea 
of division of damages can be found in some cases. Contributory negligence 
of the injured party could lead to partial compensation, namely of half the 
damage, the so-called solution of judicium rusticorum,3 or to a reduction by 
two-thirds of damages to be paid. Can traces of this approach be found in the 
early modern period? To this issue the views of the jurists of the Dutch Elegant 
School, in which an elegante Richtung and a usus modernus Richtung can be 
distinguished,4are important. The latter dealt with so-called Roman–Dutch 
law, and being a mixture of Roman law and indigenous law, this subject has 
to be discussed separately in this study.5 This topic is especially interesting as 
3 Bouman 1855, p. 41, argued that such decision was normally given by arbitrators 
(scheidsmannen) when the case was not clear or when however clear, both parties had been 
negligent. See also art. 4, §4 of title 10, book 6 of the Jus provinciale Ducatus Prussiae, stating that 
if two animals fight and one kills the other and it is not clear which of the animals provoked the 
other animal, the master of the one that survived should pay half of the damages of the animal 
that was killed to its master. See also S. Stryk, Specimen usus moderni pandectarum, lib. IX tit. I 
§IX (edn. 1730, p. 137f.).
4 Osler 1996, p. 350.
5 More on this topic later; a provincial variant, Roman-Frisian law, will also be discussed, as 
far as relevant to this study.
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some collision cases relevant to the question of contributory negligence have 
been found. In particular, the great influence of local law will be shown, which 
led to a different solution to the cases of contributory negligence from the one 
provided in (medieval) Roman law.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be considered as ‘The Age of 
the Law of Reason’. In these two hundred years of legal ‘science’, legislation and 
legal practice in most parts of Europe experienced the direct impact of natural 
law.6 The scholars of natural law schools did not feel bound to the Roman legal 
tradition as their predecessors had. Rather, they respected the Roman sources 
for their texts because in their opinion they incorporated notions of natural 
law and provided material for the construction of a new system of natural 
jurisprudence.7 Did their approach lead to a different solution in the event of 
contributory negligence from the solution offered by Roman law?
4.1.2 Method and structure
In this chapter, the most important jurists of the early modern period will be 
discussed. In this context, their commentaries on the sedes materiae were 
taken as a starting point. The search for and the selection of jurists was not only 
made based on secondary literature, but also on editions of the Corpus Iuris, 
references in the Notae by Schulting-Smallenburg (Dutch Elegant School)8 and 
manuals such as Simon van Leeuwen’s Censura forensis (Roman-Dutch law), 
Stryk’s Specimen usus moderni pandectarum, Glück’s Ausführliche Erläuter-
ungen and Coing’s Europäische Privatrecht. While some works were available 
online, the majority still had to be consulted in various libraries in the Neth-
erlands and abroad. This chapter contains a discussion of their interpretation 
of sources of the ius commune (Roman and canon law) and  their references to 
and discussion on literary sources, case law and legal doctrine as well as early 
modern legislation.9
First, a short overview of the mos gallicus and the mos italicus and their 
main differences will be provided in section 4.2.1. Thereafter, the interpretation 
by the most influential humanists of the sedes materiae will be discussed as far 
6  Wieacker & Weir 1995, p. 199; - On natural law, in particular in Germany, see Koschaker 
1966, p. 245ff.
7  Parisi 1992, p. 136; on the school of natural law see, e.g., Fassò, II, 1968, p. 113ff.
8  This chapter will contain a discussion of the authors and works mentioned in Schulting’s 
notae and the observations (animadversiones) of the editor of the work of Smallenburg, among 
which no sharp distinction will be made. This edition is primarily used as a bridge to relevant 
literature found in Dutch (Elegant) scholarship. 
9  With regard to the literary sources, the English translations, as they appear in the Loeb 
Classical Library, are used as auxiliary resource, also where no explicit reference is made.
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as relevant to the development of contributory negligence.10 The relevant work 
of the jurists of the elegante Richtung of the Dutch Elegant School is discussed 
together with the work of the humanists in the second section (4.2.2–4.2.5). 
After a general introduction to the period of the Reception of Roman law (4.3), 
the usus modernus Richtung of the Dutch Elegant School will be discussed in 
the fourth section of this chapter (4.4) on Dutch-Roman law. In that section 
the work of the Roman-Dutch jurists will be covered, especially with regard 
to the so-called collision cases. Other contributions of jurists of the Usus 
modernus Pandectarum, not being Dutch jurists, will be discussed in the fifth 
section (4.5). The Spanish legal doctrine of the sixteenth century was partially 
covered in the previous chapter, as far as the continuation of the canon law 
theory as to homicide is concerned. Although a comprehensive study on these 
scholars has not been possible, the relevant scholars will be discussed in this 
final part on natural law as far as necessary for a good understanding of the 
seventeenth-century natural law jurists. A treatment of their contributions 
will also be included in that section (4.6). My conclusions will follow in the 
last section (4.7).
4.2 Legal humanism
4.2.1 Introduction to the mos gallicus and mos italicus
The Italian scholar Andreas Alciatus (1492–1550) founded the school of legal 
humanism in Bourges (France). The University of Bourges became the centre 
of study of Roman law, called the mos gallicus.11 The mos gallicus reached its full 
development in France in the sixteenth century and then spread throughout 
Europe.12 The humanists did not agree with the way Justinian’s compilation 
(and also Canon law) was studied in their time. Three tendencies can be dis-
tinguished in the works of these French humanists. Some jurists discredited 
Justinian’s compilation, for example François Hotman, whose critical judg-
10  The (text critical) discussion of the legal humanists on the original text of the Digest 
fragments has already been discussed in the second chapter; - However, the invention of printing 
did not lead to the mass production of identical texts (the invention of book printing occurred 
in the middle of the 15th century). For economic reasons, many editions of the same work were 
printed; see Osler, ‘Legal Humanism’. As Osler rightly stated with regard to research on legal 
humanists, an accurate analytical bibliography of all the editions of their works has to be made 
first. Changes made by the author in successive editions will thus become clear. Unfortunately, 
this was not possible within the scope of this research; where possible, however, I checked more 
than one edition of the same work.
11  Feenstra & Waal 1975, p. 16.
12  Riccobono 1935, p. 382.
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ments were openly aimed at promoting French national law. Other jurists 
argued that fragments of the Corpus Iuris could be rearranged in a new and 
rational order. They tried to accomplish this by reformulating fragments and 
arguments in fragments of the Corpus Iuris.13 Others studied and used Justin-
ian’s compilation only as an important witness of Roman and Greek Antiquity. 
Some of them continued to study the Corpus Iuris in depth, but with a shift in 
method and within the context of other sources.14 
The humanists’ enthusiasm for classical Antiquity encouraged a search of 
original classical sources (now also Greek ones) to acquire a more precise 
understanding of the texts of the Corpus Iuris. The medieval Glossators and 
Commentators considered the Corpus Iuris a consistent code. They abstracted 
from the historical and social context of the sources and used texts from the 
Corpus Iuris as if they were contemporary sources of law to be interpreted or 
commented upon;15 in that sense they used it in the way Justinian intended, 
namely, as one consistent legislation with universal validity.16 In that 
perspective, both activities addressed diverse purposes, and had different 
merits. They were also divided territorially (the centres were located in 
Bologna – in the medieval period – resp. Bourges – in the sixteenth century). 
The Glossators can be considered the true interpreters of the compilation 
of Justinian, though they paid little attention to historical elements; on the 
other hand, the humanists inaugurated a new era of the study of old sources, 
animated as they were by a vivifying idea as regards all Antiquity.17
While the medieval Glossators and Commentators tried to find a workable 
rule for a contemporary problem, and this pragmatic application by the 
Bartolists (mos italicus) continued in the sixteenth century, the humanists put 
their emphasis instead on the revelation of the original meaning of Justinian’s 
texts in their classical context.18 They analysed them in a more historical 
perspective, with the aid of philosophical and literary sources from classical 
Antiquity. This new legal humanist approach, the so-called mos gallicus, 
continued to be applied and even flourished again in the Netherlands with 
later scholars of the Dutch Elegant School.19 The humanists were the first who 
13  Bellomo 1995, p. 206f.
14  ibid., p. 208.
15  Parisi 1992, p. 123.
16  Nevertheless, they did break Justinian’s prohibition against writing any commentaries 
on the text as well as the prohibition against using sigla; therefore, one must say that they were 
not totally obedient to Justinian.
17  See Riccobono 1935, p. 396f.
18  Stein 2002, p. 76f.
19  With regard to the principles and methods, the humanistic direction was diametrically 
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attempted to reconstruct classical Roman law, and so they saw a need for a 
critical reconstruction of Roman texts. The humanist approach considered 
classical texts as valuable tools for a better understanding of the ancient world. 
This led to a more attentive reading of the classics and to an appraisal of the 
legal sources of Roman law, by philological and historical analysis.20
As the work of the humanists of the mos gallicus (and of the Dutch Elegant 
School) can be qualified as academically created legal rules with the purpose 
of gathering knowledge, their work differed from the work of the jurists of the 
mos italicus. The work of the latter was oriented to legal practice, law-creating; 
what they produced was law made by practising lawyers. This method of in-
terpretation and education was followed in Italy since the Gloss. The jurists of 
the mos italicus took Justinianic law as a starting point, to which they applied 
their harmonising interpretation. The German legal practitioners put an even 
stronger emphasis on local law with their usus modernus pandectarum, and 
therefore the results were more regional.21
In general, it can be said that the humanists studied the Corpus Iuris because 
it could teach them about ancient society, but they renounced applying its 
legal rules to contemporary problems.22 This led to three main activities. (1) To 
reconstruct classical Roman law, the medieval glosses and commentaries had 
to be removed from the text of the Digest. (2) This restoration did not take place 
based on the littera Bononiensis from the eleventh century,23 but on the littera 
Florentina from the sixth century, which  possibly contained the text Justinian 
had sent to Pope Vigilius. The humanists criticised the littera Bononiensis.24 
Starting with Poliziano, humanistic philologists produced various text editions, 
opposed to that of the Commentators, as mos gallicus is opposite to mos italicus, see also 
Koschaker 1966, p. 109; for a discussion of the different methods of interpretation of the Corpus 
Iuris, see Riccobono 1935; Astuti 1937, esp. p. 27f.
20 Parisi 1994, p. 332f.; see also Coing 1977, p. 30; Osler, ‘Legal Humanism’; - These philological 
studies of Roman law contained the study of a civilisation and culture that belonged to Roman 
society and was therefore a study of a civilisation and culture that no longer took part in the 
society of the 16th century.
21  Koschaker 1966, p. 246. 17th-century lawyers-practitioners in distinct areas in today’s 
Germany aimed at a synthesis of the received Roman law and the local legal institutions, and 
therefore worked in the same way as the Italian Commentators; see Koschaker 1966, p. 101.
22  Furthermore, on legal humanism and legal education, and the interaction between the 
humanists and the jurists, see, e.g., Hewett 2010, p. 73f.
23 According to Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 228, the text of the littera Bononiensis seems 
to have received a more or less established form towards the middle of the 13th century, but a 
final and authoritative recensio has never been established. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not 
correct to talk about the Vulgate Digest.
24 See Van den Bergh 1994, p. 51ff., who discussed five main criticisms of the humanists on 
the medieval jurists. Summarising, it included a return to the sources (ad fontes), the fact that the 
humanists did read Greek (Graeca leguntur), an attack on the traditional authorities, a reform of 
legal eduction and the deficiency of the traditional systematics.
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e.g. Torelli (see also chapter two). 3. As stated above, the humanists attempted 
to reconstruct classical Roman law (by way of interpolation criticism and 
palingenesis25). They tried to ‘deconstruct’ the Corpus Iuris to get to the original 
sources. Through textual criticism the humanists attempted to cleanse the text 
of scribal errors and also to retrieve elements that, considered of no interest 
at the time, had been omitted in the Middle Ages.26
To conclude this short introduction on mos gallicus and mos italicus, it can be 
argued that the approach of the humanists was focussed on classical Roman 
law, as was part of chapter two of this study. As I have shown in chapter two, 
in classical Roman law an all-or-nothing approach was followed in delictual 
liability cases and no division of damages was possible between wrongdoer 
and injured party. Furthermore, D. 50.17.203 originated in the law of legacies 
and should be interpreted palingetically in this context. One would expect 
the same results in the various treatments of the humanists. This is not totally 
the case as will be shown below, as they were also influenced by medieval 
doctrine. Another question is whether the humanists contributed to the 
development of the thinking on contributory negligence. As to the mos italicus, 
on the other hand, one would expect such development. But the humanists 
were also familiar with the Gloss and with Bartolus (et al.), and they were 
well acquainted with legal practice in areas where Roman law was received. 
This makes the picture more interesting but also more complex. The central 
question I will answer in the following sections is whether the humanists 
were nevertheless tempted to express themselves on the consequences of 
contributory negligence of the injured party as to the extent of the claim for 
damages.
4.2.2 Humanistic thoughts based on the rule of D. 50.17.203
In this section, I will study whether my main conclusions on classical Roman 
law in chapter two differ from the classical (i.e. pre-Justinianic) context pro-
vided by the humanists. It will be shown that the humanists did not go so far as 
my main conclusions. The humanists kept in mind legal practice. Furthermore, 
one has to keep in mind that Gaius’ Institutiones were not available to the hu-
manists, that they did not have an extensive Palingenesia such as Lenel made 
25 The humanists sought to detect the interpolations of Tribonian and to reconstruct 
Roman law based on the littera Florentina, and attempted to make the reconstruction by 
palingenesis. As noted before, the humanists recognised that the littera Florentina was older and 
closer to the original (Digest) than the littera Bononiensis.
26 See Osler, ‘Legal Humanism’.
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and they did not fully carry through the close connection between rhetoric, 
on the one hand, and law (and politics), on the other. 
The humanists lectured on the two final titles of the Digests (D. 50.16 and 
D. 50.17), which texts they regarded as a sort of summary of legal thinking.27 As 
to the comments on D. 50.17.203, three different aspects were discussed by the 
humanists and the scholars of the Dutch Elegant School as to the importance 
of contributory negligence: (1) the origin of D. 50.17.203, (2) the meaning of 
this text and (3) examples of the effect of the rule contained in D. 50.17.203. 
I will show that the humanists used the same examples as the medieval 
lawyers when explaining the rule of D. 50.17.203. This ius commune applica-
tion shows that the humanists were of two minds about the way they worked 
with the Roman law texts. In addition, the humanists tried to reconstruct the 
original classical context of D. 50.17.203. This aspect is the only new (and re-
ally humanistic) aspect:28 such a reconstruction had not been made before in 
(legal) history. 
4.2.2.1 The origin of D. 50.1 7.203
In their attempt to reconstruct the contextual origin of D. 50.17.203, some 
humanists used palingenesis to put D. 50.17.203 back into its original context. 
However, they came to a conclusion different from the views of Aumann and 
Wollschläger, which were both plausible (see chapter two). The examples of 
the rule of D. 50.17.203 given by the humanists show that the prevailing view 
was that D. 50.17.203 concerned a situation in which the damage is due to the 
negligence of the injured party. This is in accord with the conclusion result-
ing from the presumable original context of D. 50.17.203 (law of legacies). 
What is new is the view of Petrus Faber (1540–1600) and Johannes de Sande 
(1568–1638), who for the first time considered the possibility of a partial 
compensation.29 This is remarkable, as this approach is not purely humanistic. 
There was no reason whatsoever to consider such a partial compensation in 
27  Van den Bergh 1994, p. 53.
28 According to Wieling 1970, p. 223f., the French humanists do not seem to have gone any 
further than the replies of the classical jurists in the Corpus Iuris with regard to the question 
of contributory negligence. Wieling referred to Charles Dumoulin’s (Molinaeus) Tractatus de eo 
quod interest, edn. 1612, nr. 64 col. 809 [=859]. I found another part of Molinaeus which is also 
relevant: in Tractatus contractum et usurarum, q. 56, nr. 399 (edn. 1612, col. 1434), Molinaeus 
mentioned a seller who stipulated a right of repurchase of a piece of land, thus enabling the 
seller to repurchase his property at any time so that he would not lose the fruit harvest, unless 
he was negligent (i.e. he repurchased the field too late, that is to say, after the fruit had been 
harvested and sold). In that case he had to blame himself for this damage (cf. D. 50.17.203).
29 Faber and De Sande did not theorise any further on this topic. Extending this view would 
have meant the abandonment of the all-or-nothing approach; such abandonment was, however, 
not yet accepted. 
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classical Roman law, due to the all-or-nothing approach. This will be more 
extensively discussed below.
As to the origin of D. 50.17.203, the Dutch humanist Jacobus Raevardus 
(1535–1568) tried to put D. 50.17.203 back into its original context, i.e. the 
law of legacies (palingenesis, namely, with D. 29.2.77). This is a different 
palingenetical connection than the one taken by modern scholars (such as 
Lenel) which I followed (see chapter two). Apparently the case concerned a 
testamentary heir, who also would have been an heir ab intestato. If this heir ac-
cepted the inheritance based on a will which also included disadvantages, the 
heir was not considered to have suffered any damage (based on D. 50.17.203), 
because he had the possibility to reject one or both of these ways of receiving 
an inheritance.30 Furthermore, he could have asked for a period of time in 
order to consider accepting or rejecting the inheritance (see also D. 28.8.5).31 
The view of Raevardus has found no supporters among twentieth-century 
scholars; only D. 29.2.77 stems from the same origin as D. 50.17.203, while the 
other texts referred to Raevardus – Inst. 2.22.2 & D. 28.8.5 – do not; the former 
text, however, does not contain the word damnum. Nevertheless, as stated in 
chapter two, there must have been a case concerning a legacy for which Pom-
ponius found it necessary to define or interpret the legal term damnum more 
closely, as D. 50.17.203 indicates that there was an explicit reason to interpret 
this word in the original (classical) context.
Also Hugo Donellus (1527–1591)32 considered the origin of the text to be a 
case of damage or loss of legacies. Donellus, too, applied palingenesis to this 
text.33 Three possible situations can be distinguished for the application 
of D. 50.17.203. In the first situation a usufruct was granted as a  legacy. 
Subsequently the heir deprived the legatee of enjoying the usufruct (D. 
43.16.9.1). Accordingly, the usufruct came to an end by the lapse of time and 
the heir’s ownership was again unencumbered. According to Paul at the end 
of D. 43.16.9.1, the heir/owner was compelled to restore the situation, viz. by 
granting the usufruct for a second time. The loss resulting from this act had 
30 Raevardus referred to Inst. 2.22.2; this text, however, is part of Justinian law but not 
of classical Roman law. Although Raevardus had no access to Gaius’ Institutes, he must have 
thought that some classical Roman law survived in this text of Justinian. However, after 
comparing the relevant part in the Institutiones of Gaius and Justinian, the conclusion must be 
taken that the relevant part – as described below in the main text – was not already present in 
the correspondent text in Gaius’ Institutiones.
31  Raevardus, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203.
32  On Donellus, see in particular Eyssell 1860; Holhöfer 1982, p. 157ff.; Ahsmann 1990, p. 
49ff.; Feenstra 1991, p. 231ff.; Pfister 2007, p. 256ff.
33 See H. Donellus, Commentarii, ad D. 50.17.203.
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to be imputed to himself. Based on a palingenetical link with D. 50.17.155pr., 
Donellus came to the conclusion that negligence of one party implied that 
the resulting loss had to be imputed to himself and not to the other party.34
In the second situation, described  in D. 23.3.66, the usufruct of a plot of 
land, which was not owned by the husband’s bride, was granted by the  owner 
of the land, a third party, as a dowry. In the event of a divorce, this dowry had 
to be returned to the wife. However, this would be a problem, as a usufruct 
cannot be transferred by the usufructuary to anyone but the owner of the bare 
property rights. If it is assigned to an extraneous person (someone who has 
no ownership), i.e. the wife in this case, that person acquires nothing, and the 
usufruct reverts to the owner of the property. If the usufructuary nevertheless 
made such an assignment (i.e. to an extraneous person), the loss of the usufruct 
(it ceased to exist) had to be imputed to his own fault. The damage or loss 
was imputed to the negligence of the person who rescinded the usufruct by 
assigning it. Donellus drew this conclusion by palingenetically linking D. 
23.6.66 to D. 50.17.203.35
In the third situation the legatee repudiated a legacy containing a usufruct. 
The rule of D. 50.17.203 applies, unless the following situation occurs. Suppose 
the legacy containing a usufruct was bequeathed under a (suspensive) con-
dition, or a condition as to time, and the legatee coincidentally rejected the 
usufruct before that condition was fulfilled. According to D. 31.45.1, a legacy 
bequeathed under a condition cannot be rejected before the condition is 
fulfilled or the set period of time has elapsed, since before that moment the 
legacy does not belong to the legatee. Therefore, the legatee did not suffer any 
damage. According to Donellus, D. 31.45.1 has to be connected to D. 50.17.203 
because both texts (palingenetically) originate from Pomponius’ commentary 
in his eighth book on Quintus Mucius.36
34 According to Donellus, this conclusion had to be drawn from the text of D. 50.17.155pr., 
which was connected to D. 43.16.9.1 as both originated from Paul’s commentary in book 65 Ad 
edictum.
35 Both texts originated from Pomponius’ commentary in his eighth book on Quintus 
Mucius; H. Donellus, Commentarii, ad D. 50.17.203.
36 In addition, according to Donellus the same applies in the case of an inheritance. An heir 
who rejected an inheritance before a certain period of time, set as a condition, had elapsed, or 
before a set (suspensive) condition was fulfilled, could not claim damages, because he did not 
suffer any damage due to his own negligence (see also D. 50.17.174.1). Additionally, an example 
can be mentioned of a slave who was set free by testament under a (suspensive) condition, and 
subsequently the slave did not comply with the condition. As a result, the slave would not be set 
free, either never or for a rather long period. See H. Donellus, Commentarii, ad D. 50.17.203. 
early modern period 199
4.2.2.2 According to the humanists, did D. 50.17.203 really concern contributory 
negligence in classical Roman law?
The prevailing interpretation of the rule of D. 50.17.203 among the humanists 
was that if someone suffered damage due to his own negligence, no compensa-
tion for the damage could be claimed from the wrongdoer. The injured party 
himself had to suffer the damage if it was caused by his own negligence.37
A minority interpreted the rule of D. 50.17.203 differently: specifically, 
Petrus Faber38 and Johannes de Sande. They argued that the person who gave 
the causa (or occasio) that produced the damage through his own culpa (or 
negligentia) could not partially or totally claim compensation for the damage 
from someone else. This view is important because it would at least demon-
strate they contemplated a diminution of damages, meaning an abandonment 
of the all-or-nothing approach.39 Unfortunately, no continuation seems to 
have been given to this observation by themselves or by other humanists. The 
same can be said about Donellus (and Gothofredus), who treated the text of D. 
50.17.203 under the heading of ‘de damni communione’ (common participation 
in damage).40 Apparently, Donellus really considered this text to include the 
situation we now call contributory negligence. The central question to him was 
whether an injured party that contributed to the realisation of the damage and 
suffered damage because of his own negligence could partially or totally claim 
damages from the wrongdoer, to the extent the damage had resulted from the 
actions of the injured party, actions taken at the injured party’s own risk. This 
is all the more important since Donellus was possibly the first scholar who 
dogmatically formulated the main problem in general terms. Donellus argued 
that in the event an act was considered to be undertaken at a person’s own 
risk, any damage could not be claimed from the other party involved, because 
in such case the person was not considered to have suffered damage (see D. 
50.17.203).41 Furthermore, from D. 50.17.155pr. and D. 50.17.173.2. in connection 
37  See, e.g., E. Bronchorst, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203. 
38 P. Faber, Commentarius ad D. 50.17.203: Qui in causa ipse est ut damnum sentiat, eum non 
intelligi damnum sentire Pomponius hoc loco refert: quod eo arbitror pertinere, ut scilicet intendere 
non possit quo magis ei damnum hoc ab alio vel in totum, vel ex parte sarciatur. …; J. de Sande, 
Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203: Docet h[oc] l[ege] Pomponius quod is non intelligitur damnum 
sentire, qui damno sua culpa aut negligentia causam vel occasionem dedit, itaque is agere non 
potest, ut ei damnum ab alio in totum, vel ex parte sarciatur  ….
39 Also Luig 1969, p. 206, nt. 94.
40 Wieling 1970, p. 223f., referred to the commentary of Gothofredus on D. 50.17.203. 
He meant the commentary of Jacobus Gothofredus, a jurist born just a couple of years before 
Donellus died; Gothofredus’ commentary on D. 50.17.203, however, is exactly the same as 
Donellus’; therefore in this specific case I only referred to Donellus’ commentary.
41  See H. Donellus, Commentarii, ad D. 50.17.203.
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with D. 50.17.203, the general rule can be established that in such case any act 
had to be to the detriment of the actor himself, not to the other party.42 Donellus 
mentioned two consequences of the rule of D. 50.17.203. Firstly, the risk had 
to rest with the person by whose negligence the damage was caused, e.g. the 
purchaser for whom the vendor had made a stipulatio duplae as a guarantee 
against eviction. However, if the purchaser/promisee lost possession through 
his own fault, he had no right to bring an action either under a stipulation 
for double selling prices or on the contract for purchase against the vendor 
(D. 21.2.29.1). Secondly, the person who suffered damage because of his own 
negligence could not claim anything from the other person of a community; 
e.g. when one of the co-heirs makes a payment under a heritable stipulation 
in consequence of his own act, he cannot reclaim anything from his co-heir 
(D. 10.2.44.5). Donellus mentioned various examples of the application of the 
rule of D. 50.17.203 in different areas of law, among which an example with 
a reference to the lex Aquilia.43 These examples show the application of the 
rule that when someone suffered damage because of his own negligence, and 
only this injured party suffered damage because of his act, no liability could 
be imposed upon the wrongdoer, because the damage to the injured party was 
not considered claimable.44
4.2.2.3 Examples of the application of D. 50.17.203
In this section I will give a short overview of the cases mentioned as examples 
of D. 50.17.203. However, from the fact that they originated from different 
contexts, and from the fact that they were written by various different Roman 
jurists, one can conclude that the research of the humanists was not that 
palingenetical. They supported the idea expressed by D. 50.17.203 in various 
examples from the Digest. Most of these had already been mentioned by 
medieval scholars (see the previous chapter on the ius commune). The cases 
frequently mentioned by various humanists and scholars of the Dutch Elegant 
School are: the case of the procurator (D. 3.3.46.5), the buyer who was evicted 
(D. 21.2.29.1 and D. 21.2.55pr.),45 the guarantor (D. 17.1.29),46 the victor47, the 
42  This connection is not at all self-evident, as this connection was not present in classical 
Roman law. Donellus can maybe present it as logical but it is not, as the texts were written by 
different Roman jurists: Paul (D. 50.17.155pr. and D. 50.17.173.2) vs. Pomponius (D. 50.17.203); H. 
Donellus, Commentarii, ad D. 50.17.203. Similarly, G. Majansius, Commentarius ad D. 50.17.203, nr. I.
43 See some examples mentioned by Donellus in his commentary on D. 50.17.203.
44 Donellus, Commentarii, ad D. 50.17.203.
45 See E. Bronchorst, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203.  
46 ibid.
47  See W. Durantis, Speculum, De expensis § Nunc de expensis.
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promise of financial security against losses,48 a partner (socius) who performed 
a delict of furtum or iniuria (D. 17.2.52.18), 49 the creditor who lost a case against 
his debtor through his own negligence 50 the jointly owned slave (D. 9.4.9 and 
D. 9.4.17pr.) and the co-heirs (D. 10.2.44.5).51 An additional example is given by 
J.J. Wissenbach (1607–1665)52 who stated that someone who lost an object as 
a consequence of usucaption could not file a complaint, since the loss had to 
be imputed to this person’s negligentia and careless inactivity for not having 
searched better to find his object for a certain period of time nor for having 
tried to claim it back by vindication (D. 41.3.1).53
Also cases of delictual liability based on the lex Aquilia were mentioned. If 
someone suffered damage due to his own negligence, based on the lex Aquilia 
no compensation of the damage could be claimed, and this was apparently 
considered an example of the application of D. 50.17.203 (e.g. in D. 9.2.7.4 
and D. 9.2.52).54 Also the case of the shopkeeper (D. 9.2.52.1) is frequently 
mentioned as an example of the rule of D. 50.17.20355 (the case of the shop-
keeper will be shortly recapitulated in the next subsection). Additionally, Faber 
mentioned the Aquilian cases of the slave lying in ambush. If he was killed by 
the person he was trying to attack, his master could not bring an action under 
the lex Aquilia, because of the slave’s negligence, attacking the other first (see 
D. 9.2.4pr.). Furthermore, no action could be brought in the case of D. 9.2.9.4, 
because the slave himself was to be blamed for having crossed the field of the 
javelin throwers at an inappropriate time. The same applied in the case of the 
barber (D. 9.2.11pr.), because the slave entrusted himself to a barber shaving 
in such a dangerous place.56 
48 This example was mentioned by the Renaissance lawyer H. Cagnolus (1491–1551) in his 
Commentarii, ad D. 50.17.204 (=203), nr. 5.
49  See I. Cuiacius, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203, also on the partner who paid a poena 
because of a delict of furtum or iniuria. Besides, Cuiacius also provided the commentary of 
Bulgarus on D. 50.17.203 (see the previous chapter) that was, however, wrongly attributed to 
Martinus; - According to Faber, the poena follows the wrongdoer and the poena should be where 
the offence is. Therefore, the crime (maleficium) had to be imputed to the actor and not to his 
partners. This is an application of the rule that someone who suffered damage because of his own 
negligence was not considered to have suffered damage; see A. Faber, Rationalia, ad D. 17.2.52.18.
50 See A. Augustinus, Explanationes, ad D. 50.17.203.
51  Mentioned among various other examples by G. Majansius, Commentarius ad D. 
50.17.203, nr. II.
52  On Wissenbach, see Van den Bergh 2002, p. 215ff.
53 J. Wissenbach, In extremum pandectarum titulum, de diversis regulis iuris antiqui, 
exercitationes cathedrariae, ad D. 50.17.203.
54 See J. de Sande, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203.
55 See, e.g., E. Bronchorst, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203.
56 P. Faber, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203; - These examples mentioned in the main text 
are repeated by Wissenbach; see J. Wissenbach, In extremum pandectarum titulum, de diversis 
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Some sales cases will be discussed now, as they – at least in the treatises of 
the humanists – seem relevant for contributory negligence. In these cases the 
rule of D. 50.17.203 appears to have been applied, though the rule was not 
explicitly mentioned. As will be shown below, these cases, however, do not 
really concern contributory negligence, but rather damages caused by the sole 
negligence of the injured party.
 The first relevant sales case is C. 8.44(45).8, in which apparently the vendor 
gave a promise to pay double the amount of the purchase price in the event 
of eviction (a stipulatio duplae). According to C. 8.44(45).8, the purchaser of 
land (fundus), if evicted, in principle had no right to bring an action whether 
under a stipulation or for double the selling price, or on the contract for pur-
chase whether against the vendor or his sureties. This would be different had 
he previously57 notified the vendor (or his heir) of the suit for eviction. In 
his commentary to this text, Donellus stated that in the event of eviction the 
vendor was not liable if the eviction took place as a result of the negligence 
of the purchaser or by an unjust judgment rendered against him.58 Donellus 
discussed various sorts of contributory negligence of the purchaser, e.g. in 
the case of the purchaser who unintentionally lost the object due to his own 
fault. Instead of bringing an action against the new possessor, which required 
relatively easier evidence, i.e. the burden of proof was less difficult (e.g. the 
actio Publiciana), and despite the fact the vendor advised him to bring that 
action,59 he preferred to bring an action for which the burden of proof was 
more difficult (e.g. the rei vindicatio). Such an act (in bad faith) would only be 
to his detriment, and so the purchaser would not be granted any right to bring 
an action under a stipulation against the vendor.60
The second case in which the question of contributory negligence was men-
tioned, namely by Cuiacius (1522–1590),61 was the case of C. 8.44.9. Apparently 
in that case a controversy was raised by someone who claimed to be entitled 
to the land, sold and conveyed. If the purchaser was evicted by the dominus, 
regulis iuris antiqui, exercitationes cathedrariae, ad D 50.17.203; see P. Faber, Commentarius ad D. 
50.17.203, p. 773ff. in edn. of 1618; Faber mentioned various examples of the rule of D. 50.17.203 – 
which are not discussed any further here – among which the cases of the lex Aquilia (D. 9.2.52.1, 
D. 9.2.9.4-D. 9.2.11pr.).
57  Apparently, when it became clear to the purchaser that he might be evicted from his 
property, he had to inform the vendor (before the actual eviction). In this way the vendor was 
enabled to defend himself against the claims of third parties.
58 H. Donellus, Commentarium ad C. 8.45.8, esp. nr. 2ff.
59 See also D. 21.2.66pr.
60 See H. Donellus, Commentarium ad C. 8.45.8, nr. 4.
61  On Cuiacius see, e.g., Declareuil 1925, p. 848f.; Astuti 1937, p. 29 (and the literature 
mentioned there).
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the purchaser could recover damages from the vendor (or his heir) (quanti 
tua interest). The expenses he incurred to improve the property purchased 
could be included in the claim. So C. 8.44.9 provides the purchaser with a 
claim against the vendor for the compensation of expenses. This seems to 
be in contrast with D. 19.1.45.1. In this text, someone sold a vacant lot that 
belonged to a third person and the purchaser built upon it. Subsequently, the 
owner of the property recovered his lot. According to D. 19.1.45.1, the owner 
who brought an action in order to recover his property could be barred by an 
exception on the grounds of bad faith, unless he was willing to pay the build-
ing costs.The vendor was not liable for those expenses. However, anyone who 
knowingly sold property belonging to a third person was liable. According to 
Cuiacius, the rule of C. 8.44.9 has to be understood as follows: the purchaser 
could claim the price and the costs of the lawsuit from the person he bought 
the land from by actio empti. He could not claim the improvement costs if it 
was possible to acquire these from the evictor (apparently by means of a lien, 
i.e. a right of retention). If the purchaser did not do so, he had to bear the loss62 
and could not claim these expenses from the vendor since the loss was due to 
his own negligence. However, if the vendor acted with bad faith (mala fide), a 
claim by the evicted purchaser for damages as well as for expenses incurred 
for improvement to the property was possible.63
4.2.2.4 Preliminary conclusion
Some humanists held the view that  D. 50.17.203 dealt with common par-
ticipation in the total damage, i.e. with situations in which both parties acted 
negligently. This view was influenced by the medieval approach. Most appli-
cations and the examples of the rule of D. 50.17.203 are mainly the same as in 
medieval Roman scholarship. In addition to this, the humanists applied the 
rule of D. 50.17.203 also explicitly to the relevant sedes materiae I discussed in 
the previous chapters: D. 9.2.52.1, D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr. This approach is not 
purely humanistic, on the contrary. In fact, it will be made explicit in the next 
subsections that the latter cases concern cases of ‘contributory negligence’ of 
the injured party, i.e. cases in which the injured party acted negligently. I will 
now turn to this topic of contributory negligence in cases of Aquilian liability.
62  Although this seems like an application of D. 50.17.203, no direct reference is made to 
this rule; also in the Glossa Ordinaria, no reference is made to D. 50.17.203.
63 I. Cuiacius, Comment. ad C. 8.44.9; see also Wieling 1970, p. 223f., esp. p. 224 where he 
concluded that ‘Auch Cuiacius verschmäht also die von ihm so oft bekämpften mittelalterlichen 
Methoden nicht, hier den Schluß von der Entscheidung auf den Sachverhalt. Sachlich ergibt sich 
nichts Neues.’
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4.2.3 New insights as regards D. 9.2.52.1
4.2.3.1 The case of D. 9.2.52.1 as an example of self-defence 
Two interpretations of D. 9.2.52.1 which appear from humanistic writings 
will be discussed now: in the first interpretation D. 9.2.52.1 is considered an 
example of self-defence; and in the second interpretation the text is explained 
by making a comparison with (the writings of) Quintilian (an example of 
compensation of unlawful acts [invicem iniuriae compensatio]). Remarkably, 
this comparison differs from the one defended in the second chapter of this 
study. I will make clear that both interpretations, as mentioned above, in fact 
are not really humanistic, but are influenced by the Bartolistic approach of 
the medieval scholars.
The case of D. 9.2.52.1 was used by various humanists to develop their views 
on self-defence. Alexander ab Alexandro (1461–1523)64 already argued that if 
the shopkeeper had been hit by a weapon hidden in a wooden stick (dolon), he 
would be permitted to hit the passer-by with his sword.65 In addition, François 
Hotman (1524–1590) argued that someone who had not been able to defend 
himself in a way other than by inflicting damage did not act negligently: all 
provisions (in the Corpus Iuris) permit using violence against violence. How-
ever, it is only permissible to hit somebody in a case of personal attack and 
solely for the purpose of self-defence, and not for revenge.66 
According to D. 9.2.52.1, the party who was first hit by a whip and then hit 
the instigator of the fight in the following quarrel, knocking out an eye of the 
instigator, did not act with negligence. Antonius Faber (1557–1624) concluded 
that after all in a quarrel all negligence was often ascribed to the instigator of 
the fight, as in D. 11.3.10.67 According to Faber, to the prejudice of the instiga-
tor (unless the contrary was proven), it was presumed that all actions of the 
person subject to the attack had taken place in self-defence, provided these 
were performed immediately after the attack (and not after a period of time). 
64 Alexander ab Alexandro (Neapolitanus) was a ‘civilian and polite scholar’ born in 
Naples. He studied and practised law, first in Naples and afterwards in Rome. On Alexander ab 
Alexandro, see Enfield 1799, p. 172. 
65 Alexander ab Alexandro, Genialium dierum libri sex, Caput XV.
66 F. Hotman, Opera, ad Inst. 4.3, edn. 1599,  col. 744.
67  Although these texts can be connected, due to overlap in content, this should not be 
allowed according to purely humanistic thought: D. 11.3.10 is from Paul, who lived at a later time 
than Alfenus.
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Furthermore, it was not necessary to wait until the aggressor actually inflicted 
his first blow.68 
Later, the Dutch jurist Johannes Voet asked to what extent self-defence 
justifies wounding or killing a person. According to Voet, the provisions of 
the Corpus Iuris approve of a moderate defence of property. It was unlawful, 
however, to kill or wound a thief when the he stole without using violence.69 
In conclusion, these scholars’ elaborations on self-defence led to the same 
conclusion as drawn by the medieval Roman scholars, but are not truly human-
istic in the sense that they return to the interpretation of D. 9.2.52.1 according 
to classical Roman law. The same applies to the aforementioned connection 
of D. 9.2.52.1 with D. 50.17.203 (see, e.g., Bronckhorst, Noodt and Majansius), 
which is not justified by the palingenetical context.
4.2.3.2 The connection with D. 50.17.203
Already Everard van Bronckhorst (1554–1627) observed that the case of the 
shopkeeper is frequently mentioned as an example of the rule of D. 50.17.203. 
In D. 9.2.52.1, Alfenus considered the shopkeeper not liable for having knocked 
out an eye of the passer-by, as the damage was not considered to be inflicted 
with iniuria, because the thief inflicted the first blow. The thief could not ob-
tain an actio legis Aquiliae, since he suffered damage (he lost his eye) due to his 
own negligence by stealing the lantern and by hitting the shopkeeper with a 
whip and/or a dagger. In other words, two reasons are given which constitute 
contributory negligence: firstly, he stole a lantern from the shopkeeper, and, 
secondly, after this theft, when the shopkeeper claimed his lantern back, he 
struck the shopkeeper with a whip or a dagger hidden in a wooden stick.70
68 A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.52.1, who, besides D. 11.3.10, also referred to D. 
9.1.1.11 and D. 43.16.3.9. The same remark as in the previous footnote has to be made here, as the 
latter two Digest texts were not written by Alfenus, but by Ulpian.
69 See J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 9.2 nr. 22 (edn. 1778, p. 434).
70  E. Bronchorst, Commentarius, ad D. 50.17.203.
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4.2.3.3 Compensation of unlawful acts
Also Gerard Noodt (1647–1725)71 interpreted D. 9.2.52.1 as a case in which the 
shopkeeper acted lawfully (iure), as he acted in self-defence, and even though 
the eye of the passer-by was knocked out, according to Noodt the injury would 
be forgiven by human nature. This is most particularly the case here, where 
the damage was due to the negligence of the injured party, who was therefore 
not considered to have suffered any claimable damage, according to the rule 
of D. 50.17.203.72 This application is not humanistic – since these two texts 
originate from a different palingenetical origin and since these texts are writen 
by different Roman jurists in different periods (the first century BC vs. the 
second century AD) – but rather a continuation of the Bartolistic tradition. 
Also the next part of Noodt’s treatment can be characterised as such. Accord-
ing to Noodt, if the shopkeeper acted intentionally because he wanted to get 
the lantern back from the passer-by by force and started a fight using violence, 
the damage would be considered as inflicted with iniuria. The shopkeeper 
was not allowed to cause damage out of revenge or to kill the unarmed thief 
of the small lantern; he should not even hit or wound the thief. But he had the 
right to retain the lantern or claim it back, to grab the thief and hold him. If he 
was hit by the thief, the shopkeeper could also defend himself in any possible 
way, and if he was (physically) in danger, he would have no duty to prevent 
the thief from being harmed. If he intentionally or accidentally knocked out 
an eye of the thief while defending himself after having quarrelled in order 
to get the lantern back, both parties acted negligently. Based on Quintilianus’ 
Declamatio (Maior) XIII.11,73 Noodt claimed that when a delict was on both 
71  G. Noodt is regarded as one of the leading figures of the Dutch Elegant School; on Noodt, 
see, e.g., Van den Bergh 1987, p. 135ff.; 1988; 2002, p. 193ff.; Hewett 2010,  p. 120ff.; Noodt generally 
followed the method of legal humanism; unlike more orthodox jurists such as Huber and Van 
Bijnkershoek, he did not hesitate to emend the littera Florentina; see Hallebeek 2009, p. 235; also 
Van den Bergh 1988, p. 119f.; - Usually humanists only emended passages in the textus receptus 
that were corrupt or incomprehensible, the so-called loci difficiliores; see Van den Bergh 1988, p. 
115; - In Noodt’s writing and teaching both the philology of legal humanism and the rationalism 
of natural law played an important role; see also Luig 1990, p. 204f.; 1999, p. 103; Van den Bergh 
1988, p. 124ff., esp. p. 132; on the method of Noodt (methodus Noodtiana), see Van den Bergh 1988, 
p. 133ff.; - There were rationalistic tendencies in his interpretation of the texts of the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis; reason also induced him to consider Roman law primarily as the product of a certain 
social and historical context; see Hallebeek 2009, p. 236 (a short list of the literature on G. Noodt 
is also included).
72  G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. XIX, edn. 1767, p. 143.
73  Quintilianus’ Declamatio (Maior) XIII.11 (edn. Burmann 1720, p. 284f.): At enim adversus 
inferentem damnum justa ultio fuit. Dicam nunc, quam iniqua fit invicem injuriae compensatio, 
quamque non solum legi adversa, sed etiam paci. Barbarorum mos est populorum, quos procul 
omnis juris humani societate summotos proxima bellvis natura efferavit. Nos ideo magistratus 
legesque a majoribus nostris accepimus, ne sui quisque doloris vindex sit, et assiduae scelerum 
causae se refellant, si ultio crimen imitabitur. Damnum accepisti. Erat lex, forum, iudex: nisi si vox 
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sides, a compensation of unlawfulness took place.74 This comparison would 
seem humanistic, as Noodt quoted a rhetorical passage from Antiquity, but 
in fact is not. The idea of compensation of unlawfulness is of medieval origin 
and is influenced by the Bartolistic (medieval) approach rather than based on 
a thorough comparison with and knowledge of rhetorical figures. Nevertheless 
the same approach can be found with the Spaniard Gregorio Mayáns y Siscar 
(Gregorius Majansius; 1699–1781),75 who argued that if the shopkeeper acted 
in revenge, i.e. if he started a fight just to get back his lantern, both persons 
acted unlawfully (in the case of D. 9.2.52.1). Majansius concluded with a com-
parison with the same fragment from Quintilian, and stated that when both 
acted unlawfully, a compensation of unlawful acts (iniuria) could take place.76
4.2.4 New insights as regards the case of the javelin throwers
4.2.4.1 The link between D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.10
In the second chapter of this study, I defended the view that there was no direct 
relation between D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.10 in classical Roman law (although 
one has to admit that Ulpian and Paul were contemporaries). The compilors 
created such a direct relation by the word ‘nam’. Ideally, the humanists should 
have come to the same conclusion. Now, did they? As will be shown below, 
they did not; humanists used D. 9.2.1077 to interpret the text of D. 9.2.9.4. In 
principle, one could state that this is defensable as both texts originated from 
the third century AD. Still, the texts were written by different jurists. Only a 
few humanists were critical in this respect (see below).78 D. 9.2.10 reads as 
jure vindicari pudet. At mehercle jam ad arma mittimur, et instituitur perniciosa nocendi contentio, 
et in vicem legis ira succedit. …
74  G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. XIX, edn. 1767,  p. 143.
75  Majansius did not belong to the Dutch Elegant School; however, his work was obviously 
seen as important, since it had been included in the edition of Schulting-Smallenburg. On 
Majansius, see, e.g., Alvadaro 2004, p. 589ff.
76  G. Majansius, Commentarius ad D. 50.17.203. Interesting is also a remark of Majansius 
that if the shopkeeper asked for the lantern back, but the thief was not willing to do so, the 
shopkeeper should reclaim his lantern by means of the magistrate (in court?). I have not found 
this remark in other sources. 
77  With regard to D. 9.2.10, an alternative reading is provided by Brenkman (1681–1736), 
who stated that the littera vulgata contained ‘ludus’. In Ms. Torino BN, E.I.4, fo. 139v, lusus was 
indeed changed by a later corrector into ludus, as also ludum into lusum in D. 9.2.9.4. However, 
Brenkman also questioned the reading lusus because of the fact that this reading was not 
followed in D. 9.2.9.4. See H. Brenkman, Apparatus ad D. 9.2, note lusus (*) ad D. 9.2.10 (edn. Van 
den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 263). On H. Brenkman, see Stolte 1987, p. 150ff.; Van den Bergh 2002, p. 
169ff.; Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 227ff., esp. 230ff., and on the vulgate readings in Brenkman’s 
Apparatus, see Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 243ff.
78  For example, A. Schulting-N. Smallenburg added that the phrase ‘but nevertheless, if 
anyone intentionally casts a javelin at him, he will be liable under the Lex Aquilia’ ought to be 
connected to D. 9.2.11pr.
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follows: Nam lusus quoque noxius in culpa est. Based on D. 9.2.10, a distinction 
had to be made between games that were harmful and games that were lawful, 
a distinction already present with Cicero.79
Already in the work of the German humanist Ulrich Zasius (1461–1535) it be-
comes clear that the case of D. 9.2.9.4 was seen as an example of a situation in 
which both wrongdoer and injured party acted negligently. Zasius apparently 
saw a connection with D. 9.2.10, as he stated that the javelin thrower acted 
negligently, because participation in a harmful game was to be regarded as 
culpable behaviour. The behaviour of the injured party could also be consid-
ered negligent for having undertaken such a dangerous crossing (over the field 
of the javelin throwers). In this situation, in which both acted negligently, the 
actio legis Aquiliae would not be applicable.80
The French philologist and jurist Desiderius Heraldus (Didier Herault; 
1579–1649) stated that Roman law provisions concern public games and com-
petitions, but not games played in private. The exercise field in D. 9.2.9.4 was 
a public place, designated for exercise such as javelin throwing. If someone 
crossed this field as the slave did in D. 9.2.9.4, he had to blame himself for this 
act. The outcome would be different if the field was not designated for such 
exercises. If someone crossed that field and was hit, the thrower would not 
remain unpunished. The reason for this was that participating in a harmful 
game was also seen as an act of negligence (culpa) (see D. 9.2.10). Heraldus 
tried to reconstruct the original order: D. 9.2.10 had to be connected to the 
first sentence of D. 9.2.9.4.81 However, this is in contrast to the palingenetic 
origins of these two texts; the connection of D. 9.2.9.4 to D. 9.2.10 is not of 
classical origin, but Justinianic. Also from the fact that D. 9.2.10 starts with 
‘nam’ it appears that the compilers brought these two fragments (D. 9.2.9.4 
and D. 9.2.10) together. With regard to the content, the texts of D. 9.2.9.4 and 
79  See Cicero, De officiis, I.103f.; - Later, in the Basilica, ‘ludus noxius’ changed into ἐπιβλαβὲς 
παίγνιον (damnosum ludicrum; a harmful game); see H. Brenkman, Apparatus ad D. 9.2, note 
noxius (a) ad D. 9.2.10 (edn. Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 263).
80 However, if the javelin thrower aimed at the passer-by intentionally (with dolus), his 
behaviour could not be excused by the negligent behaviour of the injured party.
81  Also the 18th-century Utrecht professor Jacobus Voorda (1698–1768) argued in his 
Electorum liber singularis (1749), cap. 5, p. 59, that the ratio in D. 9.2.10 ought to belong to the 
first sentence of D. 9.2.9.4, and not to the second sentence (the slave crossed the field at an 
inappropriate place, etc.). This view is incorporated by P.I. de Fremery’s Dissertatio de rationibus 
veterum jurisconsultorum (1801), in cap. 1 §10 p. 37f. De Fremery (1776–1862) also referred to G. 
Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII and Pothier, Ad legem Aquiliam, XX. The latter 
brought the text of D. 9.2.10 into connection with the first part of D. 9.2.9.4 (Sed si per lusum 
jaculantibus servus fuerit occisus, Aquiliae locus est) – a place where it was not permitted to play 
– not with the second part (Sed si quum alii…).
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D. 9.2.10 could connect to each other, but no such connection can be made 
with the inscriptiones of these texts. The argument of Heraldus, that the Digest 
consists of various kinds of definitions and decisions of classical jurists, that 
therefore the fragments in the Digest cannot always be put very accurately in 
the right order, and that therefore some fragments might not have been con-
nected to the closest fragments, but to earlier ones – is not sound.82 The other 
example Heraldus gave, namely, of D. 5.2.5 and D. 5.2.3, is more plausible as the 
inscriptiones of these texts, indeed, point at the same palingenetical context/
origin. However, no such thing can be said about D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.10, as the 
latter texts are written by different Roman jurists. 
The Spanish legal humanist Ioannes Suárez de Mendoza (†1681) tried to 
explain the distinction drawn in D. 9.2.9.4. The thrower would be held liable 
if the javelin was thrown somewhere else other than on the Marsfield or at 
a place designated for javelin throwing. The reason is that such a game was 
considered noxius and therefore participating in it was considered as acting 
with culpa (reference to D. 9.2.10).83 That throwing javelins was considered 
dangerous also becomes clear from some examples of hunting cases men-
tioned in classical literature.84
Also Noodt discussed the case of the javelin thrower in his Ad legem Aquiliam 
liber singularis.85 The criterion of the place apparently was more relevant than 
the criterion of the person, since a soldier who threw javelins at an unusual 
place was not entitled to do so (sine iure). According to Noodt, the throwing 
of javelins was dangerous for others and a harmful game always led to guilt (in 
case of accidents) and was seen as unlawful (iniuria). Noodt referred to Paul 
in D. 9.2.10, whose statement fits well into the preceding text in the Digest, D. 
9.2.9.4, and is logically connected to it.86 However, this connection is contrary 
to classical Roman law (as D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.10 palingenetically come from 
different origins). The logical connection is indeed true from the perspective 
of the compilors; to reconstruct classical Roman law, one has to undo this 
82  D. Heraldus, Observationes ad Jus Atticum et Romanum, V.6, nr. 11.
83  J. Suarez, Commentarius ad legem Aquiliam, lib. I. cap. II  sectio VII, nr. 6f.
84 See J. Suarez, Commentarius ad legem Aquiliam, lib. I. cap. II  sectio VII, nr. 8f., who 
referred to Ovidius, Metamorphoses, VII.841, Herodotos, < Ἱστορίαι >, I [esp. I.43, EvD], Valerius 
Maximus, <Facta et dicta memorabilia,> I.7 ext. 4.
85  Although Van den Bergh 1988, p. 174, argued that Noodt’s Ad legem Aquiliam liber 
singularis was – as far as he knew – the first humanistic monograph published on the lex Aquilia, 
Osler proved that this was not the case. Suarez de Mendoza’s humanistic work on the same theme 
was published in 1640, while Noodt published his monograph in 1691; see Osler 1996, p. 349; on 
Noodt’s Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis in general, see, e.g., Van den Bergh 1988, p. 173ff.
86 G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII, edn. 1767, p. 125. 
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connection. The same can be said about the connection of D. 9.2.9.4 with 
Justinian’s Inst. 4.3.4, to which Noodt also referred and that according to him 
compared to D. 9.2.9.4 was ‘more complete’ (plenius).87 As already dealt with 
earlier, the text of Justinian’s Inst. 4.3.4 introduced another criterion, namely, 
whether the javelin thrower was a soldier or a civilian.88  
4.2.4.2 Solving D. 9.2.9.4 with a new criterion: (in)iustum?
According to Zasius, no liability based on the lex Aquilia occurred when the 
injured party acted culpably. However, when the crossing of the passer-by was 
the right/just thing to do (iustum) and this was not considered dangerous, no 
such negligence could be attributed to the injured party and the javelin throw-
er would be held liable for the killing of the passer-by.89 The same criterion has 
been applied by François Hotman, discussing whether the killing of the passing 
slave by a soldier in Inst. 4.3.4 was commanded or forbidden by (Roman) law. 
He argued that nobody would consider such a killing the right/just thing to do 
(iustum). However, neither could the killing be considered to have been done 
unjustly (iniustum, meaning with dolus or with culpa). According to Hotman, 
in this case the killing was neither just (iustum) nor unjust (iniustum),  but it 
had to be regarded as more remote from unjust (iniustum), which opinion is 
agreed to by (Roman) law in a certain way: because the law (ius) is not so much 
what the laws (leges) command, but also what they do not forbid. 90
87  See G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII, edn. 1767, p. 125. Noodt found 
support in Manilius, Astronomicon, 4.227-229, in which the custom was described of people 
enjoying mock-fights and jousts in arms, such was their love for fights, and the use of leisure 
time to war studies and to everything that had to do with the art of war (my paraphrase is based 
on the English translation by Goold 1977, p. 241).
88 Therefore, the possibilities described by Noodt are as follows: (a.) the person throwing 
the javelin was a soldier, or not (i.e. a civilian); (b.) if he was a soldier, he threw at an unusual 
place, or in an exercise field; (c.) if he threw in an exercise field, he either hit the passer-by 
intentionally (dedita opera), or not; (d.) if he threw intentionally, the accident was considered to 
be caused by the negligence of the thrower; if he did not throw intentionally, it was considered 
to be caused by the negligence (culpa) of the slave, because the slave had no right to walk there, 
and the thrower could not and should not have foreseen that the slave would pass by; of course 
this was the case when the thrower practised a game in the usual place legally designated to that 
purpose and usual for military training. See G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII, 
edn. 1767, p. 125.
89 See U. Zasius, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2, nr. 11, who also mentioned D. 9.2.11pr. as an 
example of this compensation rule.
90 F. Hotman, Opera, ad Inst. 4.3, edn. 1599,  col. 745. Further, Hotman seems to reformulate 
the text of Inst. 4.3.4: If the wrongdoer was a soldier who exercised customarily in a field and then 
killed a slave, he would not be liable. The slave should not have crossed the exercise field at an 
inappropriate time. Nevertheless, the soldier would have been liable if he threw a javelin at the 
slave intentionally. However, if the thrower was a civilian throwing javelins in a field designated 
for practice by soldiers, he would be liable if he killed a slave. See F. Hotman, Opera, ad Inst. 4.3, 
edn. 1599,  col. 746.
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4.2.4.3 A case from practice: application of a iudicatio scheme
Hotman described the following case. A student went to a place, where soldiers 
were used to practising with iron pipes, to practise with a hollow tube. A young 
slave was coincidentally present and was killed by the student: either the 
slave had not seen the student, or he had but, being unfamiliar with the rules 
of the game, had not taken precautions. The student was sued by means of 
an action based on the lex Aquilia. It is remarkable that in his argumentation 
Hotman used rhetoric, more specifically the so-called iudicatio scheme.91 The 
accusation (intentio) of the master of the young slave was that his slave had 
been killed because of the negligence of the student. The objection (depulsio) 
of the student was that the accident did not occur because of his negligence, 
but rather because of the slave’s own negligence. The definition of the problem 
(quaestio) arising from these two contradictory claims is: who (of the two persons) 
had been negligent? The student tried to justify the killing of the slave (ratio): 
according to the student, his act was justified because the slave, not taking 
care of himself at that place where such dangers frequently occurred, had 
been negligent. In the end, the strongest argument (firmamentum) was: on the 
contrary, the student had not been negligent at all because he had not been 
in a position to take precautions at that place, since he had not seen anyone 
who could have been exposed to risk.92
4.2.4.4 Contributory negligence as avoidability
Situations in which someone acts on purpose may occur, coincidentally 
inflicting damage on another person. According to Donellus, there were two 
possible justifications for such an act in which case the wrongdoer was not 
considered to have acted culpably.93 Firstly, if the damage was unforeseeable: 
e.g. in the case of a tree pruner cutting a tree far from the road who would not 
expect someone to pass by, but someone nevertheless passed underneath and 
was killed by a branch falling from the tree (see also D. 9.2.31). Secondly, when 
the injured party acted negligently: i.e. when he could have avoided being 
injured, but did not, as in the cases of D. 9.2.28.1 and D. 9.2.31. In this respect, 
91  See on the iudicatio scheme Braet 2007, esp. p. 230ff.
92  See F. Hotman, Opera, ad Inst. 4.3, edn. 1599,  col. 746.
93 Donellus also argued that someone is not liable when an act by casus is not preceded 
by a culpable act. Accidental damage can be excused when no negligence of the wrongdoer 
can be established. This was the case in two situations: the accident was unforeseeable under 
normal human care or it was foreseeable, but there was no obligation to take precautions; see H. 
Donellus, Commentarius (in Opera Omnia IV), lib. 15, cap. 27, nr. 5.
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Donellus referred to the rule of D. 50.17.203.94 This connection is contrary to 
the humanistic ideal of the reconstruction of classical Roman law and to the 
palingenetical context. It must therefore be qualified as a continuation of me-
dieval Bartolistic thought. Examples can be found – such as in the cases of D. 
9.2.9.4, D. 9.2.28 and D. 9.2.11pr. – for the situation in which the injured party 
was aware of the fact that a certain action which took place frequently was 
not forbidden but, nevertheless, was dangerous.95 However, participation in a 
harmful game (lusus damni) would not be an excuse, because it was in every 
person’s own power to refuse to participate in the game.96
4.2.4.5 Faber’s criterion of gravior culpa
Antonius Faber (1557–1624) observed two problems in D. 9.2.9.4. Firstly, the 
javelin thrower did not have the intention to cause injury or to act unlawfully.97 
Secondly, he did not inflict damage directly with his own body but by means of 
a spear. Because of these two aspects, one could argue that the javelin thrower 
was not to be held liable. However, with regard to the second aspect (in fact 
a problem of causality), Faber concluded that throwing a spear (at someone) 
can be considered similar to locking someone up (resulting in death by starvation; 
C. 3.35.5), and therefore the wrongdoer is not free from negligence. With regard 
to the first aspect, if the javelin throwers threw their spears outside a campus 
iaculatorium, they would not be free from negligence. Furthermore, partici-
pation in a harmful game should also be considered as an act of negligence, 
and should not remain unpunished (cf. D. 9.2.10 and D. 47.2.50.4).98 A game is 
played for the purpose of recreation, and is not meant to harm others. There-
fore, games should be innocuous in order for people to play with impunity (in 
case an accident occurred).99
If someone who exercised with javelins in an exercise field noticed a passer-
by, he should foresee the eventuality of an accident. However, if someone 
crossed an exercise field at an inappropriate time, the blame was imputable 
94 H. Donellus, Commentaria ad D. 9.2, Caput 1, nr. 9. See also H. Donellus, Commentarius 
(in Opera Omnia IV), lib. 15, cap. 27, nr. 5.
95 H. Donellus, Commentaria ad D. 9.2, Caput 1, nr. 9. 
96 ibid., nr. 13.
97  Also François Hotman treated the case of D. 9.2.9.4 (and D. 9.2.10) as an example of 
a situation in which someone did not kill with iniuria; see F. Hotman, Opera, ad D. 9.2, nr. 4; 
more specifically, Hotman argued that the javelin thrower (in the situation of Inst. 4.3.4) acted 
negligently (with culpa) if he threw at a place where no persons, or only soldiers, customarily 
practised; see F. Hotman, Opera, ad Inst. 4.3, edn. 1599, col. 743f.
98 A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.9.4.
99 A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.10.
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to that person.100 He should have foreseen the danger, and not deterred the 
throwers from the game out of fear for danger. Neither was the lex Aquilia 
applicable when someone who played a game was hurt if this happened by 
accident rather than because of negligence. In such a case the blame was 
attributed to the game, just as other unfortunate events that could occur when 
playing a game.101
An important remark made by Faber is, however, that no action could be 
brought by the injured party who had been negligent himself (propria culpa); 
was it possible to impute a certain amount of negligence to the person hit by 
the javelin? If this question were answered positively,102 the equal amounts of 
negligence on both sides would be cancelled out by way of mutual compensa-
tion (cf. D. 24.3.39). Notice that the case discussed by Faber is the case in which 
both parties acted negligently. It is remarkable that Faber compared the neg-
ligence of both parties and argued that the more serious form of negligence, 
the gravior culpa in this case, was attributed to the person who intentionally 
aimed (his javelin) at a passer-by crossing a field, even though this field was 
an exercise field. Therefore, no fine was imposed on the injured person who 
crossed the field at an inappropriate time, and the person who killed on purpose 
did not remain unpunished (because of the doctrine of culpae compensatio, 
dolus could not be compensated by culpa, but only by dolus).103 Thus, in his 
commentary, not only does Faber build his theory on medieval doctrine, and 
does his view have to be situated in the tradition of the mos italicus, but he also 
reveals the first traces of the so-called maior culpa theory.104
100 Of course when the javelin thrower threw intentionally at the slave, he would 
nevertheless be liable (see D. 9.2.9.4).
101  A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, in note (a) sed si cum alii. ad D. 9.2.9.4, who ends with 
a nice distichon: 
Ludus, opes, rixas, fas, furtum, numina, sortem, 
Perdit, amat, nescit, parturit, odit, habet. 
The distichon – in which Faber eruditely described the unfortunate events – shows that Faber 
had good knowledge of the Latin language. 
102 Also in the Disputatio juridica inauguralis ad tit. instit. de lege Aquilia (1718) submitted 
by Gerardus Aemilius van Hoogeveen (eruditorum examini submittit) under authority of Ant. 
Schulting (ex auctoritate magnifici rectoris), the case of the javelin throwers is mentioned. Faber’s 
view does not seem to have been accepted immediately, as in this Disputatio it is still stated that 
liability is only established if the wrongdoer acted negligently (culpa), not when  the injured 
party (laesus) acted culpably (what seems only to be the medieval ius commune view); see G.A. 
van Hoogeveen/A. Schulting, Dissertatio juridica inauguralis, p. 14: … Denique Aquiliae locus non 
est, si non sit culpa in eo, qui damnum dedit, verum in eo, qui laesus est. … As to the authorship 
of this dissertation, however, one can doubt whether Van Hoogeveen wrote the dissertation 
himself. According to Söllner 1977, p. 575, it is impossible to tell in such disputations what the 
contribution/share was by the respondent to the information contained in the disputation.
103 A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, in (b) Qui tamen data opera, ad D. 9.2.9.4.
104 Also Luig 1969, p. 207f.
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4.2.4.6 Conclusion on the humanistic contribution to the development of the 
theory based on D. 9.2.9.4
Various humanists directly connected D. 9.2.9.4 in an, for classical law, a-
historical manner to D. 9.2.10. Furthermore, humanists such as, for example, 
Zasius and Faber considered D. 9.2.9.4 to cover the case in which both parties 
acted negligently. This, however, does no justice to the procedural approach of 
the classical jurists105 (the same applies to D. 9.2.11pr., which will be discussed 
below). Only by considering the cases as cases of concurring negligence could 
the negligent acts be compared and could theories develop. A new approach 
was the question of (in)iustum, with which the justness of the act of crossing 
the field was examined (see Zasius and Hotman). Also new and interesting is 
Hotman’s application of rhetoric and the iudicatio scheme to the case of D. 
9.2.9.4. Some jurists connected the cases of contributory negligence in the lex 
Aquilia to D. 50.17.203 (e.g. D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr.), which is not justified 
from a palingenetical perspective. Again medieval influence occurred in the 
application of the theory of culpae compensatio by Faber, in whose work the 
first traces of the maior culpa theory appeared.106 
4.2.5 New insights as regards the case of the barber
4.2.5.1 A new approach to the actors in D. 9.2.11pr.
What was new in the approach of various humanists to D. 9.2.11pr.107 was the 
fact that they considered the role of the ball-player important in this respect,108 
and that they discussed whether the player could be held liable, while this is 
not covered by D. 9.2.11pr.  (except possibly – implicitly – in Mela’s opinion). 
According to Faber, the barber could also have acted culpably, i.e. when he 
shaved near a place where people usually played, or where there was intense 
105 The jurists gave replies as to the requirements of the relevant formula of a certain actio 
in question, as the fulfilment of these requirements was relevant for the success or the failure of 
the action. No extensive consideration had to be given to all other circumstances insofar as they 
were not directly relevant for the fulfilment of these requirements.
106 Heraldus’ comparison of D. 9.2.9.4 with Antiphon of Ramnus is also interesting (see 
chapter two, p. 66ff.).
107 According to A. Schulting- N. Smallenburg, Notae ad Digesta seu Pandectas, ad D. 
9.2.11pr., the case of D. 9.2.11pr. has to be connected to the case in D. 9.2.9.4 as both are taken 
from Ulpian in his 18th book on the Edict. In this sense, they make a palingenetical link, which 
indeed seems correct.
108 In the same sense the early modern (usus modernus) period professor J. Brunnemann, 
Commentarius ad D. 9.2.11, who wrote that the player who hit the ball forcefully causing damage 
was liable, unless the place was designated for such purpose (ball-playing); in that case the 
barber would be liable. 
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traffic.109 However, as already stated in D. 9.2.11pr., someone who entrusted 
himself to a barber who put his chair in such a dangerous place ought to blame 
himself, and therefore the barber should never be held liable. The player 
should be held liable if he played where it was not customary,110 or if he aimed 
intentionally at the hands of the barber, or no one would be liable (because 
the accident was due to casus rather than to culpa).111 After all, the blame had 
to be imputed to someone whose culpa preceded the accident.112 
 Also Gerard Noodt113 explicitly discussed the position of the ball-players: when 
the ball-players played somewhere where they had a right to play, no liability was 
imputed to them. In support of this, Noodt referred to Ovidius’ Metamorphoses, to 
the part on the young man Hyacinthus who was killed during a game of discus 
throwing.114 In this story, Apollo tried to excuse himself from liability, because 
in his view Hyacinthus had been killed because of his own imprudence. Even 
though the death was accidental, Apollo was held liable. Apollo admitted that 
it was his discus that had caused the death of Hyacinthus, but tried to justify 
his act by arguing that there was no reason to assume that he was negligent, 
unless the fact that his entry into playing the game with Hyacinthus could be 
qualified as a fault.115
109 Also interesting is J. Heineccius, Recitationes, IV.3 De lege Aquilia, §MLXXX-MLXXXIV. 
Apparently, Heineccius considered the barber liable because he acted at least with culpa levis 
(levis sane admodum culpa erat tonsoris), shaving somewhere where children were used to 
playing ball.
110  In the same sense M. Freher, Verisimilium libri duo, ad D. 9.2.11pr.
111  In that case both persons (the barber and the player) would have acted in a permissible 
manner. The ball-player did not act culpably even when he hit the ball quite hard and it landed 
on the hands of the barber as a result of which the slave’s throat was cut; the barber did not act 
culpably either.
112  A. Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas, ad D. 9.2.11pr., with reference to D. 9.2.52.4 and D. 13.6.23.
113  According to Noodt, if one acted lawfully, within certain limits (with proportionality), 
and another person was killed by accident or by necessity, the actor was not held liable under 
the lex Aquilia because the wrongdoer did not act unlawfully (iniuria). When someone acted 
lawfully, but exceeded the due limits when defending himself, this would be different, as was 
the case when someone killed another coincidentally but a negligent act of the wrongdoer had 
preceded the coincidental event. Those acts were considered more unlawful than lawful or 
coincidental, and would lead to liability, based on the lex Aquilia. An example is the case of the 
barber (D. 9.2.11pr.): G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII, edn. 1767, p. 124; see also 
Luig 1999, p. 108.
114  Ovidius, Metamorphoses, X.174ff., esp. 196ff.
115  G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII, edn. 1767, p. 125, who referred to 
the fragment of Ovidius just discussed in the main text. This literary source supports Noodt’s 
argument that the ball-player did not act with negligence. See also Luig 1999, p. 108f.
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4.2.5.2 Application of the medieval doctrine of culpae compensatio?
A humanist scholar active at the University of Salamanca was the seventeenth-
century Spanish scholar Pedro Pantoja de Ayala, who, in his Commentaria 
(1625), argued that in D. 9.2.11pr. there was a doubt whether the barber or the 
player was exposed to liability under the lex Aquilia. According to De Ayala, 
Ulpian excused both the barber and the player, and denied the master of the 
slave an actio legis Aquiliae because he had to complain about his own slave. 
The final phrase of Ulpian (quamvis nec … queri debere) led to the exculpation 
of the player in this case. The player did something permissible (playing ball; 
unless the way of playing was dangerous; see also D. 9.2.10),116 did not throw 
the ball with the intention to hit the hand of the barber and the instrument he 
used, and ultimately the ball in itself was not sufficient to cause the damage 
in question.117 Indeed, already older sources state that no actio iniuriarum was 
granted against someone who, while playing with a ball, hit the ball and caused 
a personal injury to someone else – unless he did so intentionally. Apparently 
what was considered decisive was whether or not the instrument was suitable 
to cause injuries; a ball was normally not suitable to cause injuries.118
According to Ayala, nor would the barber be liable because he could not 
have prevented the damage in any way.119 At first sight, it seems that the negli-
gence of the slave cancelled out the negligence of the barber as well as the neg-
ligence of the player. However, a more precise reading leads to the conclusion 
that the theory of culpae compensatio was not applied here. The ‘contributory 
negligence’ was just considered as a circumstance, relevant to the determina-
tion of (possible) negligence on the side of the barber and/or the player.
4.2.5.3 Influence of the mos italicus in the thinking of Suarez de Mendoza
The Spanish legal humanist Ioannes Suarez de Mendoza (†1681)120 stated that 
the question in D. 9.2.11pr. was who should the master of the slave hold liable: 
116  See also Angelus de Ubaldis, Consilia, 397, nr. 1.
117  De Ayala refers to Angelus de Ubaldis’ Consilia, 397 and Cardinal Dominicus Tuschus’ 
Practicarum conclusionum iuris, concl. 456, nr. 16; the relevant parts are used in the previous and in 
the next footnote, with a slight change and/or narrowing down based on the content of these works.
118  A. de Ubaldis, Consilia, 397, nr. 3f.; D. Tuschus, Practicarum conclusionum iuris, concl. 
456, nr’s 15f.
119  P.P. de Ayala, Commentaria ad D. 11.5.2, nr. 42, col. 984.
120 Luig 1969, p. 204f., discussed Ioannes Suarez de Mendoza in a subsection on the ‘älterer 
Usus modernus’; to me this distinction seems unnecessary and confusing, although with regard 
to this specific fragment the author could possibly fall into this category. Because of the inclusion 
of his work in Meermann’s Thesaurus, because of his influence on humanistic authors of the 
Dutch Elegant School, and when reading Suarez’s section seven of his commentary on the lex 
Aquilia and considering his method in this section, he can best be considered a humanist.
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the ball-player or the barber. Because of the negligence of the barber (shaving 
at a place where people were used to playing), there is no negligence left for 
the ball-player; furthermore, the ball game was permitted by law, because it be-
longed to the exercises for the purpose of displaying courage (see D. 11.5.2.1).121 
Besides, this ball game was practised outside Rome, namely, in the field of 
Mars, which was designated for the practice of such games.122 Therefore, any 
imprudence would go unpunished.123
Furthermore, according to Suarez, Ulpian meant to argue that the barber 
was to blame. With the final phrase ‘de se queri debere’, Ulpian only seemed 
to reverse his decision, but what he really meant was that the barber acted 
negligently in any case, but that his liability could be denied if the slave also 
acted negligently. This only occurred when the slave acted in a careless way 
(namely, by entrusting himself to a barber who shaved at such a dangerous 
place). When the slave acted with care, no negligence could be imputed to 
him, and thus the slave did not act negligently and the barber would be liable. 
This, for example, was the case if the slave was a stranger, not familiar with the 
customs of the place, or blind.124 By doing so Suarez returned to the opinion 
of the glossator Johannes Bassianus, which was adopted by and incorporated 
in the Glossa Ordinaria by Accursius (gloss queri debere ad D. 9.2.11pr.).125 
This is remarkable since it demonstrates a Bartolistic approach rather than a 
humanistic approach.
4.2.5.4 Application of the maior culpa doctrine to D. 9.2.11pr.?
Ulpian ends the text of D. 9.2.11pr. with the remark that it may not be improper 
to state that when anyone seats himself in a barber’s chair in a dangerous place, 
he can only blame himself.126 It is interesting to consider the commentaries 
121  J. Suarez, Commentarius ad legem Aquiliam, lib. I. cap. II  sectio VII, nr. 10ff. The reference 
to D. 11.5.2.1, including the various types of activities, is based on P. Faber, Agonisticon, liber I, cap. 
6 (edn. 1595, p. 29f.), who referred to various literary sources, among which Plautus, Bacchides, 
III.3, where these games can also be found (which were exercised on athletic grounds).
122  See, e.g., Strabo, Geographica, V.3.8. 
123  See J. Suarez, Commentarius ad legem Aquiliam, lib. I. cap. II  sectio VII, nr. 16f., who 
referred to a few legislative texts concerning situations in which someone remained unpunished, 
namely, Fuero Real IV.7.7, Nueva Recopilacion VIII.7.8 & VIII.23.3 (later also recorded in Novísima 
Recopilación XII.23.7 & XII.21.4).
124  J. Suarez, Commentarius ad legem Aquiliam, lib. I. cap. II  sectio VII, nr. 18ff.
125  See also Luig 1969, p. 205.
126 According to the edition of A. Schulting-N. Smallenburg, Notae ad Digesta seu Pandectas, 
ad D. 9.2.11pr., the fragment ‘Although it is not improper to say that someone who has entrusted 
himself to a barber who put his chair in such a dangerous place, ought to blame himself,’ is not 
sufficient to conclude that the master of the slave should blame himself and therefore could not 
claim damages. In Schulting-Smallenburg, reference is made to D. 47.10.1.15, D. 47.10.26 and Inst. 
4.3.16. However, the reason remains uncertain in this phrasing. See also G.A. van Hoogeveen/A. 
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of the humanists on this phrase more closely: do they see an application of 
the medieval culpae compensatio doctrine here, or maybe even the renewed 
doctrine of maior culpa? According to the latter doctrine, not every degree of 
contributory negligence cancelled out the injured party’s right to claim damages. 
Only when the injured party’s contributory negligence was more serious was 
no recovery of damages possible. This will be made clearer below.
An affirmative answer can already be found with the humanist Marquard(t) 
Freher, who argued that the slave who entrusted himself to be shaved at such 
a dangerous place was culpable to some extent. However, the negligence of 
the barber is held to be more serious and therefore the barber was held liable 
(cf. decision of Proculus).127
Noodt gave two possible explanations for Ulpian’s opinion in the final part of 
his reply in D. 9.2.11pr. First, Ulpian could have meant that although it is not 
incorrect to say that the slave had to blame himself, nevertheless the barber 
was also negligent. A second interpretation of the final part of Ulpian’s reply 
could be that the barber acted negligently, but the negligence of the slave, who 
could have taken precautions but did not, was more serious (maior). There is 
no doubt as to whether Ulpian left open the question as to which party had to 
be considered responsible. Noodt, however, supposed that Ulpian chose one 
of the parties to be responsible, and asked himself which party that would 
be.128 According to Noodt, this becomes clear when studying the use of the 
word quamvis, the initial word of the final part of Ulpian’s reply stating that 
the negligence of the slave was more serious, correcting or tempering (corrigat, 
aut temperet) the preceding sentence in which the negligence of the barber 
was assumed.129 In that case, Ulpian would opt for the negligence of the slave 
to be more serious. However, also another interpretation of the use of the 
word quamvis is possible: the most natural use of the word quamvis does not 
Schulting, Dissertatio juridica inauguralis (1718), p. 15f., stating that Ulpian’s view seems to be 
that the barber was liable because of his imprudence, namely, that he put his chair in a place 
where people were used to playing or where there was a lot of traffic. However, Ulpian’s doubt 
about this conclusion can be read in the phrase starting with quamvis. Unfortunately, in the 
disputatio the problem is solved simply by referring to the solution provided by G. Noodt’s Ad 
legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII.
127  M. Freher, Verisimilium libri duo, ad D. 9.2.11pr.
128  Also Luig 1999, p. 109.
129  Noodt cited four texts from the Corpus Iuris (D. 10.4.7.5, D. 6.1.15.3, Inst. 1.25.8 and D. 
27.1.6.19); for a treatment and discussion of these texts, see Luig 1999, p. 109f.; - See also Jansen 
2002b, p. 206, nt. 14, who argued that Noodt supported his explanation of D. 9.2.11pr. by his 
reference to the word quamvis, namely, by making a restriction. The first sentence expressed the 
real opinion of Ulpian, namely, that it is correct to blame the barber, while the second sentence 
is an objection to this starting with quamvis.
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preclude the assumption that Ulpian believed the negligence of the barber 
to be crucial.130
Which interpretation has to be preferred? Noodt solves the ambiguity 
(ἀμφιβολία) by referring to Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria VII.9.15. According 
to Quintilian, the whole question in any ambiguity concerns the following: 
sometimes which of the two interpretations is the more natural; and always 
which of the two interpretations is the more equitable, and what was the inten-
tion of the writer or speaker.131 Noodt argued to his reader that when reading 
Quintilian, the reader would clearly come to the same conclusion as Noodt 
himself, i.e. that the first sentence expressed Ulpian’s true opinion.132 Accord-
ing to Noodt, this interpretation is more useful (utilior) and more consistent 
with (principles of) morality.133
Noodt’s view on the last part of D. 9.2.11pr.134 seems to have become the pre-
vailing view in legal scholarship (considering the references to Noodt in this 
130 For this interpretation, Noodt cited two texts from the Corpus Iuris (D. 2.10.1.2 and D. 
11.5.1.1), also treated and discussed by Luig 1999, p. 110.
131  Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria VII.9.15.
132  See also Johannes van der Linden (1756–1835) in his Annotatio ad Voet D. 9.2, nr. 17.
133  G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII, edn. 1767, p. 125; - Also provided 
by H. Brenkman, Apparatus ad D. 9.2, note quamvis (e) ad D. 9.2.11pr. (edn. Van den Bergh/
Stolte 1977, p. 264): Amphiboliam in hisce observat Clariss[imus] Noodt c. 7 Ad leg[em] Aquil[iam] 
putatque priorem sententiam Ulpiani esse, quia utilior est et bonis moribus convenientior. Apart 
from the value for the reconstruction of Justinian’s Digest (as used in the second chapter), 
Brenkman’s papers are important, being part of the legacy of the Dutch Elegant School and 
providing information on Roman legal science in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries; see Van den 
Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 235. Brenkman’s Apparatus hardly ever departs from the opinions of Noodt, 
as was not the case in the quamvis matter. According to Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 235f., 
Brenkman’s Apparatus is just as philological and antiquarian as Noodt’s work, and, therefore, 
only a few traces of the usus modernus are found in his Apparatus on the lex Aquilia. One 
interesting example, mentioned by Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 236, is Brenkman’s note (s) ad 
D. 9.2.30.3, which, based on a so-called Gothofredus note, referred to a regula framed by Baldus 
based on this fragment of the Digest, on being killed by one’s own negligence. Brenkman hereby 
reproduced a late medieval marginal note referring to Baldus’ opinion; see note culpa (s) ad D. 
9.2.30.3 (edn. Van den Bergh/Stolte 1977, p. 289). According to this note, if one did not permit a 
doctor to take care of oneself and because of that one died, one would have been killed because 
of one’s own negligence.
134  More in general, Noodt’s argumentation with regard to the case of D. 9.2.11pr., can be 
considered as situated between humanism and the practical usus modernus. In the same sense 
Luig 1999, p. 107; differently Van den Bergh 1988, p. 180, according to whom Noodt’s book had 
been written with a purely humanistic or elegant purpose, without any practical orientation (no 
traces of the usus modernus) and that it therefore did not have any influence on legal reality. 
However, Luig 1999, p. 107, states that a closer inspection reveals that Noodt by his interpretation 
of the source aimed to improve the practice of positive law; furthermore, Luig states that Noodt’s 
interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr. is related to the interpretation of the practice-oriented Johannes 
Voet; - Although Noodt’s interpretation could be proof of his interest in Antiquity (a scene from 
daily street life in Rome); see Van den Bergh 1988, p. 174; it can also be connected to his attention 
to relevant practical issues; see Luig 1999, p. 107f., 112.
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respect in which his view was adopted). It has been argued in the literature 
that Noodt interpreted D. 9.2.11pr. in such a way that, according to Ulpian, the 
negligence of the barber was more serious than that of the slave and therefore 
crucial.135 If that is true, Noodt considered D. 9.2.11pr. as concerning mutual 
negligence, and so the question would be who had the maior culpa and thus 
had to bear the damage.136 In that case, a parallel can be drawn with the very 
practical Johannes Voet (see section 4.4.2), who argued that although it is not 
improper to say that the slave should blame himself (in these circumstances), 
the more serious negligence and carelessness of the barber cannot be excused. 
Therefore, if there was concurrence of negligence on both sides, the relative 
culpability of both had to be weighed in order to determine the liability for the 
ultimate accident: the person whose negligence was considered to be more 
serious was liable.137 In conclusion, one can state that Noodt’s interpretation of 
D. 9.2.11pr. (theory of maior culpa) is an example of his way of finding a rational 
and reasonable solution, which later became legal practice (see below).138 
A different interpretation of the just-mentioned phrase is provided by U. Huber’s 
(1636–1694) posthumously published Eunomia Romana (1700).139 Huber 
argued that Ulpian, after having argued that the barber would be liable if he 
placed his chair at such a dangerous spot, added an adversative word (namely, 
quamvis) that it is just (recte) to say that the slave should blame himself if 
he entrusted himself to a barber who put his chair at such a dangerous spot. 
How to solve Ulpian’s double judgment? Huber solved it by referring to the 
Basilica, in which quamvis was interpreted in an ampliative manner (εἰ καἰ 
τὰ μάλιστα καλῶς λέγει τις: ‘even though one would say very correctly’),140 
namely, by translating it as ‘not standing in the way the fact that’.141 The neg-
ligence of the barber would then prevail (praevalere) over the responsibility 
135  Luig 1999, p. 111.
136  This seems to be clearer than the medieval criterion of ‘culpa admixta’; see also 
Luig 1990, 207: ‘Van den Bergh meint, Noodt habe es nicht als seine Aufgabe angesehen, ein 
modernes Schadensersatzrecht in naturrechtlichem Geiste zu entwerfen. Er findet hier nur ein 
einziges Beispiel einer Regel, die der Usus modernus ergeben hatte. Ebenso modern schient mir 
jedoch Noodts Entscheidung für die Maßgeblichkeit der maior culpa anstelle der mittelalterlich 
unklaren culpa admixta in Melas viel erörtertem Barbier-Fall zu sein (D. 9,2,11pr.) ...’.
137  Luig 1999, p. 111; see J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 9.2 n. 17 (edn. 1778, p. 
432); Aquarius 1945, p. 142; Powell 1951, p. 212.
138  See Luig 1999, p. 112.
139  On U. Huber, see, e.g., Veen 1976; 1987, p. 120ff.; Zimmermann 1992, p. 36ff.; Van den 
Bergh 2002, p. 184ff.; Hewett 2010, esp. p. 79ff.
140  See also already chapter two, footnote 414, in which I noted the interesting, definite 
way of formulating the final phrase of B. 60.3.11pr.
141  Also G. Noodt, in his Ad legem Aquiliam, cap. 7, seems to have come to the same 
conclusion. He considered these words in a way that, although it is not wrong to say that the 
slave ought to blame himself, the negligence of the barber would prevail.
early modern period 221
of the slave who entrusted himself to the barber, and thus the barber would 
be obliged to pay damages.142 This function of the word quamvis corresponds 
to the use of that word in Inst. 1.25.8. Huber argued that the real opinion of 
Proculus/Ulpianus was that in order to determine whether the barber was 
liable, distinctions had to be made: was the place noticeably dangerous? If 
it was, a second distinction was necessary: was the slave aware of the (place 
and) danger, and was the unexpected cut due to the slave’s own behaviour/
choice because he wanted to enjoy the spectacle or was he ignorant of the 
danger of the game? In the latter case the negligence was on the barber’s side.143 
4.2.5.5 Some concluding words on the theories developed by humanists based 
on D. 9.2.11pr.
In Ioannes Suarez de Mendoza’s view on D. 9.2.11pr., one can notice the influ-
ence of the view of the medieval glossator Johannes Bassianus (i.e. by way of 
the Gloss), namely, in writing that Ulpian meant that the barber had acted 
negligently in any case, but that his liability could be denied if the slave had 
also acted negligently. This only occurred if the slave had acted in a careless 
way. If the slave had acted with care and no negligence could be attributed 
to him, the barber would be liable. This was the case, for example, when the 
slave was a stranger and did not know the customs of the place; or when the 
slave was blind. By doing so Suarez returned to the opinion of the glossator 
Johannes Bassianus. This is not the only proof of the remaining influence of the 
mos italicus in the writings of the humanists, as more traces can be found. Mar-
quardt Freher considered the negligence of the barber to be more serious: his 
work includes a comparison of negligences, in which a trace of the later maior 
culpa theory is already present, which is not only a continuation, but even an 
elaboration of the medieval doctrine of culpae compensatio. Another trace of 
the elaboration of the newly revised doctrine of culpae compensatio (i.e. with 
the addition of the culpa maior doctrine) can be found in Noodt’s commentary, 
in which Noodt tried to solve the ambiguity of the quamvis-phrase by referring 
to Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria VII.9.15: upon which Gerard Noodt tried to 
prove that the ball thrower did not act with negligence, comparing the text 
with Ovidius’ Metamorphoses. Although this seems purely humanistic (using 
142  This humanistic approach fits well into my interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr.; see section 2.5.
143  U. Huber, Eunomia Romana, ad D. 9.2.11pr., nr. 2, edn. 1724, p. 408f. this ‘alternative 
view’ is also provided by J. van der Linden, Annotatio ad Voet D. 9.2, nr. 17; - Scott 1984, p. 170, 
rightly stated that no light is, however, shed by the Roman-Dutch sources on the question 
regarding contributory intent, in which both plaintiff and defendant displayed a blameworthy 
state of mind in regard to the former’s harm.
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literary sources), it is not. The result is more in line with the just-mentioned 
doctrines. In contrast, Huber tried to solve the ambiguity by referring to the 
Basilica. He stated that the negligence of the barber would prevail (praevalere) 
over the slave’s, and thus the barber would be obliged to pay damages. Huber’s 
view is more humanistic, in the sense that he did not make use of medieval 
theories developed by the tradition of mos italicus.
4.3 A general introduction to the period of  
the Reception of Roman law
4.3.1 Reception of the lex Aquilia
The term ‘Reception’ refers to the influence (or even inclusion) of Roman law 
on legal practice and indigenous law. For example, within the Roman-Dutch 
tradition, Roman law was applied as the generally applicable subsidiary law. 
Since the reception of Roman law, the Aquilian concepts are sometimes said 
to have framed legal thinking about extracontractual liability.144 However, the 
very question is what exactly has been received of the lex Aquilia.145 This topic 
will be touched upon below.
The Glossators and Commentators still felt bound to adhere to the Roman 
law of the Corpus Iuris, with, among others, the penal character of the lex 
Aquilia. Even in the fifteenth century, the scholars of Roman law assumed the 
penal character of delictual actions.146 However, in canon law, presumably 
from approximately 1300 onwards, the payment made by the wrongdoer to 
the injured party was considered compensation for damage.147 Before the 
thirteenth century, courts applied indigenous law with its system of the (penal) 
compositio. Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, a change occurred 
in this ancient system of compositio in indigenous law, due to several events: 
the rising authorities/government with its officials, of whom the sovereign 
had to be able to command obedience,  and the rise of the cities, which led to 
acting more firmly against offenders. These developments led to the fact that 
144  See, e.g., Jansen 2004, p. 450.
145  I will refer to this question in my conclusions when discussing the question of which 
ideas of Roman law on contributory negligence were received.
146  Hallebeek 2006, p. 323. The penal character can still be seen in the assessment of 
damages (with practice-oriented jurists of the 15th century such as Baptista de Sancto Blasio 
and Johannes Cripsus de Montibus; see Hallebeek 2001, p. 82), the passive intransmissibility and 
the unrestricted accumulation against co-offenders.
147  See also Dondorp 1998, p. 40, 58.
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punishing the offender came to be conducted by means of a procedure extra-
ordinaris, and led to the emergence of a public criminal law.148 
About the time Roman law began to be received, the repression of crime 
was considered a duty/function of the public authorities.149 Nevertheless, a part 
of the ancient compositio still had to be paid to the family of the deceased. In 
the event of a delict, the public authorities could allow a remission, but only 
if the family of the deceased (the murdered person) received satisfaction 
through compositio.150 The Roman Catholic Church combatted the system of 
private vengeance and succeeded in several ways in changing the character 
of the compositio into a reparation (a restitutio). Such restitution had to go 
first to the nearest relations of the deceased, i.e. his widow and his children.151
The view of canon law that all crimes belong to public law – omnia crimina 
publica esse –was generally adopted in practice as appears from the work of 
the legal humanist P. Gudelinus.152 The prevailing view of jurists at the time 
of the Reception153 has been that the injured party had to be compensated in 
the event of a delict, while punishing the wrongdoer was the sole task of the 
authorities. Therefore, the view was that in the event of private delicts no fine 
could be claimed, but only compensation for damages.154 Furthermore, the 
thought of restitutio came up in canon law (see previous chapter),155 but only 
through the Spanish moral theologians did this idea reach the secular world 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Moreover, the idea worked through 
that every delict, apart from criminal consequences, had to lead to a possible 
claim for damages to the injured party.156 
148  Hallebeek 2006, p. 325.
149  Lawson & Markesinis 1982, I, p. 39f.
150 Feenstra 1972, p. 232.
151  ibid., p. 233.
152  See P. Gudelinus, Commentariorum de jure novissimo, lib. III, cap. 13 (edn. 1643, p. 136). 
153  In general, in my references to scholars of the early modern period, I excluded the notes 
and references of these scholars to other scholars in my footnotes; I also studied those references, 
and, where relevant for the discussion as included in this study, I included these works.
154  Hallebeek 2006, p. 325; Broers 2012, p. 82f. See P. Gudelinus, Commentariorum de jure 
novissimo, lib. III, cap. 13 (edn. 1643, p. 136) and J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 47.1, 
para. 3 (edn. 1778, p. 803).
155  In medieval canon law, the wrongdoer was only liable when he was at fault (culpa); see 
the decretal Si culpa tua, i.e. X 5.36.9: If loss is caused by your own fault (culpa), it is right that you 
make amends for it (satisfacere te oportet).
156  See, e.g., A. Gomez, Variae Resolutiones, III, III.37 (edn. 1616, p. 470);- Already in the 
Corpus Iuris there are some texts which deal with recovery of purely patrimonial loss, namely D. 
48.10.25 and D. 48.10.32.1. The Accursian Gloss described an actio poenalis in factum as a remedy 
for the plaintiff ’s interest and does likewise for the remedy granted for the duplum in the second 
case. See gloss penali ad D. 48.10.25 and gloss condemnatur ad D. 48.10.32.1; see more elaborately 
Dondorp 1998, p. 43; Hallebeek 2001, p. 83ff.; 2006, p. 339f. According to the medieval jurists, 
there must be a civil remedy in damages available provided that there was a public crime or 
penal action for reprehensible behaviour from which the damage results.
chapter four224
To conclude this brief introduction on the Reception, around 1700 the general 
action for damages (sometimes with the name actio legis Aquiliae or with the 
name actio de damno dato) lost its penal character throughout Europe; the 
reasons whereof were discussed above.157 This is an important development, as it 
implies that no accumulation against co-actors or any passive intransmissibility 
applied any longer.158 The change into a reipersecutory action could possibly 
have contributed to the gradual abandonment of the all-or-nothing approach. 
The reason is that because of this change the question ‘Must the wrongdoer 
be punished, yes or no?’ changed into ‘Has the injured party a right to claim 
compensation?’ The latter question, or at least its answer, probably (might 
have) developed (gradually) into the taking into account of the injured party’s 
contributory negligence. This question of contributory negligence was now 
placed into another, different, context.
4.3.2 Requirements for a succesful claim for damages
What exactly has been received of the lex Aquilia? According to Thomasius’ 
Larva, the action is now purely reipersecutory,159 the heirs of a person who 
caused the damage are liable (passive transmissibility)160 and – finally – in 
cases where several persons caused the damage and one of them paid the 
whole claim, the other wrongdoers were released.161 The peculiar retrospective 
(or prospective?) assessment of the value of the object killed or damaged, as 
written in chapters one and three of the lex Aquilia, appears to have never 
been received in Europe. Courts simply assessed the value of the object of the 
plaintiff as present at the moment the damage was caused.162
By the end of the seventeenth century it had become manifest that modern 
law in action no longer reflected the Aquilian delict of the Corpus Iuris.163 The 
Aquilian action for damages was disposed of a large part of its Roman law charac-
teristics. One could argue that it rather contains indigenous law and canon law 
with Roman law terminology. A general action for damage done unlawfully 
was provided, which was only Roman in its name. The actio legis Aquiliae in 
157  See Dondorp 1998, p. 64f., 70. The penal character of the actio legis Aquiliae had already 
disappeared in the 17th century: a purely compensatory action remained. European jurists had 
to convert the penal actio legis Aquiliae into a compensatory actio de damno dato; see Jansen 
2003, p. 294; 2004, p. 451.
158  See Zimmermann 1996, p. 1020ff.; 2000, p. 62; Jansen 2003, p. 294f.; Broers 2012, p. 84. 
159  Thomasius, Larva, § 12.
160 ibid., § 13.
161  ibid., § 14.
162  Zimmermann 2000, p. 61.
163 Coing 1985, p. 509f.; Zimmermann 1990, p. 68; 1996, p. 1018.
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Roman-Dutch law and in usus modernus showed large differences with the 
actio legis Aquiliae of the Corpus Iuris.164 Nevertheless, in other respects the 
lex Aquilia was still considered the basis for a general delictual liability. The 
concept of culpa (in the sense of fault) as a requirement for Aquilian liability 
remained essentially unchanged. It could take the form of intention (dolus) 
or negligence (culpa in the narrow sense). Wrongfulness (iniuria) remained 
an essential prerequisite for Aquilian liability, but terminologically it was not 
distinguished from fault.165 Furthermore, a general theory of causation was 
never developed or applied. The adagium ‘Nam qui occasionem damni praestat, 
damnum fecisse videtur’ (derived from D. 9.2.30.3) was maintained as a crite-
rion for causality in legal doctrine: the wrongdoer had to provide the occasio 
damni, the inquiry of which was often linked up with the broader problem 
of fault.166 This means that all consequences of someone’s imprudence were 
imputed to him, no matter how far the causal connection between his act and 
the damage occurred.167 
According to Hugo de Groot (Grotius, 1583–1645), and many others with 
him, it was not sufficient that damage resulted from the act, there had to be 
imputable blame. He followed the approach of the canonists who started from 
the fault (culpa) of the individual. Fault was more than careless behaviour, 
namely, also knowing or having to know that an act was unlawful, or if the act 
was not unlawful, but careless.168 The restitution theory of Thomas Aquinas 
in the way explained by the Spanish moral theologians was the basis of Hugo 
de Groot’s general claim for compensation. His famous phrase in De iure belli 
ac pacis describes maleficium in terms of culpa, which he defined as ‘acting 
differently from how one ought to’.169 In his definition he does not only mention 
carelessness, but he emphasises the wrong act in itself, not the imputability 
of the act to the wrongdoer. 
164 Also Hallebeek 2006, p. 344.
165  Zimmermann 1990, p. 77f.; 1996, p. 1027f.; 2000, p. 63f.; - Until the 18th century, 
unlawfulness, negligence and causality as requirements for a successful claim for damages were still 
strongly connected with each other. Instead of considering unlawfulness as a separate requirement 
(which the jurists did not), it was examined whether negligence was present. If negligence was 
missing on the side of the wrongdoer, his act was considered lawful. See also Dondorp 1998, p. 71.
166 Kaufmann 1958, p. 65; Zimmermann 1990, p. 78.
167  Dondorp 1998, p. 71f.
168 Hallebeek 2006, p. 333f.
169 H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, II 17.1 (edn. De Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp 1993, p. 
427): Maleficium hic appellamus culpam omnem, sive in faciendo, sive in non faciendo, pugnantem 
cum eo quod aut homines communiter, aut pro ratione certae qualitatis facere debent. Ex tali culpa 
obligatio naturaliter oritur si damnum datum est, nempe ut id resarciatur.
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4.3.3 Different types of damage
All sorts of damage had to be compensated, even when no physical object was 
damaged and nobody was wounded or killed; this conclusion was already made 
by the medieval scholars.170 According to the medieval interpretation of Roman 
law, in the event of the death of a freeman, only medical expenses and damages 
for loss of earnings/wages could be claimed, not for scars and disfigurement.171 
From two texts of Hugo de Groot, it turns out that the law of Holland deviated 
from Roman law. The first text, Inleidinge III.33.2, regards manslaughter, and 
states that the wrongdoer does not have to pay compensation, except for fu-
neral costs (a deviation from the medieval interpretation of the Roman law as 
contained in the Corpus Iuris), and other costs caused by the crime.172 Another 
deviation from the texts of the Corpus Iuris and its medieval interpretation is 
the fact that the widow of the victim, and his children, as well as other persons 
who were maintained by his labour, were granted an action for compensation 
for the loss of support as a result of the death of the family breadwinner (the 
influence of (Spanish) natural law scholars and indigenous law).173 
Medieval Roman scholarship generally maintained that there was no valua-
tion of scars and disfigurement (cf. the Roman principle), although Jacques de 
Revigny and Albericus de Rosate and other later authors made an exception in 
the event of disfigurement of women.174 The rationale behind this is probably 
that the (unmarried) woman is not able to get an equally good marriage and – 
to compensate the resulting financial loss – her dos must be increased by a pay-
ment of the wrongdoer so that she will be in the same position with regard to 
her marriage prospects as she was in the situation before her disfigurement.175
According to the the second text, Inleidinge III.34.2, in a case of injuries 
inflicted on a man,  a duty to compensate for medical costs and loss of (future) 
income was accepted, both in accord with Roman law texts of the Corpus Iuris, 
170  Dondorp 1998, p. 70.
171  Feenstra 1972, p. 231. See Accursian gloss glori(a)e causa ad D. 9.2.7.4 (a transcription 
can also be found in Feenstra 1972, p. 237), where Azo stated – with reference to D. 9.2.13pr. – 
that an actio legis Aquiliae utilis was possible in the event of the killing or wounding of a freeman. 
Although Bulgarus denied the action, and according to Rogerius D. 9.2.15.1 and D. 21.1.42 plead 
for this point of view, as these texts show that the value of a freeman’s body cannot be assessed. 
According to Azo, however, although the value of a freeman’s body cannot be assessed, the other 
kinds of damage can be claimed (cetera damna). An extensive study on the compensation for 
pain and suffering can be found with Olivier 1978.
172  Feenstra 1992a, p. 440f.; Broers 2012, p. 87.
173  See Feenstra 1958, 29ff.; 1992, p. 440f.; Broers 2012, p. 87f.; according to Dondorp 1998, 
p. 73, this claim originated in indigenous legal practice. However, also the moral theologians did 
defend such maintainance duty.   
174  Feenstra 1972, p. 235; Pauw 1977, p. 244f.
175  Olivier 1978, p. 68, 74.
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and additionally a compensation for pain and suffering (or for scars and dis-
figuration of the (human) body) was provided (a deviation from Roman law; 
the influence of local law and Spanish natural law scholars).176 According to 
Grotius, pain and disfigurement of the body of a freeman, although properly 
speaking incapable of compensation, are assessed in a sum of money, when 
such damages are demanded.177
 
4.4 Roman-Dutch law
4.4.1 Introduction
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Roman law was ‘received’ in the 
province of Holland. Under the rule of the Counts of Holland, the law of 
Holland consisted principally in general and local customs.178 These Germanic 
customs were supplemented by privileges (handvesten) and local regulations 
(keuren) and were themselves affected by an earlier infiltration of Roman law 
(early reception). The resulting mixed system was called ‘Roman-Dutch law’.179 
Apart from these customary laws of Germanic origin (custom), Roman-Dutch 
law was composed of other sources of law, such as local laws, legislation (e.g. 
decrees, edicts, ordinances and resolutions), judicial decisions and rules set 
out in legal literature, treatises and opinions of jurists.180 As already stated 
above, the Corpus Iuris Civilis was accepted as an additional source of law in 
many parts of continental Europe in early modern times. Also in the province 
of Holland, as well as in other provinces of the Dutch Republic, the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis was accepted as such. The extent of the reception of Roman law or the 
legal rules in force was not always identical. Each province was autonomous 
as regards its private law. Also, the legal authorities displayed divergent views 
when describing the law in force in the various provinces.181 The majority of 
the jurists from the province of Holland used the concepts of Roman law to 
describe the private law of their time, and added whether or not the Roman 
176  Feenstra 1972, p. 235f.; 1992, p. 452f.; Dondorp 1998, p. 74; Broers 2012, p. 88f.
177  H. Grotius, Inleidinge, III.34.2; see also Feenstra 1958, p. 40f.; 1972, p. 235; 1992, p. 451f.; 
Pauw 1977, p. 246; Olivier 1978, p. 137f.
178  Lee 1953, p. 3.
179  This term was invented by Simon van Leeuwen in 1652. See on this matter, e.g., Lee 
1953, p. 2. Roman-Dutch law remained in force in Holland until it was superseded in 1809 by 
the ‘Wetboek Napoleon ingerigt voor het Koningrijk Holland’, which in its turn gave place to the 
Code civil in 1811 and the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) in 1838.
180 See on these sources of Roman-Dutch law, e.g., Lee 1953, p. 14ff.; Smits 2002, p. 153ff. 
with references.
181  See Hallebeek & Merkel 2010, p. 84.
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rules were received in legal practice of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. This private law, as conceived by Dutch jurists, was called Roman-
Dutch law. The question of Aquilian liability seems to have risen when a person 
caused patrimonial loss to another, pure economic loss, loss resulting from 
the death of a breadwinner and even immaterial damages.182 The (divergent?) 
treatment of the different types of damages will be discussed below.
4.4.2 Liability based on the lex Aquilia
There was sufficient legal ground for liability if  the wrongdoer acted in 
contravention of a rule of positive law, or acted with dolus or with culpa.183 
Liability could thus only be based on the lex Aquilia if the damage was inflicted 
unlawfully (iniuria). Iniuria only occurred if the damage had been inflicted 
due to negligence, not in case of coincidence (casus). If culpa (even levissima) 
preceded the accident, the wrongdoer was liable, even if he did not mean to 
inflict damage.184 
The foundation upon which the law of contributory negligence has been 
built in Roman-Dutch law is to be found in certain passages in the Digest, 
among which the most important is D. 50.17.203. According to the secondary 
literature, particular attention may be given to D. 9.2.28, which includes the 
general rule that an injured plaintiff is refused relief if it had been in his power 
to avoid the danger created by the defendant.185 The words ‘culpa sua’ in the 
rule of D. 50.17.203 could be understood as applying to any carelessness in 
safeguarding a person’s own life or property. That would be negligence in the 
sense of failing to look after a person’s own interests.186 If the rule was applied 
to deprive a plaintiff of a remedy whenever his damage was partly caused by 
182  According to Roman-Dutch law, in cases of defamation one could ask for an amende 
honorabele (recantation and apology) as well as an amende profitabele (monetary penalty) – the 
latter had to be paid to himself or to the poor. See on this topic Zimmermann 1996, p. 1070ff.; 
Broers 1996, p. 158ff.; 2003, p. 55.
183  See also A. Matthaeus, De criminibus, XLVII.3, caput I, nr. 4.
184  See, e.g., Paulus Voet (1619–1667), In quatuor libros Institutionum imperialium 
Commentarius, §. 3.4, who also mentioned the case of a soldier who was doing exercises on 
the Marsfield, and coincidentally killed a passer-by with a javelin; he would not be liable, 
because the soldier did not act negligently (culpa); but the passer-by acted negligently (culpa) 
by inappropriately (importune) and imprudently (imprudenter) crossing the field designated for 
javelin throwing (see also Inst. 4.3.4 & D. 9.2.9.4).
185  Aquarius 1941, p. 248.
186  ibid.
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his own negligence, this rule would be a hard one.187 I will show that some deci-
sions and opinions nevertheless point at such a rule and such an application.
Some jurists seem to have applied the theory of contributory negligence to 
cases of their time; theoretically, the usual ius commune approach is followed 
and they do not provide anything new. This appears from the commentary 
of Arnold Vinnius (1588–1657)188 on the Institutes (first published in 1642), in 
which he stated that a wrongdoer could not be held liable if an injured party 
also acted negligently and this contributory negligence of the injured party 
was the cause of his damage.189 With regard to the case of the javelin throwers, 
Vinnius argued that what is said in Inst. 4.3.4 about soldiers practising in an 
exercise field190 is also applicable to civilians who were used to exercising in 
a certain place.191 Vinnius asked what was to be said about a meeting of civil-
ian archers who regularly competed by shooting at targets in a certain field. 
Also in case of a person of a group of non-soldiers who, while training in a 
field where they regularly trained, killed someone who crossed the area at an 
inappropriate moment, no negligence would be assumed unless the spear was 
aimed intentionally at the passer-by.192 
187  Mazeaud-Tunc 1970, para. 1449, described the adoption of D. 50.17.203 in Roman 
law as ‘une règle brutale’; and added that ‘la victime qui a participé au dommage ne peut rien 
réclamer; il n’y a pas à distinguer selon que sa faute est ou non la cause unique du préjudice.’
188  On Vinnius see, e.g., Arnaud 1969, p. 319; Zimmermann 1992, p. 42f.; 2005, p. XIff.
189  A. Vinnius, Commentarius ad Inst. 4.3.2, nr. 1: Qui hac actione non teneantur? … Aut si in 
eo, qui laesus est, culpa sit, cur sit laesus, vid. infr. § 4 & 5. [Inst. 4.3.4 & 5] …
190 In the case described in the second line of Inst. 4.3.4, a soldier was exercising in an 
exercise field when one of his javelins pierced a slave. According to A. Vinnius, Commentarius 
ad Inst. 4.3.4, nr. 1, in this case two circumstances led to the fact that the conduct of the thrower 
was considered to be without negligence and that therefore the Lex Aquilia was not applicable. 
Firstly, the place, predetermined or not for exercise and, secondly, the person practising, i.e. a 
soldier, were important circumstances. If either one of these circumstances did not occur, the 
Lex Aquilia would again become applicable. Thus, if either a civilian threw a spear in an exercise 
field for soldiers and killed a slave, or a soldier did this outside the exercise field, both would be 
liable under the lex Aquilia. The same distinction was made by (the German) C. Rittershusius 
(1560–1613) in his Commentarius novus, ad Inst. 4.3.4  He argues that if someone acted without 
negligence, he should not be punished by a poena based on the lex Aquilia. In the case of the 
javelin thrower one has to make a twofold distinction: based on the person and based on the 
place. If the thrower was a civilian, he would have acted negligently in any case (the place where 
he threw javelins in that case did not matter), because he should not have thrown javelins (only 
allowed to soldiers). If the thrower was a soldier, javelin throwing would have been permitted at 
a usual place or a place designated for such a purpose; if that was not the case (so if he threw in 
an unusual place), he was negligent.
191  See A. Vinnius, Commentarius ad Inst. 4.3.4, nr. 1 (edn. J.G. Heineccius, Leiden 1726, p. 755).
192  See also H. Grotius, Inleidinge, III.33.8: Voor onschuldig werden ghehouden die oeffening 
van wapenen doen daer sulcks gewoonlick is te gheschieden, oock die boomen snoeien niet aen de 
weg, ofte die sulcks doende aen de weg de voorby-gaenden luiden door gheroep waerschouwen; also 
interesting is D.G. van der Keessel’s Praelectiones iuris hodierni ad Grotius’ Inleidinge III.33.8, 
wherein he referred to the view of the jurists who write in the Rechtgeleerde Observatien, III, obs. 
95 (edn. 1778, p. 250ff., EvD) that Grotius’ view that no poena nor compensation of the damage 
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The aforementioned view of Vinnius that what is said in Inst. 4.3.4 about 
soldiers practising in an exercise field is also applicable to civilians who 
were used to exercising in a certain place,193 is affirmed by a similar case 
that occurred in the area of the Duchy of Brabant (Brabantia) and which 
is mentioned in the Consilia of Wamesius (1524–1590).194 In Consilium II.51 
Wamesius described the case of Wilhelm van Arschot and Wilhelm vanden 
Putte. Young people were playing at a place where men as well as young men 
were used to practising shooting arrows at targets during their holidays. The 
just-mentioned Wilhelmus van Arschot passed this field and unfortunately 
was hit in his right eye by one of the arrows, as a result of which he lost his 
sight. According to Wamesius, the archer could only be held liable if it could 
be proven that he had acted negligently.195 In his argumentation, Wamesius 
referred to D. 9.2.9.4, when he stated that the thrower played at a place where 
one generally was used to playing with spears, and a passer-by crossed the field 
without reason and was hurt in any way, the thrower did not act negligently. 
Therefore, in the case in question, Wilhelm vanden Putte could not be held 
liable unless some other (special) kind of negligence was proven.196 In this 
case, nothing that could have impeded excusing the defendant from liability 
(not because of place, time or genus lusus) was proven by the plaintiff. By 
way of witnesses, it was even proven that the defendant shouted loudly 
before he threw the javelin, so bystanders could have secured their safety.197 
In conclusion, Wamesius explicitly dealt with the question whether this kind 
of behaviour was permitted only to soldiers or also to civilians. Training with 
javelins was only permitted to soldiers, and only on exercise fields; however, 
based on the general custom of that time, civilians also played with arrows 
had to be paid by the thrower must be understood in the way that such a thrower needed a 
pardon. Although Van der Keesel has doubts on this, he admitted that indeed such a pardon 
is sometimes given (so-called remissie) and he referred to the existence of a special privilege, 
namely the Voorrecht aan de Schutters van Sint Joris Gilde te Leiden, verleend door Hertog van 
Bourgondië d.d. 15 juni 1438, given to the shooters of the Sint Joris Gilde in Leiden. The privilege 
granted a pardon for the case in which they performed military exercises at a usual place and 
coincidentally killed someone, but nevertheless imposed upon the shooter the making of a 
payment of compensation (beteringe) to the relatives (maghen) of the victim.
193  See also Cyprianus Regneri ab Oosterga, Censura Belgica, edn. 1648, p. 567f.: … Sed quia 
militibus ita se exercentibus, et amputatoribus, qui plerumque pauperes sunt, aliquid remittendum 
sit, posset hic sententiae nostrae exceptio esse …, with reference to Grotius, Inleidinge, III.33 and 
J. Wamesius, Consilium 51 (centuria 2). Apparently, with regard to soldiers and tree pruners, who 
are often poor, an exception was made and their liability was slightly diminished.
194 Johann Wamesius studied at Louvain, not only law but also ancient languages, and in 
particular Greek. He became ordinary professor of law in 1555 and professor primarius of canon 
law in 1570. On Wamesius, see Von Schulte 1896, p. 131f.
195  J. Wamesius, Consilium 51 (centuria 2), nr. 1.
196 ibid., nr. 2.
197  ibid., nr. 5.
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and catapults (arcum aut balistam). Therefore it was allowed for civilians to 
play such games if it was permitted to play games of shooting with arrows in 
the area of the Duchy of Brabant.198
 
A similar application of contributory negligence in conformity with the ius 
commune approach can be found in Ulrich Huber’s Heedendaegse Rechts- 
geleertheydt.199 In this influential work he mainly treated Frisian law, not the law 
of Holland. In his chapter on loss (Van Schade), which he described as ‘the wors-
ening of another’s property by the fault of the offender, whether occasioned 
intentionally or unintentionally’,200 he argued that if a wrongdoer inflicted dam-
age negligently, he had to bear the loss.201 An exception was made in the case 
of an accident (ongeluck), e.g. if a person in accordance with normal practice 
started any physical exercise at a place meant for it and then killed someone, 
provided that he had to give a warning where warnings were usually given, as 
in the (ball)game of Palmasie (rincket). In case of a game of kaetsen,202 no such 
warning had to be given and everyone had to look after himself. So an injured 
person should blame himself if he suffered any damage during that game.203 
This reasoning looks like an exact application of the rule of D. 50.17.203.
4.4.2.1 New starting points for the theory of culpa maior
In the commentary on the Digest by the Utrecht professor Johannes Voet 
(1647–1713)204 on the liability of the barber (D. 9.2.11pr.), the relevance of 
contributory negligence in Roman-Dutch law becomes immediately clear.205 
In interpreting Ulpians’ reply, Johannes Voet argued as follows. It is true that 
it may be said that someone who entrusted himself into the hands of a barber 
198  ibid., nr. 3.
199 Huber was a professor at the Franeker University, teaching Rhetoric and History from 1657 
to 1665, and Law from 1665 until his death, which period was interrupted by three years of service at 
the Provincial Court (Hof van Friesland) at Leeuwarden (1679–1682); see Hewett 2010, p. xix.
200 Translation cited from Gane 1939, p. 388; the original words in Dutch are as follows: 
‘verslimmeringe van een ander sijn goedt, door des Daders schuldt, het zy met, of sonder opzet 
veroorzaekt’ (U. Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheydt, VI.4.2, edn. 1768, p. 886).
201 U. Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheydt, VI.4.4; - Also VI.4.11 is relevant as to 
the statement that, apart from an accident, any kind of fault and imprudence (schuldt en 
onvoorzichtigheyt) must be made good, so a person who did not act with the most scrupulous 
possible diligence was obliged to pay for the damage caused to another’s property.
202 On palmasie and kaetsen, see Schotel 1869, esp. p. 127.
203 U. Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheydt, VI.4.7 (4th edn. of the Dutch version 
(1742); I also used the English translation by Gane 1939, p. 388f.).
204 On Johannes Voet see, e.g., Roberts 1933; Kop 1987, p. 130ff.; Zimmermann 1992, p. 39ff.; 
Moosheimer 1996, p. 440ff.; Ashmann 2001, p. 656; López-Jacoiste Díaz 2004, p. 465ff. 
205 Scott 1984, p. 170.
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who put his chair in a dangerous place (i.c. where it was customary to play 
games) ought to blame himself. Nevertheless, such greater negligence and 
carelessness on the barber’s part in plying his craft at an unsafe place could not 
just be excused for that reason. Voet qualified it as ‘common knowledge’ that 
when two persons were negligent at the same time, the person whose negli-
gence is considered more serious was held liable.206 The same would apply if 
someone put himself under the treatment of an unskilled medical man. Such 
person was not entirely free from negligence, yet the unskilled medical man 
was liable if he was responsible for bad treatment, due to his unskillfulness.207 
Voet’s approach appears to be based on culpae compensatio,208 but with a 
more logical application of the rules of set-off (than the medieval (Roman) 
rules) since Voet believed that the greater fault of the barber could not be 
excused.209 This text of Voet’s is indeed important since it clearly outlines the 
idea of greater fault/negligence (culpa maior).210 Voet believed that in the case 
of D. 9.2.11pr. the negligence and carelessness on the barber’s part could not 
be excused just because of the fact that the slave ought to blame himself as he 
put himself into the hands of a barber with his chair in a dangerous spot. When 
two persons were negligent at the same time, but their faults were unequal, 
the person whose negligence was considered to be the more serious was 
held liable/responsible.211 Voet’s approach implies a quantitative estimation 
of the negligence on each side; if the negligence on each side was unequal, 
206 My paraphrase is based on the translation by Gane 1955, p. 576 here.
207 J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 9.2 nr. 17 (edn 1778, p. 432): … non tamen inde 
excusata videri potest major illa tonsoris culpa ac imprudentia, in loco non tuto artem profitentis; 
dum novum non est, ut in concurrente duorum culpa is teneatur, cujus culpa major conspicitur 
…. Voet refers to D. 18.6.13(12), D. 18.6.14(13), D. 2.7.1.2 and 2. Van den Bergh 2002, p. 55, rightly 
stated that these texts only imply that negligent behaviour of one party excluded negligence of 
the other party, but that the concept of ‘maior culpa’ cannot be found in these fragments.
208 With regard to the theory of culpae compensatio as applied by the Dutch Elegant 
School, the disputation of E. Emtinck (1701) under the presidency of Schultingh is relevant; see 
Schultingh, Thesium controversarium, thesis 57.7. There seems to be no large difference in the 
application of this theory compared to medieval practice: in contractual relations, as well as in 
the case of delicts, a mutual compensation of the respective negligent acts (culpa), or dolus (as 
far as one is legally demanding a financial compensation) was possible. Therefore, no one could 
legally bring an action against the other. 
209 Thomas 2001, p. 353, 359.
210 Also Aquarius 1941, p. 260; see also Voet (9.2.22) in which he solves a responsibility 
problem by fault comparison.
211  Scott 1984, p. 170. As Scott rightly stated, Voet apparently agreed with the view that 
the greater blame is of the person to whom blameworthy conduct is imputed, as a consequence 
of the rule ‘imperitia culpae adnumeratur’; this can be concluded from Voet’s aforementioned 
commentary (9.2 sect. 17) and more in general from his commentary on D. 9.2. sect. 3 in fin. and 
sect. 23; - According to Kotzé 1953, p. 68, ‘is teneatur’ apparently has to be interpreted in such a 
way that it also concerns the case in which the negligence (culpa) of the plaintiff is more serious. 
Then is teneatur does not necessary imply liability of the plaintiff-injured, but the plaintiff was 
not granted an action.
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the person who committed the smaller fault was discharged and the bigger 
fault remained. As a result of this rule, the claim against the more negligent 
person succeeded in totality.212 Although the all-or-nothing approach was still 
the same as in medieval times, it was now renewed in the sense that the less 
serious negligence of the injured party did not cancel out his right to claim 
for damages.213
This approach is not applied by Voet to the case of the javelin throwers. 
Voet discussed whether injuries inflicted during games would lead to liability 
under the lex Aquilia. According to Voet, people were regarded as liable when 
hurting another while engaging in a lawful exercise or a game, in case the harm 
occurred because no proper attention was paid to the particular place or to 
persons at a certain time. Liability would also occur when harm was done 
knowingly and deliberately, although no negligence in respect of time, place 
or persons could be held against the wrongdoer(s). In the case of the javelin 
throwers, one of the throwers, while playing or exercising with javelins, pierced 
another’s slave (passer-by). If this throwing was committed by a soldier on a 
field where exercising was common, the thrower did not act negligently. But 
if someone else, not being a soldier, performed such an action, he would have. 
The same would apply when a soldier committed such an action in a place 
outside the allotted exercising field, or threw his javelin at the man on purpose, 
even in an allotted javelin exercising field.214
4.4.2.2 Criminal law
The relevant sources of the ius commune had also found their way into 
criminal law. As mentioned before, in the early modern period, Roman delicts 
lost their penal character. However, some rules of these (Roman) delicts were 
still used in (public) criminal law, as revealed in the elaborate treatise on 
homicide written by Simon van Leeuwen (1625–1682) in his Censura forensis 
where he compared the regional and local law with Roman law.215 Furthermore, 
212  Thomas 2001, p. 353f.; according to Thomas 2001, p. 354, if both negligences were 
equal, the situation could be regarded as comparable to an accidental situation in which no fault 
was made. In Roman-Dutch marine collisions the principle applied that the loss on both sides 
was borne in halves (see section 4.4.3), this moiety rule should apply in marine collisions where 
an equal mutual fault occurred. Voet (Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 9.2, nr. 15), however, did 
not draw these conclusions from his own rule on culpa compensation.
213  According to medieval Roman law, the mere existence of culpa led to the denial of 
claim for damages.
214  J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 9.2 nr. 24 (edn. 1778, p. 435); my paraphrase 
is based on the English translation by  Gane 1955, p. 585.
215  On Simon van Leeuwen see, e.g., Zimmermann 1992, p. 44f.;- Besides, Antonius 
Matthaeus II (1601–1654) wrote a treatise called De Criminibus (1644) in which he treated books 
47 and 48 of the Digest (the so-called Libri terribiles) and discussed the Roman criminal law as 
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it is also interesting to see the way in which the rules of canon law are used in 
criminal law in the early modern period. The concept of culpa as used in canon 
law is incorporated in the early modern treatments on homicide. Contributory 
negligence of the injured party has no explicit place in this theory; however, 
this is not implausible, because of the criminal character of homicide. 
With regard to homicide, as in canon law a distinction was made between 
accidental and culpable homicide. A homicide was regarded culpable if neg-
ligence was involved.216 Negligence was considered to be present if the death 
of the victim by sheer chance occurred while doing something illegally217 or 
if someone, although performing a lawful and permitted act, had not taken 
adequate care.218 Also, this definition of negligence by Van Leeuwen reminds us 
of the definition of canon law (see the previous chapter).219 When a homicide 
regarded as culpable (aliqua culpa) had been committed, the judge had to 
decide the penalty according to his judgement and discretion and depending 
on the extent of the negligence involved in the delict.220 
Conversely, a different situation occurred in the event of accidental homicide, 
i.e. homicide committed by chance with absolutely no malicious intent or 
negligence of the killer during or before the homicide.221 No penalty was given, 
nor was the wrongdoer imputed any irregularity by an ecclesiastical judge in 
case of fortuitous chance.222 An example, already thoroughly discussed in the 
previous chapter,223 and mentioned in this context, is the case of a cleric who, 
playing boisterously, threw another cleric to the ground and in doing that, 
received in (the United Provinces of) the Netherlands.
216 See also already, e.g., P. Farinacius, Praxis Criminalis, De homicidio, q. 125, nr. 36.
217  See also the example given by F. Wielant, Corte instructie I, cap. 53/14, in which he 
states that when someone intentionally threw another from a bridge into the water, or from a 
window onto the street, and the victim drowned or died as a result of the fall, the wrongdoer 
would be punished on the charge of homicide, even though it was meant as a game, because 
such a game was not permitted; see also Vrolijk 2004, p. 170.
218  See S. van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis I.V.XI De homicidio, nr. 11.
219  See also L. Carerius, Practica causarum criminalium. De homicidio, nr. 2.
220 S. van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis I.V.XI De homicidio, nr. 11: Quibus duobus casibus, si 
infortunio ac casu quodam ex facto alicujus quis interficiatur, homicidium pro culposo habendum 
est: eoque commisso judex pro arbitrio et discretione sua poenam decernet, secundum culpae aut 
levitatem, aut gravitatem, quae communiter esse solet, exilium, relegatio, damnatio ad carceres sive 
perpetuos, sive temporales, etiam pecuniaria. …  See also already P. Farinacius, Praxis Criminalis, 
De homicidio, q. 125, nr. 27.
221  S. van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis I.V.XI De homicidio, nr. 7.
222 On this topic, see also J. Ayrerus, De Homicidio, pars 3, num.1 et 10ff.; - This corresponds 
with what Carerius argued with regard to the accidental homicide in ius civile in his Practica 
causarum criminalium. De homicidio, nr. 1.
223 Other examples of homicidium casuale and homicidium culposum are mentioned by L. 
Carerius, Practica causarum criminalium. De homicidio,  nr.’s 12ff., 19ff.
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a knife he had attached to his side got loose and fell on the other by chance, 
causing fatal wounds (X 5.12.9).224
Another example, which was mentioned (in the German and Latin versions) 
by Van Leeuwen is Article 146 of the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina of Charles V of 
1532 (CCC).225 The Constitutio criminalis Carolina of 1532 was a revision – known 
by its Latin title but retaining the German of the original226 – of the Bamberg 
Code, the Peinliche Halsgerichtsordnung of Charles V of 1507, authored in large 
part by J. von Schwarzenberg (see below).227 From Article 146 CCC it appears that 
a homicide was not punished in the presence of a justification to the act which 
was valued according to objective circumstances.228 Article 146 CCC, concerning 
accidental homicide against the actor’s will (except for self-defence), is especially 
interesting as two cases are listed which are comparable to the case mentioned 
in Justinian’s Digest: the case of the barber and the case of the javelin throwers. 
As to the reception of these fragments, in chapter three I discussed the 
224  According to the report of the facts of the case as presented by Joost de Damhouder 
(1507–1581) in his Practycke in Criminele saken, cap. 84, nr. 16ff., two clerics played a wrestling 
game, and one of them threw the other to the ground. The cleric thrown to the ground 
coincidentally held a knife in his hand, and the cleric who threw him fell on the knife, was 
wounded and subsequently died. Because of the coincidental nature of the accident, the cleric-
wrongdoer did not act negligently. According to Joost de Damhouder, this coincidental accident 
was only excused if the wrongdoer acted without intention to harm, did something which was 
allowed to him, and used great care to prevent the accident. Otherwise, the wrongdoer acted 
negligently, and he would become irregular. Dispensation for such irregularity could only be 
given by the Pope, or in minor cases by a bishop (however not based on his own authority but on 
a mandate from the Pope). See also already F. Wielant, Corte instructie in materie criminele, cap. 
85, nr. 4: Zo zyn ooc die ghesleghen [hebben] onwetens ende onwillens end zonder malencien, of diet 
deden by messchieve of ongheval, zonder culpe of groote roukelooshede, of diet deden in spele als 
tspel gheoorlooft was, ende niet te ruude, ende ooc tgrief niet te groot, noch scadieuselic ghedaen.
225 Van Leeuwen’s version seems to be derived from the Latin text of art. 146, which reads: 
Cum Titius in tonstrina sua (qui locus ei nogocio commodus est) Sempronio barbam raderet, 
inopinato casu in manus tonsoris iactatum quid est, aut tonsor percussu, unde gula eius, quem 
radebat, cultello, praeciditur. Exemplum dari et hoc potest: Si balearis quis funditor, aut miles in 
campo Martio iaculationibus atque militaribus exercitationibus atque militaribus exercitationibus 
destinato, iaculis ludens, palum iaciens, dum telum emittit, bombardam ad metam exonerat, 
transeuntem transcurrentemve laeserit, traiecerit: vel si, cum nondum collimasset, telum inuito 
manu fugerit, atque hominem occiderit, quia improviso casu factum est, nulla horum culpa 
intelligitur; §1. Si vero tonsor in via publica aut ubi homines ex consuetudine tonderi non solent, quem 
radat: aut miles, sagittarius, bombardarius in alio loco, quam qui ad exercitandum iaculandum 
datus est, ut qua vulgo iter fit, eiaculatus fuerit: aut si imprudentius arcum, tormentumve in loco 
ipso destinato tractarit et versarit: si quis ab eo tonsore vel milite occidatur, quod in lata culpa sint, 
puniri possunt. …
226 The Carolina was composed in what is today is called Frühneuhochdeutsch; see 
Langbein 1974, p. 259.
227 Reinhart 2007, p. 766.
228 Krikke 1980, p. 205. He reminds us of the glossator Vivianus who discussed the case 
of the barber. He argued that if the barber was sitting at a public place near to people who 
were throwing, and if, for example, he had been hit by a horse, that could be considered casus 
fortuitus. However, the barber would have acted with culpa if the accident occurred as the result 
of a game which did not prevent him from doing his job as if there was nothing going on; see Van 
Zuylen 1912, p. 32f.
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Klagspiegel which included diverse explanations of culpa; these became a 
model (Vorbild) for the Halsgerichtsordnung of Bamberg (1507) of Johann von 
Schwarzenberg und Hohenlandsberg (1465–1528),229 and later in Article 172 of 
the Bambergensis.230 The fact that the Klagspiegel was taken as a model can be 
explained by the fact that Von Schwarzenberg could not base himself directly 
on the sources, not being familiar with the Latin language.231 
As (generally speaking) Roman jurists derived fundamental ideas and rela-
tionships from casuistry, Schwarzenberg adopted the results of this derivation 
and adduced the Roman cases as examples to convey the right understanding 
of these derivations to the ‘common man, as sitting at the courts’, with the aim 
of explaining the relevant distinctions made by the law even to uneducated 
(‘nicht gelehrten’) judges.232 Soon after this, Article 172 of the Bambergensis 
was adopted unchanged in Article 146 of the Carolina of 1532, which text is 
also recorded by Van Leeuwen.233 
Von Schwarzenberg distinguished three kinds of damage-inflicting acts. 
The first is the coincidental act, which remained unpunished and which was 
excused. The second is the intentional (malicious and wilful) act and the 
third is the negligent act234 which was careless, for which he – with mercy – 
provides a reduction of the punishment.235 With regard to negligent killing, 
229 Knütel 2001, p. 365. On J.F. von Schwarzenberg, see, e.g., Wolf 1963, p. 102ff.; Conrad 
1966, p. 408; Kleinheyer/Schröder 1996, p. 364ff. 
230 See Brunnenmeister 1879, p. 172f.
231  Hälschner 1855, p. 90; Stintzing 1959, p. 400; Knütel 2001, p. 365.
232 Knütel 2001, p. 366.
233 See S. van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis I.V.XI De homicidio, nr. 8; - Art. 146 of the Constitutio 
criminalis Carolina of Charles V (1532) is based on art. 172 of the Halsgerichtsordnung of 
Bamberg drawn up by J.F. von Schwarzenberg in 1507, fo. 48v/49r; - The German text version of 
the Constitutio criminalis Carolina as reproduced by Van Leeuwen slightly differs from the text of 
the Peinliche Gerichtsordnung Kaiser Karels V. of 1532 as reproduced in the edition of Radbruch-
Kaufmann of 1978, p. 92f: Eyn balbirer schiert eynem den bart inn seiner stuben, als gewonlich 
zu schern ist, und würd durch eynen also gestossen oder geworffen, daß er dem so er schiert, die 
gurgel wider seinen willen abschneidet, Eyn ander gleichnuß, so eyn schütz inn eyner gewonlichen 
zilstatt steht, oder sitzt, und zu dem gewonlich blatt scheust, und es laufft im eyner under den 
schuß, oder jm lest ungeuerlicher weiß unnd wider sein willen sein büchs oder armbrust, ehe und er 
recht anschlecht und abkompt, unnd scheust also jemandt zu todt, dise beyde seind entschuldigt. 
Understünd sich aber der balbirer an der gassen oder sunst an eyner ungewonlichen statt jemandts 
zu schern, oder der schütz an eyner dergleichen ungewonlichen statt, da man sich versehen mocht, 
daß leut wanderten, zu schiessen, oder hielt sich der schütz inn der zilstatt unfürsichtiger weiß, 
unnd würde also von dem balbirer, oder dem schützen, als obsteht, jemandt entleibt, der thätter 
keyner würd gnug entschuldigt. …
234 An act has to be regarded as done with negligence if it is done ‘ungeferlich, auss 
geylheit oder unfursichtigkeitt, doch widder des thätters willen’; see Schmidt 1965, p. 118.
235 Schwarzenberg took over the principle of liability in case of negligence (Schuldhaftung) 
for public penalties (and eliminated the remainder of the Erfolgshaftung, in particular the 
‘Ungefährwerke’); see Hälschner 1855, p. 88f., 94f.; Schmidt 1965, p. 117; Conrad 1966, p. 409; 
Knütel 2001, p. 367. Also J. Brunnemann, Commentarius ad D. 9.2.9, nr. 3, in his commentary 
on the contents of D. 9.2.9.4 (and D. 9.2.10), referred to art. 146 of the Constitutio Criminalis of 
Charles V.
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Schwarzenberg endeavours to make the facts clear by examples borrowed from 
the Digest (see Article 146 CCC).236 As stated above, coincidental killings led 
to the full excusing of the killer from liability; in the examples Schwarzenberg 
shows the distinction between negligent behaviour and not-punishable 
coincidental acts. Finally, the fact that he declared negligent manslaughter a 
culpable act shows that he followed the view developed by the medieval jurists 
(Glossators and Commentators) and that in canon law.237
As to the example of the barber (D. 9.2.11pr.), it is remarkable that Von 
Schwarzenberg distantiated himself from the version as provided in the Klag-
spiegel in which the final solution of D. 9.2.11pr. (quamvis nec illud male …) was 
adopted. Von Schwarzenberg seems to put aside Ulpian’s view and return to 
that of Proculus, affirming the liability of the barber because of negligence on 
his side.238 It has been argued that Von Schwarzenberg, probably advised by his 
associate, the learned jurist Leonard von Egloffstein,239 supplied himself with 
the knowledge of the text of D. 9.2.11pr. (and further relevant fragments)240 and 
decided consciously thereupon against (the solution of) the Klagspiegel.241
 Another instance of reception can be found in an example referred to by Van 
Leeuwen, which can be found in Article 6, §2 of title 5, book 6 of the Landrecht 
des Hertogtums Preußen of 1620.242 In this article some examples are discussed 
236 Knütel 2001, p. 367f.; see also Roßhirt 1839, p. 193f., 214ff.; Engelmann 1922, p. 37f., esp. 
nt. 2., p. 257; 1965, p. 186, 209, 224ff.
237 In the same sense Knütel 2001, p. 367; - An English translation of the relevant part of 
the (later) Carolina (i.e. of the case of the barber and the case of the javelin throwers) can be 
found with Hewett 1991, p. 65.
238 On the suspected influence of this jurist on the Bambergensis, see Trusen 1984, p. 101ff.
239 Von Schwarzenberg had no learned and legal education; see, e.g., Conrad 1966, p. 408.
240 See Brunnenmeister 1879, p. 173; Knütel 2001, p. 367; - The examples of the barber and 
the javelin thrower are also mentioned in later times; see, e.g., B. Carpzovius, Practicae novae, I, 
quaest. XXVII, n. 9, where they were mentioned as examples of homicidium culposum.
241  Although it was originally written in German, it was translated into Latin in 1623/1624, 
and it is this version to which Van Leeuwen referred. See S. van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis 
I.V.XI De homicidio, nr. 9; Van Leeuwen’s version slightly differed from the original Latin version 
I consulted in the University Library of Leiden (Jus provinciale Ducatus Prussiae, edn. Rostock 
1623/1624).
242 See Art. 6, § 2 of title 5, book 6 of the Jus Provinciale Ducatus Prussiae (edn. Rostock 
1623/1624, p. 139): Aliud exemplum animadvertere licet in tonsore, qui cum in tonstrina sua, loco ei 
negotio destinato, barbam alicui raderet, inopinato casu inpulsus, aut percussus gulam ei quem 
radebat, praecidit: itemque aliud in funditore baleari vel jaculatore, qui in loco jaculationibus atque 
militaribus exercitiis destinato, jaculis ludens vel bombardam ad metam exonerans subeuntem 
transcurrentemve laeserit, trajecerit, vel cui invito et nondum collimanti, arcus vel bombarda 
exploditur, exoneraturque, atque ita hominem occidit: horum culpa nulla intelligitur. At si tonsor in 
via publica aut ubi homines tonderi non solent, quem radat; aut miles, sagittarius vel sclopetarius 
sive bombardarius in alio loco quam qui ad exercitandum datus est, et qua vulgo iter fit, ejaculatus 
fuerit: aut si imprudentius arcum tormentumve in ipso loco destinato tractavit et versavit: si quis ab 
eo tonsore vel jaculatore occidatur, delinquens non satis excusatur. Humaniores tamen in homicidiis 
per lasciviam imprudentiamve et invito auctore admissis; severiores in plectendis, studio et deliberato 
factis, judices esse par erit. Similiter si venator, dum venationi operam dat, et in feram telum mittit, 
hominem forte fortuna percusserit, tanquam homicida puniri non debet. Si igitur caedes ejusmodi, 
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to show in which cases a person acted negligently and in which situations he 
did not. No negligence can be found with the barber who when shaving a cus-
tomer’s beard in his barber’s shop, got accidentally struck and cut the throat of 
the man he was shaving; nor a slinger or soldier, in a place set aside for target 
practice and military exercises, who, when throwing a pike or firing a gun at a 
target, injured or killed someone passing or running by, or when a soldier had 
not yet aimed, his crossbow or gun automatically went off and thus killed a 
man.243 The actor will not be excused in the following situations: if the barber 
killed someone while shaving him in the public road or at a place where people 
were not accustomed to be shaved; or a soldier, archer or crossbowman if he 
killed someone while shooting in a place other than one which has been set 
aside for target practice, and where there is a public way, or if he handled his 
bow or cocked his crossbow rather carelessly albeit in the place assigned.244
Another example mentioned in Article 6, §2 of title 5, book 6 of the Landrecht 
(and later referred to by Van Leeuwen), is that of a hunter who, while concen-
trating on the hunt, shoots at an animal and by chance and ill luck strikes a 
man. In this case he ought not to be punished for a homicide. Interestingly, the 
view of the Landrecht here is that if a killing of this kind – which was uninten-
tional but with an element of negligence – is brought to court, and the judges 
consult the jurists about it, they will decide from the law and its workings and 
from their own knowledge what punishment corresponds to each act commit-
ted.245 This example of the hunter is similar to a remark made by Gratian’s,246 
namely, that a blind man is considered guilty if he hurt someone while hunting 
with a javelin.247 As already recapitulated above, according to the doctrine of 
canon law, if A unintentionally hurt B, A was responsible (for the unintended 
consequences) if he was engaged in an unlawful activity.248 Already in the 
Decretum Gratiani one can find texts that support this doctrine.249 Especially 
interesting is D.50 c.37, a case about a priest who killed a boy by throwing a 
stone. The priest was guilty if he engaged in an unlawful activity or if his activity 
was lawful but he failed to use due diligence.250 Such a situation occurred, for 
quae non quidem ex proposito, sed tamen culpa aliqua interveniente fuerit facta sit, in judicium 
deferatur, judices super ea prudentes consulant, qui, quae cuique facto opposito paena respondeat, ex 
jure ejusque arte, pro sua peritia statuent. Ex exemplis autem, quae a Nobis relata sunt, non obscure 
quivis animadvertere potest. Quae homicidia casu fiant, et quomodo rei excusentur.
243 My paraphrase is based on the English translation by Hewett 1991, p. 65.
244 See also translation by Hewett 1991, p. 65.
245 See also translation by Hewett 1991, p. 65f.
246 C.15 q.1 p.c.2; see already Genesis 4:23-24.
247 See Gordley 2006, p. 191 nt. 68 with references.
248 See, e.g., gloss penitus ad C. 15 q.1 p.c.2.
249 See, e.g., D.50 c.6, 37, 39, 43–44.
250 Gordley 2006, p. 190.
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example, when the priest threw the stone to chase a wild boar out of a field 
of grain, unless he had been careless. The canon law theory was endorsed in 
the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274).251 Interesting is 
Summa Theologiae II.II, q. 64, art. 8 co,252 concerning the question whether a 
person is guilty of murder after having killed someone by chance. In order for 
an action to be sinful, it must be undertaken by voluntary choice. In principle, 
this rule did not apply to cases of accidental homicide. However, it may happen 
that something which is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, is 
nevertheless voluntary and intended accidentally, according to which what 
removes an obstacle was considered an accidental cause. When someone did 
not remove something, and because of that a homicide occurred, while the 
wrongdoer had an obligation to remove it, in a sense was guilty of voluntary 
homicide. This could happen in two ways: when someone caused another’s 
death by doing something unlawful which he ought to avoid or when he did 
not take sufficient care.253 
The first example discussed by Aquinas is especially relevant: the case of 
Lamech,254 an old and blind man, who went hunting. His son was used to giving 
directions to Lamech; at a certain moment he told Lamech that farther away 
something was moving in the bush, and therefore, that it could be an animal. 
Lamech tightened his bow and arrow and shot. However, it was not an animal, 
but his grandfather Cain, who was killed by the arrow. Aquinas concluded 
that Lamech had not used sufficient care to avoid the killing of the man, and 
251  ibid., p. 192; even though Aquinas accepted the doctrine, many later scholastics rejected it. 
The doctrine died out in continental Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries; see Gordley 2006, p. 189f.
252 This part of the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas is called De iustitia et jure, 
the part dealing with the virtue of justice. De justitia et jure is an integral part of the Secunda 
secundae of the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas and covers the questions from 57 to 80 
(see Hallebeek 2010, p. 58).
253 Thomas Aquinas,  Summa Theologiae, II.II. q. 64, art. 8 (edn. Leonina 1897, IX, p. 76): 
Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in II Physic [cap. 6], casus est causa agens 
praeter intentionem. Et ideo ea quae casualia sunt, simpliciter loquendo, non sunt intenta neque 
voluntaria. Et quia omne peccatum est voluntarium, secundum Augustinum [lib[er] de ver[a] 
relig[ione] cap. XIV], consequens est quod casualia, inquantum huiusmodi, non sunt peccata. 
Contingit tamen id quod non est actu et per se volitum vel intentum, esse per accidens volitum 
et intentum, secundum quod causa per accidens dicitur removens prohibens. Unde ille qui non 
removet ea ex quibus sequitur homicidium, si debeat removere, erit quodammodo homicidium 
voluntarium. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: uno modo, quando dans operam rebus illicitis, quas 
vitare debebat, homicidium incurrit; alio modo, quando non adhibet debitam sollicitudinem. 
Et ideo secundum iura, si aliquis det operam rei licitae, debitam diligentiam adhibens, et ex hoc 
homicidium sequatur, non incurrit homicidii reatum: si vero det operam rei illicitae, vel etiam det 
operam rei licitae non adhibens diligentiam debitam, non evadit homicidii reatum si ex eius opere 
mors hominis consequatur.
254 See also Genesis 4: 23–24, from which one can deduce that Lamech killed a man, 
although it is not clear who that was. Ancient interpreters came to the conclusion that the man 
was the same man as reffered to in Genesis 4:1, namely Cain. See Kugel 1998, p. 167 and also Kugel 
1990, p. 159ff.
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therefore he did not escape the negligence for homicide.255
Also in early modern literature the case of the hunter is discussed, e.g. by 
Jacobus Menochius (1532–1607). While hunting, the hunter aimed at an animal 
but coincidentally hit and killed a person. In this case the hunter had not to 
be punished for murder.256 The same view was held by Prosper Farinacius 
(1554–1618), who mentioned the case of someone shooting arrows (at an 
animal) who coincidentally killed a person. In this case, to prove he did not 
act negligently, the hunter had to prove that he had not seen the passer-by and 
also that he did not have a feud with that person but, on the contrary, a (close) 
and affectionate relationship.257
4.4.2.3 Preliminary conclusion
Before going into maritime decisions, a short conclusion can be made. The 
idea that an equal or preponderant contributory negligence excluded any 
right for compensation of the injured party began to gain acceptance from the 
beginning of the seventeenth century.258 I have found a first trace in the thought 
of dolus as gravior culpa in Faber: if one party acted with dolus, and the other 
with culpa, no compensation could take place. This idea also appeared in the 
views of important jurists in the Dutch Republic in the pre-codification era; 
after having been formulated by Gerard Noodt, the idea of maior culpa came 
255 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II.II. q. 64, art. 8, esp.: 1. Legitur enim Gen. 4 
[23–24] quod Lamech, credens interficere bestiam, interfecit hominem, et reputatum est ei ad 
homicidium. Ergo reatum homicidii incurrit qui casualiter hominem occidit. … AD PRIMUM ergo 
dicendum quod Lamech non adhibuit sufficientem diligentiam ad homicidium vitandum, et ideo 
reatum homicidii no evasit. …
256 I. Menochius, De Arbitrariis iudicum quaestionibus et causis, casus CCCXXIV, nr. 2. One 
reference is to Herodotos, Ἱστορίαι, 1.<43, EvD>, which included a story which is quite similar 
to that under discussion above, namely that of Adrastus, son of Gordias, who threw a spear at a 
boar but missed and mortally hit Atys, the son of Croesus.
257 P. Farinacius, Praxis Criminalis, De homicidio, q. 125, nr. 27. The case is also mentioned 
by J. Ayrerus, De homicidio, Pars II, nr. 103, who referred to the case of D. 48.19.11.2 stating that 
a crime is committed by chance in the case in which a man while hunting aims a dart at a wild 
beast, but thereby kills another man.This Digest text has also been cited by others, such as 
Farinacius, in their discussions on (accidental) homicide.
258 Also Jansen 2002a, p. 106f.; 2002b, p. 206; Keirse 2003, p. 23f.; also Zimmermann 1996, 
p. 1030 (in the later usus modernus); - However, according to Aumann 1964, p. 50, the theory of 
the ‘Vernunftrecht’ remained a theory in the beginning. In practice, Roman law was applied (‘das 
römisch-gemeine Recht’; see in general Molitor 1949, p. 37). Also with regard to the contributory 
negligence of the injured party, jurisprudence continued to apply the principles of ‘das ältere 
gemeine Recht’/ältere Usus modernus’, according to which any negligence of the injured party, 
even a small amount, would lead to the removal of the liability of the wrongdoer, because the 
conditions for a duty to compensate were not present. Under the influence of rational law, the 
theory of ius commune and its practice, in the course of time, was used to interpret and apply the 
Roman sources, in a more free and critical way. The usus modernus pandectarum developed, with 
which jurists endeavoured to meet the needs of the individual case (Einzelfall; see Aumann 1964, 
p. 50). This will be discussed in more detail in the section on the usus modernus pandectarum (4.5).
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also to be adopted by Johannes Voet.259 Noodt and Voet came to the conclu-
sion that if the wrongdoer’s negligence exceeded the negligence of the injured 
party, the wrongdoer would be fully liable.260 However, this was not yet generally 
accepted, as some still applied the rule of D. 50.17.203 and just let contributory 
negligence lead to a denial of a claim for compensation.
4.4.3 Maritime collisions
4.4.3.1 Introduction to the topic
As has already become clear, and will become even clearer in the following, 
various opinions can be found on the manner of handling contributory 
negligence of the injured party in Roman-Dutch law.261 Firstly, it is important 
to remark that the Roman-Dutch scholars did not regard ‘wrong behaviour’ 
of the injured party as contributory negligence, but as ‘negligence’ only. 
This will become clear from the following description.262 With regard to the 
development of the concept of contributory negligence, cases of ship collisions 
are particularly interesting. Roughly three situations can be distinguished: 
neither party acted culpably (i.e. the incident was due to casus or if it was 
uncertain who was to blame), the wrongdoer acted with negligence or 
intention, or both parties acted negligently. Below, I will discuss the most 
259 In general, on 17th-century Leyden law professors, and especially Bronchorst, Vinnius 
and Voet, see Feenstra & Waal 1975. One can also find bibliographical information on other 17th- 
and 18-century Dutch professors in this work.
260 In this respect D. 9.2.11pr. seems to be a much debated case. Noodt as well as Voet 
came to the conclusion that the barber who performed his work in an unsafe place was liable, 
because his negligence was more serious than that of the slave. Voet incorporated Noodt’s view; 
according to Voet, however, this view was not new. See J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 
9.2, nr. 17.
261 On the collisions of ships in 17th-century London, see Steckley 2003, esp. p. 45f.: 
‘English Admiralty judges experimented early in the 17th century with a remedy long available 
in European maritime codes: they occasionally abandoned efforts to identify only one party as 
responsible for the collision, decided instead that the damage was in some measure due either 
to accident or the carelessness of both crews, and consequently reduced to the plaintiff ’s award. 
Thus they were finding contributory negligence long before the notion took hold at common 
law. And the cases studied here reveal when this approach became Admiralty routine in the 17th 
century, the simple rule (rusticum judicium) by which liability was divided and the defendant 
typically required to pay for only half the plaintiff ’s losses being applied. But the cases show 
more, namely that the civilians went further in their search for equity by the 1670s and develop 
a purely no-fault doctrine, a rule enforced at Doctor’s Common throughout the 18th century 
and requiring defendant and plaintiff to bear equal shares of the total damage on both sides.’ 
Unfortunately, however, this topic falls outside the scope of this study. On the application of the 
rule of judicium rusticorum by admiralty courts in cases of collision, see, e.g., Marsden 1886, p. 
357ff.; Street 1906 (reprint 1999), p. 144ff.; Staring 1957, p. 304ff.
262 See, e.g., S. van Leeuwen, Het Rooms-Hollands regt, IV.39.8, C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones 
Juris Privati, IV.22 and D.G. van der Keessel, in his Thesis 816 (all discussed below); Kotzé 1953, p. 57.
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relevant rules applicable in determining liability for collision damage in Roman-
Dutch law. Under what circumstances could the owner of the ship recover 
from the owner of the other ship in the event of a collision at sea? Before going 
into this topic, one important remark has to be made. A medieval principle of 
maritime law was that a shipowner could not lose more on an adventure than he 
had entrusted to or ventured on it.263 Therefore, if the master of his ship, acting 
within the scope of his duties, caused damage, the shipowner was only liable 
limited to the value of his ship.264 According to Van Niekerk, judgment against 
the shipowner could be levied only against the ship, which was arrested for that 
purpose. By relinquishment or abandonment (or: fictional abandonment)265 
of the ship for that purpose and not appearing to defend the action personally, 
the shipowner(s) in effect limited his liability to (their share in) the value of his 
ship.266 The limitation was also recognised in Roman-Dutch law.267
4.4.3.2 Collision cases described by Grotius
Hugo Grotius – the father of the jurisprudence of Holland –268 deals in his 
Inleidinge with the actual legal practice in the province of Holland. Two 
relevant texts on contributory negligence can be found in his discussion of 
quasi-delictual maritime collisions in part 38, on several situations in which 
Aquilian liability would apply.269 The first text is Inleidinge III.38.16, describing 
263 s’Jacob 1890, p. 14, 32; Van Niekerk 1998, II, p. 1282. This principle is already visible in 
the Consolato del mare, see, e.g., cap. 33, 34, 183.
264 Van Niekerk 1998, II, p. 1282.
265 See Van Niekerk 1998, II, p. 1283. On the right to abandonment, see s’Jacob 1890.
266 According to Van Niekerk 1998, II, p. 1282, the limitation of the shipowner’s liability was 
achieved by a personalisation of his ship: the ship was, as it were, considered liable for the actions 
by her master in the prosecution of her voyage. But, of course, it was impossible to institute an 
action against a ship, and, therefore, the action was directed at the shipowner(s);- This idea of 
limitation of the shipowners’ liability reminds us of the Roman law principle of noxae deditio, 
where the owner could discharge his liability for damage caused by his property (e.g. an animal) 
to someone else’s property by surrendering the offending object (e.g. the animal). On the origins 
and development of the limitation of shipowners’ liability, see Donovan 1979, p. 999ff.
267 See Munniks 1776, p. 47; Van Niekerk 1998, II, p. 1282; on the right to abandonment in 
Roman-Dutch law, see s’Jacob 1890, p. 26ff. Apparently, two systems can be found in Roman-
Dutch law: restricted liability by the law (Art. 167 of the Ordonnance of Rotterdam, S. van 
Leeuwen, Het Rooms-Hollands regt, XXXI.2, S. van Groenewegen van der Made, Tractatus de 
legibus abrogatis, IV.7.32) and entire liability with the alternative of a restricted one dependent 
on whether or not renunciation was made (see Ordonnance de la Marine, II.8.2; H. Grotius, 
Inleidinge, III.1.32; Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 14.1, nr. 5).
268 On the life, work and influence of Hugo Grotius, see, e.g., Edwards 1981; Roelofsen 1987, 
p. 113ff.; Vreeland 1917 (reprint 1986); Bull, Kingsbury & Roberts 1990; Zimmermann 1992, p. 26ff.; 
Nellen 2007. The literature on Grotius is overwhelming, but see, e.g., Wieacker & Weir 1995, p. 
227ff., who give some references for further reading.
269 Thomas 2001, p. 347.
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a collision of two ships under sail, which could not have been avoided. If one 
ship went down or was damaged, the loss had to be borne in equal parts by 
both parties, irrespective of the time of the collision, day or night, or of the 
weather conditions, clear or bad. However, if the collision occurred as a result 
of intent or negligence of one party, that party alone had to bear the damage.270 
The second text is Inleidinge III.38.18, describing a vessel under sail that runs 
into an anchored or moored ship. If that ship suffered any damage, the sailing 
ship would be liable for all damages if the collision was its fault. If it was not, 
the sailing ship was liable for half the damage caused to the other ship and for 
all of its own damage.271 The absence of fault on the side of the sailing ship had 
to be purged by an oath. However, the second ship could provide proof of the 
fault of the sailing ship, in which case the second ship (i.e. the ship which was 
run into) also had to prove that there was no fault on its own side.272 However, 
there can be situations in which both parties cannot prove they were fault-
less.273 Grotius’ Inleidinge III.38.18 did not cover the situation in which the 
injured party also acted negligently. Grotius only incorporated certain rules, 
derived from the statutes,274 into the system of delictual and quasi-delictual 
270 H. Grotius, Inleidinge III.38.16.
271  See also Fockema Andreae ad Hugo Grotius’ Inleidinge III. 38.18; - See also C. van 
Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones Juris Privati, IV.21, edn. 1744, p. 467, who argued that the party that 
suffered had to blame himself in this case. He referred to D. 9.1.1.11, in which a bull killed another 
bull that was attacking him; there would be no liability, neither would there be liability if a bull 
ran into a rock. It is impossible to say that the rock did not act according to its nature, and the 
same goes for the anchored ship in this case.
272 H. Grotius, Inleidinge III.38.18; Thomas 2001, p. 347f.
273 In part 37, another text is relevant from which one can deduce an application of 
the rule that if due to the circumstances the exact proportion could not be established or if 
the faults on either side appeared to be equal, the responsibility was shared 50/50, namely, 
Inleidinge III.37.7. This rule was already applied in the decisions of the Hoge Raad as recorded in 
Neostadius, Decisiones, 48 and 49, and also later by Louis XIV in Ordonnance de la Marine (1681), 
III.7.10 (edn. 1756, p. 302).
274 According to Simon van Groenewegen van der Made (1613–1652); see notes of Simon 
van Groenewegen van der Made at Grotius’ Inleidinge; the edition of 1692, i.c. p. 306, is used and 
see also Thomas 2001, p. 348; Grotius must have used the Ordinance of Emperor Charles V on 
maritime matters of 1551 (arts. 46 and 48 of the Placaet ende Ordonnantie, Op ’t stuck vande Zee-
Rechten of 19 July 1551 are relevant here), the Ordinance of King Philip of Spain on the same of 
1563 (see the title ‘Van Schepen die malkanderen beschadigen’ of the Ordonnantie, Statuyt ende 
eeuwige Edict etc. of 31 October 1563, arts. 1 and 3), as well as the laws of Whisby (arts. 27, 48 
and 68 of the Wisbuische Zee-Rechten). As a result of editorial oversight, the publication called 
‘Laws of Whisby’ in fact also contained two other collections, namely, the decisions on maritime 
law from Damme in Flanders (a Flemish transplant of a collection of judgments by the court 
of admiralty of the French isle of Oléron) and the collected customs on maritime matters in 
Amsterdam (but which, according to Thomas 2001, p. 350, probably originated in Staveren). See 
Verwer 1764, esp. p. VIIIff.; - A new rule developed by the Court of Oléron was generally adopted 
and slightly adapted. As a result of this, Dutch maritime law held that the loss on both sides had 
to be borne in moieties. This rule was only applicable in no-fault collisions. This fact is stressed 
by art 1. of the Ordonnantie of King Philip of Spain, adding that in the event of fault of one of the 
parties, that ship had to bear the entire loss; see Thomas 2001, p. 351. On the laws of Whisby, see 
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claims. He did not pronounce himself on the possibility of fault on the part of 
both ships. Nevertheless, these texts provided the basis for the development of 
contributory negligence in Roman-Dutch law.275 Subsequently, two eighteenth-
century jurists, namely Cornelis van Bijnkershoek (1673–1743)276 and Dionysius 
Godefridus van der Keessel (1738–1816),277 posed the question of contributory 
negligence and due to them the concept of contributory negligence could 
further develop. These two jurists will be discussed below.278
 
It has been argued that in a situation in which both parties in a collision acted 
negligently, in maritime law in the period of Roman Dutch law a division into 
halves had to be made.279 However, this conclusion has not necessarily to be 
taken. Theoretically, there can be a number of options: (1.) each party had to 
bear its own damage; (2.) the party that had been preponderantly negligent 
had to bear all the damage (culpa maior theory);280 (3.) the older variant of 
culpae compensatio, i.e. that even a little contributory negligence cancels out 
the claim of the injured party; and (4.) an apportionment of damages propor-
tionate to the degree of negligence and/or causation. As will be shown below, 
while the first option is found in Roman-Dutch law, the fourth option – the 
solution of apportionment of damages – has not yet been adopted, and the 
second and third options were adopted in a slightly different manner. 
4.4.3.3 Cases in which one ship was to blame
In cases in which ship damage was caused by the fault of one of two ships or 
by both, Roman law has been the starting point. However, there was no special 
Roman legal rule on collisions, and therefore the ordinary rules applied. The 
Thomas 2001, p. 350f.
275 Thomas 2001, p. 351.
276 On Van Bynkershoek, see, e.g., Star Numan 1869; Krikke & Faber 1987a, p. 141ff.; 
Zimmermann 1992, p. 32ff.; Van den Bergh 1995, p. 423ff.; Brom 2008, p. 27ff.
277 On Van der Keessel, see, e.g., Krikke & Faber 1987b, p. 185ff.; Feenstra 2001b, p. 353; 
Ashmann & Feenstra 1984, p. 132ff.
278 Of course also Grotius’ De iure belli ac pacis is relevant; a further investigation on this 
work will follow in a later section on natural law (namely 4.6.2.1).
279 Aumann 1964, p. 158. 
280 These first two possibilities were already mentioned by Luig; see Luig 1969, p. 225f.; he 
refers to H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis II.17.21, and states that Grotius’ division into halves was 
taken due to the difficulty in determining who was to blame. But, Luig states: ‘Aus die Erwähung 
der Beweisschwierigkeiten der Schuld läßt sich jedoch nicht auf die Anwendung der Halbteilung 
bei Mitverschulden schließen, da in der Regel die Schuldlosigkeit beschworen werden mußte.’ 
However, the second opinion would require traces of the maior culpa theory in the sources on 
maritime matters, which, as will become clear in this subsection, could not (explicitly) be found. 
Accordingly, Luig 1969, p. 228.
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lex Aquilia was applied in cases of collisions between ships.281 Liability of 
those navigating the ship was based on the lex Aquilia and more specifically 
depended on the question whether culpa (or dolus) could be imputed to 
them.282 Furthermore, according to the Roman legal rules described in D. 
9.2.29.2-5, in the event of accidental loss no action based on the lex Aquilia 
could be brought by the owner of the damaged ship. Van Bijnkershoek based 
his opinion on Roman law when he stated that the damage had to be borne by 
the party who acted negligently. He mentioned the example of a ship under sail 
that caused damage to another ship under sail, or to another ship at anchor or 
in moorings, or damage caused by a ship adrift, had to bear the entire damage 
if the damage was caused due to its negligence.283
4.4.3.4 Accidental collision damage
According to (the medieval interpretation of) Roman law, if damage was inflicted 
by accident, no action could be brought against the wrongdoer (unless the act 
was forbidden by law). No explicit rule can be found in D. 9.2.29 dealing with 
the situation in which no negligence of the parties involved can be proven.284 
In his De iure belli ac pacis, Grotius stated that the law of nature dictates that 
someone whose ship caused damage to the ship of another without fault on 
his part is not liable (this view would be in accordance with Roman law, EvD). 
However, Grotius continued, by the laws of many peoples, as also by the law 
of the province of Holland, such a loss was commonly divided between both 
parties, due to the difficulty of determining who was at fault in such a case.285 
The (medieval) maritime law rule that in the event of a collision of two ships, 
281  See D. 9.2.29.2-5 – in particular D. 9.2.29.2 and 4; see also Pöhls 1832, III, p. 778; 
Lobingier 1935, p. 29f.
282 See Ashburner 1909 (reprint 1976), p. cclxxxv; Gormley 1961, p. 327; - The shipowner 
(exercitor) might be liable for goods and other property of which he had undertaken the safe 
carriage, for injuries done on board ship by the crew to goods or persons, and on contracts made 
by the magister. See Ashburner 1909 (reprint 1976), p. clix-clxiii/.
283 C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones Juris privati, IV.22, edn. 1744, p. 467f.; Thomas 2001, 
p. 355f.; - See also Fockema Andreae ad Hugo Grotius’ Inleidinge III.38.16.
284 See also Lichtenauer 1956, p. 192.
285 H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, II.17.21. See also Aumann 1964, p. 158; Parisi 1992, 
p. 146; 1994, p. 341, nt. 74. According to the latter, in the last part of Grotius’ text mentioned 
here, the focus on the nature of the injurer’s activity shifts towards the need to provide the 
victim with equitable compensation for the harm suffered. Parisi rightly states that Grotius’ 
equitable approach to compensation was not shared later by Domat and Pothier, and that the 
reception in the further development was confined to hypotheses of comparative negligence, 
which generally entail a proportional assessment of fault and liability (when acts of both parties 
causally contributed to the loss, not when the loss originated by concurrence of fault and casus). 
This topic will be touched upon below;- This is confirmed by H. Grotius’ Inleidinge III.38.16 & 18. 
These texts primarily concerned quasi-delicts, which in the institutional system of Grotius were 
limited to no-fault liability in cases in which someone suffered damage ‘from or by what is ours’.
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if no negligence of one of them could be established, the damage was divided 
between them, was (partly) founded on the old German idea of a cooperative 
damage community (Schadensgemeinschaft).286 The maritime laws (leges 
nostrae nauticae) argued that in case of an accident where none of the parties 
acted negligently, the damage still had to be partially compensated, based on 
an obligatio quasi ex delicto.287 When damage occurred in a collision of ships, 
and there was no (proven) negligence of either one of the parties, the damage 
would be commonly shared by halves.288 This rule (of rusticum judicium or 
judicium rusticorum – as already mentioned above), the rule of arbitrators 
to a partial compensation of half of the damages, can already be found in 
the Rôles d’Oléron,289 the Laws of Whisby,290 and also in the Ordonnance of 
Emperor Charles V of 1551 on maritime matters,291 and in the Ordonnance of 
King Philip of Spain of 1563 also on maritime matters,292 for a certain situation, 
namely, that in which a buoy on a cast anchor went adrift without the ship 
being at fault for that.293
Apparently, the just-mentioned rule that in the event of accidental collision 
damage, i.e. where both ships suffered damage due to a collision, was borne 
50/50 by each ship involved, was applied in practice in Roman-Dutch law in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.294 This meant that the owner of 
each ship had to pay for half of the damage to the other.
In a decision of the Court of Holland (Hof van Holland) of 4 July 1662 
recorded by P. Ockers (1628–1678),295 two ships collided; both of them were 
freighters, one larger than the other. Due to a storm the steersman of the larger 
freighter was thrown overboard resulting in a collision of the larger ship against 
the smaller ship. The anchor of the larger freighter stuck behind the mast of 
286 Aumann 1964, p. 157f.; Luig 1969, p. 225; see also Endemann 1884, p. 287. In general, on 
the collision of ships, and on the (various) ways cases were solved when both ships were at fault 
in the early modern period in several countries until the 19th century, see Endemann 1884, p. 
288ff.; Scott 1897, p. 17ff., 241ff.; Luig 1969, p. 228.
287 See D.G. van der Keessel, Praelectiones iuris hodierni ad Grotius’ Inleidinge, III.37.7.
288 See also C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris privati, IV.18, edn. 1744, p. 671ff.; - It 
seems that the partition rule in the event of accidental losses was still being applied in the period 
after the Reception; see also Aumann 1964, p. 157; Luig 1969, p. 225.
289 Art. 14 Rôles d’Oléron. On this rule, see also Staring 1957, p. 306.
290 Arts. 48, 49, 50 & 71 of the Wisbuische Seerechten.
291  Art. 49 of the Placaet ende Ordonnantie, Op ’t stuck vande Zee-Rechten of 19 July 1551. 
292 Art. 4 of title ‘Van Schepen die malkanderen beschadigen’ of the Ordonnantie, Statuyt 
ende eeuwige Edict etc., of 31 October 1563.
293 Lichtenauer 1956, p. 192.
294 See C. van Bijnkershoek, Observationes Tumultuariae 1320 and also the decision of the 
Hoge Raad as recorded by Neostadius 1667, decisio nr. 48; - On the (published and unpublished) 
sources of case law of the Hoge Raad, see Meijers 1918/1919a.
295 On the decisiën of P. Ockers, see esp. Sirks 2003, p. 197ff.
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the smaller ship, the mast was torn from the vessel and fell into the sea together 
with the gold hidden inside it.296 According to the decision recorded by Ockers, 
neither of the ships acted negligently.297 The rule of customary law was applied 
as described above, i.e. the damage to the ships was divided between both 
parties (the owner of the ship from Rotterdam and the skipper of the larger 
ship). There was disagreement on the question of whether each ship with its 
cargo should bear half of the loss,298 or whether the loss (the merchandise of 
both ships had to be valued in cash) should be divided proportionally to the 
value of the ships and cargoes. The aldermen from Rotterdam and the Court 
of Holland adopted the latter solution, deciding to interpret the Edict of King 
Philip of Spain in accordance with Article 68 of the laws of Whisby.299
The rule was also applied in the case decided upon by the judges of Amsterdam 
on 17 August 1710, in first appeal by the Court of Holland on 19 September 
1713 and in second appeal by the Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-
Friesland)300 on 12 February 1717; a description of this example has been found 
in Van Bijnkershoek in his Observationes Tumultuariae 1320. A ship, coming 
from Hamburg, arrived at the isle of Texel and then sailed out with other ships 
under a convoy of the Admiral of Holland. At a certain moment, the Admiral 
commanded the convoy to change tack. The ship from Hamburg obeyed, but 
another ship, belonging to the Dutch East-India Company could not perform 
this manoeuvre due to its heavy load and the rather rough sea and ran against 
the Hamburg ship and because of that impact the Hamburg ship sank. The 
proprietors of the Hamburg vessel claimed half of the damages from the Dutch 
East India Company.301 In this case the accident was considered to have taken 
place coincidentally, and not because of negligence of one of the parties, and 
296 P. Ockers, Decisien, part 1, title 3, dec. 1 (edn. Gall 2002, p. 85f.).
297 P. Ockers, Decisien, part 1, title 3, dec. 1: Visum fuit et damnum satis probari, et neutrius 
culpam probari intervenisse. ... However the Dutch summary above – wrongly in my opinion – 
stated, ‘… dat beide schepen geacht meten worden evenveel schuld te hebben …’.
298 cf. art 1 of the Ordonnance of Philip II of 1563, title ‘Van Schepen die malkanderen 
beschadigen’.
299 P. Ockers, Decisien, part 1, title 3, dec. 1 (edn. Gall 2002, p. 85f.). In the decision of 
the Court of Holland of 15 July 1665 recorded by P. Ockers, Decisien, part 1, title 3, dec. 2 (edn. 
Gall 2002, p. 86f.), another collision is described which also occurred without negligence of 
one of the parties involved. Apparently, the skippers had mutually arranged the damage. The 
merchants brought a legal claim against the skipper of the colliding ship. The alderman of Delft 
and the Court of Holland confirmed this, decided that in the event of a collision inland (on 
rivers, etc.) the normal rule of 50%, which applied on the sea, did not apply and the owners of 
the merchandise had to bear their damage themselves.
300 Recently, on the case law of the Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland, 
see Punt 2010, p. 3ff., who also discuss matters such as the competences of the Hoge Raad, the 
organisation of the Hoge Raad, etc.
301  C. van Bijnkershoek, Observationes Tumultuariae 1320 (edn. Meijers et al. 1934, II, p. 191f.).
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so the Hoge Raad concluded that the damage ought to be borne in common.302
The method of assesment was a point of discussion. Van Bijnkershoek – who 
first and foremost focussed on legal practice303 – argued in his Quaestiones Iuris 
privati that the parties should bear a loss in proportion to the value of ship 
and cargo, so by way of geometrical (not arithmetical) calculation.304  In fact, 
this would mean a proportional partition in accordince with the value of the 
ships instead of a partition in equal shares (50/50). This was not, however, the 
prevailing opinion of the justices of the Hoge Raad on 23 November 1720.305 
Van Bijnkershoek argued that in the situation in which damage was caused 
without negligence of one of the parties, a geometrical calculation was more 
just than an arithmetical one. The damage had to be regarded as being caused 
by bad fortune (fatum). Both parties suffered losses because of the collision, 
and both should bear the damage equally in proportion to the means (opes) of 
each party. Who had more property is exposed to greater danger and risk. This 
meant that each party had to bear the losses in accordance with its means or 
worth of its property. Half of the value of the sunken ship will absolutely not 
exceed the full value of the retained vessel, since the amount by which the 
sunken ship is worth more is deducted from the total estimated damage.306 
This is in agreement with a decision of the Dutch Hoge Raad of 1629, stating 
that it would be absurd that the owners would be liable for more than the value 
of the retained vessel, because in that case they would have to pay more than 
the amount they were at risk for.307 In this way, i.e. the view of Van Bijnkershoek, 
the liability of the owner of the ship was capped by the value of his own ship. 
302 C. van Bijnkershoek, Observationes Tumultuariae 1320 (edn. Meijers et al. 1934, II, p. 
192), with reference to arts. 50, 70, and 73 of the Wisbuische Seerechten; this case has also been 
discussed by Weskett 1781, p. 479f.
303 Punt 2010, p. 23. Van Bijnkershoek’s Quaestionum iuris privati libri quatuor (1744) was 
translated into Dutch in 1747 (Verhandelingen over Burgerlijke Rechts-Zaaken) and was a manual 
frequently used in legal practice. See Van den Bergh 1995, p. 432. Although the Dutch version has 
also been used, reference will only be made in this study to the Latin original.
304 C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris privati, IV.20, p. 689ff. 
305 ibid.; Fockema Andrea ad Hugo Grotius’ Inleidinge III.38.16; Bouman 1855, p. 63; Van 
Bijnkershoek referred to the decisions of the Hoge Raad recorded Neostadius, decisiones 48 & 49 
[without dates mentioned therein] and that of 21 December 1629 (J. Cooren, Observationes, nr. 
40, esp. nr. 26, p. 265f.) and of 17 May 1630 (J. Cooren, Observationes, nr. 41).
306 C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris privati, IV.20, edn. 1744, p. 689f.; - With regard 
to the case in which both ships were at fault, Pöhls seem to have defended the view of old-
Dutch Law, and wanted to divide the damage into halves (see Pöhls 1832, III, p. 778), which view 
was followed by Dutch legal practice at the time of Van Bijnkershoek. Van Kaltenborn 1851, p. 
7, defended the view that found its way into art. 535 WvK, i.e. that each ship should carry its 
own loss, and called this an application of the rule of D. 50.17.203; II.8 § 1930 jo. I.6 § 22 of the 
Allgemeine Landrecht of Prussia contains the rule that each ship has to bear the damage that it 
caused to the other ship in accordance with its negligence; Bouman 1855, p. 42.
307 See J. Cooren, Observatio 40, nr. 26.
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The owners are freed from further demands by giving up what was theirs. The 
custom of equally dividing was heretofore not generally applicable; the liability 
for half of the other ship’s damage extended no further than the (undamaged) 
value of the owner’s own ship.308 
The same opinion can be found in Van Bijnkershoek’s Observatio Tumultuaria 
1711 [686]. In this case a convoy ship of the Admiralty of Amsterdam, which led 
merchant vessels through the Baltic Sea to the areas belonging to Holland, on 
the night of 16 September 1702, sailed against a merchant vessel and damaged it 
so badly that it sank. The shipmasters of the merchant vessel sued the captain of 
the convoy ship before the Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland 309 
and claimed half of the value of the sunken ship and the cargo. The commanders 
of both ships blamed each other for the negligence that led to the damage. 
In this collision case, because of conflicting testimony, it was not possible to 
determine the negligence of either party. The Hoge Raad, differently from Ro-
man law, according to maritime law decided on 20 January 1711 that each party 
had to bear half of the damage since negligence was not proven. According to 
maritime law, when it was not clear whether the damage was caused culpably, 
the damage was regarded as mutual.310 Also in this case (although this was a 
minority opinion) van Bijnkershoek argued that the damage should be divided 
geometrically.311
 
308 See also Magens 1755, p. 78; Weskett 1781, s.v. running foul, p. 481; Van Niekerk 1998, II, 
p. 1295, nt. 53.
309 cf. §20 of the Instructie van den Hoogen Raedt of 31 May 1582 (in: Cau, GPB II, col. 
792): Ende ten derden, in saecken roerende de Zeevaert, te weten, als Schepen malkanderen buyten ’s 
Lants, of in Zee beschadight sullen hebben, ende diergelijcke saecken, begrepen onder d’Ordonnantie 
vande Zee-rechten, blyvende het Placaet vande Visscherye ofte Buys-Neeringe in sijn gheheel ende 
wesen, sonder ’t selve by desen te veranderen. 
310 See C. van Bijnkershoek, Observationes Tumultuariae 1711 [686] (edn. 1926, I, p. 377f.); 
Van Bijnkershoek referred to the Farragines, which, however, as being part of the Corpus iuris 
Hollandici et Zelandici, are not published. The latter consisted in three parts, i.e. Commentarii juris 
Hollandici, Commentarii de jure feudali Hollandico et Zelandico et Farragines. The whereabouts of 
the manuscript of the Corpus iuris Hollandici et Zelandici is unknown since 1867. See Meijers 
1818/1819a, p. 413, 416; Star Numan 1869, p. 234; Brom 2008, p. 28f., esp. nt. 25.
311  C. van Bijnkershoek, Observationes Tumultuariae 1711 [686] (edn. 1926, I, p. 378); also 
C. van Bijnkershoek, Observationes Tumultuariae 1689 seems relevant in that the defendant was 
absolved because the collision could not be proven; this was the majority opinion, however Van 
Bijnkershoek belonged to the dissenting minority. He believed the collision to have been proven. 
In that case half of the damage should have been paid, according to maritime law (when no 
negligence of one of the parties had been proven). Bijnkershoek pleaded for the damage to be 
borne by the parties in geometrical proportion; however, this question was finally not dealt with. 
Interesting is Van Bijnkershoek’s remark that ‘quamvis plurimi ex Senatoribus sententiam meam, 
si condemnandi fuissent rei, probarent’.
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Later writers/scholars were undecided on this topic.312 Van der Keessel313 
and Van der Linden314 mentioned both views: while the arithmetical propor-
tion is expressly enacted in the Edict of Kings Charles V,315 it is supported by 
articles in the Edict of King Philip II,316 admitted by the Laws of Rotterdam317 
and Dordrecht318 and was decided accordingly by the Hoge Raad;319 the geo-
metrical proportion – for which one can bring many reasons of importance – is 
defended by Van Bijnkershoek.320 Practice seems to have given more approval 
to the arithmetical proportion.321
4.4.3.5 Collision damage caused by the fault of both parties
According to Roman-Dutch law, if someone inflicted damage unlawfully 
and culpably, he had to compensate the loss. What if also the injured party 
acted negligently?322 What if both parties in a collision had acted negligently? 
Although one could argue that in this case both parties should pay for each 
other’s damage, this solution was not found in collision cases.323 But one can 
find two different views in Roman-Dutch law.
 In one instance, the contributory negligence of the injured party was 
mentioned by the Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland, and the 
Hof van Holland (Court of Holland), namely, in a case brought before the Hoge 
Raad which was recorded by Cornelis van Nieustadt (Neostadius, 1549–1606)324 
312  On this topic, see also Taunay 1802, p. 42ff.
313  D.G. van der Keessel, Theses selectae juris Hollandici et Zelandici, thesis 815.
314  J. van der Linden, Koopmanshandboek IV.5.7.
315  Art. 46 of Placaet ende Ordonnantie, Op ’t stuck vande Zee-Rechten of 19 July 1551.
316 Arts. 1–3, Title 5 of Ordonnantie, Statuyt ende eeuwige Edict etc., of 31 October 1563.
317  Art. 255 of title ‘Van schepen malkanderen beschadigende’ of Ordonnantie of 
Rotterdam (1721).
318  Art. 172 Instructie of Dordrecht (1775).
319  Neostadius, Decisiones, 48 and 49; Cooren, Observationes, 40 and 41.
320 C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris privati, IV.20.
321  On this topic, also already Munniks 1776, p. 47; - In fact, one remained loyal in this way to 
the custom of peasants (vulgaris rusticorum opinio), mentioned in the Accursian Gloss uideantur 
ad D. 3.5.33; Lichtenauer 1956, p. 193. Apparently, this division in halves was still applied in this 
way in decisions in legal practice, as a later addition is made to the Glossa Ordinaria (I consulted 
the edn. of 1625): rustici lites per medium dividunt.
322 A short summary is provided by Kotzé 1953, p. 67f.
323 Simon van Leeuwen was of the opinion that in a case of a collision of drivers of wagons, where 
there was negligence on both sides, the parties had to pay for each other’s damages; see S. van Leeuwen, 
Het Rooms-Hollands regt, IV.39.8: ‘So zyn ook de Wagenaars verbonden elkandren te vergoeden de 
schade die sy in het voor bij ryden en aanstoten van de Wagens, elkander komen aan te doen …’. 
324 On Neostadius, see. e.g., Ahsmann 1990, p. 46ff. The collection with the name ‘Utriusque 
Hollandiae, Zelandiae, Frisiaeque Curiae Decisiones’ (first edn. 1617) was wrongly stated on the 
name of Neostadius. See on this topic Van Apeldoorn 1938, p. 3ff.; Zeylemaker 1952, p. 123f.; 
Ahsmann 1990, p. 48. 
early modern period 251
as decisio 49. The case concerned a collision of two ships, as a result of which 
one of them sank. The skipper of the sunken ship sued the owner of the other 
ship. The defendant, however, replied that the collision was not due to his 
fault. On the contrary, the accident was due to the skipper of the sunken ship, 
who, in the middle of the day, while guests were eating, put an inexperienced 
midshipman (vix Mesonautam)325 behind the rudder, and it was by the lack 
of experience of this man that the ships collided.326 The Court(s) had already 
ruled that if it was not clear which ship was to blame, or the negligence was 
equal on both sides, the damage had to be borne in common.327 In this case 
both parties blamed each other and the Hof van Holland and the Hoge Raad 
came to the conclusion that since the fault appeared to be equal on each side, 
the loss had to be borne equally.328 
However, legal doctrine scholars such as Van Bijnkershoek adopted the Roman 
approach. Van Bijnkershoek argued that in the case decided by the Hoge Raad, 
it would have been more correct to conclude that neither side could bring an 
action and that each ship had to carry its own damage. Whoever acted neg-
ligently could not bring an action.329 The plaintiff suffered damage, but this 
325 According to Forcellini et al., Totius latinitatis Lexicon, III, s.v. mesonauta, this word is 
composed of medius and nauta, and can be found in Ulpian’s record of Pomponius’ view in D. 
4.9.1<.2>; one has to position him in the middle between the highest seamen (e.g. the helmsman 
and the look-out man) and the lowest (e.g. the rowers and the men who obey orders of all the 
others). The positioning of the mesonauta between the highest and the lowest seamen can 
already be found in A. Turnebus, Adversaria, XXVIII.31 (edn. 1599, col. 1016).
326 Neostadius, decisio nr. 49 (edn. 1667, p. 167); Van Nieuwstad, Kooren & Van Nispen 
1655, p. 131.
327 Van Bijnkershoek’s different interpretation that in such case no action was available 
and each party should bear its own losses, seems to have been preferred by D.G. van der Keessel 
in Thesis 821 ad Gr. III.38.18.
328 Neostadius, decisio nr. 49; C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris privati, IV.22, edn. 
1744, p. 468; Pöhls 1832, III, p. 778; Bouman 1855, p. 42; Thomas 2001, p. 355.
329 Also Kotzé 1953, p. 68; - Later, i.e. at the beginning of the twentieth century, Van 
Nierop questioned whether the principle of culpae compensatio was applicable in Dutch law. 
This rule of ius commune implied that in the event of contributory negligence of the injured, 
the victim had to bear the damage himself. According to Van Nierop 1905, p. 4f., four articles 
seem to take into account contributory negligence of the injured party, among which art. 535 
WvK. This article was part of Book Two, Title Six, called Van schade door het overzeilen, aanzeilen, 
aanvaren en aandrijven veroorzaakt. Art. 535 WvK: Bijaldien dit een en ander door de schuld van 
wederzijde veroorzaakt is, draagt elk zijne eigene schade. De schippers zijn, zoo in dit, als in het bij 
het vooraangaande artikel bepaalde geval, aan de eigenaars van de schepen en koopmanschappen 
tot vergoeding gehouden, onverminderd hun verhaal op de officieren en het scheepsvolk, indien 
daartoe gronden zijn; the edition of 1873 is used. However, in the older (official) edition of 1830 
the (slightly different text was contained in art. 413 of Title Six Van schade door aanzeiling of 
aandrijving veroorzaakt. According to Van Nierop, this presumption in favour of the applicability 
of this rule is strengthened by the history of art. 535 WvK, and ultimately by C. van Bijnkershoek, 
Quaestiones juris privati, IV 22. As already stated, Van Bijnkershoek believed it more correct 
that when two ships acted negligently in the event of a collision, both should bear their own 
damage based on D. 50.17.203 (see also Van Nierop 1905, p. 18f.). Art. 535 WvK is rooted in this 
statement. Therefore, there is a strong presumption that the theory of culpae compensatio was 
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was due to his own negligence and he was therefore considered as not having 
suffered any damage, based on D. 50.17.203. Furthermore, it would not help a 
defendant to argue that the other party also acted negligently, because in order 
to bring an action he had to have the law more on his side. When someone 
acted negligently, it was not possible to bring an action. If both parties acted 
negligently, each party had to bear its own damage.330 
Let us take a closer look at Van Bynkershoek’s argument. Van Bynkershoek pro-
posed a contra-argument against his own opinion, namely, that Article 3, title 
5 of the Edict of King Philip could have introduced an exception to the Roman 
rule that if both parties to a collision were to blame, no actions were available 
and that each party had to bear its own loss.331 According to this article, a ship 
under sail that collided with a ship at anchor bears its own loss. The damage 
to the stationary ship was to be borne in equal parts, provided the crew of the 
sailing ship declared under oath that they had no blame whatsoever. However, 
if the stationary ship could prove that the sailing ship was at fault, the latter 
was liable for the total loss, provided the stationary ship could also prove that 
there was no fault on its side.332 Van Bijnkershoek questions whether the rule 
still applicable in Van Nierop’s time. However, a decisive answer cannot be given, unless it turns 
out that the principle of culpae compensatio is founded on general principles of law (Van Nierop 
1905, p. 19). 
330 C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris privati, IV.22, edn. 1744, p. 468; Kotzé 1953, p. 
68. Accordingly J. van der Linden, Adnotatio ad Voet D. 9.2, nr. 15 (edn. 1793, p. 157); see also the 
English translation by Gane 1955, p. 574; - It seems that with regard to collision cases, the laws 
of the sea, after the reception of Roman law, are interpreted from the background of the actio 
legis Aquiliae. Accordingly S. van Groenewegen van der Made, Tractatus de legibus abrogatis, ad 
D. 9.2.29(.2-4): Si navis tua impacta in meam navem damnum mihi dederit, si quidem in potestate 
fuerit ne id accideret, adeoque et culpa eorum factum sit, actio legis Aquiliae locum habet. Hic. 
Caeterum si oborta tempestate et vi ventorum, aut alioqui sine culpa id factum sit, tunc hodie 
damnum utrinque commune est …; - See also Luig 1969, p. 227, who mentions the strict manner 
of interpretation of statutes of the Middle Ages, according to which a statute (i.c. of the laws of 
the sea) was not allowed to be interpreted a contrario if that led to a result contrary to Roman 
law. Therefore, Luig 1969, p. 227f., concluded, while no other evidence is available, that it may be 
assumed that Grotius and Van Bijnkershoek did not take the conclusion as argued by Aumann 
(i.e. the conclusion that if both parties in a collision acted negligently, a division of the damage 
into halves had to be made according to the laws of the sea in the period of the usus modernus).
331  The words of this article are as follows: In gevalle dat een Schip van binnen ofte buyten 
‘s Landts komende, seylende ofte fockende, een ander Schip vaste liggende, inne seylde, ende schade 
dede, soo sal de geene die alsoo is komen seylende, den ghequetsten ofte beschadighden Schepe, de 
helft vande schade betalen, ende hem met sijnen Schiplieden purgeren by eede, dattet by sune schult 
niet gheschiedt en is, ten zy dat die beschadighde contrarie weet te toonen, ende dat hy selve oock 
buyten alle schult is, in welcken ghevalle sal ’t voorschreven Schip van buyten komende, de gheheele 
schade betalen (edn. Cau 1658, col. 817);- See C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris privati, IV.22, 
p. 468. Van Bijnkershoek’s interpretation here, as Thomas 2001, p. 356, rightly states, seems to be 
in accordance with Van Bijnkershoeks’ belief that no action was available in case of contributory 
negligence.
332 See also Thomas 2001, p. 356.
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of the equal division of loss would apply in case the stationary ship succeeded 
in proving the fault of the ship under sail, but failed to prove the absence of 
all blame on its side. Van Bijnkershoek rejected this solution and stated that 
the correct interpretation must be that the guilty party has to carry all losses, 
unless the injured party also was to blame. In the latter case both sides had to 
bear their own losses.333
At the end of the eighteenth century, Van der Keessel, in his Select Theses on the 
Laws of Holland and Zeeland (1800),334 adopted Van Bijnkerhoek’s solution.335 
According to Thesis 816 (ad Grotius’ Inleidinge III.38.16), if two ships collided 
and both captains acted negligently, the loss had not to be borne equally336 
but both parties had to bear their own damage.337 This solution was also sup-
ported by two local statutes, namely the Law of Rotterdam and the Law of 
Dordrecht.338
However, Van der Keessel was completely new insofar as he interpreted 
Article 3, title 5 of the Edict of King Philip regarding a case of contributory 
negligence in a way that in the event of a collision, the negligence of a ship 
under sail was considered more serious than that of a stationary ship. There-
fore, culpae compensatio was not allowed and the ship under sail had to pay 
half the loss of the ship at anchor.339 It can be concluded that he estimated the 
negligence of both parties quantitatively. Contrary to Voet’s way to apply this 
estimate, the party whose negligence was greater was not liable for the total 
damage but (surprisingly) had to pay only half the damage of the counterparty, 
besides all of its own damage.340
333 ibid.; Van Bijnkershoek found support for his argument in art. 46 of the Placaet of 
Charles and art. 1 of title 5 of the Placaet of Philip, which provide that only in the event of no 
fault on either side is the loss borne equally by both parties.
334 These Theses were a condensed written version of his lectures (Praelectiones), which 
were based on the Inleidinge of Hugo Grotius; see Zimmermann 1992, p. 31.
335 cf. C. van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris privati, IV.22, edn. 1744, p. 705ff.
336 As decided by the Hoge Raad; see Neostadius, Decisio, 49.
337 D.G. van der Keessel, Theses selectae juris Hollandici et Zelandici, thesis 816. 
338 See art. 262 Ordonnantie of Rotterdam (1721): Als den Beschadigde het hadde konnen 
ontgaan, zal hy zijn eygene schade, als door zijn eygen of zijn eygen Schippers schuld opgekomen, 
moeten dragen, zonder deswegens eenige Actie te hebben op het zeylende Schip, and art. 179 
Instructie of Dordrecht: Als den Beschadigde het had konnen ontgaan, zal hy zijn eigene Schade, 
als door eigen, of zijn eigen Schippers schuld bygekomen, moeten dragen, zonder deswegens eenige 
actie te hebben op het zeilende Schip.
339 See D.G. van der Keessel, Praelectiones ad III.38.16 (edn. P. van Warmelo et al., p. 406f.), 
s.v. Schuld van de eene; Thomas 2001, p. 357.
340 Also Thomas 2001, p. 358f., who even stated that Van der Keessel, by teaching his 
students that in the event of contributory negligence the loss had to be shared, sowed the seed 
for the proportionate fault rule with its system of comparative negligence; - Ultimately, Van 
der Linden (re)formulated some general rules regarding maritime collisions (overzeiling van 
schepen) in his Koopmanshandboek. These rules are discussed in this section. In his treatment, 
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 Van der Keessel also discussed another case. Because ships were usually 
controlled by a rudder, in a collision between a ship under sail and a ship at 
anchor, the negligence of the skipper and the crew of the vessel under sail was 
presumed. Van der Keessel stated that the correct interpretation of Article 
3 of the aforementioned Edict of King Philip was that if any negligence was 
attributed to a ship at anchor, the liability of the ship under sail was reduced 
by half of the total damage caused to the stationary ship.341 The Edict of King 
Philip was amended by Article 262 of the Ordonnantie van Rotterdam, includ-
ing the rule that if a vessel which was struck could have avoided the collision, 
that vessel had to bear the loss, since the damage was caused by her skipper’s 
negligence. In this way, the statutory law of Rotterdam reintroduced the Ro-
man principle of D. 50.17.203.342
4.4.3.6 Preliminary conclusion on collision cases
If two ships collided, and one of them acted negligently, its captain was liable 
for the total damage (cf. the rule of Roman law). The Hoge Raad decided that 
when it was not clear which skipper had acted negligently, or the negligence 
was equal on both sides, the damage had to be regarded as common and both 
had to bear the total damage in equal parts. This decision is obviously contrary 
to the rules in Roman law and the rules in ius commune. However, the approach 
of the Hoge Raad was based on maritime law (the idea of the cooperative 
damage community). Some legal doctrine scholars, however, did not follow 
this prevailing view in the eighteenth century. They adopted the Roman ap-
proach (and applied the rule of D. 50.17.203) arguing that if both ships acted 
negligently, each ship had to bear its own loss. Interestingly, this view was 
supported by two municipal laws of the cities of Rotterdam and Dordrecht. 
Another situation that occasionally occurred was when a stationary ship 
was struck by a ship under sail. For this case, Article 3, title 5 of the Edict of 
King Philip was relevant. Based on this statutory provision, Van der Keessel 
Van der Linden, among others, also explicitly referred to the Placaet of 1563, van Bijnkershoek 
and Van der Keessel. See Van der Linden’s Koopmanshandboek IV.5.7. Van der Linden stated that 
if a ship, under sail or anchored, was damaged due to a collision with another ship, the negligent 
vessel had to bear the loss alone. If both vessels were to blame to the same extent, they both bore 
their own loss. If it was unclear by whose fault the collision had occurred, each vessel had to bear 
half of the damage. Unfortunately, Van der Linden did not comment on the question as to the 
outcome if the negligence of one of the parties was more serious than the other’s. According to 
Thomas 2001, p. 358, Van der Linden skirted the issue of contributory negligence with unequal 
blame. Thomas correctly remarked that Van der Linden’s way of formulating general rules 
cannot avoid the exceptional case of a ship sailing into a moored or anchored ship.
341  D.G. van der Keessel, Praelectiones ad III.38.18 (edn. Van Warmelo et al. 1967, p. 412f.), s.v. 
In gevalle een schip; Theses selectae juris Hollandici et Zelandici, thesis 821; Thomas 2001, p. 357f.
342 Accordingly Thomas 2001, p. 358.
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argued that in the event of a collision between a ship under sail and a station-
ary ship, the negligence of the former was always more serious. Therefore, 
according to Van der Keessel the fault of the (captain of the) sailing ship could 
not be compensated by the fault of the stationary ship. This was a renewed 
interpretation and application of the culpae compensatio doctrine. According 
to Van der Keessel, the outcome had to be that the liability of the colliding 
ship was reduced to half of the total damage of the stationary ship. This result 
is different from the outcome according to Voet, although Voet also applied a 
quantitative estimation of the negligence on both sides. According to Voet, the 
wrongdoer whose negligence was more serious compared to the negligence of 
the injured party was fully liable for the damage to the latter. This difference can 
be explained by considering the fact that in the event of a collision caused by 
casus, the laws of the sea stated that half of the damage had to be compensated 
(while Roman law would state: no liability). According to Van der Keessel, 
apparently, if the negligence of the injured party was less serious than that of 
the wrongdoer, one fell back into the casus-regime, and could only claim half 
of the damages.
4.5 Usus modernus pandectarum
4.5.1 Introduction
A general introduction on the use of the actio legis Aquiliae in early modern 
times has already been made above (in section 4.3). The jurists of the usus 
modernus applied the actio legis Aquiliae in all cases of damnum culpa datum, 
irrespective of the existence of contractual relationships between the parties 
concerned.343 Furthermore, although the lex Aquilia was used to cover cases 
of physical injury inflicted upon freemen, the question of applicability in a 
case of the killing of a freeman was a more difficult matter. The view of Azo 
prevailed in the long run: the wrongdoer was held liable in a case of the killing 
of a freeman,344 however the injured party died and, according to some authors, 
relatives or heirs could only claim expenses for hospitalisation, medical care, 
etc.345 Based on the reception of Roman law the rule was established that, with 
regard to the infliction of bodily harm upon freemen, medical expenses and 
loss of income could be claimed. By the end of the seventeenth century, com-
343 Kaufman 1958, p. 117f.; Zimmermann 1990, p. 74.
344 Feenstra 1987a, esp. 207ff., 210f.; Zimmermann 1990, p. 74.
345 Zimmermann 1990, p. 75, also on the question of whether funeral expenses could be 
reimbursed.
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pensation to wife and children for the loss of support resulting from the death 
of a man (breadwinner) was a widely accepted addition to the lex Aquilia.346 
 
In this section, the compensation to wife and children for the loss of support 
will be considered in particular. Was this claim (actio) based on the wife’s own 
right or an inherited action based on the Roman lex Aquilia? A claim for the 
widow and/or relatives could be an independent claim based on customary 
law (see Grotius, Inleidinge III.33.2), but also a claim of the deceased passed to 
the heirs in case – and which is not always the case – they were also the heirs of 
the deceased. It is important to make this distinction, as it is not self-evident 
that contributory negligence is relevant for both sorts of claims. Although one 
would suspect this relevancy as to the second claim, it is questionable whether 
the same applies for the first claim. This will be studied more in detail later 
in this section.
A second issue that arose in this period was the claim for compensation of 
pain, suffering and disfigurement. Such a claim could not be compensated in 
the period of the Middle Ages, i.e. could not be based on the Corpus Iuris. Ap-
parently, this sort of claim came into existence when the penal character of the 
actio legis Aquiliae disappeared. However, as will be shown below, the question 
whether an injured person could claim compensation for pain, suffering and 
disfigurement was not always answered in the same way. Roman law denied 
such compensation with regard to disfigurement, and also academic writers of 
usus modernus tended to follow this view. However, Germanic customary law 
already provided fixed amounts of money, which provisions were eventually 
followed by the courts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Eventually, 
the academic writers resigned themselves to the practical realities.347 Interest-
ing is the opinion of Grotius, who argued that pain and disfigurement of the 
body of a freeman, although properly speaking incapable of compensation 
(i.e. according to Roman law), are assessed in a sum of money, when such 
damages are demanded (apparently a concession to the actual practice of that 
time).348 This aspect of immaterial damages will particularly be examined as 
it is connected with the consequences of contributory negligence. This will 
be made clear below.
By the end of the seventeenth century it had become manifest that modern 
346 ibid.; Gordley 2006, p. 161.
347 Zimmermann 1990, p. 76f.; according to Gordley 2006, p. 161, by the 17th century it had 
become accepted that the plaintiff could recover compensation for pain and suffering.
348 H. Grotius, Inleidinge, III.34.1-2; see section 4.3.3. 
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law in action no longer reflected the actio legis Aquiliae as recorded in the 
Corpus Iuris, thus the view of Christian Thomasius.349 Other jurists preferred 
to award damages according to Germanic principles because they regarded 
the actio legis Aquiliae as not received into the ius commune.350 However, none 
of these opinions prevailed. The jurists of the usus modernus were normally 
not interested in theoretical debates. They applied the revised principles of 
the actio de damno dato and discussed these using terminology derived from 
the lex Aquilia.351 The most relevant jurists of the usus modernus in Germany 
and Italy will be presented in sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.352 
 A final aspect that has to be mentioned in this introduction is the rule of 
D. 50.17.203. This text has been used as a specific principle applied to concrete 
cases.353 The text of D. 50.17.203 was used by the jurists of the usus modernus as 
an argument to deny the right to claim damages in cases in which both wrong-
doer and injured party acted negligently, and so together caused the damage to 
the injured party. This is remarkable, as D. 50.17.203 can also be understood as 
a rule to solve a problem of causality, which approach apparently was followed 
in some cases (see below). 
There are also situations in which the victim himself was the only cause of 
the damage, but these situations cannot be qualified as concerning contributory 
negligence. In fact, in such cases the wrongdoer is not liable because the causal 
connection between his act and the damage is absent. In some cases (like the 
349 See Chr. Thomasius, Larva legis Aquiliae, §1.
350 Jansen 2004, p. 452f.
351  Jansen 2003, p. 291f.; on the usus modernus and the completion of the Reception see, 
e.g., Wieacker 1967, 204ff.; - On the usus modernus legis Aquiliae in general, see Zimmermann 
1990, p. 67ff.; 1996, p. 1017ff.
352 Other countries unfortunately fall outside the scope of this study. In France, the 
problem of contributory negligence seems to have been solved by applying the rules of D. 
50.17.203 and VI 5.12.86. As discussed before, Faber, in his commentary on D. 9.2.9.4, compared 
the negligence of both parties and discussed which party bore the more serious form of 
negligence, the gravior culpa. Luig 1969, p. 217, did not find more sources which could establish 
an express statement in the sense of the maior culpa theory. Nor in the works of Domat and 
Pothier (see section 4.6.2.1) can such a statement be found. Finally, in M. Guy du Rousseaud de 
la Combe’s Recueil du Jurisprudence (1st edn. of 1736), under the word dommage there is no case 
of contributory negligence. In the new edition of his Recueil du Jurisprudence Civile (corrigée 
et considerablement augmentée; edn. of 1746), the section on dommage is indeed considerably 
extended; the rule of D. 50.17.203 is printed under section II. ‘Des dommages et intérêts pour 
quasi délit’ (nr. 4), however, without explanation or example. Also interesting, but apparently 
considered as something different by De la Combe, is the rule of D. 9.2.44pr. mentioned in part 
under nr. 3. An addition is made, namely, that when someone acted in a permissible way (qui fait 
une chose licite) in which both time and place were accustomed, and the actor had performed 
all diligence he was supposed to, he was not held liable for the damage done to another person 
(he refers to Inst. 4.3.4); - Scotland lies beyond the scope of this study, as is also the case with the 
common law. For an overview, see Luig 1969, p. 220ff., p. 222ff.
353 See, e.g., J. Brunnemann who applied the rule in a consilium, i.e. cons. II.143: Sed 
damnum, quod quis sua culpa sentit, sibi non aliis debet imputare …
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one of the child run over by a cart; see below) the problem of negligence can 
be transformed into a problem of causality. Below I will discuss in which sort 
of cases this seems appropriate, i.e. in cases in which the underlying problem 
concerned a causation issue.
4.5.2 Usus modernus in Germany
4.5.2.1 Introduction
The debate as to how far contributory responsibility of the injured party 
should be taken into account to determine the liability of the wrongdoer 
continued both in practice and in science in the period of the usus modernus 
pandectarum. As discussed above in the chapter on Roman law (chapter two), 
the cases described in the texts of the Corpus Iuris only concern the question 
whether the wrongdoer, considering the circumstances of the case, had to pay 
the poena or not.354 In the medieval period of ius commune, Glossators and 
Commentators came to the conclusion that if both wrongdoer and injured 
party acted culpably, any liability ceased to exist, unless the wrongdoer acted 
intentionally. The early ius commune that developed after the reception of Ro-
man law in the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation initially resulted in 
the reproduction, without criticism, of the sources of the Corpus Iuris passed 
down to them. This also happened to fragments concerning (Aquilian) liability. 
If an injured party suffered loss as a result of his own negligence, there was no 
right to claim for compensation. The victim’s own behaviour put into ques-
tion the conditions required for the claim for damages, with the result that the 
wrongdoer completely escaped liability.355 
Accordingly, in the secondary literature it is argued that the jurists of the 
usus modernus did not come to a different solution as to the problem of con-
tributory negligence: if the injured party acted negligently, no damage could 
be claimed, unless the wrongdoer acted intentionally.356 However, the Roman 
354 According to Kaufmann 1958, p. 77, the sources of German law handed down to us seem 
to suggest that the liability of the perpetrator in many cases was related to unlawful causation, 
and that the obligation to pay compensation would only cease if contributory negligence was 
attributed to the victim. See also Hammer 1885, p. 72.
355 See Aumann 1964, p. 38.
356 Wieling 1970, p. 224; this principle also becomes clear already in the definition of 
interesse, when in cases of ersetzbare Interesse compensation is denied in case of contributory 
negligence; see Wieling 1970, p. 58f.; see also a case at the Reichskammergericht of 24 January 
1763 discussed by J.U. von Cramer (1706–1772). Cramer was assessor at the Reichskammergericht; 
the Nebenstunden emerged from his function as a judge (see Döhring 1957b, p. 391). Also, this 
decision seems to stem from the idea that no compensation was granted when the injured party 
acted negligently. See Cramer 1763, p. 112ff. (esp. 117).
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texts of the Corpus Iuris were not clear as to the question when (in which cases) 
exactly this liability of the wrongdoer expired (only when his negligence was 
equal or preponderant to the victim’s negligence or also if his negligence was 
small).357 Therefore, it is not surprising that it has been argued that the concept 
of culpa maior arose in the usus modernus as the decisive criterion to determine 
whether liability existed or not since the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
The meaning of this concept becomes clear from the writings of legal scholars 
(legal doctrine), decisions of the courts (case law) and from (legal) opinions. In 
this section, a more elaborate discussion on this topic will follow. The various 
contributions of jurists of the usus modernus will be discussed, as well as various 
consilia of the Faculties of Tübingen, Wittenberg, Halle and Helmstadt.358 
These court legal opinions (consilia) were drafted by university professors and 
introduced into the legal proceedings by advocates. Important is the so-called 
system of Aktenversendung. It was common for a German court, from at least 
the beginning of the sixteenth century, in the event of a difficult, complex case 
to consult learned experts: the court sent the records of the case to a bench of 
professors at the Law Faculties (Spruchkollegium), together with a request for 
an (collective) opinion on the legal issue(s) at stake.359
I will deal with the question of how to explain that an injured party had no 
right to claim compensation in case of contributory negligence. It will become 
clear that the approach was still the all-or-nothing one. The approach now 
took place in terms of a concurrence of faults (i.e. a fault of the wrongdoer and 
contributory negligence of the injured party). In such cases as a rule of human 
equity360 the injured party was not allowed to bring a claim based on the neg-
ligence of the wrongdoer when a similar accusation could be made towards 
himself;361 and thus contributory negligence leads to the annulment of the 
negligence of the wrongdoer.362 As will be shown below, in order to provide a 
357 According to Aumann 1964, p. 50, one view in the period of the ius commune was that 
the injured party lost his right for compensation in case of a small mistake, irrespectively of 
the fault of the wrongdoer. A second view was that the injured party did not have any right 
for compensation if his negligence was equal to that of the wrongdoer, or if  the injured party 
was responsible for the decisive fault. Luig 1969, p. 196ff., argues that, over the course of history, 
the first view has rarely been defended (and so he argued that the second view prevailed). 
The solution of contributory negligence in the period of ius commune was mainly based on D. 
9.2.11pr., D. 50.17.203 and the theory of culpae compensatio.
358 On the ‘praktische Thätigkeit der Juristenfakultäten’ in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
especially on their influence on the development of German criminal law from Carpzovius 
onwards, see Hegler 1899.
359 Feenstra 1992b, p. 415; Letto-Vanamo 2012, p. 162. On the Aktenversendung, see Klugkist 
1967, p. 155ff., with references to older secondary literature.
360 Chr. Thomasius, Larva, §6 (edn. Hewett 2000, p. 9): regula aequalitatis et humanitatis.
361 See, e.g., J.F. Eisenbach, De compensatione circa maleficia, §10 and §19; Chr. Thomasius, 
Larva, §6.
362 Jansen 2007, p. 664; - This view is shown to be applicable law until the 19th century, 
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basis for this annulment, jurists did not always base themselves on the idea of 
culpae compensatio, but sometimes just referred to the rule of D. 50.17.203.363 
When taking a closer look at theory and practice, several doctrinal starting 
points dealing with the problem of contributory negligence are provided. 
Three main views can be distinguished, which will be further explained below 
and, if necessary, subdivided as follows: considering contributory negligence 
as a causality problem or as a negligence problem (with several subdivisions, 
among which the use of the culpae compensatio doctrine), or solving the case 
without any reference to contributory negligence.
4.5.2.2 Contributory negligence in theory and in practice:  
a problem of causality
In a consilium given by the Faculty of Tübingen on 6 June 1695, collected by 
Michael Grass (1657–1731), it was reported that a thief (Sauter) was killed during 
the act of stealing at night. The relatives (wife and children) claimed compen-
sation for the loss of support resulting from the death of their husband and 
father. This claim was denied. The consilium  states that Sauter, by committing 
the theft, gave occasion for and caused the accident.364 Therefore, one could 
even argue that it seems to have been purely a problem of causality, exactly as 
in the rule already described in D. 9.2.30.3. However, apparently, this was not the 
case, as according to the wording of the consilium (confirmed by references to 
the Digest), the decisive criterion was not causality at all. The surviving relatives 
were denied any action because the negligence of the injured party (i.e. the 
theft by the thief) concurred with the fault in the act of killing.365 However, to 
maintain – as Luig did – that the decisive reason to come to this conclusion 
was that the negligence of the thief was considered preponderant,366 cannot 
be based on the consilium in question.
see, e.g., Glück 1812, p. 68ff.; see also Krug 1833, p. 142ff.
363 In the same sense Jansen 2007, p. 664; - See, e.g., H. Donellus, Commentaria ad D. 9.2, 
Caput 1, nr. 9.
364 M. Grass, Consilia, V, cons. 78, nr. 34.
365 M. Grass, Consilia, V, cons. 78, nr. 35: Ubi vero culpa patientis concurrit, actio L[egis] 
Aquiliae aut subsidiaria, accommodata ad L[egem] Aquiliam, locum haud invenit l. 11. pr. ff. ad L. 
Aquil. [D. 9.2.11pr.], l. 203. ff. de R.I. [D. 50.17.203].
366 Luig 1969, p. 210.
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4.5.2.3 Contributory negligence in theory and in practice:  
a problem of negligence
View 1: Application of the theory of culpae compensatio but only when the 
respective negligence was equal on both sides
Some jurists in the period of the usus modernus still applied the (medieval) 
theory of culpae compensatio in a way that compensation could only take 
place when the delicts and/or negligence of two opposing parties were equal 
in degree.367 This theory has been studied on a doctrinal level for practical 
purposes. However, although some cases mentioned by Johannes Zanger 
(1557–1607)368 show that the theory was applicable to cases in which both 
parties acted negligently, no situation of contributory negligence in the event 
of Aquilian liability cases is mentioned in his work. This approach is very 
conservative in the sense that it shows a continuation of the Bartolistic view 
and the Bartolistic way of argumentation. 
View 2: The mere existence of contributory negligence (i.e. even a very small 
degree of contributory negligence) leads to the deprivation of the possibility to 
obtain compensation
A forerunner of this view can already be found with the German humanist 
Ulrich Zasius, who considered the problem of the scope of the compensation 
solely a problem of fault and therefore, because of the analogy to the sources 
of Roman law, the role of the contributory responsibility of the injured party 
was not regarded as a problem of contributory causation, but only appears 
in terms of contributory negligence.369 He argued that if both wrongdoer and 
injured party acted negligently, the actio legis Aquiliae was not applicable.370 
This approach is similar to that in Justinianic Roman law. Zasius’s conclusion, 
367 See J. Zanger, Tractatus de exceptionibus, cap. 6, nr. 27;- A similar position seems to 
have been taken by Sebastiano  Medici, Tractatus de compensationibus, pars I, quaestio 35ff., and 
Celsus Bargalius, Tractatus de dolo, liber VI, regula 15 (dolus cum dolo compensatur), esp. nr. 61f. 
Summarising, the two latter authors agree with the prevailing view: culpa can be compensated 
with culpa, dolus with dolus, negligentia with negligentia. However, culpa lata cannot be 
compensated with culpa levis, because culpa lata is preponderant; so only when the negligence 
was equal could compensation take place. Furthermore, the negligence on both sides had to 
constitute an act or an omission and no compensation could take place if one party’s negligence 
constituted an act and the other’s an omission.
368 On J. Zanger see, e.g., Landsberg 1898, p. 685.
369 U. Zasius, Commentaria, ad D. 9.2, nr. 11; Kaufmann 1958, p. 78.
370 As examples, Zasius mentioned the cases of D. 9.2.9.4 (and D. 9.2.10) and D. 9.2.11pr.; 
Ulrich Zasius treated the problem of the negligence of the injured party as an abstract legal 
question of law; see also Kaufmann 1958, p. 78, who wrote that Zasius treated the problem as an 
‘abstrakte Rechtsfrage’ without ‘erkennbare Anknüpfung an die mittelalterlichen Juristen’. Because 
Zasius can be considered a humanist, this is not extraordinary; Luig 1969, p. 206.
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namely, that if both wrongdoer and injured party acted negligently, the actio 
legis Aquiliae was not applicable, can be considered as an expression of the 
all-or-nothing approach. This approach, in which the degree of mutual par-
ticipation or the more subtle differentiations within the concept of culpa were 
not taken into account, at first was mainly followed in practice and representa-
tives of this line applied it until the second half of the eighteenth century.371 
This becomes clear from several consilia from the Law Faculty of Tübingen.372 
Also in two decisions of the Reichskammergericht, as recorded in the 
compilation of decisions by Adrian Gilman, an all-or-nothing approach was 
followed, namely, by applying the rule of D. 50.17.203.373 Other jurists – e.g. 
Johannes Stucke (1587–1653)374 in various consilia – seem to have applied the 
same thought but by means of the rule of D. 50.17.203. Stucke argued that the 
injured party could bring no action if he was held to have been contributorily 
negligent (if there was culpa admixta on his side), because damage suffered 
due to one’s own negligence was not considered claimable damage.375 Appar-
ently, the use of the words culpa admixta is typical in consilia literature, e.g. in 
the consilia of the Socini, Cravetta, Stucke and Venturini (all discussed in this 
chapter), but is not followed in other kinds of literature of the usus modernus 
pandectarum.
371  Kaufmann 1958, p. 78.
372 See several decisions of the Faculty of Tübingen where, in case of contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff, the claim was (totally) denied. See G. Schweder, Cons. Tub., I.12.88ff. 
(decision of 1685); I.70.12 (decision of 1698); I.98.15 (decision of 1701); Lauterbach, Cons. Tub., 
II.66.15 (decision of 1652); II.89.11 (decision 1673); III.204.26 (decision of 1656); III.205.36 
(decision of 1657); M. Grass, Cons. Tub., V.1.39 (decision of 1699); V.78.35 (decision of 1695); see 
also a consilium of the Faculty of Altdorf, C. Rittershusius, Consilia sive responsa iuris Altdorfina, 
pars I, resp. 42: Nam damnum quod quis sua culpa sentit, non intelligitur sentire, Welche ursach 
dann im Rechten der Importantz, das wann gleich der Beklagter angezogene sachen mit verursachet 
hette, er dannoch darumb nicht köndte belanget werden. Nam quando ex utraque parte culpa 
intervenit, cessat Aquilia. Zas[ius] in paratit. D. ad l. Aquil. n. 11. …
373 A. Gilmannus, Decisionum sive rerum in camera imperiali iudicatarum, book 1 decisio 5, 
nr. 75: … Ex quo etiam Reus nullum damnum sentit, etiamsi quid pensionum loco dederit. Nam iuris 
regula est, quod is qui ex sua culpa sentit damnum, nullum intelligatur damnum sentire, l. Quod 
quis de reg. Iuris [D. 50.17.203]. …;  book 2 decisio 41, nr. 50: … Propterea quando quis ex culpa 
sua damnum sentit, non videtur damnum sentire, l. Quod quis ex culpa sua, ff. de regulis iuris [D. 
50.17.203], c. Damnum eod. tit. in 6 [VI 5.12.86].
374 On J. Stucke see, e.g., Köcher 1893, p. 716f.; Südkamp 2007.
375 See Stucke & Stucke, Consilia sive responsa, cons. II.114: Quod vero damnum, siquidem 
ex proprio facto obvenisset, sibi imputarent et non emptori. Neque enim quod quis ex culpa sua 
damnum sentit intelligitur sentire l. Quod quis 203. ff. de reg. jur. [D. 50.17.203] ... and IV.827f.: 
Quinto juris esse ajunt, quod quis ob damnum datum vel dolum seu culpam commissam, contra 
damnificantem vel dolum seu culpa committentem in litem jurare non possit, si dolus admixtam 
habeat culpam damnificati Cravett[a] cons[ilio] 119 num[ero] 11, Paris[ius] in vol. 4 cons[ilio] 158 n. 
10 et 12. Et facit regula, quod damnum, quod quis sua culpa sentit, sibimet ipsi et non alii imputare 
debeat, unde et Plotus de in lit[em] jur[ando] § 50 n. 14. ... and V.534: Nec potest Ecclesia ea ratione 
de damno et injuria conqueri. Cum quod sentit, propria a culpa sentiat, quae damni nomen plane 
excludit, l. Quod quis 203. digest. [D. 50.17.203] et cap. damnum 86. de R.I. in 6. [VI 5.12.86].
early modern period 263
Another example of an approach in which the rule of D. 50.17.203 was applied 
in the event of Aquilian liability, can be found with Wolfgang Adam Lauterbach 
(1618–1678).376 Lauterbach used the text of D. 50.17.203 to argue that seen 
ethically, nobody was considered to have suffered damage377 if that damage 
was caused by the negligence of the victim and therefore, when contributory 
negligence of the victim occurred, the wrongdoer was not considered to have 
committed a delict.378 The approach was therefore still all-or-nothing, but for 
the first time the problem was really seen in terms of concurrence of fault.379 
Lauterbach drew no further conclusions from his new point of view: in case 
of mutual negligence, the requirements of an actio ex lege Aquilia were appar-
ently not fulfilled. Because of the contributory negligence of the injured party, 
either the recoverable damage itself was considered to have been moraliter 
absent or the negligence of wrongdoer, required to establish liability, was 
absent.380 According to Lauterbach, if someone, being provoked to a duel, at-
tacked his provoker with arms, even if he exceeded the appropriate measure 
for self-protection, the wounded person was denied an actio legis Aquiliae.381 It 
is interesting that Lauterbach even denied the action when the provoked party 
had acted excessively.382 Lauterbach did not take into account the degree of 
contributory negligence,383 implying that even a small degree of contributory 
negligence annulled the negligence of the wrongdoer.384 
From Lauterbach’s treatment it becomes clear that one can distinguish two 
situations: the first one, in which the wrongdoer committed a delict and the 
injured party was contributorily negligent; the second one, in which two par-
376 On bibliographical information on W.A. Lauterbach, see, e.g., Eisenhart 1883, p. 75ff.; 
Stintzing-Landsberg 1978, II, p. 139ff.; Luig 1982, p. 736ff.; Kleinheyer/Schröder 1996, p. 493.
377 Lauterbach defined damage as a financial loss, namely, as a decrease in one’s assets.
378 Also Kaufmann 1958, p. 78.
379 Also Zimmermann 1990, p. 80; 1996, p. 1030; - According to Aumann 1964, p. 51, Lauterbach 
deviated from the prevailing opinion of his time, according to which the origination of the total 
damage was traced back to the wrongdoer or to the injured party. In this respect, the description 
of Lauterbach corresponds to that of his contemporarily natural law teacher Pufendorf (see also 
Aumann 1964, p. 41).
380 W.A. Lauterbach, Collegium theoretico-practicum, exerc. 19, Th. 10, ad D. 9.2 §7. See also 
Aumann 1964, p. 51.
381  W.A. Lauterbach, Collegium theoretico-practicum, exerc. 19, Th. 10, ad D. 9.2 §7, and 
see also §11: Ubi itaque talis abest culpa, ibi non locum habet Lex Aquilia; ut si damnum casu, 
sine hominis culpa, acciderit; Vel si culpa agentis interveniat, et concurrat culpa patientis, e.g. si 
provocatus provocantem vulneravit; ex proprio enim delicto, licet alter in re illicita sit constitutus, 
actio non competit [D. 50.17.203]. 
382 See also W.A. Lauterbach, Exercitatio 19 § 10: Si provocatus ad duellum provocantem, vel 
armis insultatus aggressorem, vulneravit, licet moderamen inculpatae tutelae excesserit, vulnerato 
tamen actio legis Aquiliae ad expensas et interesse non competit …
383 According to Luig 1969, p. 211, this was not the usual position taken in legal practice at 
that time.
384 In the same sense Jansen  2007, p. 664, nt. 60.
chapter four264
ties (i.e. including the ‘injured party’) committed a delict. Lauterbach discusses 
the second situation, the event of proprium delictum, in the same treatment, 
although this cannot strictly be included under ‘contributory negligence’.
According to Lauterbach, the existence of contributory negligence of the 
injured party led to the denial to grant an action; Lauterbach substantiated 
this denial by referring to D. 50.17.203 and stating that someone who suffered 
damage because of his own delict could not claim damages. However, the text 
of D. 50.17.203 only considered contributory negligence that contributed to 
the victim’s own damage and not, as Lauterbach stated, because of a ‘proprium 
delictum’.385 In that sense, Lauterbach interprets ex sua culpa in D. 50.17.203 as 
ex suo proprio delicto and thereby interprets D. 50.17.203 in a different direc-
tion. A proprium delictum is an action contrary to the law, which immediately 
brings damage to someone else.386 These actions cannot be referred to as cases 
of contributory negligence, because that would mean that someone’s act co-
produced his own damage. Lauterbach did not distinguish between these two 
situations (of an act of the injured party who caused damage to himself by sua 
culpa, or to someone else by his proprium delictum),387 probably due to the prac-
tical application of the rule, and because it fitted well into his line of arguing.
 
View 3: The theory of maior culpa
Already the glossator Azo was of the opinion that in the event of damage 
caused by the intentional behaviour of the wrongdoer and contributory 
negligence of the injured party, the negligence of the latter was considered ir-
relevant.388 A further elaboration of the degrees of negligence cannot be found 
in the sources. According to Jansen, jurists (I suppose early modern) did not 
qualify the less serious behaviour of the injured party as negligent, when the 
wrongdoer’s negligence was preponderant.389 Since the seventeenth century 
this rigid approach seems to have been overcome and a more flexible approach 
385 Aumann 1964, p. 51.
386 An example of such a delict of the injured party can be found in the already frequently 
mentioned text of D. 24.3.39; according to D. 24.3.39, if both husband and wife acted with bad 
conduct, and both of them gave cause for repudiation, neither can bring a claim, as the offence of 
each of them is compensated by that of the other; - According to M. Wesenbecius, Commentarii 
in Pandectas, I, ad D. 9.2 (edn. 1589, p. 135), when two people wounded each other in a fight, 
and it could not be established who provoked the other, both delicts would be compensated 
mutually. This view is in conformity with D. 9.2.45.3, and the gloss sibi ad D. 9.1.1.11; see also the 
commentaries on the latter text (mentioned in the previous chapter), and also A. Tiraquellus, De 
poenis, causa 62.
387 See also Aumann 1964, p. 51f. 
388 See gloss tenebitur ad D. 9.2.9.4.
389 Jansen 2007, p. 664f.; this was indeed true as regards J. Brunnemann, Commentarius, ad 
D. 9.2.31, esp. nr. 2f. (see below).
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taken.390 From the rule on liability in the event of intentional misbehaviour, it 
can be deduced that the degrees of negligence had to be weighed:391 only equal 
or preponderant contributory negligence should exclude liability.392 Accord-
ing to Luig, this conclusion can be made for the majority of jurists of the usus 
modernus in the eighteenth century: a claim filed by an injured party only had 
to be rejected when this party acted with negligence to an extent equal to or 
preponderant with respect to the negligence of the wrongdoer.393 This mainly 
appears in their decisions and advice/opinions. However, as will be explained 
below, this did not apply in all cases.
A first trace of the maior culpa theory can be found in the work of the human-
ist Marquard Freher, who argued that in D. 9.2.11pr. the negligence of the 
barber had to be considered as being more serious, and therefore the barber 
should be held liable.394 In the usus modernus in Germany, this renewal of the 
medieval culpae compensatio doctrine can also be found in a consilium of the 
Law Faculty of Tübingen, recorded by Christoph Besold (1577–1638).395 In the 
case described by Besold, the plaintiff provoked the other (the defendant) to 
a fight, resulting in the disembodiment of the first one. Here, the plaintiff ’s 
contributory negligence was more serious (major culpa) than the negligence 
of the defendant. Apparently, the negligence of the plaintiff had to be qualified 
as malicious intent (dolus) or gross negligence (culpa lata).396 Therefore, the 
negligence of one party was compensated by the other party’s negligence, in 
390 See the theory of A. Faber on the gravior culpa in which first traces of the so-called 
maior culpa theory can be found (see section 4.2.4.5).
391  See J. Brunnemann, Commentarius in pandectas, ad D. 16.2.10, nr. 2, and also already 
Tyndarus Alphanus, Tractatus de compensationibus, art. 5, nrs. 30 and 36.
392 Jansen 2007, p. 665.
393 Luig 1969, p. 198; on this topic also Zimmermann 1996, p. 1030; - The view of Luig 
1969, p. 212, that the judge, although often by different or ambiguous legal arguments always 
aimed at establishing to which party the greater blame had to be imputed,  in my opinion is not 
sufficiently supported in the sources.
394 M. Freher, Verisimilium libri duo, ad D. 9.2.11pr. (discussed above).
395 Chr. Besold, Consilia Tubingensia, vol. VI, cons. 290, nr. 43f.: ‘Unnd abermal gesetzt, es 
sollte einige Culpa dem Reo imputirt werden: so ist jedoch der Entleibte, als provocans, in majori 
culpa. Itaque culpa cum culpa et delictum cum delicto compensandum …’ He referred to D. 24.3.39, 
D. 24.3.47, X 5.16.6 and X 5.16.7, L. Schrader, Tractatus feudalis, pars 9, cap. 4. num. 74; on Besold, 
see, e.g., Muther 1875b, p. 556ff.;- See also  J.H. Böhmer, Doctrina de actionibus, sect. II, cap. XI, 
§XXV, barring an action based on the lex Aquilia brought by an injured party against a wrongdoer 
if the injured party’s negligence was more serious than that of the wrongdoer. Böhmer referred 
to D. 9.2.11pr.
396 See also L. Schrader, Tractatus feudalis, pars 9, cap. 4, nr. 74: … Quia is, qui alterum 
provocat in dolo vel saltem lata culpa esse dicitur, d. § Tabernarius [D. 9.2.52.1]. …; see also nr. 75: 
Et culpa cum culpa, quatenus agitur de privato interesse, compensatur, l. Item obstetrix 9. § fin. 
et l. Si putator, 31. ff. ad l. Aquil. [D. 9.2.9.4 & D. 9.2.31], l. Si ambo. 10. ff. de compensatio[nibus] 
[D. 16.2.10pr.]. Et damnum, quod quis sua culpa sentit, sibi, et non alteri imputare debet, l. Item 
Mela 11. in prin. ff. ad l. Aquil., c. Damnum et ibi Dyn. de reg iur. Lib. 6. [VI 5.12.86].
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the same way as two delicts were compensated. This argument is a dogmatic 
one; the theory of culpae compensatio was elaborated for various degrees of 
culpa, and, since in this case the injured party’s negligence was preponderant 
to the less serious negligence of the wrongdoer, the plaintiff (who provoked 
the other to a fight) could not recover any damages. 
The view of the ‘königliche Hannoversche Justizkanzlei’ in 1762, object of legal 
considerations by David Georg Strube (1694–1776),397 is important in this re-
spect. A maidservant rode the horse of her Lord Titius (Dienstherr) to a place 
where it could drink water. On the ride back, at full speed, the horse toppled 
over and died. Titius claimed compensation from the servant. Strube argued 
in the following manner. It was not proved that the servant deliberately beat 
the horse or could have restrained it; the plaintiff was not free from negligence 
since he let his servant ride an irrepressible horse, and one could not believe 
that a female could control the horse equal to a young man. If the plaintiff also 
acted with some negligence, no actio legis Aquiliae was granted. Apparently, a 
different conclusion was taken if the servant deliberately beat the horse, and 
in order to determine whether this was the case, the Justizkanzlei ordered the 
performance of a submission of evidence for this statement.398 
Strube’s view is not very clear. The secondary literature provides various 
interpretations that can be given to the view of Strube. Firstly, Strube’s view 
can be understood as viewing the preponderant negligence as the decisive 
criterion for the Justizkanzlei. This implies the assumption that a small de-
gree of negligence of the injured party did not lead to a denial of the claim. 
In such case, the submission of evidence would have been useless since the 
Justizkanzlei had already decided that Titius was ‘nicht ausser aller Schuld’. The 
Justizkanzlei apparently considered the negligence of Titius less serious than 
that of the servant, which did not lead to a denial of the claim.399 However, 
the negligence of the servant was possibly closer to intention (dolus) than to 
negligence (culpa).
Secondly, Strube’s view could be interpreted as an example of a legal inter-
pretation in which neither the degree of mutual participation nor the more 
397 On Strube, see, e.g., Frensdorff 1893, p. 635ff.
398 D.G. Strube, Rechtliche Bedenken, III, Bed. 61, esp. p. 229. Strube, among others, 
referred to Lauterbach, Collegii theoretici-practici Pandectarum, ad D. 9.2, §7 & 11. See also 
F.-C. Harpprecht, Responsorum criminalium et civilium, vol. IV, resp. 83 n. 379: Quod vero in 
omnibus ejusmodi casibus, quando scilicet culpa a duobus commissa est, unius culpa cum alterius 
compensetur nullam dubitationem relinquit argumentum Legis 36. ff. de dolo [D. 4.3.36] et Leg. 
39 sol. matr. [D. 24.3.39] …; also interesting in this respect is the case of D. 13.6.23, which was 
mentioned by Peter Faber in his commentary on D. 50.17.203 as a case of contributory negligence 
(in edn. of 1618, p. 776).
399 Luig 1969, p. 212.
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subtle distinctions within the concept of culpa were taken into account.400 In 
that case, the Justinianic solution to the problem of contributory negligence 
was followed, and in the event of contributory negligence, no action was 
granted. This conclusion can be found in a contemporary scholar of Strube’s, 
namely Johann Müller (1750–1795), who in his Promtuarium juris, based on 
Strube and other authors already mentioned by Strube, stated that an action 
based on the lex Aquilia could not be granted if the injured party acted with 
negligence to a certain measure.401 It can be questioned whether Müller took 
the degree of negligence of the injured party into account, possibly if under-
stood in the sense that even a slight degree of negligence excluded an action.
A jurist who clearly thought that the degrees of negligence were of importance 
was Karl Hommel (1722–1781).402 In his Observatio 792, he applied the medieval 
doctrine of culpae compensatio and further elaborated on this doctrine in the 
sense that if two parties acted negligently, compensation could only take place 
if the respective negligence was equal in degree.403 He gave two examples. The 
first example is actually not about contributory negligence, but about two of-
fences. However, this situation is brought up, as it could be relevant – by way 
of an analogy – for the situation of contributory negligence. This fictitious 
example can be summarised as follows: concerning a married couple, the wife 
cheated repeatedly on her husband – since she liked men, and her husband 
could barely bear a tenth of the marital burden –404 and from her adultery six 
children were born. Almost dying at her last childbirth, she confessed her 
adultery to her husband to obtain forgiveness for her sin. The husband, in tears, 
confessed his own sin. He knew about the adulteries, and because he was tired 
of these ‘comedies’, he had mixed poison and had given it to her. This poison 
was the reason she was dying now.405 According to Hommel, these two delicts, 
the wife’s carnal sin and the man’s poisoning are not comparable (as they are 
entirely different in nature);406 therefore, the exceptio of compensation which 
400 Kaufmann 1958, p. 78.
401 J. Müller, Promtuarium juris, s.v. Aquilia lex. Actio ex lege Aquilia, nr. 14: Actio ex Lege 
Aquilia nullam plane invenit locum, si actor quodammodo in culpa est.
402 On K.F. Hommel, see, e.g., Lieberwirth 1972, p. 592.
403 K. Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, obs. 792, esp. nr. 1.
404 ibid., nr. 2:  Mulier valde pia, in rebus domesticis assidua, benefica, nullo vitio deformis, 
nisi quod virorum amantior esset, nupta erat homini debiliori, qui vix decimam partem onerum 
maritalium ferret. …
405 ibid.
406 Although this is not explicitly stated by Hommel, one can suppose that the heirs of the 
woman tried to obtain recovery from the husband; this is rather strange, of course, as this is their 
father (although not biologically). All in all, it is just a fictitious case, made by Hommel to show 
the application of the culpae compensatio doctrine.
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was brought forward by the defendant in order to plea for a diminution of the 
damages, was brought forward in vain.407 
According to Hommel, malicious intent (dolus) could not be compensated 
with another form of malicious intent (dolus) if both intents were not equal in 
degree, just as in the case of two acts performed with an equal amount of negli-
gence (culpa).408 Hommel argued that the prevailing opinion of the jurists was 
based on D. 9.2.11pr., namely, that the wrongdoer was exculpated if the injured 
person also acted negligently,409 and that no replicatio doli was granted against 
an exceptio doli if both parties acted in bad faith (see D. 44.4.4.13), and that no 
exceptio and replicatio are granted in the event in which both parties were at 
fault (culpa).410 Hommel did not agree with this prevailing view, because he 
believed that the exact measure of various degrees of negligence (culpa) in a 
case had to be taken into account: a more serious fault should lead to a more 
serious inconvenience and/or punishment than a minor fault (see X 5.31.18).411
This appears from Hommel’s application of the theory of compensatio culpae 
to a second, this time real case that occurred in Martisburg in October 1779: a 
woman (let us call her A) put poison into her homemade soup she prepared 
for her husband but then she put it aside, before he had a chance to eat it. But 
unfortunately a poor hungry woman, Catharina (C), who was accidentally 
present, ate this soup.412 C was not killed, but the poison weakened her and she 
claimed the costs of cure plus one hundred thalers from A because of missed 
income from work. Hommel argued that A had not prevented C from eating 
the soup, even though she knew it was poisoned, nor did she act when she 
407 K. Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, obs. 792, nr. 2: Stoicus haec paria dixerit, non 
ego. Quis enim delictum carnis cum veneficio comparare audeat? Itaque vereor, ne frustra ad 
minuendam poenam compensationis exceptio ei profutura sit. The stoicus mentioned by Hommel 
seems to be Seneca Maior (namely, Controversiae, VI.6), and not his son Seneca the Philosopher. 
The case described by Seneca Maior could indeed be regarded ‘haec paria’: a man told his wife 
to whom he proposed to marry their daughter. The daughter died before the marriage, due to 
poison. Apparently, the wife was unfaithful with the bridegroom. The man accused his wife of 
adultery and murder. Apparently, and this also stems from Seneca Maior, Controversiae, VII.3.6, 
one says that a woman has been an adulteress to make people believe that she is therefore a 
poisoner. In that sense also Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, V.11.39 is relevant, questioning 
whether an adulteress who is accused of poisoning is not already condemned by the sentence of 
Cato the Elder. The latter stated (according to Quintilian) that every adulteress was as good as a 
poisoner. Here Cato equated a woman making poison with an adulteress; see also Kaufman 1932, 
p. 157f.; apparently, the adultera-venefica was a stock character of practical cases argued in the 
school of rhetoric. See Santoro l’Hoir 2006, p. 161.
408 K. Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, obs. 792, nr. 3.
409 J.H. von Berger, Oeconomia juris, III.9.12, nota 1 (see below).
410 K. Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, obs. 792, nr. 4f.
411  See K. Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, obs. 792, nr. 5.
412  From Hommel’s Rhapsodia the reason for this removal is not clear. Possibly, she was 
driven by remorse but also other scenarios are imaginable: it could also be that the soup burned, 
or that she used too many spices, etc.
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actually saw that C was eating it. C ate the soup, despite a mild warning from 
A who said: ‘It is not good for you’. In that respect C acted negligently herself, 
but her negligence (according to Hommel) had to be qualified as minor negli-
gence, while the defendant A’s failing to interfere and prevent C from eating, 
knowing that the soup was poisoned, had to be qualified as an irresponsible 
and more serious act. Therefore, these acts were not reciprocally compensated 
and the possibility for C to claim damages from A was not totally excluded.413 
So, despite the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, an action could be 
brought, because the negligence of the defendant was more serious. In such 
cases, in which divergent degrees of negligence occurred, a total compensation 
was inadmissible.414 At the most the negligence on the side of the plaintiff was 
taken into account/compared with regard to the costs of the trial.415
With regard to the concept of contributory negligence, progress was made by a 
study of Eisenbach (1778). Eisenbach noticed that the question of contributory 
negligence had not yet been dealt with in a separate monograph treatise.416 He 
found his theory of compensation essentially already in existing material, and 
used it as a basis upon which he intended to clarify this material in a system-
atic manner, eliminating errors and consolidating its practical application.417 
Eisenbach drew a distinction between the compensation of claims originating 
from negligent behaviour, and the compensation of negligences as such.418
In Eisenbach’s dissertation, D. 4.3.36 is considered to contain a basic rule 
regarding negligence of the injured party.419 According to D. 4.3.36, if two 
persons acted with a fraudulent intent (dolo malo), they could not bring an 
actio de dolo against each other. Although D. 4.3.3.6 does not mention any 
compensation, Eisenbach maintained that a general principle of compensatio 
doli cum dolo could be deduced from this rule.420 Because of his focus on D. 
4.3.36, the starting point of his research was the intentional acts of two parties 
against each other. These acts are different from situations of contributory 
413  See K. Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, obs. 792, nr. 5f.
414  Luig 1969, p. 213.
415  K. Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, obs. 792, nr. 6: … also beyderseits sehr verschiedene 
Ungebührnisse sich gegen einander nicht völlig aufheben, sondern was Klägerin hieran an ihrer 
Seite zu Schulden kommen lassen, allenfalls nur die Vergleichung der auf diesen Proceß verwanten 
Unkosten bewirket, so ist etc.
416 J.F. Eisenbach, De compensatione circa maleficia, §1: Quotquot enim evolverim librorum 
indices, a nemini tamen thema nostrum speciale opere tractatum fuisse, inveni …; - See also Wieling 
1970, p. 224, who wrongly referred to §3.
417  Rother 1965, p. 31
418  ibid., p. 31f.
419 In the same sense Aumann 1964, p. 54.
420 J.F. Eisenbach, De compensatione circa maleficia, §2; also Rother 1965, p. 32.
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negligence, because in the case of D. 4.3.36 both parties are wrongdoer and 
injured at the same time. The sources discussed in the course of his study were, 
however, put on a par by Eisenbach with cases of contributory negligence (e.g. 
D. 9.2.11pr.).421 However, by doing so Eisenbach came up with new points of 
view, which could equally be applied to contractual and delictual claims. This 
can be regarded as the first record of a tendency to generalise the problem of 
contributory negligence by a jurist of the usus modernus.422 Eisenbach ques-
tioned the rigid prevailing use of the brocard dolus cum dolo compensatur, 
culpa cum culpa.423 Eisenbach felt that a total disclaim did not have to follow 
in all cases of contributory negligence (culpa) of the injured party, but rather 
a weighing of degrees of negligence of both parties. If an injured party acted 
with more serious negligence than, or equal negligence to, the other party, the 
victim could not bring an action (as in D. 9.2.11pr. and Inst. 4.3.5, in which case 
the injured party’s negligence was more serious than that of the wrongdoer).424 
421  Aumann 1964, p. 54.
422 ibid., p. 54f.;- Finally, with regard to the theory of culpae compensatio, C.F. von Glück 
(1755–1831) – the last exponent of the usus modernus pandectarum – stated that in a situation 
in which there was insulting behaviour on both sides, a compensation of these injuries could 
only be granted when the manner and extent of the insults were equal. See Glück 1813, p. 
71f.; he referred to D. 9.2.52.1 and A. Schulting, Thesium controversarum, thesis 57.7 and C.A. 
Tittmann, Handbuch des gemeinen deutschen Peinlichen Rechts, I, § 177; see esp. p. 452; in the 
preceding pages Von Glück also discussed the sedes materiae with regard to the theory of culpae 
compensatio, like the cases mentioned in D. 16.2.10pr., D. 4.3.36, D. 24.3.39 and X 5.16.7. Von Glück 
mainly referred to Eisenbach’s dissertatio; see also G.C. Bastineller, de pari turpitudine, § 9. On 
C.F. von Glück, see, e.g., Hirata 2006, p. 330ff. The situation in which there was a compensation 
of insulting behaviour on both sides is an analogous situation to that in which two delicts are 
compensated by way of mutual compensation. Based on Von Glück and the references made 
by Von Glück, the following summary can be given. In principle, injuries can be caused by acts 
(i.e. physical assaults) or words (i.e. non-physical assaults) – note that already in D. 47.10.1.1 it 
is stated that an injury (iniuria) can be caused by a thing (re) or by words (verbis). When two 
injuries (Beleidigungen) are equal as to extent, but not as to manner, both parties had to pay each 
other compensation. See C.A. Tittmann, Handbuch des gemeinen deutschen Peinlichen Rechts, 
I, § 177, p. 452 and also G.A. Kleinschrod, Systematische Entwicklung der Grundbegriffe und 
Grundwahrheiten des peinlichen Rechts, II, §92, p. 248f. (where he talks about ‘zum nämlichen 
Geschlecht gehören’). If one insult excessively exceeded the other, the person who was more 
injured could definitely claim damages. Such a situation occurred, for example, when a non-
physical assault (insulting words) was opposed to physical acts of violence. See G.C. Bastineller, 
de pari turpitudine, para. 17; see also J. Wernher, Selectae Observationes forenses Pars I, obs. 83; 
Pars III, obs. 14 & 143. With regard to the causation of the damage, pure negligence of the injured 
party, provided no insults took place, did not exclude the possibility to claim damages. Neither 
was the injured party who failed to apply the appropriate resources in order to repair the damage 
excluded from the right to claim compensation, but an exception was made in the case in 
which the injured party’s negligence was more serious than that of the wrongdoer, or when the 
injured party intentionally failed to use an antidote. See C.A. Tittmann, Handbuch des gemeinen 
deutschen Peinlichen Rechts, I, § 177, p. 454.
423 See J.F. Eisenbach, De compensatione circa maleficia, §2. 
424 ibid., §10. Eisenbach referred to G. Noodt, Ad legem Aquiliam liber singularis, c. VII, U. 
Huber, Praelectiones iuris civilis ad D. 9.2 § 11 and Chr. Wildvogel, de imputatione culpae propriae, 
cap. 3 §48. The argumentation of Wildvogel does not seem to provide a new point of view in 
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So the contributory negligence of the injured party cancelled out an equal or 
smaller negligence of the wrongdoer; the negligence of the wrongdoer was 
compensated by that of the injured party.425 Therefore, the judge – based on the 
circumstances of the case – could deny applying a compensation, namely, in 
the situation in which the negligence of the injured party was considerably less 
serious (multo levior) compared to the wrongdoer’s (apparently the prevailing 
opinion in Eisenbach’s time).426 With this consideration, it seems that Eisen-
bach borrowed an idea already expressed by the natural law jurist Pufendorf.427 
Furthermore, Eisenbach pointed at the importance of the individual decision 
of a judge – who should take into account the factual circumstances of the 
individual case – in his assessment of the degrees of negligence.428 However, a 
partition of damage between parties was not yet considered since Eisenbach 
still applied the all-or-nothing approach.429
Also Gallus Aloys Kleinschrod (1762–1824)430 discussed the question of 
whether an injured party could claim recovery if his damage was due to his 
own negligence. Apparently, the decisive criterion was whether either the neg-
ligence of the injured party gave cause to the delict (the damage-inflicting act; 
damnum iniuria datum), or whether the negligence of the injured party had 
any relation or connection with the origin of the damage-inflicting act. Only 
in the first case was no claim for damages granted, because negligence of the 
injured party also contributed to the cause of the damage, the injured party 
in fact being totally or largely causer of the damage. His negligence was the 
cause of the delict and its consequences, and therefore the rule of D. 50.17.203 
the sense that it only seems to reproduce and rearrange the information already provided in the 
sources (D. 9.2.9.4, D. 9.2.10, Inst. 4.3.4 and D. 9.2.11pr.); the latter he calls a ‘jocosum exemplum’ 
(humorous example)). Also U. Huber, Praelectiones iuris civilis ad D. 9.2 § 11, does not add 
novelty as to the legal interpretation of D. 9.2.11pr. Interesting is Huber’s statement that although 
barbers once shaved in public places, in his time they no longer did, but instead they shaved their 
customers inside houses.
425 Looschelders 1999, p. 20f.; -  According to the secondary literature, Eisenbach did 
not invent the theory of the decisiveness of the maior culpa, but just confirmed the rule that 
gradually developed as the prevailing opinion in the usus modernus from the beginning of the 
seventeenth century onwards; see Luig 1969, p. 215; Lorenz 1972, p. 312.
426 J.F. Eisenbach, De compensatione circa maleficia, §10. See also J. Heeser, Loci communes 
de rationibus reddendis, loc. 10, nr. 179, F.-C. Harpprecht, Consiliorum Tubingensium, VI, cons. 95, 
nr. 584 & nr. 585, and see also W.A. Schoepff, Selectae Decisiones et Resolutiones Tubingenses, dec. 
192, n. 16ff. 
427 Aumann 1964, p. 41, 55; - Additionally, according to Aumann 1964, p. 58, his tendency 
to generalise and his assessment (Abwägung) of the respective negligence and also the stronger 
emphasis on the specific case reflects the influence of the natural law thinking of fairness.
428 Aumann 1964, p. 55f.
429 Aumann 1964, p. 56; Rother 1965, p. 32f.; Wieling 1970, p. 225.
430 On Kleinschrod, see, e.g., Merzbacher 1979, p. 8f.
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applied.431 However, when the injured party acted culpably, but his negligence 
stood in no connection to the delict (e.g. when he was careless with regard to 
the protection of his own property and by this gave occasion for theft), he could 
still bring a claim for compensation. In such case the injured party contrib-
uted in no way to the origination of the damage-inflicting act; he was neither 
originator, nor assistant to the event, and no exception (of negligence) could 
be adduced against him. Therefore, the wrongdoer had to pay compensation, 
even in this case, in which the injured party, due to his negligence, gave some 
remote cause (causa remota) for the wrongdoing, and in some way advanced 
it. Although the injured party was negligent, the negligence of the wrongdoer 
had to be regarded – according to Kleinschrod – as being more serious and the 
wrongdoer was therefore held liable. 432
View 4: Proximity of damage
A different opinion can be found in the works of David Mevius (1609–1670).433 
In a case that actually occurred,434 a child tried to grab corn from a cart and 
then fell underneath the cart, after which the child was killed when the driver 
drove off. According to Mevius, to establish if it was possible to claim damages 
from the driver, it was decisive whether the accident was due to his negligence. 
To determine this the question of whether the driver could be accused of any 
neglect, i.e. in respect of what he ought to have done, had to be answered. 
Firstly, Mevius argued that the driver had not acted in a neglectful manner: he 
did something which was permitted, i.e. transporting corn on the street. Fur-
thermore, a witness stated that the driver called out loudly before he drove off. 
Secondly, he sustained that (even) if it could not be proven that the driver had 
called out loudly, the accident still could not be imputed to him, as he could 
have been seen and been warned by everyone. So Mevius concluded that the 
driver did not act with negligence,435 and that the injured party, considering 
the circumstances of the case, was contributorily negligent (the child did not 
leave his position after the warning), and therefore (cf. D. 50.17.203) was not 
considered to have suffered claimable damage. When both parties acted with 
some negligence, the person whose negligence was the latest in time and less 
remote to the accident would be liable. The person whose negligence was 
considered the ultima et casui proximior, had to bear the damage alone.436
431  G.A. Kleinschrod, Doctrina de reparatione damni delicto dati, Spec. I, §5; Abhandlungen 
aus dem peinlichen Rechte und dem peinlichen Processe, 3. Th. 2. Abt., § 5.
432 ibid.
433 On Mevius, see, e.g., Wieacker & Weir 1995, p. 170.
434 The title of the work ‘Decisiones super causis praecipuis ad tribunal regium Wismarensium 
delatis’ suggests that it concerns decisions to important cases brough to the regal chair of Wismar.
435 D. Mevius, Decisiones, I, decisio 221. 
436 D. Mevius, Decisiones, I, decisio 221, nt. 7: Culpa sua quod quis sentit, damnum sentire 
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4.5.2.4 Solving cases of contributory negligence without replying upon the 
contributory negligence of the injured party
Interestingly, the case described by Mevius is also described by his contem-
porary Johann Brunnemann (1608–1672).437 Brunnemann was of a different 
opinion than Mevius and argued that the driver, had an obligation to stop his 
cart after he noticed the danger. If the driver asserted that he could not possibly 
have stopped his cart, he had to confirm this by oath. If he, while noticing the 
danger, could have stopped but did not, and so did not spare a person’s life, 
his act had to be considered a negligent one especially since a small boy was 
concerned. Brunnemann’s argument shows that this case, which can be seen 
as a case of contributory negligence, is actually solved without any reference 
to contributory negligence.438 It is remarkable that the question of negligence 
non intelligitur, l. Quod quis 203. ff. de R.I. [D. 50.17.203], si utrinque est aliqua, nocet ejus, quae fuit 
ultima et casui proximior, l. Si et per emptorem 51. ff. de action. emt. [D. 19.1.51]; see also Kaufmann 
1958, p. 78; Luig 1969, p. 213f. Luig adds that Mevius’ explanation reminds us of the canon law 
distinction between causa proxima and causa remota. Mevius, however, seems to argue based 
on culpa instead of causa (see decisio 221, nr. 7). More clearly, Rittershusius adopted the causa 
proxima theory of canon law. As already mentioned in a previous footnote, as a legal basis 
Rittershusius referred to the older theory as described by Zasius (any contributory negligence 
of the injured party excluded his right to any compensation). Apparently, the defendant was not 
liable, because his act, compared to the act of the injured party, was not the causa proxima. See 
Rittershusius, Consilia sive responsa iuris Altdorfina, pars 1, resp. 42:‘… so hat er doch weder in 
erster, noch ander Instantz Acten nirgends, wie recht, außgeführet, daß beklagter solcher tortur, 
etc. ursach, zugeschweigen, daß er caussa proxima sey. Nun ist aber im Rechten klärlich versehen, 
Neminem damnum praestare, nisi qui caussam, et quidem proximam, damno dedit. …’; - While 
Mevius emphasised the decisive role of the most recent negligence, others put more weight on 
the degree of negligence on both sides. They considered this more important, because in case 
of preponderant negligence of the injured, the wrongdoer escaped from liability; cf. Chr. Besold, 
Consilia Tubingensia, VI, cons. 290, nr. 43f.; see also I.H. Böhmer, Doctrina de actionibus, sect. 
II, cap. XI, §XXV. Therefore, the wrongdoer was liable when his negligence was preponderant, 
even though the injured also acted negligently. This was the case when someone was attacked 
and the victim in the defensive act exceeded the limits of self-defence (noodweerexces); in that 
case he was liable. See Kaufmann 1958, p. 78f.; - According to Kaufmann 1958, p. 79, the overall 
approach of contributory negligence gave a rather heterogeneous picture. Not lastly this should 
be attributed to the ambiguous lack of separation between cause and negligence.
437 See J. Brunnemann, Commentarius, ad D. 9.2.31, esp. nr. 2f. On Brunnemann, see, e.g., 
Wieacker & Weir 1995, p. 170.
438 Luig 1969, p. 214, writes that ‘Da das gemeine Recht für die Fälle von Mitverschulden 
nur ein Entweder-Oder vorsah, wurden solche Fälle oft auch ohne jede Erwähnung des Problems 
des mitwirkende Verschulden gelöst, indem man nämlich die überwiegend schuldige Partei für 
alleinschuldig erklärte. Ein gutes Beispiel dafür bietet Brunnemanns Kritik an der von Mevius 
überlieferten Entscheidung ....’ However, that the driver is considered to be the party that acted 
with preponderant negligence in my opinion could not be based on this fragment (Brunnemann’s 
commentary on D. 9.2.31); the total focus seems to be on the negligence of the wrongdoer.;- In 
English law, there was the (civil) liability in trespass, which was strict rather than fault-based. 
Throughout the medieval and early modern periods there was a strong focus on the loss suffered 
by the injured party rather than on the wrongful conduct of the wrongdoer; see Ibbetson 1999, 
p. 58. The absence of negligence of the wrongdoer was in a concealed way discussed as an issue 
of causation: the arguement was that the injury was caused by the injured party rather than by 
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is linked to the age of the injured party. This connection has no foundation in 
the received Roman law on damnum iniuria datum.
4.5.2.5 The criterion of the auctor rixae as an alternative way to solve the problem 
of contributory negligence
The problem of contributory negligence also manifested itself in the event of 
quarrels, when one of the parties was wounded (or even killed) and he (or his 
relatives) sued the other party for damages. Early modern jurists agreed on 
the fact that the person who started a fight or provoked a fight (the so-called 
auctor rixae), and was wounded – in principle – could not claim any damag-
es.439 However, the qualification of ‘instigator of the fight’ is not undisputable. 
This apparently simple criterion in reality is more complex in the sense that 
the perpetrator of the fight was not the person who acted out of anger (the 
person who first hit the other; D. 9.2.52.1), but the person who by means of 
words provoked the anger of the other party,440 who should understand that 
his verbal provocations could ignite a fight. Whenever a fight occurred (more 
or less immediately, not after a period of time), the person who provoked with 
words was regarded as the auctor rixae.441 That person was the cause of the 
unlawfulness, and negligence (culpa) was attributed to that person.442
the defendant/wrongdoer. Ibbetson 1999, p. 59, rightly stated that there is a world of difference 
between the man running under the cart and the cart running over the man. While both 
formulations may refer to the same facts of the case, the difference between them is nonetheless 
significant. The first formulation ascribed the responsibility to the man; the second formulation 
to the cart and presumably to its driver. In this way, a problem of contributory negligence can 
be reformulated into a problem regarding the causal connection. The argumentation is in that 
case as follows: the injured party himself jumped before the cart, and therefore there is no causal 
connection between the act of the wrongdoer and the damage that occcurred; the injured party 
himself caused his damage.
439 See J.H. von Berger, Oeconomia juris, III.9.12, nota 1; i.e. according to Berger, medical 
costs and other damages. According to S. Cocceji, Jus civile controversum, ad D. 9.2 and J. Wernher, 
Selectae observationes forenses, III, obs. 143, ‘expensas et interesse’.
440 See also N.C. von Lyncker, decisio 1056.
441 C.F. Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, II, obs. 383, esp. nr. 2f. The situation is different 
if the fight occurred after a lapse of time. Neither party could be regarded as auctor rixae, unless 
one of them had the maior culpa. 
442 See B. Carpzovius, Jurisprudentia Forensis, IV, const. 9, def. 4, nr. 5; J. Brunnemann, 
Commentarius ad D. 9.2.52, nr. 5ff.; see also B. Carpzovius, Jurisprudentia Forensis, IV, const. 10, 
def. 4, esp. nr. 3, from which it appears that the provoking party gave the causa for the damage 
inflicted to himself, and thus he had to blame himself (he referred to D. 50.17.151 and D. 9.2.11pr.); 
- An exception is made by Modestinus Pistoris, who described a case concerning a lawful assault 
(e.g. by a magistrate). Any resistance to such a lawful act was considered to bring about culpa, 
and therefore if damage resulted – the homicide of the defender – that ‘damage’ was considered 
to be the defender’s own fault. See Modestinus Pistoris, Consilia sive responsa, II, cons. IIII, nr. 28, 
with reference to D. 9.2.11pr. and VI 5.12.86.
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To make this theoretical exposé clearer, I will shortly descibe a case found in a 
responsum of Johann Nikolaus Hertius (1651–1710).443 As a result of a fight, one 
of the fighters, a fisherman, died. The fisherman’s widow444 wanted to use the 
confiscated goods of the person who killed her husband as monetary support 
for the necessary maintenance for herself and her children. The question arose 
whether this was at all possible. In answering this question, Hertius applied 
the culpae compensatio doctrine: the actio legis Aquiliae was not applicable, 
because negligence of the injured party occurred (with that of the wrongdoer). 
Therefore, in this case, the claim of the widow was denied. The reason for this 
denial was a particular form of this doctrine, namely, the criterion of auctor 
rixae: no claim was granted because the fisherman appeared to have been the 
initiator (auctor rixae) of the fight. Whoever was the auctor rixae was at fault 
(culpa).445 The fisherman’s wife’s claim was rejected because the fisherman 
had acted with negligence, being the initiator of the fight. Luig argued that 
the criterion of culpa maior was often moulded in the question of the auctor 
rixae.446 However, no such conclusion can be drawn from this responsum. In 
the approach in this responsum no explicit mention was made of the mutual 
degrees of negligence of both parties. The question of auctor rixae is relevant 
in order to determine whether an injured person acted negligently. In this case 
the victim did, and therefore the negligences were mutually compensated 
(apparently no subtleties in degrees of negligence were considered by Hertius 
in this case). 447
In early modern literature, many cases in which an initial provocation led to 
an excessive reaction can be found. The general rule that the originator of a 
fight could not claim compensation from the other party (no compensation for 
medical expenses or immaterial damage)448 did not apply – according to Johann 
Berger (1657–1732)449 – if the other party acted excessively in defence.450 If the 
443 On Hertius, see, e.g., Sellert 1969, p. 700f.; according to Sellert, Hertius belonged to the 
Epoche of natural law, which was especially also characterised by the revival of German law.
444 Apparently, the widow has a claim in her capacity as heir (an inherited action); 
contributory negligence cannot be imputed otherwise than to the heirs.
445 J. Hertius, Responsa et consilia, resp. 399, nr. 4f.: … des entleibten Wittib aber und Kinder 
können nichts praetendieren, weilen ex actis erhellet, daß der entleibte Fischer autor rixae gewesen, 
actio autem ex lege Aquilia locum non habet, si patientis concurrit...
446 Luig 1969, p. 209f.
447 Also Kaufmann 1958, p. 78.
448 No right to recovery due to the fact that he himself was negligent (contributory 
negligence), which negligence excluded the right to recovery based on D. 9.2.11pr. jo. D. 50.17.203; 
see, e.g., J. Wernher, Selectae observationes forenses, I, obs. 83.
449 On J.H. Berger, see, e.g., Muther 1875a, p. 364f.
450 J. Berger, Electa Iurisprudentiae Criminalis. Supplementa Pars 1, obs. 25, with reference 
– among others – to X 2.13.12 and Exodus 21:19.
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initial aggressor tried to sue the other, his claim was not denied if the other 
party exceeded the limits of normal self-defence (see X 2.13.12).451 The latter 
exception can also be found in an answer (to a consultation) given by jurists 
of the (Law) Faculty of Wittenberg, as reproduced by Johannes Wernher 
(1677–1743),452 where one can find that this excess had to be ruled on by the 
judge in a given case, based on the specific circumstances. Apparently, a large 
and extraordinary excess (magnus et insignis excessus) was required.453 In 
such case (i.e. not in the event of a slight overreaction454), the instigator of the 
fight could claim damages and expenses (damna et expensa).455 It seems that 
this was the usual way of dealing with this matter at the Faculty of Wittenberg 
(Ordo Vitembergensis), and thus represents the leading view in the opinions 
at the beginning of the eighteenth century in Wittenberg.456 According to one 
observation, this view even included compensation for inflicted grief and pain 
(immaterial damages).457 This was not the prevailing view, as appears from 
others, who argued that in the latter case no damages for pain and suffering 
had to be paid.458 
451  J. Berger, Oeconomia juris, III.9.12. One reference of Berger is particularly interesting, 
namelt toa part of Berger’s Resolutiones legum obstantium quae in compendio iuris Lauterbachiano, 
p. 151f. in edition of 1716, where he discussed the question ‘An provocanti vulnerato actio L. 
Aquiliae detur ad expensas et interesse?’ Firstly, he referred to D. 47.2.12.1, according to which the 
answer should be ‘no’, because no one can obtain an action due to his own improbitas. Thereafter 
three obstantia follow, with a response (D. 9.2.5pr., D. 9.2.45.4 and D. 9.2.7.4). The fourth and 
fifth obstantia are particularly of interest: D. 9.2.52.1, where it is stated that the damage would be 
done due to the negligence of the shopkeeper (tabernarii culpa factum videri). That would be the 
case if the shopkeeper started the fight himself because he wanted to take back the lantern, and 
in that case he would have been the instigator of the fight (alternative scenario); and X 2.13.12 
(satisfactionem debitam exhibere), that is, if someone reacted very excessively (Berger: casum 
magni excessus; X 2.13.12: modum excessistis); see also S. Cocceji, Jus civile controversum, ad D. 9.2; 
A. Leyser, Meditationes ad Pandectas, Med. 112 ad D. 9.2, §2.
452 J. Wernher, Selectae observationes forenses, III, obs. 143, with reference to a decision of 
the Faculty of Wittenberg of 1714.
453 J. Wernher, Selectae observationes forenses, I, obs. 83, with reference to a decision of 
the Faculty of Wittenberg of 1707. On J.B. Wernher see, e.g., Kathe 2002, p. 324f.; - The originator 
(auctor rixae) of a fight could only claim compensation for medical expenses when the other 
party had (re)acted in a very excessive way (compared to the act of the originator); see C.F. 
Hommel, Rhapsodia quaestionum, vol. II, obs. 383, nr. 1; Glück 1808, p. 389; - See also D. Strube, 
Rechtliche Bedenken, IV, 43, p. 101, and J. Quistorp, Grundsätze des Peinlichen Rechts, I, §336, p. 503.
454 It is not exactly clear how these two situations (a large and extraordinary excess vs. 
slight overreaction) should be distinguished.
455 See also Supplementum novum ad J. Wernher, Selectae observationes forenses, I, obs. 
83; and also W.A. Schoepff, Selectae Decisiones et Resolutiones Tubingenses, dec. 192, nr. 18, who 
referred to this decision of the jurists of the Faculty of Wittenberg as reproduced by Wernher.
456 J. Wernher, Selectae observationes forenses, III, obs. 14.
457 ibid.
458 See, e.g., G. Meister, Principia iuris criminalis, §173, p. 182. See also C.F. Hommel, 
Rhapsodia quaestionum, vol. II, obs. 383, nr. 1 and also C.A. Tittmann, Handbuch des gemeinen 
deutschen Peinlichen Rechts, 1. Th., § 177, p. 453.
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Augustinus Leyser (1683–1752)459 mentioned a case in which the jurists of 
the Faculty of Helmstadt in September 1719 possibly applied the maior culpa 
theory. The provoking party, Jacob, brought a case against Duderstedt and 
Elzen, who apparently had taken revenge on him. The defendants tried to 
excuse their excessive actions by stating that Jacob provoked their actions by 
throwing water out the window onto passers-by and by calling them ‘Taschen-
spieler’ (conjurer). However, the jurists argued that even in such a situation, in 
which the defendants exceeded the measure of defence, the provoked persons 
Duderstedt and Elzen could be held liable.460 This example can indeed be con-
sidered as a clear application of the rule that a small amount of negligence of 
the injured party (i.e. Jacob, namely, by throwing water out the window onto 
passers-by and calling them ‘Taschenspieler’) did not free the wrongdoers 
of liability; however, the reason behind this was not revealed. It could be an 
example of a doctrine of major culpa.461
The action of Jacob was a delict against the other(s), which as a provocation 
was (indirectly) causal to his damage. Nevertheless, if the other party (re)
acted very excessively (compared to the act of the originator), the originator 
(auctor rixae) of the fight could claim recovery for medical expenses and loss 
of future earnings, but recovery for immaterial damages was denied because 
of the conduct of the injured party.462 
This was the case in an example described by the jurists of the Faculty 
of Helmstadt in September 1715. Keltze and Mertensen played a game with 
dice all night long in the pub. This led to a quarrel and a fight. Ultimately, 
Mertensen’s head seemed to be injured very seriously by Keltze. Based on the 
circumstances of the case, it appeared that both parties acted negligently. 
Especially relevant was the fact that Mertensen, by taking away money belong-
ing to Keltze, gave occasion and cause to the quarrel and the fight, as well as 
the fact that Keltze started the fight and ultimately caused the serious injury 
to Mertensen’s head. Mertensen, being the originator of the fight, could only 
claim satisfaction because Keltze had acted excessively, but only for medical 
expenses, not for lost income, costs of the failure to comply with procedural 
requirements or damages for pain and suffering (immaterial damages).463
459 On Leyser, see, e.g., Wieacker 1967, p. 221f.; Luig 1980, p. 41ff.; 1985, p. 437ff.; Wieacker 
& Weir 1995, p. 172f.
460 A. Leyser, Meditationes ad Pandectas, Med. 112 ad D. 9.2, §2.
461 Differently Luig 1969, p. 215.
462 See A. Leyser, Meditationes ad Pandectas, Med. 112 ad D. 9.2, §3; Aumann 1964, p. 53; 
Van Wassenaer van Catwijck 1971, p. 241.
463 See A. Leyser, Meditationes ad Pandectas, Med. 112 ad D. 9.2, §3.
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So the criterion of the auctor rixae could be used as an alternative way to solve 
the problem of contributory negligence. Wernher gave two alternative reasons 
for the general denial of a claim for damages in the event that an injured party 
originated the fight: firstly, because the damage was inflicted on him during 
the fight and he was the instigator464 or, secondly,  because his negligent act 
(negligence of the ‘injured party’) coincided with the negligent act of the other 
party (the ‘wrongdoer’ in this respect).465 A similar consideration can be found 
with Eisenbach, who stated that the injured party could not bring an action if 
he acted negligently (culpa) to an equal or more serious extent,466 or if he was 
the instigator of the fight.467
According to Samuel Cocceji (1679–1755),468 the reason for a denial of a 
claim for damages (expensas et interesse) in the event of a provocation was that 
someone who suffered damage due to his own negligence was not considered 
to have suffered claimable damages (based on D. 50.17.203). Furthermore, 
whomever acted wickedly was not granted an action. Cocceji introduced 
another new criterion, namely, that a person who attacked his attacker and 
killed him was liable for his death, depending on the outcome of the question 
of whether he could have avoided the death of his attacker by running away.469
Consequences of contributory negligence: reducing the damages?
As shown above, the idea of a reduction of the total amount of damages was 
not completely foreign to some jurists of the usus modernus.470 In the fragment 
464 See J. Wernher, Selectae observationes forenses, I, obs. 83 and III, obs. 14.
465 See J. Wernher, Selectae observationes forenses, III, obs. 143 & Supplementum novum ad 
Wernher, Selectae observationes forenses, I, obs. 83.
466 Eisenbach also wrote an interesting part on the lex Aquilia. A wrongdoer who had to 
pay a poena based on the lex Aquilia became, because of that obligation debtor to the other party. 
It is possible that the other party was also indebted to this party, due to contract (conventio) 
or delict (maleficium). In such case a compensation of debita/delicta was possible, and neither 
party could claim damages from the other.
467 Due to his own delict he behaved in an unworthy manner, and the damage was 
imputed rather to him than to the wrongdoer, in such a way that neither the widow nor the heirs 
of the dead (killed) instigator of a fight could bring an action. If, on the contrary, the person who 
knocked out an eye was the originator of the fight, or if the provoked party exceeded the measure 
of self-defence, this party could – in principle – be condemned by a decision of the judge based 
on the lex Aquilia. No such condemnation to grant private satisfaction took place if the provoked 
party exceeded his defence even rather slightly; see J.F. Eisenbach, De compensatione circa 
maleficia, §19. See also the already mentioned Schoepff, in his Selectae Decisiones et Resolutiones 
Tubingenses, dec. 192, nr. 14: quo casu, si culpa agentis interveniat et concurrat culpa patientis, 
tunc cessat, v.g. in provocatione, actio L. Aquiliae cum ex proprio delicto, licet alter in re illicita 
constitutus, actio haud competat, et damnum quod quis sua culpa sentit, non sentire videatur ….
468 On Cocceji, see, e.g., Döhring 1957a, p. 301f.
469 S. Cocceji, Jus civile controversum, ad D. 9.2. 
470 See the aforementioned commentaries of Peter Faber and Johannes de Sande ad 
D. 50.17.203; see also Liutpriand c. 136, as discussed by Conrad 1962, p. 164f.; - This example 
seems very similar to the example mentioned in D. 11.5.1pr.-2. According to D. 11.5.1pr., no action 
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of Leyser’s Meditationes discussed above, including a responsum of the Faculty 
of Heldstedt from 1715,471 damages for medical expenses and a monetary fine 
had to be paid, but not for immaterial damages and loss of earnings, which 
were denied because of the negligent conduct of the injured party.472 The ap-
proach of the jurists of the Faculty of Helmstadt was considered ‘new’ in the 
sense that for the first time a reduced amount of damages was discussed.473 
Apparently, the question whether immaterial damages could be recovered 
became an issue in this period, while this topic was not prominently present 
in legal discussion in earlier times. After the Reception, immaterial damages 
were considered a separate category of loss. 
In this respect, for a proper assessment of the issue of immaterial damages, 
one has to distinguish two different matters. Firstly, which kind of losses could 
be compensated (material or immaterial losses) and, secondly, whether the 
judge was competent to mitigate/reduce the amount of compensation. It is 
the first matter which is relevant in the responsum of the jurists of the Faculty 
of Helmstedt, as only certain kinds of losses (immaterial damages and loss of 
earnings) were excluded from compensation, therefore a division of damage 
as proposed later by Wolff was not yet applied. The second matter is not in 
question: the total damages are not reduced, but some kinds of damages are 
excluded.474 This is not different in the following cases and doctrinal works.
In the view of two scholars, Hommel and Schoepff, a small amount of neg-
ligence of the injured party did not exclude this party’s compensation claim, 
but was taken into account in order to determine the exact amount of damage. 
Hommel, in an opinion discussed above, proposed to divide the costs of the 
litigation because of the contributory negligence of the injured party,475 prob-
ably meaning that each should bear its own costs of the litigation. The second 
jurist is Schoepff who, in a decision – which will be dealt with now – discussed 
was granted if someone beat a person (or in any way damages him) in whose house a game 
with dice is said to have taken place. Where someone employs violence because of a game with 
dice, he will be punished as the circumstances may demand. According to D. 11.5.1.2, when the 
proprietor of such a house was beaten or suffered a loss, he could not bring an action, no matter 
when or where this occurred. Theft can be committed with impunity in the house at the time 
of gambling, even though the party who committed one of these offences may not have taken 
part in the game.
471  A. Leyser, Meditationes ad Pandectas, Med. 112 ad D. 9.2, §3.
472 See A. Leyser, Meditationes ad Pandectas, Med. 112 ad D. 9.2, §3; accordingly Aumann 
1964, p. 53.
473 Aumann 1964, p. 53.
474 Possibly, the exclusion of damages for inflicted grief was dictated by the practical 
circumstances of this specific case; see Aumann 1964, p. 53. Luig 1969, p. 216, added that if 
this was the case, it could – according to his opinion – be explained by Leyser’s ‘eigenwilligen 
Billigkeitsjurisprudenz’; see Wieacker 1967, p. 221.
475 See C.F. Hommel, Rhapsodia, obs. 792.
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the amount for maintenance expenses.476 
In a decisio of the Faculty of Tübingen, passed down to us by Wolffgang 
Adam Schoepff (1679–1770),477 the case concerned a man who provoked 
another man by throwing flour on him. This man reacted by giving a crude 
verbal reply. The conflict worsened as follows: the provoker then hit the other 
man with a stick, and this man then defended himself with a butcher’s knife 
and killed his adversary. The widow wished to recover medical expenses, 
costs for surgery, funeral costs and mourning clothes and also claimed private 
satisfaction (satisfactio privata; by means of an actio utilis) and an assessment 
of her interest (apparently the future loss of revenue) for her and her five-
year-old child. In Schoepff ’s discussion on the determination of the amount 
for maintenance expenses, the contributory negligence of the injured party 
was taken into account.478 
One can argue that the husband was the auctor rixae realis, and, if so, the 
throwing of flour was the cause of the quarrel.479 However, this was not the case, 
as the second person (provoked due to the flour which was thrown on him) 
should not have reacted verbally in such an excessive manner as he did, which 
made him the auctor rixae verbalis. Although the one whose ear was boxed with 
the stick and subsequently wounded his attacker, was – in principle – not given 
an action based on the lex Aquilia (based on D. 47.10.1.5 and D. 50.17.203),480 
at the same time the circumstances of the case, including the question of who 
could be regarded the originator of the fight and whose negligence was the 
more serious, had to be taken into account. 
This appears from the following case. A person of servile status accused a 
nobleman of a lie, and the nobleman subsequently gave him a box on the ear 
(which was apparently justified: ex justa causa alapae infligantur), and then 
the person of servile status wounded the nobleman.481 In this case an action 
based on the lex Aquilia could be brought against the person of servile status, 
since culpa maior (the person of servile rank who wounded a nobleman) could 
never be compensated with culpa minor (the box on the ear by the nobleman), 
476 See W.A. Schoepff, Selectae Decisiones et Resolutiones Tubingenses, I, dec. 192, nr. 5.
477 On Schoepff, see, e.g., Eisenhart 1891, p. 358.
478 W.A. Schoepff, Selectae Decisiones et Resolutiones Tubingenses, I, dec. 192, nr 5: ‘… 
weilen jedoch die Beklagte auch nicht von denen Reichsten, und die andere Kosten auch was 
erlauffen, zudem der Erstochene auch gefehlet, so ist diese Summ denen Umständen nach vor 
billich geachtet worden …’.
479 In that case, contributory negligence would concur with the fault of the wrongdoer 
and no action based on the lex Aquilia would be granted.
480 See also, e.g., P. Farinacius, Praxis Criminalis, De homicidio, q. 119, nr. 122 (necessary 
defence); M. Lederer, De iure belli privati, lib. 1, c. 6 §5 (the provoked person who wounded the 
provoker does not have to pay a poena).
481 See also S. Stryk, Disputatione juridica de alapa, cap. 4, nr. 23.
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but only mutual negligence could be compensated when equal in degree.482
From this decision one can deduce that the difference in status/rank between 
the two persons was one of the factors which was decisive for the seriousness 
of an act or of a provocation. This element has no basis in Roman law rules 
on damnum iniuria datum nor in canon law. This must have been a typical 
indigenous feature, as it had no place in the ius commune tradition. A strict 
line was followed: the first provocation had to be qualified as serious, when 
apparently (when applicable also) based on the difference in status. The first 
serious provocation makes someone auctor rixae. But, as appears from the last 
case, it was not the box on the ear by the nobleman but the accusation of the 
person of servile rank which was regarded as the first serious provocation (this 
could also have been decided the other way around, but apparently, the status 
was decisive for the outcome), and made the other the auctor rixae.
4.5.3 ‘Giurisprudenza pratica’ in Italy
With regard to contributory negligence of the injured party, did the Italian 
jurists continue to apply the medieval doctrine of culpae compensatio? If so, 
did they apply the theory of culpae compensatio in cases in which the contribu-
tory negligence of the injured party was less serious than the negligence of 
the wrongdoer? In this section a short overview of the views of some Italian 
scholars in early modern times will be given. Thereby, I shall distinguish three 
ways in which one dealt with contributory negligence.
1. As already discussed in the previous chapter, the Italian jurist Aymon 
Cravetta (1504–1569) mentions in a consilium a case in which someone started 
a quarrel and was killed during the fight. Negligence (culpa) was attributed 
to the person who started or provoked a fight. In this case, the wrongdoer 
who killed the initiator of the fight was, however, not liable, due to the culpa 
admixta on the side of the injured party (who started the fight).483 It has been 
482 W.A. Schoepff, Selectae Decisiones et Resolutiones Tubingenses, I, dec. 192, nr. 13ff.: ..., 
who – among others – referred to S. Stryk, Disputatione juridica de alapa, cap. 4, nr. 22 and 23, 
J. Heeser, Loci communes de rationibus reddendis, loc. 10, nr. 179, F. Pacianus, De probationibus, I, 
cap. 59, nr.15 and Sebastiano Medici, Tractatus de compensationibus, q. 34-36 [‘quaest. 34. num. 
36’, does not exist, EvD]. According to S. Stryk, Disputatione juridica de alapa, cap. 4, nr. 23, the 
action is permitted because of D. 9.2.45.4 based on the criterion of revenge (apparently, the 
action of the person of servile status is considered as revenge here by Stryk); - See also Luig 1969, 
p. 210f., according to whom in this decisio the question of the application of D. 50.17.203 and 
culpae compensatio is solved by referring to the decisiveness of the maior culpa.
483 A. Cravetta, Consilia sive responsa, cons. 119, nr. 11 (edn. 1611, p. 215): Praesupposito 
igitur quod defunctus fuerit in culpa incipiendo rixam, dico, quod uulnerans non tenetur pro aliquo 
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argued in the secondary literature that with the words culpa admixta Cravetta 
meant the preponderant negligence of the injured party;484 however, this is 
not plausible, since Cravetta makes no explicit mention of such a culpa maior 
theory. Besides, I believe that this interpretation reads more into the source 
than Cravetta intended.
The Rota Florentina also mentioned this concept of culpa admixta. This ap-
pears from a decision recorded by Marzio Venturini in his decisiones Rotae 
Florentinae.485 In the case in which a decision was given on 31 March 1640, a 
certain Caesar Franciscus de Marsilia gave an order (mandatum) to Boier and 
Gantelmo to buy certain coins (piastre del leone) and to transport them by ship 
to Smirna. (Consul) Caesar received the coins and thought that they were good, 
as they normally were; however, afterwards he discovered that they were false. In 
the meantime, he spent some coins in trade with the Turks. However, the Turks 
made a fuss about it and even complained to the Ministers of Smirna. As a result 
of this Caesar was placed in danger and suffered damage. Caesar ordered the 
captain to give the false coins back to Boier and Gantelmo; furthermore, Caesar 
wanted his money back (the money with which he had bought the coins) with 
damages and interest. 
Although Caesar denied knowing that the coins were false, the Rota Florentina 
supposed that this was so and even that this was part of the mandate. According 
to the Rota Florentina, if any loss to Caesar resulted from this mandate, the same 
Caesar would be held responsible, and he was not allowed to claim any damages 
from his mandatarii.486 In the elaborate decision of the Rota, several arguments 
are used to come to the conclusion that Caesar had no claim against his manda-
tarii, among which the argument that nobody who gave cause to a delict could 
impute negligence or malicious intent to another person, and the persons who 
apparently directly caused damage (Boier and Gantelmo) were not held liable 
when sued by Caesar because there was culpa admixta on the part of the injured 
party (Caesar).487 In conclusion, it can be stated that the role of the injured party 
damno, quia damnificans non tenetur, quando damnum habet admixtam culpam damnificati ...; 
see also Farinacius, de homicidio, q. CXIX, nr. 125: Quamvis contrarium voluisse videatur Aym[on] 
in cons[ilio] 119 nu[mero] 11, ubi facit conclusionum, quod quando occisus fuit in culpa incipiendo 
rixam, et verbis provocando occidentem, tunc vulnerans seu occidens non tenetur pro aliquo damno, 
quia damnificans non tenetur, quando damnum habet admixtam culpam damnificati, ex Soccin[o] 
quem allegat in cons[ilio] 156 col. fin. lib. 2. …
484 Luig 1969, p. 209.
485 Venturini became a judge at the Rota Florentina in 1635; on Venturini, see Gerini 1829, 
p. 257ff.
486 M. Venturini, Decisiones Rotae Florentinae, dec. 45, nr. 16.
487 M. Venturini, Decisiones Rotae Florentinae, dec. 45, nr. 19f.: ... et non tenetur de damno 
quando damnum habet admixtam culpam damnificari ...: … et nemo potest cuiquam dolum, vel 
culpa imputare, cui ipse causam dedit … et damnificans non tenetur de damno quando damnum 
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is qualified in terms of culpa admixta. This cancels out the injured party’s right 
to claim for compensation, without looking any further to the seriousness of the 
respective faults.
2. Regarding the problem of contributory negligence of the injured party in the 
giurisprudenza pratica,488 a decision of the Rota Romana of 1763, collected by 
Bartholomaeus Olivatius (1704–1791),489  is relevant.490 Someone took posses-
sion of a bolt and a key from the inner door of a millhouse. The millhouse was 
the entrance to his island (called Isca). Due to this the owner was obstructed 
from entering. Because of the force of a flood from a nearby river, the door-bars 
were destroyed, the dikes were moved, trees destroyed, etc.491 In this case, a 
possessory remedy of manutentio was given, and the obstructing party (de-
fendant) was (also) condemned to pay for the damage due to the obstruction 
of possession (i.e. the damage to the estate). In this lawsuit the defendant had 
two counter-pleadings: the plaintiff could have built a bridge or he could have 
reached the place by walking under the arch of the leper’s bridge. The Rota 
Romana rejected these defences, with the motivation that the negligence of 
someone obstructing the possessor (from using his possession) was considered 
to be more serious (maior) compared with the negligence of the possessor who 
had not tried other ways to reach his possession, and that the possessor was not 
obliged to build a temporary bridge or to make a difficult and dangerous, at least 
inconvenient, journey to reach his possession.492 In conclusion, it can be said that 
habet admixtam culpam damnificari, prout ex Soccin[o] consil[io] 161 col. fin. lib. 2, tradit idem 
Cravett[a] consil[io] 119. numer[o] 11 ...; - Furthermore, the doctrine of culpae compensatio is 
discussed and applied to the case. A full account of this application, however, goes beyond the 
scope of the present study. Interesting and new is the remark that delicts could be compensated 
by mutual compensation, but only when delicts were equal; not when one delict was more 
serious than the other. Therefore, dolus was not compensated with culpa lata, and culpa lata not 
with culpa levissima; see Venturini, Decisiones Rotae Florentinae, dec. 45, nr. 79.
488 According to Luig 1969, p. 217f., the problem of contributory negligence in Italy was 
commonly solved by a denial of claim, based on D. 50.17.203 and VI 5.12.86. Unfortunately, it 
is not clear to me which sources he referred to, whether these are the sources described in this 
subsection or if other sources exist that are not contained in Luig’s article.
489 Bartholomeo Olivazzi (Olivatius) was first a Prelate Auditor of the Sacra Rota Romana, 
then Dean of the Sacra Rota Romana, and  later a Bishop of Pavia from 1769 until 1791.
490 In a decision of 1737, collected by Carlo della Torre di Rezzonico (the later Pope 
Clemens XIII), the Rota Romana applied the rule of D. 50.17.203. However – although argued by 
Luig 1969, p. 218 – no explicit application of the maior culpa theory can be found in this decision. 
It concerns a difficult case regarding a testament (a dowry). The decision of the Rota Romana 
showed that the injured party (a certain Marchio de Maximis) suffered damage (the rights to the 
dowry were assigned to him and due to that fact this cessio was extincted) was either more due to 
an act of himself (based on D. 50.17.203), or the latter had to admit that he did in fact not suffer 
any damage at all. However it may be, there was no comparison of the negligent act of both 
parties nor a trace of the maior culpa theory. See C. Rezzonico, Decisiones Sacrae Rotae Romanae, 
III, dec. 325, n. 11.
491 C. Olivatius, Decisiones Sacrae Rotae Romanae, dec. 352.
492 C. Olivatius, Decisiones Sacrae Rotae Romanae, dec. 352, nr. 16: … Praeter quod enim 
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contributory negligence of the injured party was dealt with by applying the rule of 
D. 50.17.203, sometimes with and sometimes without the renewed application 
of the maior culpa theory.493
 
3. A totally different approach follows from a decision of the Rota Fiorentina in 
1780 on the liability for damages caused by a ball game.494 The Rota Fiorentina 
was one of the highest courts in the Grand Duchy under the rule of the Medicis 
(until 1737) and the Lorenas.495 The facts of the case are as follows: in the 
Tuscan town of Marradi it was customary for a team of amateurs to play once 
a year, in summertime, a ball game (namely, gioco del pallone) in the public 
square. The custom was that this team notified the owners of the houses sur-
rounding the square where the game took place in advance, before the day 
the game would commence, so that the house-owners could take measures to 
prevent damage to their houses. Despite this warning, damage was caused to 
the house of the Fabronis during the game of the summer of 1778.496
The judicial decision was given in appeal on a commission of the Magistrato 
Supremo to a judge of the Rota Fiorentina, in this case Judge Giuseppe Vernaccini. 
Vernaccini referred to the common opinion of the Doctores interpreting the 
lex Aquilia, in order to constitute an iniuria or wrong and thereby give rise to 
liability for damages, the act causing the damage had to be committed with 
dolus or at least with culpa. When the act causing the damage was ‘licit and 
permitted by law’, there was no culpa. According to the decision, no culpa was 
maior est culpa impedientis diuturnum possessorem, ne sua possessione utatur, quam possessoris 
non experientis alias vias, aliasque transeundi rationes … 
493 Another example of the application of the maior culpa theory can be found in a 
fragment of an auditor of the Rota Romana, the later Cardinal de Luca (1614–1683); see G.B. 
de Luca, Theatrum veritatis et justitiae, lib. VIII, disc. 58, n. 22. Cardinal de Luca described a 
lawsuit of the Roman Mons Pietatis against the Collegium orphanorum. The administrators 
of the Collegium orphanorum were – in accordance with the almost general use of other 
charitable institutions – accustomed to deposit money at the Mons Pietatis with a continuous 
administration of expenditure and revenue. This was done so that – in accordance with the 
mutual good faith and shown helpfulness – as the bank at any time has a considerable amount of 
money from the depositor, the bank likewise complies with his obligations, although the money 
is missing, and this due to future supplement. In this case, one of the servants (a bookkeeper or 
a scribe) of the Collegium falsified the signature of the administrators (approving the accounts 
written in the lists/(year)books of the Collegium, i.e. the donations (made and received) and 
payments still to be made). Apparently both parties were considered negligent – at least their 
officials or administrators, because the parties had legal personality – but the negligence of the 
administrators of the Collegium was more serious (maior) in this case than that of the bank.
494 The decision was called ‘Marradien[sis] Praetensae Refectionis Damnorum’; see G. 
Vernaccini, Collezione completa delle decisioni, II,  p. 279ff.
495 See Gorla 1974/1975, p. 346, and literature on the Rota Fiorentina mentioned in footnote 1.
496 Gorla 1974/1975, p. 349f.; the facts of the case can be found in G. Vernaccini, Collezione 
completa delle decisioni, II,  p. 280ff.
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assumed in this case.497 Furthermore, the Fabronis ignored the warning of the 
players and left exposed items that could have been protected and they also 
embellished (abbelita) the façade of their house, located exactly where the 
game was customarily played, and they were well aware of that. Thus, they 
willingly exposed themselves to possible damage.498 In his decision Vernaccini 
argued that the barber case (D. 9.2.11pr.) had to be applied. According to Gorla, 
in Vernaccini’s decision an argumentum a similibus in D. 9.2.11pr. was applied: 
the barber had willingly put his trade chair in a place where it was customary 
to play ball, and in a similar manner the Fabronis did not protect the windows 
and the embellished façade of their house, while the house stood in a place 
where people were used to playing ball games.499
In conclusion, according to the Argomento of Vernaccini’s decision, there was no 
liability for damages when a ball game, licit in itself, was played in a place where 
playing such a game was also lawful, and previous notice had been given to the 
owners of the surrounding houses.500 Furthermore, the ball games were played 
mainly as public amusement for the people of Marradi. According to Gorla, the 
decision of Vernaccini imposes a burden501 upon the owners of the houses sur-
rounding the place of the ball games to avoid damage and also to accept a small 
amount of damage to these houses caused by the game, when this was played 
in an ordinary manner.502 In brief, in this case the behaviour of the wrongdoer 
and that of the injured party were considered and compared, and the conclusion 
was that the wrongdoer had done nothing wrong and that he had acted without 
negligence and that the injured party had willingly accepted the risk.
4.6 The northern natural law school
4.6.1 Introduction
In the sixteenth century scholars at the University of Salamanca integrated 
497 English reproduction/paraphrase by Gorla 1974/1975, p. 351f.
498 G. Vernaccini, Collezione completa delle decisioni, II,  p. 285f.; Gorla 1974/1975, p. 353.
499 Gorla 1974/1975, p. 354.
500 Harm that might be suffered by the surrounding houses was considered to derive 
from ‘a natural and intrinsic defect’ of the ball game. See G. Vernaccini, Collezione completa delle 
decisioni, II, p. 279; Gorla 1974/1975, p. 256. The ball game had ‘a natural and intrinsic defect’ 
inasmuch as a ball cannot always be directed by the players precisely to where they want it to go, 
and therefore harm to the surrounding houses may be expected; see Gorla 1974/1975, p. 355, 357.
501 Gorla 1974/1975, p. 356, called it ‘a burden similar to a legal servitude (i.e. deriving from 
the law)’.
502 According to Gorla 1974/1975, p. 356, the reason or policy underlying such legal 
servitude seems to be the fact that the ball games were mainly played as public amusement.
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civilian and canonist ideas into a framework provided by scholastic theology, 
more in particular the doctrine of restitution as described by Thomas Aquinas. 
These early modern scholastics were important for the development of the 
law of delicts. They were willing to look behind the rules of Roman law; and, 
furthermore, the works of the early modern scholastics united the civilian 
tradition based upon Roman law and Aristotelian philosophy.503 In particular, 
the early lawyers of the (northern) natural law school such as Grotius, and 
through them jurists such as Domat and Pothier, relied heavily on the doctrinal 
framework elaborated by the Spanish natural law school.504 In the seventeenth 
century, Hugo Grotius, the founder of the northern natural law school, was 
strongly influenced by the doctrines of the early modern scholastics. The 
doctrines remained much the same in the work of his successors, Pufendorf 
and Barbeyrac, and in that of the French jurists Domat and Pothier.505
As elaborately discussed in the previous section, according to the authors of 
the usus modernus, no partition of damage between the wrongdoer and the 
injured party was possible. As long as one principally stuck to the validity of 
Roman law, the all-or-nothing approach could not have been abandoned, as 
the principle of culpae compensatio led to a total annulment of the claim for 
damages in the event of contributory negligence of the injured party.506 With 
regard to the view of natural law scholars to the problem of contributory neg-
ligence, the secondary literature refers to Grotius, Pufendorf and Wolff. From 
these scholars, Grotius and Pufendorf still followed the same line of thought 
as in the ‘gemeinrechtliche Lehre’.507 Wolff followed a different approach, as 
will be discussed below.
4.6.2 Scholars who followed the old approach
4.6.2.1 Variant 1: the existence of contributory negligence leads  
to a denial of claim
According to some scholars, the problem of contributory negligence can 
be solved by just denying the claim for damages if the victim acted with 
negligence, possibly with application of the rule of D. 50.17.203. This view, 
503 Parisi 1992, p. 121.
504 Parisi 1994, p. 339, nt. 66.
505 Gordley 1991, p. 71; - Unfortunately, the works of the early modern scholastics could 
not be elaborately discussed in this study. Where necessary and relevant these scholars were 
mentioned and their works were discussed in this and in the previous chapter.
506 Luig 1969, p. 216.
507 Aumann 1964, p. 38ff., 48; Luig 1969, p. 229.
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which does not permit a partition of damage, can be found with the early 
modern scholastics508 and with Grotius, Domat and Pothier. Contributory 
negligence was a condition which excluded the attribution of the act to the 
wrongdoer. It seems what was decisive was less the Roman imput but more 
the normative beliefs of justice: if the injured party had a considerable co-
responsibility, apparently for the natural law scholars a denial of claim was 
the only fair, appropriate outcome.509
One of the most important works of natural law was Grotius’ De iure belli 
ac pacis (1625).510 According to De iure belli ac pacis II.17.17, 511 someone who 
obtained (literally: gave cause to (the origination of)) a contract or a promise 
by deceit, violence or duress was obliged to pay compensation.512 According 
to De iure belli ac pacis II.17.18,513 someone who himself gave the cause to why 
he suffered violence or was compelled by duress should blame himself. For 
an involuntary act that had its origin in a voluntary act was – from a moral 
perspective – considered to be a voluntary act. As this is rather puzzling, these 
thoughts will be explained below and will be enriched by examples.
Aumann argued with regard to Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis II.17.18, that 
Grotius thought that a claim for compensation had to be denied in the case 
in which the injured himself gave cause (causa) to being forced to conclude 
a contract or to commit a crime.514 To ‘give cause’ (causam dare) also had to 
include the ‘Willenselement’, which also becomes clear from the words ‘ex 
voluntario ortum’ in the second sentence of Grotius’ De iure belli ac pacis, 
II.17.18. Therefore, only objectively causing damage did not suffice to exclude 
the possibility to claim damages. Grotius discussed contributory negligence 
508 See L. de Molina, De iustitia et iure, edn. 1614, tract. II, disp. 697, nrs. 11, 12, 14 (discussing 
the Roman law cases of the javelin thrower, barber and tree pruner). See also Jansen 2007, p. 672.
509 Jansen 2007, p. 673.
510 Grotius’ work formed the basis of the theorising of the natural lawyers of the 17th and 
18th centuries – such as Pufendorf, Thomasius, Barbeyrac and Wolff – whose ideas penetrated into 
the general intellectual circulation of Europe of the Enlightenment; see Ibbetson 2003, p. 477; - On 
Hugo Grotius and the transition from natural law to ‘Vernunftrecht’, see Schlosser/Molitor 1979, 
p. 42ff.; - Furthermore, the lawyers of the natural law school from the 17th century formulated 
the general rule that all damage caused to another by one’s fault is recoverable, starting with the 
famous passage of H. Grotius’ De Iure belli ac pacis, II.17.1. See also Jansen 2009, p. 241f.
511  H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, II.17.17 (edn. De Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp 1993, 
p. 432): Sed et qui contractui aut promissioni causam dedit dolo, vi aut metu iniusto tenetur eum 
quicum actum est in integrum restituere, quia ille ius habuit, tum ne deciperetur, tum ne cogeretur; 
illud ex natura contractus, hoc ex naturali etiam libertate. His annumerandi sunt qui id quod ex 
officio facere tenebantur facere noluerunt nisi pecunia accepta.
512  See also Aumann 1964, p. 38f.
513  H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, II.17.18 (edn. De Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp 1993, 
p. 432): At qui causam dedit cur vim pati, aut metu cogi debeat habet quod sibi imputet. Nam 
involuntarium ex voluntario ortum habens moraliter pro voluntario habetur.
514  Aumann 1964, p. 39.
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only for a specific individual case, in which the injured party suffered damages 
after having concluded a contract or committed wrongdoing (Verbrechen), 
due to deceit, violence or menace by the other person, and had to stand in for 
the fulfilment of that contract or to answer for that crime.515 Except for this 
final restriction, Grotius only followed the Justinianic interpretation of D. 
50.17.203: because of contributory negligence the victim’s claim was totally 
denied, without any possibility to consider mutual negligences.
Luig argued that,516 as in the last sentence of De iure belli ac pacis II.17.17, 
Grotius assumed that the person described in De iure belli ac pacis II.17.18 did 
not want to comply with his duty. If such a person had to be brought to comply, 
he could not bring the usual claim in case of violence (vis), deceit (dolus) or 
duress (metus).517 Luig argued that these fragments of Grotius do not concern 
cases of contributory negligence. The coerced person is treated as having acted 
voluntarily within the legal order. Negligence of the coercer in this case was 
not only remarkable, but was even considered non-existent.518 
A comparison with the work of the Flemish Jesuit and theologian Leon-
ardus Lessius (Lenaert Leys, 1554–1623), whose thoughts were adopted by 
Grotius, supports the interpretation of Luig as described above.519 Lessius wrote 
about the influence of coercion on contractual freedom.520 Is there a differ-
ence between legitimate and illegitimate duress?521 Lessius stated that from 
an objective point of view one could think that both in the case of legitimate 
threat to sue someone as well as in the case of illegitimate threat both threats 
would lead to a nullification of the transaction, because the will of the other 
515  ibid.
516 See also the different translation/interpretation of the text (different than that of 
Aumann) that can be found with Luig 1969, p. 229f.: ‘Wer Anlaß dazu gibt, daß er mit Gewalt 
etwas zulassen oder durch Drohung zu etwas gezwungen werden muß, soll sich das selbst 
zuschreiben; denn ein unfreiwilliger Akt, der seinen Ursprung in einem freiwilligen Verhalten 
hat, wird im Bereich des Sittlichen als freiwillig behandelt.’
517  Luig 1969, p. 230.
518  ibid., p. 229f.
519  Luig 1969, p. 230; - The reference can be found in an annotated version of Grotius’ 
De iure belli ac pacis; see, e.g., the edn. of De Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp et al., 1993, p. 432, nt. 
2, but also in the annotated version of Gronovius 1773, p. 518, next to §18/19 (b); according to 
Krause 1949, p. 64 (nt. a), this reference is found for the first time in the editions annotated by 
Gronovius.   
520 On Lessius’ contract doctrine, see Decock 2011. For Lessius freedom of contract is the 
absence of external coercion in entering into a contract. According to Lessius, the ‘doctores’ 
spoke about free consent if it had not been forced through an external cause, namely by unjust 
duress, or induced through deceit.
521  Two topics are revelevant: namely, whether there is a difference between legitimate 
and illegitimate duress, and whether, in the event of legitime duress, one has to make a 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate execution of the duress based on the intention 
with which the legitimate duress is exercised. The second topic will shortly be dealth with in the 
next footnote.
early modern period 289
party is in both scenarios affected by coercion. However, Lessius argues that 
from a subjective point of view (moraliter, i.e. considered from the perspective 
of the will/consent of the threatened party) one has to say that just coercion 
(that someone has the right to sue the other in court (ius accusandi)) does 
not result in involuntary consent. Lessius argued that the fear coming from 
just coercion was considered not to originate from a force external522 to the 
intimidated party, but from a force coming from within the person involved. 
Therefore, the subsequent assent is not deemed to be involuntary, since the 
assent is entirely voluntary as to its cause.523
The interpretation of Luig seems to be comfirmed by two later commentar-
ies on the text of Grotius. According to J.F. Gronovius (1611–1671), if someone 
did not want to comply with his duty as in Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, II.17.18, 
and if this person had to be forced, the coercion (i.e. something involuntary) 
was not considered against one’s will, since the injured party was seen as 
wanting to be forced.524 Also Vitriarius (1647–1720) commented on the text 
of Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, II.17.18, stating that someone who gave cause 
that by means of force he needed to permit something, or by means of threat 
he was forced to do something, had to blame himself. Vitriarius distinguished 
two examples in which someone acted iure suo and therefore was not consid-
ered to have been injured by someone else. In the first example, someone who 
enters onto another’s property without having a good reason to do so (iusta 
causa), could be repelled with violence (a right given to men by nature). In the 
second example, someone declares war on another, in which case it is allowed 
to the other party (based on the law of war) to cause harm to his enemy (i.e. 
the person declaring war on him), in person and in his possessions. Vitriarius 
concluded that in these situations one had to impute it to himself if he was 
injured by the other party, and if in this way something involuntary arose from 
his voluntary act, the resulting damage – from the subjective point of view of 
522 Recently, Decock made clear that Lessius indicated that fear is about psychology and 
appearance rather than about objective truth and reality, whether an evil event is really out there 
did not really matter. The perception of the evil event in the mind of the intimidated party is 
the crucial element; see Decock 2011, p. 222. Applied to the case mentioned above, it means 
that it does not make a difference whether the litigation threats are based on an actual will to 
take the intimidated party to court or not. As long as the intimidating party is perceived to have 
the intention of actually executing his right, the same degree of (legitimate) duress affects the 
intimidated party, according to Decock 2011, p. 222.
523 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. II, cap. 17, dub. 6, rdn. 43. My paraphrase is based on the 
English translation/paraphrase of Decock 2011, p. 222.
524 Gronovius explained the words qui causam dedit with the phrase: Negando scilicet quod 
jure ab eo petebatur. Furthermore, he explained involuntarium ex voluntario in the following way: 
Coactio, quam quis meruit recusando, quod omnino illi faciendum erat, non putatur invito inhibita, 
sed ipsum cogi voluisse existimatur. See the annotations of Gronovius in edition of 1773, p. 517f. 
chapter four290
the will of the injured party – was considered to have occurred voluntarily.525
 
Unfortunately, Jean Domat (1625–1696),526 in his Les loix civiles, did not include 
a discussion of the law of delicts.527 Nevertheless, two fragments are relevant as 
to the topic of contributory negligence. According to the first one,  if something 
happens by an unforeseen consequence of an innocent act, without any blame on 
the side of the actor, the actor is not held for the damage. The event is considered 
caused by another cause joined with the cause of the act, namely, by the impru-
dence of the injured party or some accident (cas fortuit). According to Domat, it 
is either to the injured party or to accident that the damage ought to be imputed. 
Domat gave an example of someone who crossed a public mall while people were 
playing there. If a ball was struck and hit the person who crossed over, the person 
who struck the ball was not held liable for the event, which ought to be imputed 
to the imprudence of the injured party if he could not have been ignorant that 
the place he crossed was a public mall, or ought to be imputed to a mere accident 
if it was altogether unknown to the injured party that the place he crossed was a 
public mall, and if no imprudence could be imputed to the actor.528
The other fragment can be found in the section on damage caused by animals. 
If someone provoked or irritated a dog or another (similar) animal and caused 
him to bite, the provoker was to be held liable. If the provoker and the injured 
party were one and the same person, he had to blame himself.529 The latter part 
seems to have been based on VI 5.12.86.530 An affirmation of the use of this rule 
as a total obstacle for compensation (the ‘old view’) can be found in the applica-
tions given in the Pandectae of Pothier (1699–1772),531 where D. 50.17.203 appears 
as rule 13.532 Within this rule, Pothier arranged applications from the Digest, 
525 See Ph. Vitriarius, Institutiones juris naturae et gentium, II.XVII.XIV. Vitriarius’ 
interpretation could somehow be understood to be the modern expression of volenti non fit 
iniuria, a thought which, according to Luig 1969, p. 230, is often linked to D. 50.17.203; Barbeyrac 
referred to the aforementioned commentary of Vitriarius and argued that although forced to do 
something, the consent could still be considered voluntary, because the person coerced gave the 
occasion leading to the duress, namely, by his voluntary refusal; see Barbeyrac 1746, p. 7f., note 
2 ad II.XVII.XVIII: L’auteur veut dire, qu´une contrainte, dont on avoit droit d´user envers quelcun, 
n’empêche pas que son consentement, quoique forcé, ne passe pour libre, parce qu´il a donné lieu à 
la contrainte par un refus volontaire. Mais la pensée est exprimée d´une manière à faire prendre le 
change au Lecteur: et je vois qu´effectivement Mr. VITRIARIUS, dans son Abrégé de notre Auteur …
526 On Domat, see, e.g., Sherman 1922, p. 237; Voeltzel 1936; Baudelot 1938; Arnaud 1969, p. 309.
527 See J. Domat, Les loix civiles, Liv. II. Titre VIII pr.: De ces trois fortes de fautes il n’y a que celles 
de la derniere espece qui soient la matiere de ce Titre. Car les crimes et les délits ne doivent pas être mêlés 
avec matieres civiles, et tout ce qui regarde les conventions, a été expliqué dans le premier Livre. …
528 J. Domat, Les loix civiles, Liv. II. Titre VIII sect. 4 § 3 (with reference to D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 
9.2.11pr.).
529 ibid., sect. 2 § 10.
530 In the same sense Luig 1969, p. 217.
531  On Pothier, see, e.g., Dupin 1825; De Curzon 1919, p. 266ff.; Sherman 1922, p. 237f.
532 See Pandectae Justinianae in novum ordine digestae 1782, p. 700. He also mentioned 
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among which the example of a partner (socius) who suffered damage due to his 
own negligence – in that case the loss cannot be partly claimed from the other 
partner of the partnership (see D. 17.2.52.4).533 
4.6.2.2 Variant 2: applying the doctrine of maior culpa
Some natural law scholars, like Pufendorf and Thomasius, seem to have fol-
lowed the maior culpa theory.534 With regard to an inflicted injury, Samuel von 
Pufendorf (1632–1694)535 argued that liability536 could only be imposed upon the 
wrongdoer if the negligence of the injured party was not more serious537 than 
that of the wrongdoer,538 therefore a weighing of mutual faults was necessary. 
 The negligence of the injured party had to be more serious than the culpa 
(levissima) of the wrongdoer, in which case the total claim for compensation 
would be denied (a partial compensation based on the degree of negligences 
was not yet considered possible539). A small amount of negligence apparently 
would not lead to the denial of a compensation claim.540 A dogmatic explanation 
the already discussed examples of the procurator, the eviction of the buyer; furthermore, he 
discussed the case of D. 39.2.44 as an example of the rule of D. 50.17.203. D. 39.2.44pr. concerns 
the case of a threatened injury/anticipated injury due to a building which is in a dangerous state. 
If the neighbour started legal proceedings regarding a cautio damni infecti (in order to force the 
owner of the dangerous building to give surety for possible damage due to the (future) collapse 
of the building) too late, namely after  the dangerous building fell down and caused damage to 
his building, the damage suffered was due to his own fault; - In Larva, Thomasius completely 
changed the basis of the Pufendorfian (and Grotian) general principles of responsibility for 
wrongs. A fault was apparently no longer required: liability was merely based on the fact that 
a person caused damage to another person. The new doctrine of Thomasius, however, had no 
great influence on the 18th century-natural law treatises as far as this deviation from the fault 
principle is concerned, thus Feenstra 2001, p. 163; - On Pothier and on his Pandectae, see, e.g., 
Arnaud 1969, p. 111ff., 163ff., 315f.
533 R. Pothier, Pandectae Justinianeae, in novum ordinem Digestae, note b. ad D. 50.17.203; 
the question of preponderant negligence was not put here; see also Luig 1969, p. 217.
534 Luig 1969, p. 214; 230f.; Kiefer 1989, p. 91.
535 Samuel von Pufendorf taught from 1661 until 1686 at the University of Heidelberg; on 
Pufendorf, see, e.g., Arnaud 1969, p. 317; Wieacker & Weir 1995, p. 243ff.
536 According to Pufendorf, causation was not sufficient for imputation; it was necessary 
to show that the injury stemmed from an act of the wrongdoer with dolus or culpa (not only 
physical cause but moral cause was needed); see Ibbetson 2005, p. 25.
537 Differently Jansen 2007, p. 673, who argued that ‘Es komme darauf an, ob das 
Verschulden eher (magis) beim Verletzten als beim Schädiger liege; ein Verschulden des 
Geschädigten schließe – ebenso wie höhere Gewalt – die Zurechenbarkeit aus.’
538 S. von Pufendorf, De iure naturae, III, I §6.
539 As will be discussed below, the first scholar who decided that in the event of contributory 
negligence damages should be split was the natural law jurist Christian Wolff; see Aumann 1964, 
p. 42ff. However, according to Kiefer 1989, p. 86f., 110, the first to propose a general gradation 
according to the degree of negligence was J. Barbeyrac, who translated Pufendorf ’s work into 
French and commented upon it as to the amount of compensation according to the degree of 
negligence. However, Thomasius, Wolff and Darjes did not take on this division, but stuck to the 
total compensation of damage in case of preponderant negligence of the wrongdoer.
540 See also Kiefer 1989, p. 86.
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of this rule cannot be found in Pufendorf ’s description.541
With regard to murder cases, Pufendorf did not take into consideration 
such balancing. This appears from the following. In principle, a person who 
killed wantonly (lascivia) was bound to render compensation, as anyone who 
killed with evil intent; such compensation also existed in cases in which death 
was the result of negligence (cases of culpable homicide). An example is the 
case of a soldier who practised with his arms in a place not meant for this 
purpose, and killed someone; another example is the case of a countryman 
practising with arms in a place where soldiers regularly practised.542
Apparently, if the injured party contributed to the occurrence of the 
damage, due to his contributory negligence the wrongdoer was without fault 
and no liability was imposed on the wrongdoer. For example, if a person was 
accidentally struck by a soldier in a place where soldiers regularly practised, 
the soldier would get off scot-free, because it was that person’s own fault to 
be in that place, and the soldier was there to do his duty. Likewise, in the case 
of the pruner in D. 9.2.31, if the pruner killed a slave who crossed an area far 
from the road in the middle of farmland, even without warning first, since a 
stranger had no right to be on the landowner’s property.543
According to Luig, it seems that Christian Thomasius (1655–1728)544 followed 
the same approach as Pufendorf, in his Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae.545 
In this respect, one phrase in Thomasius’ section on not causing harm to others 
and on compensation for inflicted damage (de non laedendis aliis, et de damno 
dato resarciendo) is particularly relevant. However, in my view this phrase did 
not concern the balancing of mutual negligences. It just states that one has 
to consider whether the damage possibly had been caused by negligence of 
the injured party rather than by that of the wrongdoer. If so, the injured party 
himself had to be regarded as the cause of his damage, and there was no con-
tributory negligence whatsoever. Thomasius described the case of the death 
of slaves who had no more food after the theft of grain. It becomes clear that 
the negligence in question did not concern the delict of inflicted loss as such, 
but the question of whether consequential damage (in this case the death of 
slaves was a result of the theft of grain, i.e. they starved due to lack of food) had 
541  Aumann 1964, p. 40f. Aumann regards Pufendorf as the initiator of the typical natural 
law idea of the weighing of faults. See Aumann 1964, p. 41; according to Luig 1969, p. 231, because 
Aumann paid no further attention to writers of usus modernus.
542 S. von Pufendorf, De iure naturae, III, I §7 (an English translation can be found in 
Oldfather & Oldfather 1934).
543 ibid.
544 On Thomasius, see, e.g., Wieacker & Weir 1995, p. 251ff.; Zimmermann 2000, p. 49ff. 
545 Luig 1969, p. 214; Kiefer 1989, p. 91.
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to be imputed to the injured party rather than to the wrongdoer.546 Thomasius 
argued that this loss did not have to be compensated.
Thomasius examined topic after topic, rule after rule, in order to determine 
the application of Roman law in German practice. In some cases, he affirmed 
the use of Roman law, but rejected it in many other cases.547 In his treatise, 
Thomasius tried to reconsider the fundamental issues of delictual liability 
on a rational basis. The usus modernus of the Aquilian delict had absorbed 
Germanic customary law, some elements of canon law and of medieval moral 
theology and was formed by the efforts of generations of judges and counsels 
(as also discussed in the previous section). Thomasius believed that a new 
theoretical framework was needed for this vigorous, but flexible, jurisprudentia 
forensis.548 According to Thomasius, nature dictates that damage (damnum) 
done should be made good, including damage done by mere negligence, but 
also damage caused by accident.549 Thomasius argued it was equitable and 
just that one should make good damage caused by accident. 
An example of a person looking at some valuable glass at a friend’s house 
is given. Suddenly something entirely unforeseen happened (unfortunately, 
it is not clear what exactly happened) that greatly startled not only the visitor 
but also the owner of the glass. The visitor, while turning the glass around to 
have a closer look, let it fall from his hands. The damage in this case was purely 
accidental: no negligence could be imputed either to the owner of the glass or 
to the visitor. It is interesting that Thomasius questioned whether the damage 
should be divided between the two, but concluded negatively, because the 
owner could act and hold the visitor responsible for his act.550 If the visitor had 
not taken the glass into his hands, it would not have been broken. The visitor 
should suffer for the loss, however innocent his curiosity, as it was nevertheless 
his curiosity, not that of the owner. In other words, since the visitor derived 
pleasure from this innocent act of curiosity he should also suffer the loss.551
546 Chr. Thomasius, Institutionum jurisprudentiae divinae, II.V.30. Thomasius referred to 
D. 9.2.21.3 [‘l. 21 § 3 ad L. Aquil.’; edn. 1730, p. 124]; this text, however, does not exist; I think he 
meant D. 19.1.21.3 (nam pretium tritici, non servorum fame necatorum consequitur) which dealt 
with the interest of the owner.
547 Zimmermann 2000, p. 58f.
548 ibid., p. 64.
549 See Chr. Thomasius, Larva legis Aquiliae, §2ff.; - According to Ibbetson 2005, p. 24, 
Thomasius’ fundamental principle was that no one should be injured by another: nemo 
laedendus (let no one be harmed). The starting point was not a shortcoming on the part of the 
wrongdoer, but the fact that the injured party suffered some loss.
550 Chr. Thomasius, Larva legis Aquiliae, §4 (edn. Hewett 2000, p. 7f.); on this case, see also 
Jansen 2009, p. 231f.
551  Chr. Thomasius, Larva legis Aquiliae, §4 (edn. Hewett 2000, p. 7f.); see also Zimmermann 
1996, p. 1033; Chao-Duivis 2005, p. 14.
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For Thomasius, to impute a loss to someone there was no need to prove 
any fault of the wrongdoer. If there was a physical causation, the wrongdoer 
was liable, unless it could be shown that the victim was at fault in a way that 
was considered sufficiently serious to blot out the responsibility of the wrong-
doer.552 Grotius, Pufendorf and most of the other natural law lawyers took a 
different view as they focussed their attention on the injuring party, rather than 
on the injured party, and emphasised the duty aspect of the matter; someone 
can only be held liable if he did something that he ought not to have done or 
if he did not do what he ought to have done.553
Thomasius also discussed a situation in which two persons intentionally in-
jured each other or damaged each other’s property. The rules of human equity 
in such a situation require that intent may be offset by intent (dolus cum dolo 
compensetur) and thus each person should bear the loss suffered in excess of 
his own fault. The reasoning is not very different – according to Thomasius 
– if negligence (culpa) of an owner concurred with negligence (culpa) of a 
wrongdoer, it would not be fair for the owner to acquire something from the 
other because of a human failure. Thomasius provided some examples of this 
rule. If someone deposits his property with a friend who is negligent with 
regard to his own property, or gives it into the care of a person not very careful 
in looking after his own property, or if someone joined a partnership with a 
very negligent man, and then damage is done to the deposited object or to the 
(common) property of the partners, provided the friend or partner did not 
look after his own property better than the injured party’s property, the former 
was to be blamed. In that case it is clear, or according to Thomasius at least as-
sumable, that intent (dolus) is present.554 So, according to the ius gentium, the 
person who physically caused damage by accident was liable and had to pay 
compensation. The liability was, however, limited if the owner contributed to 
the cause (causa) of the act or at least provided the occasion (occasio) for the 
damage to occur. That would be the case, e.g., if the owner had put the valuable 
glass into the hands of his visiting friend in order for him to look at it, or if he 
had asked his friend to take it from a high place where it was standing and his 
friend fell from a stool.555
552 Ibbetson 2005, p. 24.
553 Zimmermann 1990, p. 83; 1996, p. 1033f.
554 Chr. Thomasius, Larva legis Aquiliae, §6. My paraphrase is based on the translation by 
Hewett 2009, p. 9. 
555 ibid., §7. My paraphrase is based on the translation by Hewett 2009, p. 9.
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4.6.3 A new approach: Christian Wolff
The possible attribution of damage both to the wrongdoer and to the injured 
party (according to the resp. faults or causal contributions) had its origin in 
the ‘Aufklärungstheorie’ of Christian Wolff (1679–1754)556 and is therefore 
a relatively recent phenomenon. But the assessment and balancing of the 
respective gradations of negligence of both parties was already a step in that 
direction.557 So, although Wolff was the first legal scholar558 who turned away 
from the ‘all-or-nothing principle’, his theory – as described below – can also 
be considered a continuation of the preceding development. Wolff did not 
treat the matter of contributory negligence in an abstract way, but only for 
some concrete cases, as will be shown below. In particular, no remarks are 
found as to the relation with the delictual obligation to pay damages.559 In 
that respect, the aforementioned example included in the Selectae decisiones 
of Schoepff (see p. 280), of an earlier date than the work of Wolff, is a much 
clearer example of a partial compensation of damages in the area of liability 
for damages, in the sense that certain specific sorts of damages (amount for 
maintenance expenses) were not recoverable due to the contributory negli-
gence of the injured party. 
Wolff ’s theory implied an apportionment of damage. He argued that when 
both the wrongdoer and the party injured were negligent, the damage should 
be borne by both parties according to the extent of their individual negligence 
(in ratione culpae).560 He rejected the idea of placing the burden of all dam-
age on the party whose negligence was regarded to be more serious than the 
other’s negligence. Wolff ’s theory of division of damage based on quota is 
founded on the mutual responsibilities of the parties involved. However, the 
sources mentioned by Wolff do not really concern contributory negligence 
of the injured party; but the considerations made by Wolff – considering the 
fact that according to the traditional solutions the uniform damage had to be 
imposed on the owner or on the possessor (no partition) – can be transferred 
to the contributory negligence situation.561
556 On Wolff, see, e.g., Arnaud 1969, p. 319; Wieacker & Weir 1995, p. 253ff.
557 Equally important for dogmatic legal history was the new idea of a partition of the total 
amount of damages; see also Jansen 2007, p. 675, nt. 129.
558 Aumann 1964, esp. p. 44f.; Luig 1969, p. 231; Jansen 2009, p. 242.
559 Jansen 2007, p. 674; see Chr. Wolff, Jus naturae, II, §580.
560 See Chr. Wolff, Institutiones juris naturae et gentium, §283, p. 153; Chr. Wolff, Grundsätze 
des Natur- und Völkerrechts, §283, p. 176; Luig 1969, p. 231; Kiefer 1989, p. 99, 110; Jansen 2009, p. 242.
561 Looschelders 1999, p. 17.
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The situation discussed by Wolff is that of an owner who brought a rei vindicatio 
against the possessor. The possessor made expenses for improvements, among 
which luxurious expenses. However, these could not be taken away without 
damaging the property of the owner, or could not easily be taken away at all. 
The question was whether a possessor bonae fidei was entitled to compensation 
as to the expenses incurred for improvements, more specifically for these luxu-
rious expenses (impensae voluptuariae).562 As the possessor lost the expenses 
of the materials, he suffered loss; if the owner had to recover these costs, it 
would be he who suffered loss.
One of the questions Wolff dealt with was who had to bear the damage 
if the damage of two persons (that of the owner and that of the possessor) 
collide (Si damna duorum collidantur, quinam id ferre debeat).563 At first sight 
one could think that the words collisio damnorum duorum concerned a case 
in which one act caused damage to two persons’ estates. This is not the case; 
it only regards one kind of ‘damage’, namely the luxurious expenses. These 
expenses, which did not lead to an increase in value of the object, could theo-
retically damage two people: the possessor, who did not have an action but only 
a lien, and the owner, who had to pay compensation. How should the damage 
be divided between two persons when both suffered damage from the same 
act? According to Wolff, the decisive criterion is who acted negligently: the 
owner, the possessor or both?
In accordance with this criterion, Wolff argued – in more general terms – that 
if one of the parties was negligent, that party had to bear the damage.  If the 
injured party caused his damage alone, he had to bear it, and no compensation 
whatsoever was possible.564 However, if both parties could be considered the 
free cause (causa libera) of the damage, the wrongdoer’s duty to pay compensa-
tion was not put aside. The question now shifted focus: the situation in which 
both parties were at fault was solely considered as to the question of the extent 
of damages to be paid.565 An apportionment of the total damage was made, 
proportional to the negligence (culpa) of both parties.566 
Wolff recognised that the equal treatment of the injured party and the 
wrongdoer obliges giving a certain (negative) consequence to both the con-
tributory negligence of the injured party and the negligence of the wrongdoer, 
562 Aumann 1964, p. 42; see Chr. Wolff, Jus naturae, II, §628.
563 Several arguments were used by Wolff; see Chr. Wolff, Jus naturae, II, §§629-632; 
Institutiones juris naturae et gentium, § 283; see also Aumann 1964, p. 42f.
564 Aumann 1964, p. 44; Looschelder 1999, p. 18; see Chr. Wolff, Jus naturae, II, §629.
565 Aumann 1964, p. 44, 48.
566 ibid., p. 47, 49; Looschelders 1999, p. 18; see Chr. Wolff, Jus naturae, II, §632.
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namely on the basis of the ‘ratio culpae’. The negligence (culpa) of the wrongdo-
er and the negligence (culpa) of the injured party are compared and balanced 
against each other. In secondary German literature, ‘ratio culpae’ has been 
translated as ‘Art’ or ‘Beschaffenheit’ of the negligence,567 but it has also been 
explained as ‘Verhältnis’ or ‘Maß’ of negligence (in the German translation of 
§283: Proportion der Schuld).568 If both parties acted negligently, they had to 
bear an amount of damage corresponding to the degree of negligence of each 
party (in ratione culpae utriusque). It is generally assumed that in Wolff ’s work, 
culpa also included causation (causa).569 Hereby, Wolff discovered a general 
principle of equity (Gerechtigkeitsprinzip) that when more persons are respon-
sible for the whole damage, each had to bear the damage in the proportion to 
which he was responsible for it.570 Therefore, the party whose negligence was 
preponderant did not have to bear all of the damage, but the larger share.571
The transmissibility of Wolff ’s theory developed within the framework of 
the law of property to the contributory negligence situation is confirmed by 
Wolff ’s Pflichtenlehre. Duties can exist towards oneself, towards another per-
son or towards God.572 Regarding the first duty, Wolff put extensive duties to 
someone to avoid damage to oneself. Furthermore, the duty to others is equal 
to that owed to oneself.573 Therefore, in the event of contributory negligence, 
the accusation of blame towards the wrongdoer and (towards) the injured 
party regards an infringement of similar duties.574  Wolff ’s theory made an im-
putation of damage to both the wrongdoer and to the injured party possible. 
The partition according to quota seems a logical consequence; this partition 
had nothing to do with the older ideas of equity (see above) except from the 
central idea of equal treatment of the parties.575
567 Aumann 1964, p. 45.
568 Luig 1969, p. 231, nt. 208.
569 See Lorenz 1972, p. 312; 1979, p. 36. This also appears from the information provided 
in my main text. According to Lorenz, probably, when writing ‘ratio culpae’, Wolff had in mind 
the degree of negligence and causation. See also Aumann 1964, p. 45f.: ‘Da aber Wolff mit der 
Zurechnung der culpa zugleich die Eigenschaft des Verhaltens als causa libera damni bejaht, 
enthält der Begriff culpa bei ihm neben dem subjektiven Element des Willens (libera) auch das 
objective der Verursachung (causa).’ See also Looschelders 1999, p. 18.
570 Looschelders 1999, p. 18. See also Jansen 2007, p. 674f.
571  Luig 1969, p. 231; also Aumann 1964, p. 46; Keirse 2003, p. 24; see also Chr. Wolff, Jus 
naturae, II, §590 and Chr. Wolff, Jus naturae, IV, §591.
572 Looschelders 1999, p. 18.
573 Chr. Wolff, Institutiones juris naturae et gentium, § 133.
574 Lorenz 1979, p. 35; Looschelders 1999, p. 19.
575 Jansen 2007, p. 675.
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Wolff ’s theory of Rechtspflichten gegen sich selbst was not accepted in later 
(German) codifications or legal scholarship.576 On the other hand, the idea of 
a partition of damage, the solution based on quota and the idea of proportion-
ality between the duty to pay damages and negligence or causal contribution 
did find their way into various codifications.577 Yet, Wolff ’s doctrine was still 
contested in the nineteenth century in legal doctrine as well as in case law.578 
The modern – twentieth century – solution in which a partition of damage is 
made between the wrongdoer and the injured party, based on the respective 
contributions of causation and negligence, originated in Wolff ’s ‘Enlighten-
ment philosophy’.579 However, it might be argued that it is more precise to say 
that the considerations of Wolff did not concern the actual situation of con-
tributory negligence and therefore a direct immediate influence of his theory 
cannot be established.580
 Wolff ’s theory of a partition of damage was introduced into the majority 
of European codifications (e.g. § 1304 of the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch of 1811, Article 51 II of the Schweizerische Obligationenrecht of 1881, 
Article 44 of the Schweizerische Obligationenrecht of 1911 and § 254 of the 
German Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch), notable exceptions being the Code Civil and 
the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838.581 The reasons for and the consequences of this 
choice will be discussed in the next chapter.
4.7 Concluding remarks
4.7.1 The humanistic contribution
In this chapter, the contributions of the humanists (and the scholars of the 
Dutch Elegant School) to the problem of contributory negligence were dis-
cussed. With regard to D. 50.17.203, Donellus formulated the central question: 
576 See Looschelders 1999, p. 19f., who stated that the Rechtsflicht gegen sich selbst was 
– in principle – accepted in the Allgemeine Landrecht (I.3 §§ 27f.) but only when it was legally 
prescribed. See also on this legal provision Mayer-Maly 1976, p. 263.
577 In the same sense Jansen 2007, p. 675.
578 Aumann 1964, p. 50; Luig 1969, p. 231; Lorenz 1972, p. 312; Wacke 1977, p. 11; 1979, p. 276; 
1991, p. 362; - This will be extensively discussed in the next chapter.
579 Wollschläger 1976, p. 115; see also Aumann 1964, p. 42ff. & Luig 1969, p. 231.
580 Looschelders 1999, p. 20; differently Jansen 2007, p. 676, with references, who argued 
that at least an influence already by Martini und Zeiller on the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch is plausible.
581  Also Jansen 2002a, p. 107; 2002b, p. 206; 2009, p. 242; however, in France from 1875 
onwards the all-or-nothing principle was released in case law. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
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whether an injured party that contributed to the realisation of the damage 
and suffered damage because of his own negligence could totally or partially 
claim damages from the counterparty to the extent the damage resulted from 
his own actions and furthermore: to what extent the damage would be due to 
his own risk? This is all the more important since Donellus was (possibly) the 
first scholar who dogmatically formulated the main problem in general terms. 
The text of D. 50.17.203 was a starting point for the doctrine of contributory 
negligence in the medieval period. The humanists, however, tried to re-situate 
this fragment in its original context (law of legacies). The examples of this rule 
given by the humanists are, however, mainly the same as those given in the 
medieval period. Without looking to the different palingenetical contexts, 
this rule is connected to the cases of D. 9.2.52.1, D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr. It is 
explicitly stated that these cases concern events in which the injured party 
acted negligently.
More features were found in the approach of the humanists which do not 
point at reconstructing classical law: based on a comparison of D. 9.2.52.1 with 
Quintilian (Noodt and Majansius), it was stated that when a delict was on both 
sides, a compensation of unlawful acts (iniuria) took place. Considering D. 
9.2.52.1 as an example of a compensation of unlawfulness is rather a sign of a 
Bartolistic approach than that it was based on a thorough comparison with and 
knowledge of rhetorical features. Also the interpretation of D. 9.2.52.1, from a 
perspective of self-defence, is contrary to the classical interpretation of Alfenus 
in D. 9.2.52.1 (see chapter two). Nor is the connection of D. 9.2.9.4 with D. 
9.2.10, as defended by the humanists, defendable  – because such connection is 
not in conformity with the inscriptions of the fragments– nor is the fact that D. 
9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr. are considered examples of the situation in which both 
parties acted negligently. However, only by doing so could the negligent acts 
be compared and theories be developed. One of those theories is the criterion 
of (in)iustum, the application of the iudicatio scheme, the continuation of the 
application of the culpae compensatio, and also the first traces of the theory 
of gravior culpa (A. Faber) or maior culpa (M. Freher and G. Noodt) appeared. 
The last new development of major importance is that P. Faber and J. de Sande 
envisaged the possibility of a partial compensation for the first time.
4.7.2 Reception and usus modernus
In this chapter the central question was: why did the injured party have no 
right to claim compensation? This question is based on the hypothesis that 
the approach to compensation based on the actio de damno dato was still 
all-or-nothing. In the period of the Reception, the actio legis Aquiliae lost its 
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original characteristics, because the penal character disappeared. This could 
have made it easier to abandon the all-or-nothing approach, but that did not 
happen at once, as will become clear from the summary below. 
From a purely normative perspective it is possible to draw the conclusion 
that the idea that an equal or preponderant contributory negligence excluded 
the right to claim compensation began to gain acceptance in the early modern 
period. However, from a functional perspective the answer as to how the problem 
of ‘contributory negligence’ was solved by jurists in the period of the usus 
modernus is more heterogenous. Some Roman-Dutch scholars still explained 
texts of the Corpus Iuris in which contributory negligence of the injured party 
was at stake in the same way as the scholars in the Middle Ages. Some (Roman-
Dutch) scholars still applied the rule of D. 50.17.203 and just let contributory 
negligence lead to a denial of a claim for damages. Others indeed applied the 
so-called maior culpa theory, as, e.g., Voet did. Voet even suggested that this 
doctrine was nothing new, which conclusion, however, cannot be drawn from 
the Digest texts to which he referred. Furthermore, Voet did not always apply 
this doctrine, since he applied it in the case of the barber, but not in the case 
of the javelin throwers. 
Also, from the usus modernus in Germany it appears that several starting 
points were or could be used to solve the problem of ‘contributory negligence’. 
Firstly, the role of the injured party was considered a problem of causality. 
Secondly, the role of the injured party was considered a question of negli-
gence, and in that respect it was considered a question of concurrence of 
faults. Several variants of the application of the culpae compensatio doctrine 
were found, among which the maior culpa theory. Another solution was to 
solve the problem of contributory negligence without any reference to the 
contributory negligence of the injured party. In this variant, the negligence of 
the wrongdoer was the only relevant factor and the contributory negligence 
of the injured party was not considered as such. A last solution was provided 
by the use of the criterion of the auctor rixae as an alternative way to solve the 
problem of contributory negligence. The initiator of a fight could not claim 
damages for injuries suffered during the fight, unless the other party acted 
excessively in self-defence.
In the giurisprudenza pratica in Italy, the criterion of auctor rixae was 
connected with the concept of culpa admixta. If someone started a fight or 
provoked a fight (the so-called auctor rixae) and during that fight was injured, 
the act of the injured party is called culpa admixta because the hurtful action 
by a wrongdoer is now mixed with a fault of the injured party. As a result of the 
injured party’s culpa admixta, his claim was denied in totality (see Cravetta, 
Venturini). The Rota Romana sometimes held the view that contributory 
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negligence, however small, led to a denial of claim, while in another case it 
seemed to require culpa maior on the side of the injured party. The third option 
of the usus modernus in Germany was also applied in Italy, namely by the Rota 
Fiorentina in 1780: sometimes the wrongdoer(s) had not acted negligently, but 
the injured party willingly exposed himself to possible damage and therefore 
did not obtain any compensation.
The criterion of auctor rixae brings us to the question of whether the all-
or-nothing approach was still applied in its totality. Apparently, there was 
some discussion at that time on the question of what sort of damages could be 
recovered, and especially whether immaterial damages could be recovered or 
not. In case of an excessive reaction by the provoked party, the provoker could 
only claim medical costs and no immaterial damages (and loss of earnings) 
were granted. This can be based on Leyser, and on a decision of the Faculty of 
Helmstadt (of 1715) included in his work. In two cases a small amount of neg-
ligence of the injured party did not exclude the victim’s claim for damages, but 
was taken into account in order to determine the amount of damage, accord-
ing to the advice of Hommel, who proposed sharing the costs of the litigation 
because of the contributory negligence of the injured party, and a decision of 
the Faculty of Tübingen provided by Schoepff on the amount for maintenance 
expenses. Since these last examples are all examples of non-compensation of 
certain types of damages, and not of a reduction of the total damage in ques-
tion, depending on certain standards, the all-or-nothing approach has to be 
considered still intact.
4.7.3 Collision cases
In Roman-Dutch law, collision cases are particularly interesting. In these 
cases a different starting point is taken from the one in Roman law. If a ship hit 
another ship, without negligence, this ship still had to pay 50 per cent of the 
damage. But if two ships collided and both had acted negligently, there were 
various views on what the law dictated. In cases where damage was caused to 
ships by fault of one of two ships or by both, Roman law has been the starting 
point. If one party acted negligently, it had to pay for all of the damage. If it was 
not clear which party had been negligent, or when the negligence was equal on 
both sides, the Hoge Raad decided that the damage had to be regarded as com-
mon, and both should bear the damage in equal proportions; Van Bijnkershoek 
and Van der Keessel argued that each party should carry its own loss, because 
the party that had been negligent could not bring an action and the damage 
that occurred was not regarded as damage (cf. D. 50.17.203). Another problem 
was to determine what the law dictated in case a stationary ship was hit by a 
chapter four302
moving ship. Van der Keessel considered the negligence of the latter as more 
serious, and therefore no culpae compensatio (mark the application of the ius 
commune theory) could take place. Thus one ship had to bear 50 per cent of 
the damage of the other ship, and so something quite similar to the idea of 
division of damage occurred. Compare this with the old tradition of judicium 
rusticorum, with one renewal, namely, that in case of culpa maior 50 per cent 
of the damage of the other party had to be paid.
4.7.4 Natural law/rationalism
The scholars of the natural law schools did not feel as strongly bound to the Ro-
man tradition. Did this new approach in case of contributory negligence lead 
to a different solution from the solution in the tradition of ius commune? No, 
not really, since in the natural law tradition there were still some scholars who 
followed the ‘old’ ius commune approach: in case of contributory negligence of 
the injured party, they just applied the rule of D. 50.17.203. In such case the ap-
plication of that rule led to a total denial of a claim for compensation. This view 
might have been held by Grotius, while it can also be argued that the relevant 
fragments in his work do not really concern the problem of contributory negli-
gence. In any event, this approach was followed by Domat and Pothier. Others 
applied the doctrine of culpa maior, such as Pufendorf and Thomasius. Both 
approaches, if answered in the affirmative, led to a denial of claim and in that 
sense the all-or-nothing approach was still followed. A break with this approach 
only came about with the new theory of Wolff. He argued that when both the 
wrongdoer and the injured party acted negligently, the damage should be borne 
according to the extent of their individual negligence. What was the influence 
of this doctrinal point of view? It will be shown in the next chapter that Wolff ’s 
doctrine of apportionment was still contested in the nineteenth century in legal 
doctrine as well as in case law. In the end, most twentieth-century national states 
followed his approach in their codifications, but the respective negligence of both 
parties was not always taken as the (only) decisive factor. Furthermore, it will be 
made clear that there  were new tendencies in the twentieth century and in the 
early twenty-first century which contrast with the principle sustained by Wolff.
chapter five
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
5.1 Introduction: content, method and structure
It has already become apparent that in the development of contributory 
negligence two different concepts influenced the rules on this subject: the 
approach(es) from Roman law and the approach from natural law. The Roman 
concept of claim for damages (i.e. the rule as laid down in the Corpus Iuris) 
has been the prevailing view for centuries, in situations which modern lawyers 
would consider as contributory negligence,1 that the negligence of the injured 
party led to a denial of his claim (unless the wrongdoer acted intentionally2). 
This starting point was challenged in the early modern period. The first steps 
as to the ‘diminution’ of the amount of damages were made by the jurists of the 
Faculty of Heldstedt (see Leyser’s Meditationes) and by Schoepff in the Selectae 
decisiones – showing that certain types of damages were not recoverable due 
to contributory negligence. This development was continued by the natural 
law scholar Chr. Wolff, who considered contributory negligence a question of 
the extent of damage – although one has to note that no remarks are found as 
to the relation with the delictual obligation to pay damages; his solution did 
notchoose to exclude certain sorts of damages from recovery but reduced the 
total amount of damages in cases of contributory negligence. The total dam-
age was divided between the two parties, proportionate to the level of their 
negligence.The two different approaches – that of Roman law and that of 
natural law – decisively influenced the discussion from the eighteenth century 
onwards. The natural law jurist Wolff, although holding a minority view at 
1 Although I used the term ‘contributory negligence’ in this study as a ‘useful shorthand’, 
in modern and contemporary times it became a technical term. In this chapter contributory 
negligence will be used in this ‘modern’ sense.
2 This latter exception did, in principle, not apply any longer under the German BGB: also 
in the event of intentional wrongdoing (at least in the area of § 254 Abs. II BGB), contributory 
negligence of the injured party can be taken into account; see Rother 1965, p. 40, with reference 
to the ‘Motive’ (to § 222 Entwurf I) in Mugdan 1899, II, p. 13. In practice, intentional wrongdoing 
mostly resulted in the mere negligence of the injured party not being taken into consideration.
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that time, turned away from the all-or-nothing approach. He believed that if 
the negligence of the wrongdoer as well as the contributory negligence of the 
injured party contributed to the damage in question, both parties should bear 
the damage, proportionate to the gravity of faults on either side.3 The ques-
tion remains whether a partition of damages or the all-or-nothing approach 
was laid down in codes and which approach was applied in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century legal scholarship and legal practice.4
Around 1800, in a fairly short period of time the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht 
(1794), the French Code civil (1804) and the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Ge-
setzbuch (1811) were enacted. How were rules concerning contributory negli-
gence laid down in these codes (and in the (much later) German Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch of 1900),5 and which traces of old approaches and which new ap-
proaches can be found in these codes? If a partition of damages was applied 
as a consequence of contributory negligence, what was the legal basis for this 
‘contributory negligence’ and what were the requirements in order to come to 
such a partition? Furthermore, it is interesting to examine whether at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century the all-or-nothing approach was abandoned or 
still applied and whether the maior culpa theory was still followed. Does the 
answer to this question differ in case law from legal doctrine? 
This chapter will mainly concern the situation in which the fault of the victim 
is one but not the sole cause of his damage. First, of course, the liability of the 
3 That is, the natural law principle of proportionality between fault and extent of liability. 
4 In England, contributory defence at first was a complete defence against an action in 
negligence, but later this was mitigated by the last opportunity rule (the party who had the last 
opportunity to avert the damage would be regarded as having brought about the proximate 
cause and was thus held solely responsible); see Scott 1984, p. 171; Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 
3640. The principle of partition of damages was introduced for the first time in the UK by the 
legislator in the Maritime Conventions Act 1911. Further, in common law, an injured party who 
was partly responsible for his own harm could not recover damages in tort until the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945. This Act provided the rule that in such cases the claim 
did not fail, but the defence of contributory negligence may apply and if it applies may lead 
to a reduction of the account of damages to be paid. See, e.g., Elliot & Quinn 1999, p. 90, 93. 
In Ireland, contributory negligence led to complete exemption from liability even until 1961 
(Civil Liability Act; except in cases where the defendant, in spite of his contributory negligence, 
had the last opportunity to avoid the accident, in which case he had to compensate the total 
damage of the injured party); see McMahon & Binchy 2000, p. 113. The subject of this study 
is contributory negligence. As can be noticed, the common law (and English law) is virtually 
absent from mention. This is not at all intended to belittle its role – it is certainly important – 
in the development of thought on contributory negligence, nor is it an oversight. Rather, it is 
intended to allow the concentration, in the hope that ‘less is [truly] more’, in this subject on the 
role of the continental civil law tradition. A recent overview of the historical evolution in Anglo-
American law, with regard to the all-or-nothing approach of the rule of contributory negligence, 
can be found in Weyts 2003, p. 327ff.
5 I will discuss the conditions to be fulfilled in order that the fault of the injured party is 
considered legally relevant, as well as, if legally relevant, the effect(s) of the fault of the injured party.
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wrongdoer had to be established and subsequently the fault of the injured 
party (more on this requirement later). 
The defence of contributory negligence is pre-eminently suitable to make 
differentiations in the area of liability law, an area that is expanding. The de-
fence of contributory negligence is frequently brought up, not only in personal 
injury cases and damage to objects, but also in the area of the new profes-
sional liabilities, liability for products and state liability.6 The assessment of 
contributory negligence influences the range of liability. As will be discussed 
in this chapter, development did not progress in a lineal fashion but rather in a 
rising and falling fashion, and the development of the doctrine of contributory 
negligence today shows a reversion to older times.
Theoretically and historically, three possibilities are provided as to the 
consequences of the contributory fault of the injured party.7 According to the 
first possibility, coming from postclassical Roman law (and common law), 
the injured party cannot recover damages if his injury is partly due to his own 
negligence, unless the wrongdoer acted intentionally. The second possibility 
allows a certain limited amount of compensation, depending on different 
criteria, such as fault, causal contribution, equity or a mixture of these.8 The 
Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch , the Swiss Obligationenrecht and 
the German Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch are examples (these codes will be dis-
cussed later in this chapter). A third possibility is that the fault of the injured 
party under certain circumstances is totally ignored (e.g. the French Accident 
Compensation Law of 18989). It has been suggested that the comparative 
examination of various systems reveals a trend towards fuller compensation 
as the economy of a particular state expands. Thus the fault of the victim, 
first a complete bar to recovery, later led only to a reduction of the victim’s 
compensation and finally was completely disregarded, unless the fault was 
especially serious or flagrant.10 This is obviously the all-or-nothing approach, 
6  Keirse 2010, p. 126.
7  On the rationale of these solutions, see, e.g., Honoré 1983, p. 97f
8  Lawson & Markesinis 1982, I, p. 131; Honoré 1983, p. 97.
9  But also in the Civil Code of the USSR of 1964; see Bloembergen 1997, p. 8; Honoré 1983, 
p. 95f., 111, only gross negligence of the injured party that helped to cause or aggravate the harm 
can lead to a reduction or extinction of the victim’s claim for compensation; see Art. 458 Civil 
Code of the RSFSR; sometimes this possibility is applied in cases of a qualified fault, as will be 
shown below.
10  Lawson & Markesinis 1982, I, p. 132; Honoré 1983, p. 97; Keirse 2003, p. 30f.; the same 
development is detected in Dutch personal injury law; see also Bloembergen 1997, esp. p. 13, and 
a discussion of the latter view, e.g. in Hartlief 1997a, p. 131ff., 140. According to Bloembergen, 
this development is related to the development of liability law from offender-based law to a 
victim-based law: before, the focus was on the punishment of the offender, today, especially in 
personal injury law, the focus lies on the protection of victims. According to Bloembergen, this 
will probably lead to further erosion of the defence of contributory negligence; South Africa lies 
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which regains acceptance in the area of contributory negligence of the injured 
party.11 However, recently the track/course has been set in the opposite direc-
tion: contributory negligence is becoming more and more of importance and 
leads more and more to a restriction of liability;12 the proportional approach 
advanced again and as a rule a partition of the damage between the wrongdoer 
and the injured party is supported.13 Possibly, if this movement continues, 
the importance of contributory negligence will increase in the near future.14 
The tendency to reduce the contributory negligence defence, stimulated by 
legal doctrine, stands in sharp contrast to the views defended by the economic 
approach of contributory negligence. Legal rules should give incentives for 
efficient care to both injurer and victim in the event of bilateral accident 
cases (i.e. where victims can have an influence on the accident risk).15 From 
a theoretical perspective, pure strict liability is not considered as optimal in 
these cases. It would become efficient in the joint-care case – cases in which 
the victim’s care also has an influence on the accident risk – if a contributory 
negligence defence (or comparative negligence)16 is added to this strict liability 
rule to control the incentives of the victim.17 Under the normal fault-rule, the 
judge will only examine whether the wrongdoer did take efficient care, and – 
according to the majority of the economic literature – a defence does not add 
beyond the scope of my study. Section 1(1)(a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act of 1956 
allows a reduction of damages in the event in which both parties were at fault. This regards a 
reduction by the court to such an extent as the court may deem just and equitable, having regard 
to the degree in which the injured party was at fault in relation to the damage. A discussion 
of this section can be found with Scott 1984, p. 166ff. His treatment is interesting as he states 
that in South African law, no apportionment based on the aforementioned rule takes place in 
the situation in which, if the wrongdoer acted intentionally and the injured party negligently 
regarding the same damage, full compensation is given (with reference to D. 9.2.9.4); in the 
opposite situation, i.e. if the injured party acted intentionally and the wrongdoer negligently 
regarding the same damage, no compensation will be granted as the contributory intent of the 
injured party forms an absolute defence (with reference to the Accursian gloss tenebitur to D. 
9.2.9.4: culpa culpam abolet sed non dolum and also the English common-law principle generally 
denying a person with ‘unclean hands’ a remedy); see Scott 1984, esp. p. 176f.
11  The increasing influence of insurance law is one of the most important causes for this; 
see Weyts 2003, p. 324. 
12  There are also other instruments which lead to a restriction of liability, e.g. by the 
principle of relativity; see, e.g., HR 13 April 2007, NJ 2008, 576.
13  Keirse 2010, p. 127.
14  In this sense Keirse 2009, p. 561f.; 2010, p. 127, who argued that there are certainly 
indications for that to descry (i.e. that the injured party’s responsibility is increasing). She 
referred to case law of the Dutch Hoge Raad in the area of liability of employers, where the Hoge 
Raad seems to attach importance to the employee’s own responsibility. She also refers to the 
(Dutch) developments in the area of the duty of the injured party to limit his damage. See also 
Keirse 2009, p. 557ff., esp. p. 562.
15  Faure 2004, p. 237.
16  An elaborate overview of the law and economics literature on contributory and comparative 
negligence can be found in Artigot i Golobardes & Gómez Pomar 2009, p. 46ff.
17  Faure 2004, p. 238, 255; also Magnus & Martín-Casals 2004, p. 278.
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anything new since under fault the victim would expect to be fully exposed to 
the risk anyway.18 This result seems to run counter to the tendencies in the law 
as described above (and further described later in this chapter).
In this chapter some connecting lines with and thoughts on modern codifications 
will be presented by providing the main developments of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries leading to the most important codes of Western Europe 
(French Code civil and German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) and the recent Dutch 
Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992. The chapter concludes with a brief study of the 
contemporary concept of contributory negligence, especially the way ‘con-
tributory negligence’ is dealt with in France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
The chapter aims at establishing which traditions influenced the codes just 
mentioned. It draws connecting lines from the period of ius commune to 
modern times;19 this will enable obtaining a more complete picture of the 
historical development and of the influence of certain ideas on the concept 
of contributory negligence. Particular attention will be paid to the question of 
which elements of the two major traditions – natural law (which provided a 
partition of damages in the event of contributory negligence) and (the various 
manifestations, which all applied an all-or-nothing approach, of) Roman law – 
were followed by the codifications.20 In general, three important questions will 
be answered: Did contributory negligence have any role in the determination 
18  Faure 2004, p. 239ff., 255; - Other views can also be found in legal literature, namely 
that of a legal-economics point of view which seems to point to a preference for a partition of 
damages rather than an all-or-nothing approach. The former approach stimulates both parties 
to keep the costs of damage as low as possible by applying efficient care; see Keirse 2003, p. 319. 
In the same sense Van Boom 2004, who argued that – from a law and economics perspective – 
the principle of contributory negligence provides an incentive for achieving an efficient level of 
care for the potentially injured party. A short discussion of some criticism on whether or not to 
abolish the defence of contributory negligence from a legal and economic perspective can also 
be found in Hartlief 1997a, p. 132f., note 21, 138. Differently, Honoré 1983, p. 98 (with references), 
who stated that, according to economic criticism, the machinery of apportionment is relatively 
expensive in comparison with a solution that transfers the whole or none of the loss from one 
party to another. A more profound study on this lies beyond the scope of the study.
19  Special attention will be dedicated to traffic accidents, as in these cases the defence of 
contributory negligence occurs most frequently in practice.
20 And whether approaches possibly included new aspects as decisive for the outcome and/or 
manner in which contributory negligence was taken into account (see, e.g., Art. 6:101 BW below).
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of liability?21 If so, what consequences were given to contributory negligence? 
What was the dogmatic foundation of contributory negligence?
In this chapter, I will study the problem of contributory negligence in a 
chronological manner and I will discuss the major codifications and scholarly 
movements which existed in chronological order: the French Code civil (and 
the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838), the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch, the German Historical School, German Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch 
and the (new) Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992. Thereafter, I will give a brief 
overview of the contemporary manner in which Germany, the Netherlands 
and France deal with the problem of contributory negligence, with a particular 
focus on the topic of traffic accidents (section 5.6). Some final words on con-
tributory negligence after the damaging event follow (section 5.7). The chapter 
ends by discussing the possibility of a (European) harmonisation (section 5.8), 
and finally, with some concluding remarks (section 5.9).
5.2 Codifications around 1800
As to the problem of contributory negligence, the first codifications of the 
Enlightenment did not entitle an apportionment of damages.22 The Codex 
Maximilaneus Bavaricus Civilis of 1756 seems to follow the view of the gemeine 
Recht, namely (the older view) of the usus modernus pandectarum – that in 
cases of contributory negligence in contractual relationships – if the party that 
suffered damage or loss also acted negligently (culpa), then that party was not 
entitled to claim reimbursement from the culpable party.23 But no remark is 
made as to the application of this rule to delictual liability.
Although the Allgemeine Landrecht (1794) of Prussia gave a differentiated solu-
tion for the problem of contributory negligence,24 in principle (predominantly) it 
21  The question of whether a young victim can be contributorily negligent is a delicate one 
and will not be broadly discussed in this study, but only when obviously crucial.
22  Various 18th- and 19th-century codes, namely the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis 
(1756), the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht (1794), the Code Civil (1804) and the Badische Landrecht 
(1809) and the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1811), are thoroughly discussed by 
Aumann 1964, p. 58-79 (which he dealt with under the part called ‘Die Aufklärungsgesetze’).
23 Aumann 1964, p. 58ff.; Jansen 2007, p. 665f.; see, e.g., CMBC IV 1 §20, IV 2 §5, IV 3 §16 and 
also Kreittmayr’s Anmerkung zu CMBC IV 1 §20.
24  ALR I.6 §§ 18-21’ are summarised by Wieling 1970, p. 225, in the following manner. 
If both parties are equally at fault, only the direct damage (unmittelbaren Schaden) can be 
claimed; if the wrongdoer’s negligence has been preponderant, he has to pay the total damage 
(direct and indirect loss). When the injured party’s fault is predominant, the wrongdoer is not 
liable. The Allgemeine Landrecht only distinguishes degrees of negligence, namely between 
intentional misconduct, gross neglect, moderate neglect and minor neglect as possible degrees 
of fault (within these levels of negligence no further differentiation is applied), each of which 
corresponds to a different level of liability; see also Stoll 1972, p. 139. On these legal provisions, 
modern and contemporary law 309
attached to the gemeine Recht.25 However, as in particular I 6 § 20 of the 
Allgemeine Landrecht shows,26 the principle of culpa maior was applied.27 
Thus, if the injured party’s negligence was large and the wrongdoer’s mistake 
was moderate or slight, the former could not claim any damages. However, 
the Allgemeine Landrecht of Prussia did not consider all sorts of damages as 
one unity, but distinguished two categories of damages. According to the first 
category (§§ 19, 21 of the Allgemeine Landrecht), the duty to pay recovery was 
excluded as regards indirect damage and loss of earnings; this primarily con-
cerned cases in which the injured party did not perform his duty to limit the 
damage. It is not certain whether the partition of damage as proposed in the 
Allgemeine Landrecht also applied to the second category, i.e. contributory neg-
ligence: when the injured party contributed to the occurrence of the damage.28
see also Looschelders 1999, p. 24f.; Van Wassenaer van Catwijck 1971, p. 3, argues that §§ 19-21 
of the Allgemeine Landrecht was the first Western code which offered the possibility of partition 
of damages. See also Van Wassenaer van Catwijck & Jongeneel 1995, p. 5; Weyts 2003 p. 326. 
According to Haller 1926, p. 123, in § 22 there are traces of the principle of a division of damages 
proportionate to the respective faults. Indeed, in §22 each party is liable for damage done to 
the other in accordance with his fault; however, this concerns the situation in which two or 
more parties injured each other reciprocally, and is thus a different situation from contributory 
negligence.
25 See Aumann 1964, p. 60-68, 192, who makes clear that based on reasonableness a 
diminution of the amount of damages was possible in the event of contributory negligence. The 
casuistic approach seems an echo of the exceptional decisions in Roman law as discussed in 
chapter two.
26 ALR I.6 § 20: Ein dergleichen eigenes grobes Versehen des Beschädigten macht denselben 
aller Schadloshaltung verlustig, wenn der Schade nur aus einem mäßigen oder geringen Versehen 
des Beschädigers entstanden ist (cited after Aumann 1964, p. 60/Kiefer 1989, p. 303); this is still 
the case in Reitemeier’s proposal for an Allgemeinen Deutschen Gesetzbuches, namely in Titel 
23 § 81: ‘Hat sich bey einem mäßigen oder geringen Versehen des Beleidigers der Beschädigte 
ein grobes Versehen zu Schulden kommen lassen, so macht sich dieser aller Schadeloshaftung 
verlustig’ (based on § 20 of the Allgemeine Landrecht). Also § 78 is important: ‘Ist der Beschädigte 
mit Schuld an dem angerichteten Schaden, so fällt, nach Maaßgabe seiner Verschuldung, der 
Ersatz entweder ganz oder zum Theil weg’. As appears from a footnote, the text is based on 
D. 9.2.28.1, D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr.
27  Luig 1969, p. 232; on this topic more elaborately, see Kiefer 1989, p. 152f.; - However, 
Aumann 1964, p. 192, stated ‘Dabei hat er [der preußische Gesetzgeber, EvD] sich aber zugleich 
von dem vernunftrechtlichen Gedanken der Proportionalität zwischen Höhe der Schuld und dem 
Umfang der Ersatzleistung leiten lassen.’
28 See also Looschelders 1999, p. 25; - In the event of a collision of ships, when both ships 
suffered damage, and provided none of the parties acted with gross negligence, ALR II.8 § 1911f. 
apply and both ships have to pay for half of the total mutual loss.
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The French Code civil of 30 ventôse XII (21 March 1804)29 contained neither a 
conceptualisation nor an explicit legal rule on ‘contributory negligence’, nor 
did it contain a rule on contributory negligence set for damage claims in the 
law of delict.30 In any event, the relevant principles in France were developed in 
legal doctrine and practice.31 However, in the Code civil in the part on contrac-
tual relationships, in the title on damages resulting from the non-performance 
of an obligation, two articles, namely Articles 1150 and 1151, could be relevant 
for the problem of contributory negligence. These articles regard claims for 
damages and interest as a result of the non-compliance with a contract by 
the debtor. It has been argued that the contributory negligence of the credi-
tor who suffered loss was taken into account by recourse to Articles 1150 and 
1151 of the Code civil.32 According to these articles, after a breach of contract 
the debtor only has to compensate the creditor for foreseeable damage (dom-
mage prévu),33 i.e. damage foreseen or to be foreseen at the conclusion of the 
contract, and anyhow if the debtor intentionally caused the breach.34 In the 
latter case the debtor is liable for damage which is the immediate and direct 
consequence of the violation of the agreement.35 
Therefore, the fault of the creditor could be relevant in two situations: in 
cases where the actual damage was in fact  caused by a negligent act of the 
creditor that occurred after the breach of the contract, and in situations in 
29 On the Code civil in general, see Halpérin 2001; - General articles such as Art. 1382 CC, 
according to which any human act that causes damage to another person obligates the person 
by whose fault the damage occurred to offer reparation for the damage, lead to the result that 
judges had to decide upon each singular case, based on the circumstances, with a much freer 
interpretation of the rules of law; see Aumann 1964, p. 68; cf. also Heinsheimer 1928, p. X.
30 Possibly, this can be explained by the fact that Pothier did not give any explicit rule on 
contributory negligence for these claims (see previous chapter).
31  The Code civil became applicable also in the territory that is now Belgium and therefore 
no explicit rule on contributory negligence applied there either; no explicit rule existed 
in the Netherlands under the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838; - No explicit rule on contributory 
negligence existed in Italy under the Codice Civile (del Regno d’Italia) of 1865. In Italy, under the 
aforementioned code, the principle of culpae compensatio was applied in doctrine and practice. 
Based on this principle, the division of damage according to the faults of both parties was 
recognised more and more and ultimately sanctioned by Art. 1227 of the Codice Civile of 1942. 
See Luig 1969, p. 236 nt. 225 with further references; Keirse 2003, p. 26f.
32  Aumann 1964, p. 132. 
33 cf. Art. 1149 CC: with damages owed to the creditor, his losses as well as the profit denied 
to him are meant. In this chapter both losses will be referred to as ‘damage’, unless otherwise 
demanded by the context.
34 See also Priester 1896, p. 29; - In case of intent (dol), the debtor had to pay compensation 
for the damage suffered by the creditor and also for loss of profit, if the loss was the immediate 
and direct consequence of the non-performance; see on this topic Kaden, Anm. II to Art. 1149-
1152 CC, in: Heinsheimer 1932.
35 Priester 1896, p. 29.
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which the debtor could not foresee the serious consequences of his fault due 
to the the culpable act of the creditor.36
In general, contributory negligence of the creditor cannot be predicted at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract. Therefore, one can state that – as 
to contributory negligence regarding the law concerning compensation in 
contractual relations – French doctrine upheld recognition of the Roman law 
principles of the ius commune:37 if the act of the creditor contributed to the 
causation of the damage, even if it consisted in an omission, the requirements 
for liability were not met, because the debtor could not foresee such an act.38 
Therefore the duty to compensate the damage is not present at all.
As in the early accounts of the Historical School, still founded on the Roman 
sources,39 in older French doctrine the case in which both parties were at fault 
was not dealt with. Instead, the negligence is placed on one or the other as the 
(only) cause of the damage.40 In conclusion, one can state that in French contract 
law the idea of a partition of damage according to the ratio of the respective 
negligence of both parties was not applied, neither in doctrine nor in practice.41 
 The first code in which Wolff ’s natural law principle of partition of damage 
was accepted was the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch of 1811, 
more specifically § 1304.42 The decisive criterion was the respective negligence 
36 ibid., p. 29f.
37  Aumann 1964, p. 132. cf. Zachariae-Dreyer 1886, p. 331: Haben beide Theile den Schaden 
verschuldet, so kann der Gläubiger in der Regel nicht auf Ersatz Anspruch machen. The application 
of the principle of ius commune is justified by the reference to Art. 1599 CC. According to that 
article, the sale of property belonging to another person is void and can give rise to damages if 
the buyer is unaware of this fact. Accordingly, no compensation was granted to the buyer if he 
was familiar with the quality of the object at the time of the agreement. 
38 Aumann 1964, p. 132f.; - However, if contributory negligence of the creditor just related 
to certain consequential damages, the act of the injured party would give rise to a deduction of 
damages since these consequential damages were not foreseeable for the debtor, and the amount 
of compensation due was reduced accordingly; see Aumann 1964, p. 133; - So, according to Luig 
1969, p. 234, in French contract law the problem of contributory negligence, in jurisprudence 
and in practice, was solved by taking the predictability of damages into account.
39 cf. Unterholzner 1840, p. 254, 272. The duty to compensate expired if the injured party 
had acted negligently; but not if, although the injured party acted negligently, the wrongdoer had 
acted in an unscrupulous manner (dolus). Unterholzer (among others) refers to D. 50.17.203 and 
D. 9.2.11pr.
40 See Larombière 1862, no. 23 ad Art. 1148 CC, p. 224; - Exceptionally, this principle was 
also applied outside contract law in cases of statutory obligations for surety, in which negligence 
of the originator of the damage was not required. See Aumann 1964, p. 133. This is for example 
the case for the liability of an innkeeper for objects delivered to him; see Larombière 1862, no. 
23 ad Art. 1148 CC, p. 224. Another example is the liability of the owner of an animal that caused 
damage (Art. 1384 CC). In that case, according to Priester 1896, p. 30, the owner could bring 
an exception against a noxal action, namely the exception that the damage was caused by the 
negligence of the injured party himself.
41  Aumann 1964, p. 133f.
42 Luig 1969, p. 232; Koziol 1998, p. 593; also Kontogianni 2003, p. 146f., who called it the 
outcome of the influence of the doctrine of rationalism; - This was done under the influence of 
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of both parties.43 The Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch furthermore gave 
the judge discretionary power to decide upon the legal consequences of 
contributory negligence, which was a novelty.44 Then the injured party was 
considered proportionately ‘liable’, and if the correct proportion could not be 
established, he would be equally liable as the defendant.45
5.3 Conservatism in nineteenth-century legal doctrine and the 
struggle of nineteenth-century judges
5.3.1 French exegetical school: faute de la victime
5.3.1.1 Introduction
French law of delict does not contain any specific provision for the apportion-
ment of liability due to contributory negligence. Apparently, predictability/
foreseeability of damage (as in Articles 1150 & 1151 Code civil) is not the core 
criterion. However, in French judicial practice, the concept of ‘la faute de la 
victime’ was developed as a criterion to reduce the wrongdoer’s liability, if 
necessary. Some argue that the rule of apportionment of liability, based on 
the gravity of the respective faults in French law, seems to have prevailed soon 
after the introduction of the Code civil.46 Others argue that in the first half of 
Karl A. F. von Martini and Franz A.F.E. von Zeiller; see on these scholars, their influence and a 
treatment of the topic of contributory negligence in the Austrian codifications Aumann 1964, 
p. 70-79; - §1304 ABGB: Wenn bei einer Beschädigung zugleich ein Verschulden von Seiten des 
Beschädigten eintritt, so trägt er mit dem Beschädiger den Schaden verhältnißmäßig; und, wenn 
sich das Verhältniß nicht bestimmen läßt, zu gleichen Theilen (cited after Aumann 1964, p. 73). 
Notice the subsidiary rule of partition in halves; - See also the drafts of codes in the German 
Länder Hessen, Sachsen and Bayern in the 19th century, where the natural law solution of 
partition of the uniformly calculated damages (the total damage as one unity) is connected 
with differentiations of individual consequential losses (Schadensfolgen) which were based on 
exceptional Roman law decisions; see Aumann 1964, p. 140-152; Luig 1969, p. 235. No natural law 
thoughts, especially not on a partition of damage – but instead, of the idea of fault compensation 
– can be found in the Sachsian BGB (1865) in which the solution prepared by Pandectism was 
codified in its entirety (culpae compensatio doctrine), and the Dresdener Entwurf (1866) which 
was more closely oriented towards the older doctrine of ius commune. See Aumann 1964, p. 
152ff., 155ff.; Luig 1969, p. 234; also Jansen 2007, p. 666, 676.
43 The prevailing view on the term Verschulden in §1304 ABGB is that it concerns a non-
technical term, namely ‘Sorglosigkeit in eigenen Angelegenheit’, which does not presuppose 
unlawfulness; see Looschelders 1999, p. 67 with references.
44 Aumann 1964, p. 77ff., 192.
45 Lawson 1968, p. 56.
46 Lawson & Markesinis 1982, I, p. 132f.; according to these authors, the French judge-made 
rule had to find its true justification elsewhere (than in a statutory provision) and many have 
hence chosen to fall back on wider considerations of equity (see, e.g., Honoré 1983, p. 98) rather 
than on any particular operation of the doctrine of causation, while others have chosen to explain 
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the nineteenth century the all-or-nothing approach still applied.47 It should 
be noted that there were two basic types of contributory negligence. First, 
when the injured party contributed to the damage and, second, contributory 
negligence was presumed in the event the injured party did not endeavour to 
limit the extent of the damage arising from his injury.48 This subsection will 
only deal with the first type of contributory negligence; the second type will 
be discussed shortly in section 5.7. 
5.3.1.2 Faute commune
Based on the Code civil one can state that a necessary condition of civil liability 
was the requirement of fault (faute).49 According to Article 1382 Code civil, fol-
lowing any human act causing damage to another, the person through whose 
fault the damage occurred is obligated to pay compensation. Article 1383 Code 
civil added that everyone is liable for damage caused, not only by a wrongful act 
but also by negligence or imprudence.50 Already at the end of the nineteenth 
century the problem of negligence of the injured party came up and Demo-
lombe (1804–1887)51 argued that the central question was which of the parties 
acted negligently (faute). Two different situations can be distinguished. First, 
the situation in which only one of the parties acted negligently: the wrongdoer 
was negligent but the injured party was not, or the injured party acted negli-
gently and the wrongdoer did not. In the latter case, in which the injured party 
the reduction as a sanction, corollary to the notion of fault. Lawson & Markesinis 1982, I, p. 
133f., gave a causal explanation based on an assessment of comparative causations. They argued 
that the apportionment of damages seems to be attempted more on the basis of the conduct’s 
potential to cause injury than on the basis of the relative gravity of the respective faults.
47  Jansen 2007, p. 676 (with the literature and references).
48 Van Dam 2000b, p. 555.
49 This principle had already been accepted by Domat, and the travaux préparatoires of the 
Code civil show that the draftsmen desired to follow that same tradition; see Amos/Walton 1967, 
p. 203, who added that this conclusion is confirmed by the arrangement of Arts. 1382-1386. In the 
years following the publication of the Code civil it was taken for granted that a person incurred 
liability only if he was at fault; the special cases described in Arts. 1384-1386 can be explained on 
the ground that there were legal presumptions of fault.
50 Domat’s influence on these articles is remarkable; see esp. J. Domat, Les lois civiles dans 
leur ordre naturel, I, book ii, title VIII, section iv, 1 (quoted in English by Auzary-Schmaltz 2001, 
p. 330f., nt. 135), according to which all damage that may arise from the act of another, whether 
by imprudence, thoughtlessness, ignorance, or other comparable faults, however slight, must be 
made good by the person whose imprudence or other fault has given rise to the damage. According 
to Domat, the reason was the wrong of the wrongdoer, even if there was no intention to cause 
harm. Thus a person unwisely playing ball in a place where there was a risk of damage to passers-
by (apparently Domat thought about D. 9.2.11pr.) was to be held liable if someone got injured.
51  On Demolombe, see, e.g., Bouckaert 1981, p. 60; Halpérin 2001, p. 67f.
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was the sole cause of the total damage,52 no liability occurred, because no one 
was responsible for damage caused by the injured party himself.53
Second, the situation in which both parties acted at fault is explicitly 
distinguished from the situation in which only the injured party did.54 The 
former situation is more complex and in that case judges could exercise their 
discretion. The term faute commune55 – foreign to Roman law – was used in legal 
practice for situations in which damage resulted from the faute of the wrongdoer 
as well as from the faute of the victim.56 This situation occurs also when an injured 
party was at fault, imprudent or negligent (faute, imprudence or négligence). 
It did not, however, mean that the imprudent or negligent wrongdoer was 
freed from all liability.57 In these cases – as will be more elaborately discussed 
below – French legal doctrine and practice seem to have applied a partition 
of damages,58 proportionate to the gravity of the faults on either side.59 It is 
worth remarking that a ‘faute commune’ only affects the extent of the amount 
of damages. The nature of the damage and the way it was caused, e.g. directly 
or indirectly, had no influence on the admissibility of the claim (for damages).60
Demolombe defended the opinion that if the negligence of the wrongdoer 
was equal to the negligence of the injured, the negligences of both parties 
52  Extensively on damage caused by the seule faute de la victime, see Haller 1926, p. 33ff.
53 Zachariae-Dreyser 1886, p. 740; - The participation of the wrongdoer was too remote to 
be considered when the victim’s fault was the more direct cause of the damage. Not the gravity 
of the respective faults, but the causal connection (lien de causalité) is at stake; see Ripert 1933, p. 
112; Aumann 1964, p. 134, argued that already in the distinction between different cases a parallel 
with the treatments of the natural law scholars Pufendorf and Wolff becomes clear. 
54 Demolombe 1882, no. 502, p. 434.
55 However, in itself this term is inaccurate, since in this situation the two parties have 
nothing in common: neither the damage, nor the fault. In fact, it is more correct to refer to this 
as a concurrence of two faults. See also Le Tourneau 2004, nr. 1876, p. 444.
56 On the faute commune or the compensation of fautes, see Demogue 1924, p. 508ff.; Haller 
1926, p. 17ff.; Mazeaud & Mazeaud 1970, p. 621ff.; Marty & Raynaud 1988, p.707, wrote that ‘C’est 
d’abord dans le cas de la responsabilité de droit commun que le problème de l’incidence de 
la faute de la victime s’est posée. Ce problème a été résolu en considérant la victime comme 
co-responsable du dommage qu’elle subit en organisant un partage de la responsabilité entre 
victime et responsable: c’est la théorie de la faute commune.’ It is interesting to see that the victim 
is regarded as co-author of his own damage and that, therefore, the responsibility is divided 
between wrongdoer and injured party.
57  Laurent 1878, p. 522; Demolombe 1882, no. 503, p. 434; - In the French system the 
wrongdoer cannot be freed from all responsibility, as the wrongdoer’s fault has to a certain extent 
contributed to bringing about the accident or to aggravating its effects; see Honoré 1983, p. 124 
with references.
58 See also Demogue 1924, p. 510f. and case law and the literature mentioned.
59 Zachariae-Dreyser 1886, p. 740 nt. 11; also Laurent 1878, p. 522; Guex 1904, p. 163 (adopting 
the Swiss theory of Art. 51 (II) OR); Tassin 1912, p. 103f.; Demogue 1924, p. 512ff.; Aquarius 1941, p. 
249; Ripert-Boulanger 1949, p. 357f.; Aubry & Rau 1951, p. 454f.; on this topic also Haller 1926, p. 
120ff.; - Various arguments against this theory of proportionality are given by Terlez 1938, p. 19ff.
60 Zachariae-Dreyser 1886, p. 740f.
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were annulled and compensated, so no damage had to be paid. In my opinion, 
this is in accordance with the rules of ius commune. Furthermore, he held 
that if the gravity of their responsibilities was not equal because the fault of 
the wrongdoer and that of the injured party were not equal, both parties had 
to pay for the damages according to the respective proportion of damages 
suffered and the respective gravity of fault imputed to them. The judge had 
to determine the gravity and the proportion of the damage according to the 
specific circumstances of the case.61
 
The traditional all-or-nothing approach – meaning that in cases where there 
was contributory negligence on the side of the injured party a denial of claim 
for damages followed, which even applied until the early modern period – was 
now set aside as one started to apply a partition of damages in the event of 
contributory negligence. However, the new concept of common fault (‘faute 
commune’) could not be subsumed under any statutory provision, and there-
fore the French judge was allowed significant leeway in the assessment of the 
effects of mutual negligence.62 
While the majority of the legal scholars in France accepted the theory of 
partition according to the gravity of faults, the judges initially stuck to the 
application of the all-or-nothing approach63 and denied compensation when 
the fault had contributed to the occurrence of the damage of the victim.64 The 
doctrine of common fault (faute commune) seems to have prevailed definitely 
in the late forties of the nineteenth century.65 So, after initially sticking to the 
61  Demolombe 1882, no. 503, p. 435.
62  Aumann 1964, p. 135; on the faute commune, see also, e.g., Planiol-Ripert-Esmein 1952, p. 790f.
63 As to the question of whether the Pomponian rule of D. 50.17.203 (Quod quis culpa sua 
damnum sentit, non intellegitur damnum sentire) was directly applied, Haller 1926, p. 21 and 
Neumann-Schniedewind 1969, p. 73f., stated that the Pomponian rule of D. 50.17.203 could not 
be found as such, i.e. as a general rule, although the scholars of the ancien droit no doubt knew 
this rule. Only applications of the rule could be found, namely in the event of damage caused by 
an animal or in the event of theft of objects from a traveller at an inn. See for the traveller case F. 
Bourjon, Le droit commun de la France et la Coutume de Paris, II, livre VI, titre III, chap. III, sect. 
I, §V and more in general §IX (Outre les cas marques ci-dessus, cette action cesse lorsqu’il y a une 
imprudence marquee de la part du voyageur …). See for the damage caused by animal J. Domat, 
Les loix civiles, Liv. II. Titre VIII sect. 2 § 10. See also Mazeaud & Mazeaud 1970, p. 543; Hinrichs 
1991, p. 55f.
64 See C Lyon 17 January 1844, S. 1844.2.401 and C Douai 14 December 1846, JdP 1848, 492; 
Mazeaud & Mazeaud 1970, p. 625; Honoré 1983, p. 95; Hinrichs 1991, p. 56.
65 Lawson 1968, p. 56. According to Lawson, it is well attested that French courts occasionally 
applied the doctrine of common fault (faute commune) even before the enactment of the Code 
civil. Furthermore, Lawson stated that in the first decades of the 19th century the French courts 
sometimes applied the proximate cause rule instead; Lawson 1968, p. 56; - In legal doctrine various 
dogmatic justifications for this partition of damages are given. See, e.g., Neumann-Schniedewind 
1969, p. 76 (with references to the secondary literature): due to a responsabilité envers soi-même 
(see also, e.g., Lalou 1962, nr. 348, p. 256), the injured party had to bear the damage caused by 
himself; some considered the victim to be a co-causer, and he had to bear the damage in total, but 
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principle of ius commune,66 the natural law solution was adopted, namely the 
doctrine of ‘faute commune’.67 
Clearly, the all-or-nothing approach of Roman law was abandoned with 
the new course of the French Cour de cassation from 1875 onwards.68 Already 
in a case of 1867, the Cour de Paris decided that if there was some imprudence 
on the side of the victim, this did not exclude a faute on the side of the driver 
(of the horse carriage), nor did this lead to the non-liability of the latter.69 The 
principle that a partition of damages had to take place proportionate to the 
gravity of the respective faults was accepted by the Cour de cassation70 in the 
case of Marquant (1879). The Cour de cassation argued that Articles 1382 and 
1384 Code civil did not only concern the situation in which the wrongdoer’s 
action was the only and immediate cause of the damage. When the injured 
party also acted imprudently, as in the case of Marquant, the judge had to 
reduce the compensation amount but could not free the wrongdoer from all 
liability, because the negligence of the latter to a certain extent contributed 
to the cause of the accident, or made it worse.71
Although no (direct) reference to the work of the natural law scholar Wolff can 
be found, it is possible that, taking into consideration the probable familiarity of 
the jurists with the works of Wolff – his Instutiones were even translated into 
could take recourse against the other wrongdoer (see, e.g., Rodière 1952, p. 245). 
66 According to Luig 1969, p. 234f., this was the principle of preponderant negligence; 
however, as argued in the previous chapter, this should not be taken as the general view.
67  Luig 1969, p. 234f.; see Aumann 1964, p. 135.
68 See Cass. req., 8 Feb. 1875, D.P. 1875.1.320; see already C Poitiers, 29 June 1864, D. 1864.2.181 
(50/50); C Lyon, 5 May 1865, D. 1866.3.63; CA Paris, 16 November 1871, D. 1871.2.208; see also Von 
Bar 2000, p. 547 nt. 268; Weyts 2003, p. 326.
69 C Paris 6 July 1867, D. 1871.5.334 nr. 5.; the same view was held in legal doctrine: the 
Belgian Laurent (1810-1887) concluded that in case of contributory negligence, and thus of faute 
commune, it would affect the extent of the amount of compensation; see Laurent 1878, p. 521f. 
Also Demolombe compared the fault of the injured with the wrongdoer’s fault. According to 
Demolombe, both parties share responsibility proportionate to the respective faults; only if these 
are equal are the faults compensated and no payment of compensation whatsoever will take 
place. See Demolombe 1882, no. 503, p. 434f.; - Thus the criterion to define the compensation 
amount is the extent of the faute, in which ‘faute’, as a complex concept in French doctrine, 
includes subjective negligence as well as objective causation elements. See Aumann 1964, p. 136; 
cf. Kaden, Anm. B I 1 at Art. 1382-1386 CC in Heinsheimer 1932.
70  Later, Ripert 1933, p. 114f., argued that case law diminished the extent of compensation in 
cases where the victim was also at fault. However, he did not explicitly mention whether this was 
because of the seriousness of the fault or because of the causal impact of the fault. According 
to Ripert, it seems that the extent of the compensation is more influenced by the causal impact 
of the fault than by the gravity of the fault. If the influence of the victim is preponderant, his 
action could be the cause principale of the damage, and could completely absorb the liability 
of the wrongdoer. However, in most cases the degree of causality as well as the degree of the 
seriousness of the fault were taken into account and equally influenced the proportional amount 
of the compensation.
71  Cass., 20 August 1879, JdP 1880, 123f.; Demolombe 1882, no. 503, p. 434f.; also Tassin 1912, 
p. 104, 107; Haller 1926, p. 141f.
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French in the eighteenth century – his ideas could have played a role in the 
intellectual luggage of the jurists.72 It seems that the legal consequences of 
contributory negligence in the law of delicts in nineteenth-century French 
doctrine73 resemble the consequences of Wolff ’s natural law solution (first 
codified in § 1304 of the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1811)).74 
These solutions, however, are not exactly similar. Wolff placed the respective 
negligences of the parties independently next to each other, and related the 
negligences of both parties directly to the damage which occurred. Because the 
negligent person always had to bear the damages, mutual negligence led to an 
equal partition of the damages. According to French doctrine, the contributory 
negligence of the injured party firstly influenced the level of negligence of the 
wrongdoer. As a consequence of the contributory negligence of the injured 
party, the negligence of the wrongdoer appeared to be less. Because the gravity 
of the negligence decreased, the damages that the wrongdoer had to pay were 
lower.75 Therefore, French doctrine better expressed the rationalistic idea of 
proportionality between the level of negligence and the extent of compensa-
tion to pay.76 The treatment of the faute de la victime is based on the idea of 
natural fairness – as was also the case in Wolff ’s theory.77
72  In general, on the influence of Wolff on the political and legal ideas in 18th-century 
France, see Thomann 1968, p. 233ff.
73  As described above, the development in France was initiated by the acceptance of 
judicial discretion when assessing the question of whether negligence (in cases in which 
both parties were at fault) had to give rise to liability and determining each party’s share of 
compensation; see Aubry & Rau 1871, IV, §446 p. 755; Aumann 1964, p. 135; Honoré 1983, p. 124; - 
Therefore, it was not only the effect of Wolff ’s theory that was crucial for the development of the 
doctrine of the partition of damages; see also Luig 1969, p. 235.
74  Aumann 1964, p. 136.
75  ibid., p. 136; - A different view was adhered to by (Art. 20 of) the Loi du 9 avril 1898 sur les 
accidents du travail; under certain circumstances the victim’s fault could be completely ignored 
and, consequently, the wrongdoer had to pay full compensation. This law allowed employers to 
diminish their awards to their employees for injuries suffered during work only if the employee 
was at fault and the faute was inexcusable; see Art. 20 of the Loi du 9 avril 1898 sur les accidents 
du travail and, e.g., Mazeaud & Mazeaud 1970, p. 546; Lawson & Markesinis 1982, I, p. 132. 
76  Aumann 1964, p. 136.
77  See especially Laurent’s treatment of this matter; see Laurent 1878, nr. 491, p. 522 (‘La 
conséquence la plus naturelle de la faute est, non d’affranchir de toute responsabilité l’auteur 
du fait dommageable, mais de la diminuer, en ce sens que les dommages-intérêts auxquels il est 
condamné doivent être proportionnés à l’étendue de la faute, et la faute est diminuée quand le 
dommage est imputable, en partie, à la faute de celui qui l’éprouve.’).
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Later, the term faute commune was also adopted in maritime law in collision 
matters. According to Article 4 of the 1910 Collision Convention of Brussels,78 
whenever there was a common fault during a collision, the responsibility of 
each ship was proportionate79 to the gravity of the respective faults. However, 
if due to the circumstances the exact proportion could not be established or 
if the fault on either side appeared to be equal, the responsibility was shared 
50/50. The subsidiary rule of partition in halves,80 a rule in accordance with 
the concept of the causal connection concept, seems to have already been 
present in the law before the French codification (ancien droit français).81 It 
was called the judicium rusticorum,82 as such was the decision of King Solomon 
in the case of the two mothers (1 Kings 3:16-28) – see already the discussion in 
chapter three, section 3.4.3.83 This rule has the advantage of simplicity: if the 
judge held that the damage was caused by both parties, he could simply hold 
the wrongdoer liable for half of the damage. But this rule can also lead to unfair 
solutions, since it is rather arbitrary and devoid of flexibility.84
78  Tetley 2001, p. 76; see Art. 4 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
with respect to Collisions between Vessels (Brussels, 23 September 1910). 
79  Apparently, traces of proportional sharing can be found in chap. 157 of Consulat de la Mer: 
see Demey 1906, p. 28f. and Haller 1926, p. 122f. (based on the fact that the damages had to be 
partitioned ‘bien et diligemment’; this included all relevant circumstances and preponderantly the 
gravity of the respective faults; see Haller 1926, p. 123).
80 The partition in halves has also been defended as the rule for partition by various authors; 
see Weyts 2003, p. 396f. and footnote 1816, including a discussion of the advantages of this approach.
81  See comment 5 ad Art. 14 of the Rôles d’Oléron, in Cleirac 1647, p. 67ff.; see already 
Ordonnance de la Marine (1681), III.VII.X (edn. 1756, p. 302).
82  See also Haller 1926, p. 109, and see also p. 112f., 115ff. on the application of this rule in 
collision matters in England in the 18th and 19th centuries. The judicium rusticorum was not 
totally abandoned with the new rules from the Collision Convention, as it became the subsidiary 
rule as also explained above in the part on France.
83  See also Bouman 1855, p. 41; Terlez 1938, p. 19; and comment 5 under Art. 14 of the Rôles 
d’Oléron as referred to by Haller 1926, p. 109 nt. 1 (this reference to Solomon is found in the edn. 
of 1671, but not in the edn. of 1647); Terlez 1938, p. 22, argues that from a legal perspective the 
division in halves is the only logical solution, but from a perspective of equity and practice the 
rule of partition based on the respective degrees of fault gives better results.
84  Haller 1926, p. 109f.; - The primary rule of proportionate damage recovery (but also the 
subsidiary rule) was adopted and inserted in Art. 407 (§4) Code de commerce, subsequently 
modified by the law on maritime collisions of 15 July 1915 (see Demogue 1924, p. 517f.; Haller 1926, 
p. 23f.; Ripert-Boulanger 1949, p. 357; on this article see also Lebreton 1941, p. 142ff.) and later 
found its way into another statutory provision, namely Art. 4 of the Loi relative aux événements de 
mer (1967; see Loi 67-545 du 7 juillet 1967 modifiee. Loi relative aux événements de mer).
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5.3.2 The revival of Roman law in nineteenth-century Germany
The Historical School85 has paid relatively little attention to the problem of 
contributory negligence. Actually, it only reproduced the relevant texts from 
the Corpus Iuris, which showed their interpretation of these texts including the 
view that contributory negligence led to a total denial of claim for damages.86
The dogmatic foundation of the denial of claim in the event of contribu-
tory negligence appeared to be controversial in legal scholarship during the 
nineteenth century. The Pandectists tried to find new reasons – though only 
dogmatic – in order to justify the loss of the claim for compensation.87 They de-
veloped mainly causation theories based on the idea of a legal-fictive or factual 
interruption of the causal connection in case of (preponderant)88 contributory 
negligence.89 They did not consider the wrongdoer’s act causal to the damages 
due to the injured party’s negligent behaviour.90 This view can be linked to 
another (older) doctrine, constructed in the nineteenth century, the theory 
of compensation of fault (Kulpakompensation).91 According to the pandectist 
theory, if the damage was caused both by the culpa of the wrongdoer and by 
the culpa of the injured party, the culpa of the wrongdoer was cancelled out 
by the culpa of the injured party. The pandectist theory of compensation of 
fault rested in essence on D. 50.17.203,92 which was understood as a statutory 
85  The topic of contributory negligence in legal (German) doctrine in the 19th century is 
elaborately discussed by Aumann 1964, p. 80-140. The contributions of Prussian legal doctrine will 
not be discussed in this study, but can extensively be found in Aumann 1964, p. 91ff.; also Luig 1969, 
p. 233. On 19th century Austrian legal theory, see Aumann 1964, p. 137ff. Interestingly, Austrian 
case law set the exceptional subsidiary rule of partition in halves (50-50) as the rule, because of the 
lack of appropriate balancing standards. See Aumann 1964, p. 138; Luig 1969, p. 233f.
86 Von Löhr 1806, p. 89, wrote that to establish liability for damages, it is also required that 
he unlawfully caused the damage by his actions. This is not the case if an act of the injured 
party contains the same cause (den Grund desselben enthält). In that case it must be attributed to 
the injured party himself. The author referred to D. 9.2.28pr.-1, D. 50.17.203, D. 9.2.9.4, D. 9.2.10, 
D. 9.2.11pr., D. 9.2.29.7, D. 9.2.31, D. 9.2.7.4 and D. 9.2.52.1. 
87  Aumann 1964, p. 125; - A good overview of the theories on ‘Mitverschulden’ by the Pandectists 
can be found in Honsell 1977, p. 4-51.
88 Hedemann 1910 (reprint 1968), p. 103 note 17.
89 Luig 1969, p. 233; see Aumann 1964, p. 101-129.
90 In the same sense Wieling 1970, p. 226.
91  The relevant authors have already been mentioned in the second chapter of this 
study (Mommsen, Pernice, V. Bar, Wendt et al.). Except for these authors, on the theory of 
‘Kompensation der Kulpa’/’Kulpakompensation’, see also (as to 19th-century scholars) Demelius 
1861, p. 52-87; Arndts v. Arnesberg 1889 (14th edn.), p. 498; Levison 1891; Endemann 1893, p. 
51ff., 55ff.; Plog 1896; Priester 1896; Ruhm 1898; Labowsky 1898, esp. p. 34ff.; Von Leyden 1902; 
Gottschalk 1903, p. 53ff, esp. p. 57f.; also Coppa-Zucari 1909; Tassin 1912; - The dogmatic basis for 
this theory has been exhaustively discussed in pandectist literature; an overview can be found in 
Von Leyden 1902, p. 22-26.
92  See, e.g., ObLG Bayern, 20 May 1880, SeuffA 35, 285; - Critical on the meaning of D. 
50.17.203 for the treatment of contributory negligence is already Cohnfeldt 1865 (repr. 1971), p. 
148f.; Brinz 1879, II, 1, p. 353, nt. 13.
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norm;93 the statement of Pomponius in D. 50.17.203 also dominated practice 
in the areas of the gemeine Recht94 until the coming into effect of the Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch.95 The pandectist theory contained the rule that if the injured party 
could have avoided (or lessened) the damage by proper care,96 he could not 
claim damages.97 An exception was made (by the Pandectists) in the event 
the wrongdoer acted in dolo (in that case there could be no set-off).98 In that 
event the damage would be recovered in total.99 This exception did not apply 
if the injured party acted with dolus or culpa lata himself.100 Nevertheless, one 
can see that the idea that the negligence of the injured party compensated 
the negligence of the wrongdoer receded into the background. Two other 
points of view gained influence, namely that of interruption of causal chain 
and that of limitation of recoverable interests.101 The latter view meant that 
the damage, which was caused by the injured party himself, did not have to 
be compensated by the wrongdoer.102
A special expression of the idea of compensation can be found with 
Demelius (1831-1891), who considered as the basis for the denial of a claim 
for damages the fact that the injured party was regarded to have wanted his 
damage, and this volition stepped between the volition of wrongdoer and 
the damage. And thus the injured party’s damage was wanted by the injured 
party and due to the principle of implied consent (volenti non fit iniuria) the 
damage he suffered was not considered to have been inflicted wrongfully.103 
Others considered equity as the correct basis for the theory of denial of claim 
of the injured party.104 As equity became the basis, the weighing could also 
93 See also Wollschläger 1976, p. 118; see, e.g., Windscheid/Kipp 1906, §258, p. 64 nt. 17 with 
reference to the literature.
94 From MünchKommentar BGB/Säcker Einleitung (2006), nr. 11, p. 10, it becomes clear in 
which various areas the ‘gemeine Recht’ applied until it was replaced by the BGB in 1900. 
95 Henke 1988, p. 757.
96 Mommsen 1855, p. 157; Windscheid/Kipp 1906, §258, p. 64.
97  See, e.g., Heilfron 1920, p. 245, and later Looschelders 1999, p. 21.
98 See, e.g., Burckhardt 1885, p. 109; Priester 1896, p. 10f.; Labowsky 1898, p. 37f.
99 Mommsen 1855, p. 157, 257ff.; Windscheid/Kipp 1906, §258, p. 64f.; differently (minority 
view) see Cohnfeldt 1865 (repr. 1971), p. 142ff., 149, arguing that there is also no liability in the 
event of intentional wrongdoing, as the contributory negligence of the injured party excludes 
the required causal connection; see also Jansen 2007, p. 666. 
100 Mommsen 1855, p. 258; Looschelders 1999, p. 21.
101  Looschelders 1999, p. 26f.
102 See on this view and its adherents Looschelders 1999, p. 27f.
103 Demelius 1861, p. 67; Von Leyden 1902, p. 26; Tassin 1912, p. 19; Honsell 1977, p. 16f.; 
Looschelders 1999, p. 28.
104 Wieling 1970, p. 226; see, e.g., Von Leyden 1902, p. 24, 35f.; according to Von Leyden, 
from the nature of a subjective right follows that everyone has to bear his own damage (casum 
sentit dominus), unless (exception based on equity) someone else was the cause for this damage. 
An exception to the latter rule based on equity, is a re-entrance of the first rule, the damage 
was caused by contributory negligence of the injured party (rule D. 50.17.203). The latter rule is 
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come to include a weighing of the degrees of negligence. As the Pandectists 
generally had a large impact on nineteenth-century legal science, the ideas 
about contributory negligence in this period have been strongly influenced 
by these scholars as well.105 A weighing of faults is predominantly denied in 
nineteenth-century German legal scholarship (Pandectism). The prevailing 
view seems to have been that the theory of fault compensation implied that 
even a small contributory negligence of the injured party led to a denial of his 
claim for compensation, unless the wrongdoer acted intentionally.106 Near the 
end of the nineteenth century, the idea that such compensation was possible 
nevertheless and that a claim for damages should not be denied, provided 
the negligence of the injured party was less serious than the wrongdoer’s, was 
defended.107 
Apart from the more commonly argued view of culpae compensatio (stating 
only that culpa is compensated by culpa), Heinrich Dernburg (1829–1907)108 
argued that only preponderant contributory negligence of the injured party 
cancelled out his right for damages (thus only in that case compensation 
should take place),109 and he seemed to accept the maior culpa theory. His 
main criterion seems to be: ‘… die Frage auf das Gebiet thatsächlicher Erwägung 
based on equity, see also Wendt 1892, p. 157; Tassin 1912, p. 12, 26f., 30f.; Haller 1926, p. 69. Later, 
some scholars argued that rudimentary § 254 BGB could be explained with the concept/idea of 
personal legal sphere (casum sentit dominus). On the latter theory see Soergel/Mertens 1986, p. 
348f., and various scholars mentioned by Jansen 2007, p. 693.
105 The German Allgemeine Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch of 1861 did not even apply 
the rule of equal division to collisions of ships, but left the loss where it fell. See Art. 737 (I 
used the reprint of Friedberg 1890): ‘Fällt keiner Person der Besatzung des einen oder anderen 
Schiffs ein Verschulden zur Last, oder ist der Zusammenstoß durch beiderseitiges Verschulden 
herbeigeführt, so findet ein Anspruch auf Ersatz des dem einen oder anderen oder beider 
Schiffen zugefügten Schadens nicht statt.’ See also Stobbe 1885, p. 379f.; Lawson 1968, p. 56. 
This rule seems to have applied even when a ‘faute commune’ was at stake. This changed in 
§ 736 of the Handelsgesetzbuch of 1897 (still applicable today):  (1) ‘Ist der Zusammenstoß durch 
gemeinsames Verschulden der Besatzung der beteiligten Schiffe herbeigeführt, so sind die 
Reeder dieser Schiffe zum Ersatz des Schadens, der durch den Zusammenstoß den Schiffen oder 
den an Bord befindlichen Sachen zugefügt wird, nach Verhältnis der Schwere des auf jeder Seite 
obwaltenden Verschuldens verpflichtet. Kann nach den Umständen ein solches Verhältnis nicht 
festgesetzt werden oder erscheint das auf jeder Seite obwaltende Verschulden als gleich schwer, 
so sind die Reeder zu gleichen Teilen ersatzpflichtig.’
106 Rother 1965, p. 30, 35; Lorenz 1972, p. 312; Looschelders 1999, p. 21; see also Henke 1988, 
p. 757; Jansen 2007, p. 666.
107  Wendt 1892, p. 171f.; Ruhm 1898, p. 51; Van Leyden 1902, p. 36; see also Gottschalk 1903, p. 54f.
108 On Dernburg see, e.g., Luig 2001, p. 175f.
109 Dernburg 1886, p. 121. Also Wendt adhered to this maior culpa theory. Wendt (1892, 
p. 165ff.) thought the respective negligence of both parties was the only decisive factor for the 
balancing out of culpa. Only an equal or preponderant negligence of the injured party should 
be detrimental to the latter; this view was shared by Priester 1896, p. 103f.; see also Ruhm 1898, 
p. 51ff., with explicit reference to the maior culpa theory (of Noodt). However, this view was not 
generally held, as Labowsky 1898, p. 38f., argued that in the entire literature it was agreed that 
also a small contributory negligence led to a denial of any claim for compensation, also when the 
wrongdoer’s negligence was more serious (unless he acted intentionally).
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gestellt, wer die Hauptursache des Schadens ist’. Next to the doctrinal scientific 
works, also more practical manuals came into being;110 in particular Von Wening-
Ingenheim also followed this maior culpa doctrine of Usus modernus.111 As to 
the all-or-nothing approach, however, an adjustment was made in this literary 
genre. It was generally stated that according to the principles in D. 19.1.11.12 and 
D. 19.1.45.1 the individual consequential losses, for which the injured was re-
sponsible, could not be imputed to the wrongdoer.112 Contributory negligence 
would not always result in a complete denial of the claim anymore, but only 
as far as the claim concerned self-inflicted damage.113 In fact, this was a first 
escape from the all-or-nothing approach. This very important change away 
from the solution in the time of usus modernus possibly came about because 
of the break of the Historical School with the tradition of ius commune. This 
doctrinal change, however, was not absolute, as is proven by the survival of the 
maior culpa rule of usus modernus in the nineteenth century.114
German nineteenth-century case law did not provide a uniform picture. Although 
different legal codes applied in various areas of the German Empire (e.g. Allgemeine 
Landrecht, Code civil,115 Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis etc.), the solutions 
as regarding the problem of contributory negligence do not seem to be in-
fluenced by that and in the following cases the court apparently applied the 
gemeine Recht. In the second half of the nineteenth century, German case law 
of the highest courts was strongly influenced by the pandectistic interpretation 
of Roman law.116 A small contributory negligence was considered sufficient to 
110  On their view on the topic of contributory negligence, see Aumann 1964, p. 84ff. These 
will not be discussed in this study. 
111  See Von Wening-Ingenheim 1841, p. 48, 79; Luig 1969, p. 232; see also Aumann 1964, p. 87.
112  No compensation for damages is provided if they could have been averted or avoided by 
due diligence; see Jansen 2007, p. 671, with reference to various 19th-century scholarly literature. 
113  Aumann 1964, p. 90; Luig 1969, p. 232.
114  Luig 1969, p. 232f.
115  A similar view was held in the event of claims for damages that were assessed based 
on the Code civil. In cases of contributory negligence, what was meant as decisive was which 
fault was the effective cause; no reduction of the (total) amount of damages was allowed by the 
Reichsgericht in these cases; see Aumann 1964, p. 171f.
116  See Aumann 1964, p. 168-174; Looschelders 1999, p. 22; - In ROHG, 22 June 1876, ROHGE 
20, 99, the Reichsoberhandelsgericht decided – with use of, among others, D. 9.2.9.4 – that in the 
event of contributory negligence, no fault compensation was applied if the wrongdoer acted 
intentionally; if the wrongdoer acted gross negligently (culpa lata), however, this exception did 
not apply. See also Knütel 2001, p. 369. An example of the application of D. 9.2.11pr. in a 19th-
century decision can be found in a decision of the Obertribunal Stuttgart of 1875, in which a 
horse was positioned at a public street where there was a lot of traffic of animals and carriages, 
and where, especially on a market day, also extraordinary incidents of every kind were possible. 
Here, the plaintiff put his horse  in danger as he put it in a place where frequens transitus and 
in loco periculoso. The Obertribunal considered this contributory negligence of the plaintiff to 
compensate a possible fault of the defendant (whose running horse collided with the horse of 
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deny any claim for compensation (unless the wrongdoer acted unscrupulously, 
because in that case the injured party would still receive full compensation).117 
In these cases, a weighing of the negligence of both parties was considered 
incompatible with the principles of the gemeine Recht.118 The acceptability of 
such a weighing was left open by the Reichsgericht in 1885,119 but in 1891 the 
Reichsgericht decided that in the event of contributory negligence of the injured 
party a claim for damages was denied, without examination as to the degree 
of negligence of the injured party.120 An exception was acknowledged only for 
the case in which the contributory negligence was not of (great) importance 
to the outcome, because also with proper care the damage could not have been 
avoided. However, this is not a genuine exception as in such a case the causal 
connection between the act of the wrongdoer and the outcome is missing.121
However, to avoid unfair solutions, judges increasingly objected to this ap-
proach.122 Already the Reichsoberhandelsgericht in some cases ruled that a small 
contributory negligence of the injured party was irrelevant (i.e. not leading to 
the denial of a claim).123 In a case where contributory negligence was obvious 
due to the injured party’s unlawful act, the Reichsgericht seems to have refused 
to accept contributory negligence as it argued that the occurring damage was 
not foreseeable for the injured party.124 Although in two instances the Bayerische 
the plaintiff); see OTR Stuttgart, 26 February 1875, SeuffA 32, 44, p. 49f. and Knütel 2001, p. 368f.
117  See also the case law mentioned by Rother 1965, p. 35, nt. 2; - Case law which proves 
an approach against a weighing of the degrees of fault can be found with Jansen 2007, p. 666f., 
footnote 76; other case law is expressly fond of such weighing and can also be found in the just-
mentioned footnote.
118  ObLG Bayern, 20 May 1880, SeuffA 35, 285; OLG Braunschweig, 21 November 1887, 
SeuffA 44, 86; see Looschelders 1999, p. 22.
119  RG, 25 September 1885, SeuffA 41, 89; Jansen 2007 p. 667.
120 RG, 5 May 1891, SeuffA 48, 30. See also Looschelders 1999, p. 22.
121  Looschelders 1999, p. 22. According to Jansen 2007, p. 670, case law seems to have 
considered the main cause; furthermore, it considered the problem of contributory negligence 
to be a problem of causality; see, e.g., RG, 25 February 1882, SeuffA 37, 219 (‘Vielmehr kommt 
es im Falle eines concurrirenden Verschuldens der Bahnverwaltung und des Getödteten oder 
Verletzten darauf an, ob die Schuld auf Seiten des Letzteren in einer solchen Weise vorwiegend 
gewesen ist, daß man sagen kann, der Unfall sei hierdurch verursacht.’).
122  According to Luig 1969, p. 234, practice turned to the preponderant responsibility of 
one of the parties, following also the doctrine of maior culpa as Von Wening-Ingenheim and 
Dernburg (the latter has been discussed above). Indeed, Von Wening-Ingenheim 1841, p. 48, 
made an exception to the rule that one cannot claim compensation if the damage was due to 
one’s own fault: the negligence of one party may not be greater (größer) than the negligence of 
the other party, as far as they are not equal in degree (like dolus and culpa lata). In this context 
the following may be true (according to Von Wening-Ingenheim): dolus culpa est peior, when, 
e.g., the wrongdoer was in dolo and the injured party in culpa.
123  Labowsky 1898, p. 39, who referred to ROHG, 7 June 1871, ROHGE 20, 40; ROHG, 9 
February 1875, ROHGE 16, 32; ROHG 18 March 1876, ROHGE 20, 66; - A discussion on the case 
law on contributory negligence in the second half of the 19th century can be found in Aumann 
1964, p. 168ff.; Honsell 1977, p. 52ff.
124  RG, 25 September 1885, SeuffA 41, 89.
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Oberste Landesgericht and Oberlandesgericht Braunschweig decided that the 
weighing of mutual negligences was contrary to the principles of the gemeine 
Recht regarding contributory negligence. Apparently, in these instances the 
tendency of a weighing of the negligence of both parties, and to decide only to a 
reduction of the damages in the event of contributory negligence, existed by the 
judges of fact.125 In 1883, the Reichsgericht for the first time accepted a reduction 
of the compensation amount in case of contributory negligence.126 The principle 
of judicial estimation of damage according to § 260 Reichscivilprozessordnung 
of 1877 (RCPO; now § 287 Zivilprozeβordnung (ZPO)) allowed the Reichsgericht 
to apply the natural law rule in practice in its totality.127 The Reichsgericht held 
that in case of contributory negligence the judge could determine the compensa-
tion amount using the discretionary leeway provided by § 260 (Abs. 1) RCPO.128 
Nevertheless, the theory of compensation of fault (Kulpakompensation) was 
still applied in a decision of the Reichsgericht in 1891.129 In that case the fault of 
the injured party led to a denial of his claim for compensation; according to the 
decision of the Reichsgericht, this would have been different if the victim’s fault 
was insignificant (unerheblich) to the outcome of the case.130
5.3.3 The situation in the Netherlands until 1916
In the Netherlands, the problem of contributory negligence had to be solved 
in legal doctrine and practice, as there was no explicit statutory provision on 
contributory negligence in the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838.131 Nevertheless, 
125  ObLG Bayern, 20 May 1880, SeuffA 35, 285; OLG Braunschweig, 21 November 1887, 
SeuffA 44, 86; see also Looschelders 1999, p. 22.
126 Aumann 1964, p. 172. 
127  ibid., p. 172ff; Luig 1969, p. 234; Honsell 1977, p. 71f., considered the discretionary leeway as 
a ‘eine gewisse begriffliche Erstarrung innerhalb der Pandektenwissenschaft vernunftrechtlichen 
Ursprungs’; in any case, Honsell argued, the judges without express encouragement had also 
observed the circumstances of the case and made free use of it to create a legal consequence.
128  RG, 15 October 1883, RGZ 10, 74, 80f.; Aumann notes that one could see the victory of 
Wolff ’s doctrine here. Luig, however, argued that the ‘gemeinrechtliche Lehre’ of maior culpa 
in essence also dominated the 19th century, and in that sense the decision of the Reichsgericht 
could be regarded as a completion of a development, i.e. that which started with the decisions of 
Schoepff and Leyser as mentioned in the previous chapter of this study.
129  RG, 5 May 1891, SeuffA 48, 30.
130 Hübner 1976, p. 496f.; according to Von Leyden 1902, p. 38, § 254 BGB contains the 
principle of culpae compensatio. However, sometimes a small contributory negligence does 
not lead to a reduction in the amount of damages, see, e.g., recently Geigel/Rixecker 2001, p. 
56; - Occasionally this view in which a small degree of contributory negligence is simply not 
accounted for can be found; see Jansen 2007, p. 667, footnote 76, who referred to a decision of 
the OLG Braunschweig of 1891; see OLG Braunschweig, 23 April 1891, SeuffA 47, 28.
131  Also in Voorduin’s History and Principles on the part on unlawful acts no explicit 
reference to contributory negligence is made. This was different in the event of collision of 
ships, as Article 272 of the draft of the WvK of 1822 stated that in the event of a collision if 
a considerable fault (‘merkelijke schuld’) on each side was present, each party had to bear its 
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in the Wetboek van Koophandel (Commercial Code, WvK) one provision is 
relevant as to contributory negligence in collision cases, namely Article 535 
WvK (see also below).132 
The thesis of Van Nierop (in 1905) provides an overview of the legal situ-
ation in case law and doctrine on contributory negligence at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. It seems that 
until then Dutch scholars had not extensively dealt with this matter except 
for Ger(h)ardus Diephuis (1817–1899).133 Van Nierop tried to explain the legal 
basis of the deprival of recovery in the event of contributory negligence; what 
is the legal basis for the principle of culpae compensatio? The views discussed 
by Van Nierop follow the discussion and the arguments of the Pandectists. Van 
Nierop rejected various views, namely: the idea that negligence of the injured 
party cancels out the negligence of the wrongdoer (as defended in pandectist 
doctrine),134 or that the negligence of the injured party lifts the causal connection 
(as defended in doctrine as well as in case law135), or that negligence of the 
injured party is based on the presumption that the victim wants the damage 
to occur and therefore the maxim volenti non fit injuria applies (theory of 
Demelius). According to Van Nierop another basis applied, namely equity:136 
own damage. It is remarkable that the word ‘considerable’ (‘merkelijk’) has disappeared in the 
draft of 1825. See Voorduin 1841, X-III, p. 107; - Arts. 276 and 294 (old) WvK (1838) mention the 
contributory negligence of the injured insured party. cf. 276 WvK no loss or damage can be 
claimed which were due to the negligence of the injured insured party. cf. 294 WvK the insurer 
does not have to compensate the insured party, if the former can prove that the fire was caused 
due to considerable fault or neglect (‘merkelijke schuld of nalatigheid’) of the insured person.
132  This article was part of Book Two, Title Six, called Van schade door het overzeilen, 
aanzeilen, aanvaren en aandrijven veroorzaakt. The wording of Art. 535 WvK is as follows (edn. 
1838, p. 121): Bijaldien dit een en ander door de schuld van wederzijde veroorzaakt is, draagt elk zijne 
eigene schade. De schippers zijn, zoo in dit, als in het bij het vooraangaande artikel bepaalde geval, 
aan de eigenaars van de schepen en koopmanschappen tot vergoeding gehouden, onverminderd 
hun verhaal op de officieren en het scheepsvolk, indien daartoe gronden zijn.
133  Diephuis 1888, p. 87, stated that there was no general rule that gave the solution in 
the event in which injured party and wrongdoer both acted negligently. It was left to the judge 
to decide what seemed most appropriate to him, in view of the circumstances. Diephuis refers 
to the French doctrine of Demolombe (XXXI, no. 502f.) and thereby implicitly alluded to 
a partition of damage; - Ten years after the thesis of Van Nierop, Scholten also dealt with the 
matter of contributory negligence; see Scholten 1915, p. 17ff. Legal provisions are only available 
in collision cases; see Art. 535 WvK: if both are negligent, each party has to bear its own damage. 
Of course these are rather special cases, in which often both parties have incurred losses. See also 
Ribbius 1906, p. 210. There are no further legal provisions available in the beginning of the 19th 
century. Scholten refers to D. 50.17.203, but states that this rule is not correct in its general sense. 
See Scholten 1902, p. 434f. On p. 436 he states that he did not succeed in finding examples of 
the application of the weighing of the causality of faults in case law, although the silence on this 
point in the law could have given way to such interpretation; Scholten presumed that the reason 
was that one strictly held to the rule of Roman law (D. 50.17.203).
134  In the same sense Ribbius 1906, p. 191, 215.
135  Van Nierop 1905, p. 30ff.
136  Also Ribbius 1906, p. 191.
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considerations of fairness may lead to denial of compensation to the injured 
party, when he has to impute the damage to himself (as he acted as a foolish 
person).137 If the injured party could have prevented the damage from occur-
ring, his claim for damages will be denied. When the basis is fairness/equity, 
the fact that the act of the injured party contributed to his own damage, however, 
does not always have to lead to a denial of the claim for compensation, this 
only occurs when such a denial seems fair in a concrete case.138
Assuming the injured party acted negligently, did this always lead to a 
denial of claim, even though his negligence was small? Van Nierop rejected 
Dernburg’s criterion of the ‘main cause’ of the damage; he argued that instead 
of weighing causality, negligence should be weighed.139 One should consider 
the ‘main fault’: whose negligence was the most serious? Only when the neg-
ligence of the injured party was less than that of the wrongdoer could the 
victim obtain compensation;140 otherwise, his compensation would be totally 
denied. Van Nierop seems to support the maior culpa theory (in the sense that 
the negligence of one party could mean little in comparison to the negligence 
of the other party). The weighing of negligence is in fact a restriction to the 
doctrine of culpae compensatio, based on fairness.141 Apparently, Van Nierop 
did not yet consider a middle course a possibility. Although Van Nierop seems 
to leave this possibility – in passing – open when he wrote that the possibility 
to partition the damages depends on the question of whether the judge has 
the competence to moderate the amount of damages, to which question Van 
Nierop did not go into.142
137  Van Nierop referred to Roman law, namely to the de se queri debet phrase of Ulp. D. 
9.2.11pr., and to Molière: ‘ Vous l’avez voulu, George Dandin!’. See J.B.P. de Molière, George Dandin, 
I.VII (edn. 1693, p. 22): ‘Ah que je … vous l’avez voulu, vous l’avez voulu, George Dandin, vous 
l’avez voulu, cela vous sied fort bien, et vous voilà ajusté comme il faut, vous avez injustement ce 
que vous meritez. Allons il s’agit seulement de desabuser le pere et la mere, et je pourrai trouver 
peut-étre quelque moyen d’y réüssir.’
138  Van Nierop 1905, p. 42f.
139  ibid., p. 54, 58.
140  ibid., p. 58f.
141  ibid., p. 65. Van Nierop also discusses contributory negligence in the situation in which a 
wrongdoer is liable based on risk, as in the situation of a subordinate; see Van Nierop 1905, p. 68ff.
142  Van Nierop 1905, p. 69f.: ‘Ik hoop aangetoond te hebben onder welke omstandigheden 
wel, onder welke omstandigheden niet, de aansprakelijkheid van den benadeeler door de eigen 
schuld van den benadeelde opgeheven wordt. Of dan, wanneer dit laatste niet het geval is, 
bij de bepaling van de schadevergoeding toch eenigszins met de schuld van den benadeelde 
rekening gehouden mag worden, is een vraag, die hier niet uitgemaakt kan worden. Daarvoor 
zou eerst onderzocht dienen te worden, in hoever de rechter de bevoegdheid heeft het bedrag 
der schadevergoeding te matigen, of die bevoegdheid al of niet beperkt is tot de gevallen, waarop 
art. 1392 B.W. slaat. Het is een vraag, die onze materie niet raakt, daar het mij slechts te doen 
was te onderzoeken, wanneer de schuld van den benadeelde vrijdom van aansprakelijkheid 
medebrengt, en wanneer dit niet het geval is.’ See also Ekering 1941, p. 132. However, one has to 
keep in mind that the competence to moderate the (total) damages is something different than 
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In case law, a partition of damages in cases of traffic accidents was rarely 
applied in the period before 1916.143 In its decision in a collision case in 1896, the 
district court (Rechtbank Rotterdam) decided that both plaintiff and defendant 
acted negligently. The court decided to dismiss the claim for damages; it argued 
that one had to consider the rule of Article 700 WvK144 as a confirmation of the 
rule that he who suffers damage as a result of his own fault is not able to lay 
any claim for damages145– although the court did not mention it explicitly,146 
this, in my opinion, is a clear application of the rule of D. 50.17.203. In another 
case decided by the Gerechtshof Amsterdam in 1913, it was decided that the 
injured party could not claim recovery due to his contributory negligence; 
the Gerechtshof came to this conclusion by applying the culpae compensatio 
doctrine. The lower court, the Rechtbank, already had decided that in this 
case of a collision between a person and a steam tram that the fault of the 
wrongdoer was cancelled out by the carelessness of the injured party.147 The 
Gerechtshof agreed and argued that in this case the injured party acted with a 
large amount of carelessness, which in the first place caused the accident, and 
the fault of the wrongdoer – on the other hand – was very small.148
In some other cases, despite the carelessness of the injured party, the liability 
of the wrongdoer remains existent in full (also outside the intention of the 
wrongdoer): no culpae compensatio took place (apparently it would be different 
if the injured party acted intentionally).149 
an apportionment of damages.
143  See also Ekering 1941, p. 137. The all-or-nothing approach was still applied by the 
Rechtbank Amsterdam in a decision of 1 February 1918. In this case, a steam tram hit a car, which 
stood still on the railroad track due to problems with the engine. The court of first instance 
stated that the injured party could only claim damages if the fact that the car stood still on the 
railroad track was not due to the negligence of the injured party. This point of view repudiated 
by a decision of the Gh. Amsterdam 16 May 1919, NJ 1919, 989, who argued that contributory 
negligence of the injured party does not have to lead to a denial of claim but can also lead to a 
reduction of the amount of damages; - It has also been stated that in Dutch case law of lower 
courts, the development from the all-or-nothing approach to the partition of damages as can be 
found in the judgment of the Hoge Raad of 1916 was gradual; see Smits 1997, p. 214f.
144  Article 700 WvK (edn. 1838, p. 165): Wanneer inwendige gebreken van het schip, dezelfs 
ondeugdzaamheid tot het doen der reize, of schuld en nalatigheid van den schipper of het 
scheepsvolk, de schade of onkosten hebben veroorzaakt, zijn laatstgemelden, hoezeer ten nutte van 
schip en lading vrijwillig gemaakt, geene gemeene avarij. 
145  A-Rb. Rotterdam, 9 December 1896, W. 6910 (1897).
146  This is understandable since Roman law was abolished as a source of law in the Wet 
Algemene Bepalingen (General Provisions Act) of 1829.
147  One of the results of the Industrial Revolution was a revolution in the means of 
transport, among which also rail transport and (steam) trains; unfortunately, this also led to (new) 
accidents. People crossed railway tracks sometimes without first looking both ways carefully. 
Also in Belgium comparable accidents with trains occurred. See on this topic elaborately Picard 
& d’Hoffschmidt (eds.), Pandectes belges, II, vers. Accident de chemin de fer.
148  Gh. Amsterdam 31 March 1913, W. 9586.
149  See, e.g., A-Rb. Arnhem, 5 October 1899, W. 7343; A-Rb. Haarlem, 20 June 1903, W. 8083.
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In a case submitted to the Rechtbank Arnhem in 1899, the plaintiff (a 
widow) received three debentures by means of payments to the mayor of 
the municipality Valburg. The mayor and an alderman of Valburg signed the 
debentures; however, the debentures appeared to be false and were not based 
on legal decisions of the council of the municipality. In the lawsuit, in which 
the plaintiff demanded compensation of her payments made with interests, 
the Rechtbank Arnhem decided that the defendant in this case, i.e. the alderman, 
acted very carelessly (by countersigning the false debentures) and committed a 
wrongful act; the unlawfulness of the act of the defendant was not removed – 
according to the court – by the carelessness of the plaintiff (who, according to 
the defendant, could have convinced herself of the falsity of the debentures). 
The latter’s carelessness/imprudence was so small compared to that of the 
defendant that the defendant could not be excused because of that.150 Another 
interesting case is one decided by the Rechtbank Haarlem in 1903. In this case, 
the plaintiff ’s daughter (aged 14) worked in a  factory where she seized and 
stacked envelopes, which, by the roller of a sorting machine, were flattened 
and thrown out. By accident she got her hand stuck between the cogwheels of 
the machine (a part of which was  not shielded) and was seriously injured. The 
defendant, the public limited company Vereenigde Koninklijke Papierfabrieken 
of the firm Van Gelder Zonen, was held liable based on Articles 1401 jo. 1402 of 
the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838 for the damage caused by its negligence; that 
the carelessness of the injured party did not cancel out the negligence of the 
wrongdoer, and that it was not proven that the injured party (or in this case 
the man’s daughter) acted intentionally.151
In other cases, a partition of damage was permitted.152 An interesting appli-
cation of the culpae compensatio doctrine can still be found in a decision of the 
Rechtbank Rotterdam of 1911. The court decided that the acts of each party were 
not without carelessness (onvoorzichtigheid), the negligence of the injured 
party did not completely nullify the wrongdoer’s negligence (schuld), and the 
liability partially remained; finally, the court awarded half of the damages to 
the injured party.153 This decision indeed proves an application of a partition 
of damages, and proves that the lower court took distance from the all-or-
150 A-Rb. Arnhem, 5 October 1899, W. 7343.
151  A-Rb. Haarlem, 20 June 1903, W. 8083.
152  However, without being clear on what basis the decisions rest; see Smits 1997, p. 215, 
who refers to A-Rb. Zierikzee, 7 June 1898, W. 7191 (1898): ‘… dat de ingestelde vordering tot 
schadevergoeding ook niet ondeelbaar is, omdat zij strekt tot betaling van een geldsom, welke 
zeer goed vatbaar is voor verdeeling’, and to A-Rb. Rotterdam, 24 November 1902, W. 7969 (1903), 
where a similar formulation can be found. However, these decisions seem as having to do with 
the situation in which there are more wrongdoers, not with contributory negligence.
153  A-Rb. Rotterdam, 6 March 1911, NJ 1914, 1223.
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nothing approach. Also in the case that later led to the important decision of 
the Hoge Raad in 1916, the Gerechtshof Amsterdam in 1915 applied the culpae 
compensatio doctrine and decided to partition the damage 50/50, i.e. the injured 
party got only half of his loss compensated. According to the Gerechtshof, the 
carelessness of the injured party could lead to a total or partial expiration of 
his claim for damages.154 It is interesting that the cassation plea to the latter 
case referred to the French term ‘faute commune’155 (and to several Articles of 
the Burgerlijk Wetboek and Wetboek van Koophandel which should have been 
violated) and argued that in such a case the damage should be partitioned 
proportionate to the degree of the faults of both parties instead of leading to a 
denial of claim for damages. In his conclusion, Procurator-General Tarquinius 
Johannes Noyon (1848–1929),156 argued that no partition of damages should 
be made: the damage was not due to the negligence of the injured party, but 
due to the negligence of the wrongdoer.157 Noyon argued that Article 1401 
and following of the Burgerlijk Wetboek did not deal with this question as in 
this case only Article 535 WvK – as mentioned above – was relevant as to the 
matter of contributory negligence. In that article it is stated that in the event 
of a collision of two ships where both were to blame, each ship should carry 
its own loss.158 Article 535 WvK only cuts the knot of the matter, and even in an 
unfair way, as the degree of the faults on both sides is not taken into account, and 
small fault and big loss and small fault or large loss can coincide in one ship.159 
According to Noyon, one cannot deduce a general system of law regarding 
partition of fault and damage from this article. Noyon argued that the answer 
154  Gh. Amsterdam, 8 February 1915, NJ 1915, 955; in Gh. Amsterdam, 28 January 1910, W. 
9066, a steam tram-train collided with a cart and its horse (horse and carriage) that had got stuck 
on the rail/track when it tried to cross it. In its decision, the Court made the observation that a 
fault of the injured party could eliminate or reduce the liability of the wrongdoer.
155  In the facts of HR, 30 October 1925, NJ 1926, 157, a collision of a steamship called 
Mijriam against a suction dredger occurred (owned by Compagnie Auxiliaire resp. by Volker). 
When the injured party, Volker, brought a suit against the owner of the steamship Mijriam, i.e. 
Compagnie Auxiliaire, the latter served a third-party notice on the owner of the ship Aldebaran, 
i.e. Van Nievelt Goudriaan. According to the Compagnie Auxiliaire, the Mijriam had hit the suction 
dredger due to a dangerous manouvre of the Aldebaran. The court of first instance (Rechtbank) 
decided that due to the concurrence of faults each party was only liable for part of the damage, 
namely proportionate to its fault; in that case a faute commune would be present as meant 
in Article 4 of the Collision Convention of Brussels of 1910 (see section 5.3.1.2); however, the 
Gerechtshof argued that the case under dispute did not fall under the words faute commune as 
this term implied contributory negligence of the injured party. The Dutch Hoge Raad, however, 
stated that, cf. Art. 1401 BW, in cases where there are more persons at fault each is liable in full. 
Furthermore, the wrongdoers have recourse against each other.
156  On T.J. Noyon, see, e.g., Van Koppen & Ten Kate 2003, p. 189f.
157  T.J. Noyon in his opinion (‘conclusie’) ad HR, 4 December 1916, NJ 1916, 450.
158  However, Noyon stated this article is unique in the Dutch legislation, which came 
about via Van der Keessel, Thesis 816, and was derived from Van Bijnkershoek, Quaestiones juris 
privati, IV, cap. 22.
159  See also Kist 1889, p. 402f.
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as to the problem of contributory negligence could (only) be found in Article 
1401 and following of the Burgerlijk Wetboek. According to Noyon, in the case 
under dispute there is no faute commune, as the fault on one side totally differs in 
nature from that on the other side. As to Article 1401, there is only one alternative: 
if the wrongdoer was at fault, he is liable in total; if he was not at fault, he is 
not liable at all. Therefore, the Gerechtshof should have balanced/weighed the 
‘negligent degree of the’ facts on both sides and only come to the conclusion 
that the wrongdoer was at fault or not based on the preponderant ‘negligence’ 
on one of the sides (which seems similar to the earlier culpa maior theory).160
As stated before, the Dutch Hoge Raad decided on the partition of damages in 
its decision of 1916 (partition of the damage based on unlawful acts161 of multiple 
persons).162 The facts of the case were, in brief, the following. A pedestrian was hit 
on a public road in Amsterdam when he tried to cross the rails which were used to 
shunt (railway) trains. He was grabbed by a shunting train of the Hollandsche 
IJzeren Spoorwegmaatschappij which just at that moment passed by. The arm of 
the pedestrian was so mutilated that it had to be amputated. In legal doctrine, this 
turn could have been initiated by two proponents, Paul Scholten (1875–1946)163 
and Hendrik Rudolph Ribbius (1881–1934).164, 165 Scholten and Ribbius were in-
deed proponents of the idea of reducing the amount of damages in the event of 
contributory negligence.166 Scholten argued that there was no relevant legal 
160 T.J. Noyon in his opinion (‘conclusie’) ad HR, 4 December 1916, NJ 1916, 450.
161  Furthermore, in 1919 the Hoge Raad fundamentally distanced itself from the restricted 
interpretation of the word ‘wrongful’ in Article 1401 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek and stated that 
a wrongful act can also exist in behaviour which is contrary either to good morals or to the 
care which is due in society with regard to another’s person or property. See HR, 31 January 
1919, NJ 1919, 161; Van Maanen 1995, p. 47. The trend to broaden liability can possibly already 
be seen in the decision of the Hoge Raad of 1916 mentioned in the main text above, where the 
central question was whether contributory negligence of the injured party cancels out or limits 
the fault of the personnel of the railways. The Hoge Raad did not test whether the behaviour 
was a violation of a right or contrary to a legal obligation, but just spoke about fault (‘schuld’). 
According to Van Maanen 1995, p. 50, it is not impossible that by using this term, the Dutch Hoge 
Raad would have wanted to distance itself from the restricted scope of the extra-contractual 
liability, which was the consequence of the interpretation of the term ‘wrongful’ (‘onrechtmatig’) 
in the decision of the Hoge Raad of 1910 (HR, 10 June 1910, W. 9038).
162  After the decision of the Hoge Raad, a note was written to the decision by Meijers 
in 1916 (WPNR 2425), where he wrote: ‘Een alleszins billijke beslissing, maar waartoe men 
moeilijk kan komen zonder gebruik te maken van een – overigens zeer toe te juichen – vrije 
rechtshanteering.’
163 P. Scholten was a professor of law at Amsterdam University. On Scholten, see 
elaborately Peletier 1979, p. 536ff. 
164  H.R. Ribbius became a professor of law at the Netherlands School of Economics, Rotterdam.
165 Keirse 2005, p. 5; see also note by Meijers to HR, 4 December 1916, NJ 1916, 450.
166 As discussed above, a partition was already alluded to by Diephuis, who argued 
that in the event of contributory negligence, although no legal provision existed (except for 
Arts. 534ff. WvK), the judge had to decide based on the circumstances of the case what the 
legal consequences of such contributory negligence were in a way that seemed to him most 
appropriate (‘zoo als hem het meest gepast voorkomt’); see Diephuis 1888, p. 87.
modern and contemporary law 331
provision as to contributory negligence – except for Article 535 of the Wetboek 
van Koophandel – and thus legal doctrine had to give a solution on this. Legal 
doctrine often applied the pandectist rule of D. 50.17.203; however, according to 
Scholten, this rule was in general incorrect. In the event of contributory neg-
ligence, one does not have to deny a claim for damages. He referred to § 254 of 
the German Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch and argued that such a partition of damages 
would be desirable.167 Scholten stated that he could not find examples of such 
a partition based on a weighing of causality or fault, although the silence of 
the law would definitely leave room for such weighing. He explained this by 
saying that the reason presumably was that judges strictly applied the Roman 
law rule of D. 50.17.203.168 Besides § 254 of the German Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch, 
Ribbius also referred to Article 51 II of the Schweizerische Obligationenrecht; 
Ribbius noticed that these two legal provisions (which were ‘newer’ compared 
to the ‘older’ Burgerlijk Wetboek) did not ignore/pass over the problem of con-
tributory negligence, but regulated this topic in a general way and showed that 
the carelessness of the injured party could have an influence on the extent of 
liability of the wrongdoer.169
5.4 Codifications around 1900
5.4.1 The German drafts for codification
The detailed rules on contributory negligence in the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht 
(discussed above) led to criticism in legal doctrine; the objections that the 
rule(s) of the Allgemeine Landrecht were not adequate and practical could have 
been reasons which persuaded the drafters of the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch not 
to make a similar rule and to leave the treatment of the problem in essence to 
the judicial discretion (of the judge).170 As to the dogmatic principles on con-
tributory negligence, which already became clear in section 5.3.2, the drafters 
of the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch could not base themselves on one established 
doctrine. This insecurity can also be found in the two drafts (Entwürfe) of 
the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch: what is it exactly that is balanced, negligence or 
causation?  As will be discussed below, the first draft started from the idea of 
culpae compensatio, while the second draft focussed on the causal relation.171
167  Scholten 1902, p. 434f.
168 ibid., p. 436; Scholten also refers to French case law where the damage was partitioned, 
the total amount of damages was reduced, in cases of contributory negligence.  
169 Ribbius 1906, p. 190ff., esp. p. 212ff.
170  Looschelders 1999, p. 26.
171  See also Looschelders 1999, p. 29. Furthermore, the author of the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch 
was also influenced by the idea of the limitation of the recoverable interests.
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It is unclear whether a division of damages according to quotas known in Germany 
as the partition of shares (‘Quotenteilung’) was not yet provided by § 222 
Entwurf I;172 the latter provision reasons from a weighing of faults: which fault 
was preponderant as to its consequences on the result (damage) in question. In this 
way it provided a limitation of the attribution of damage.173 It is self-evident 
that § 222 Entwurf I implies that the injured party’s contributory negligence 
does not eliminate the causal connection between the wrongdoer’s act and 
the damage. Because if this causal connection were absent, no liability would 
occur at all (among others the Motiven refer to D. 50.17.203).174 Although 
Entwurf I contained the words ‘mitwirkende Fahrlässigkeit’, the Motiven show 
that the quality, i.e. the culpability, of the act of the injured party is especially 
relevant here. Due to the rule of weighing it is pretended that negligence of 
the wrongdoer and contributory negligence are of similar nature.175 Possibly 
the draft was not so much a renewal (no distribution of damage in the form of 
quotas) but just a codification of the situation in the gemeine Recht was this 
view held by various scholars (see already above; the idea of compensation 
of faults).176 Some argued that such renewal was indeed the case: according to 
Levison, § 222 Entwurf I made it possible to provide partial compensation in the 
event of a small contributory negligence (he probably did think about a creation 
of quotas).177 Recently, Looschelders argued that the author of § 222 Entwurf I 
wanted to grant the judge the possibility to make a partition based on quota.178
The decisive criterion changed in § 217 Entwurf II to the extent to which 
the injury was caused predominantly by one or the other party (‘vorwiegende 
Verursachung’), in order to – according to the Protocol – cover cases of strict 
liability (i.e. liability without fault).179 However, it is improbable that one de-
parted from the dogmatic concept of weighing (Abwägung) of faults as a result 
172  In this sense Honsell 1977, p. 74; On (the relevant provision on contributory negligence 
in) the first draft and the second draft of the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1887 resp. 1895), see also 
Looschelders 1999, p. 30ff., 32ff.
173  Honsell 1977, p. 74f.
174  ‘Motive’ in Mugdan 1899 (reprint 1979), II, p. 13; see also Looschelders p. 34; - § 254 
BGB is only relevant when the injured party’s own responsibility a priori did not cancel out all 
responsibility of the wrongdoer; these cases should be distinguished from the cases which fall 
under § 254 BGB. See Looschelders 1999, p. 429ff.; Jansen 2007, p. 661.
175  Honsell 1977, p. 75.
176  See Honsell 1977, p. 76f.
177  ibid., p. 78.
178  Looschelders 1999, p. 30.
179  ‘Protokolle’ to §222 Entwurf (I) in Mugdan 1899 (reprint 1979), I, p. 519: ‘… auch 
solche Fälle zu decken, bei welchen Jemand für seine eigene Handlungen ohne Rücksicht auf 
Verschulden oder für die Handlungen eines Dritten einzustehen hat.’; Looschelders 1999, p. 33; 
Jansen 2007, p. 707.
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of this change.180 The change can be considered a commitment to the judicial 
practice of the gemeine Recht, yet at the same time one opposed to the doctrine 
of Windscheid that not all degrees of contributory negligence had to cancel 
out the injured party’s right to claim compensation in total. § 217 Entwurf II 
was in the first place understood as a corrective to the general principle of total 
compensation.181 The fluctuation between weighing of fault and weighing of 
causation in Entwurf I and II is characteristic for the dilemma caused by the 
sharp separation between basis of liability and extent of liability. In § 254 BGB no 
break with the judicial practice of the gemeine Recht was intended; a mitigation of 
damage as a legal consequence of § 254 BGB remained possible; in particular 
the concept of interruption of the causal connection was integrated in this 
new legal provision.182
5.4.2 The solution of the German Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1900)
In Switzerland, the natural law solution (particularly in Article 51 II of the 
Schweizerische Obligationenrecht)183 had been codified under the influence of 
the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch184 as well as the French doc-
trine.185 Eventually, the Swiss code, as to the problem of contributory negligence, 
was taken as example by the drafters of the German Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch and, 
also under the influence of case law, the Swiss regulation was taken over in its 
entirety.186 The German provision of § 254 BGB reads as follows:187
180  Unless one argues that the weighing of faults regarded the partial consequences; then, the 
transition to Dernberg’s doctrine of preponderant cause was easy to perform; see Honsell 1977, p. 80.
181  Honsell 1977, p. 83f.
182  ibid., p. 86.
183  On Art. 51 II Schw. OR 1881, Art. 44 I Schw. OR 1911, and more in general on the Schweizerische 
Obligationenrecht, see Aumann 1964, p. 199f.; Looschelders 1999, p. 74ff.; - According to Stoll 1972, 
p. 139, the Continental legal theory of the 19th century went beyond the natural law system of 
fixed levels of liability and developed the general principle that an equitable balance must exist 
between culpability and loss compensation. Apparently, the Swiss legal scholar Bluntschli was 
the first to articulate this axiom (see Bluntschli 1855, p. 69), and thereafter the same doctrine was 
advocated in other countries by scholars such as Jhering, Pfaff, Larombière and Laurent; see Stoll 
1972, p. 139, for the relevant references.
184  The Austrian OGH almost always came to an apportionment in halves in the second 
half of the 19th century; it was only in 1896 that a division of the damage into thirds was applied. 
The Austrian case law was cautious in applying a partition of damage going further than a 
halving; see Honsell 1977, p. 73.
185  See Aumann 1964, p. 161ff., p. 164ff.; on this topic also the ‘Motive’ in Mugdan 1899 (reprint 
1979), II, p. 13.
186  Luig 1969, p. 235; see also Aumann 1964, p. 175-190.
187  On contributory negligence and the provision of § 278, see, e.g., Looschelders 1999, p. 
502ff.; Weyts 2003, p. 227 with references, Fedtke & Magnus 2004, p. 86f., 88f.; Jansen 2007, p. 704ff. 
Therefore, the Mitverantwortlichkeit des Geschädigten does not cover only the possible negligence 
of the injured party himself but also the imputability of acts of third parties and also the question 
whether an increase in the risk must be imputed to the victim; see Jansen 2007, p. 656.
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§ 254 BGB: (1) Hat bei der Entstehung des Schadens ein Verschulden des Beschä-
digten mitgewirkt, so hängt die Verpflichtung zum Ersatz sowie der Umfang des 
zu leistenden Ersatzes von den Umständen, insbesondere davon ab, inwieweit der 
Schaden vorwiegend von dem einen oder dem anderen Teil verursacht worden ist.
(2) Dies gilt auch dann, wenn sich das Verschulden des Beschädigten darauf be-
schränkt, dass er unterlassen hat, den Schuldner auf die Gefahr eines ungewöhnlich 
hohen Schadens aufmerksam zu machen, die der Schuldner weder kannte noch 
kennen musste, oder dass er unterlassen hat, den Schaden abzuwenden oder zu 
mindern. Die Vorschrift des § 278 findet entsprechende Anwendung.188
 
The development after the enactment of this article did not immediately 
lead to a break with the practice influenced by Pandectism; instead of that, 
§ 254 BGB is also at a minimum to be regarded as an expression of the rule of 
D. 50.17.203.189 After all, some authors explicitly come to a limitation of the 
amount of compensation from the point of view of an interruption of the 
causal connection.190 Also, the case law of the Reichsgericht seems to have used 
§ 254 BGB to limit the amount of damage without applying a distribution (of 
damage) in the form of quotas.191 
188  An English translation can be found in the edn. of Kiiver & Kornet 2010, p. 281: (1) If 
fault on the part of the injured person contributed to the occurrence of the damage, the duty to 
compensate as well as the extent of compensation to be made will depend on the circumstances, 
in particular to what extent the damage is caused predominantly by one or the other party. 
(2) This also applies if the fault of the injured person is limited to the fact that he failed to draw 
to the attention of the debtor to [sic] the risk of unusually extensive damage, where the debtor 
neither was nor ought to have been aware of the risk, or he failed to avert or reduce the damage. 
The provision of § 278 applies mutatis mutandis.
189  See Honsell 1977, p. 88; - In certain cases legal provisions still include the all-or-nothing 
approach in the event of  (culpable) Mitverursachung, in the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch as well as in 
other special laws; see Looschelders 1999, p. 48ff., 61f. According to this scholar, these provisions 
are not based on a consistent basic idea, and furthermore, none of these rules was based on 
the principle of culpae compensatio. Unfortunately, a further investigation into this topic falls 
outside the ambit of this study.
190 See Honsell 1977, p. 88f.; - The provision seems to mix two thoughts, namely that of the 
interruption of the causal connection and that of the compensation of fault (Kulpakompensation); 
see also Jansen 2007, p. 679 with references, who also stated that part of the doctrine and case 
law initially resorted to the doctrine of the individual imputation of certain parts of the loss 
resulting from the damaging event based on the criterion of preponderant causation.
191  See Honsell 1977, p. 91f., with reference to RG, 9 May 1900, RGZ 46, 203, 207 (application 
theory of interruption of causal connection, and application of D. 50.17.203 and § 254 Abs. II 
to exclude consequential damages) and RG, 13 February 1905, RGZ 60, 149 and RG, 11 May 1908, 
RGZ 68, 353. However, a more nuanced view is necessary here. The Reichsgericht already early 
on considered § 254 BGB as an authorisation to a partition of damages in the form of quota; see 
Jansen 2007, p. 680 with reference to RG, 12 February 1903, RGZ 53, 394, 399f., RG, 21 January 
1905, RGZ 60, 33, 34, 36 and RG, 21 November 1907, RGZ 67, 120, 123. Explicitly, the Reichsgericht 
called it a partition of damages in the form of quota in RG, 11 December 1905, RGZ 62, 145, 148. 
However, it must be admitted that the courts also initially held to the possibility to focus on the 
causality of each individual consequential damage and equally related oneself to § 254 BGB. See 
RG, 13 February 1905, RGZ 60, 147, 150f. and RG, 11 May 1908, RGZ 68, 352, 353f. However, the idea 
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The provision of § 254 BGB as well as the original 222 Entwurf I did not contain 
an explicit disposition of a distribution of damages in the form of quotas. The 
purpose of the historical legislator is still disputed (Was the provision meant 
to assign individual consequential damages to the parties involved or was it 
meant to partition damages in the form of quotas?). The only certainty is that 
the rigid, dominant theory of the later ius commune tradition was left behind in 
favour of a more flexible division of damages, as was already the case in neigh-
bouring jurisdictions such as Austria, France and Switzerland.192 With § 254 
BGB, the all-or-nothing approach (and the theory of culpae compensatio) was 
abolished for the general provision on contributory negligence;193 contribu-
tory fault of the injured party now constitutes an exception to the principle 
of full compensation.194 The provision of § 254 BGB195 is applicable to both 
contractual and delictual liability.196 Systematically, contributory negligence 
in § 254 BGB is important both as a factor which can exclude liability as well 
as a method to determine the reduction of damages.197 Liability can thus range 
between 0 and 100 per cent; the defence of contributory negligence must be 
pleaded and proved by the person provoking it.198 According to § 254 BGB, the 
total damage is apportioned between the litigating parties concerned, depending 
on the circumstances, especially upon how far the injury has been caused pre-
dominantly by one or the other party;199 however, this has to be interpreted as 
‘in proportion to their respective degrees of causation and negligence’.200 The 
primary measure seems to be causality, buwt the judge can take into account 
of an individual attribution of certain consequential damages was increasingly considered to 
be foreign and adverse to the system; see Jansen 2007, p. 680, who referred to RG, 09 December 
1909, JW 1910, 65f. 
192  Jansen 2007, p. 678.
193  See also Wester 1976, p. 2.
194 Also Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 703.
195  An extensive commentary on § 254 BGB can be found, e.g., in Lange 1979, p. 333ff.; 
Soergel/Mertens 1986, p. 346ff.; MünchKommentar BGB/Oetker §254 (2007); Jansen 2007, p. 
677ff.; Erman/Ebert 2008, p. 955ff. 
196 See also, e.g., Lange 1979, p. 336; - On contributory negligence and strict liability, see, 
e.g., Fedtke & Magnus 2004, p. 84f.
197  Fedtke & Magnus 2004, p. 75.
198  ibid., p. 76.
199  According to Enneccerus-Lehmann 1958, p. 81 n. 11, the replacement of the criterion of 
fault in the first draft of the BGB by the causal test in the second was merely intended to generalise 
(and not to change the essence of) the principle of partition of damages; not only the faults of the 
parties involved but also – in the event of liability without fault – other grounds for liability or 
for relief of liability should be balanced against each other. See also Honoré 1983, p. 122; - For the 
procedural aspects as to the problem of Mitverschulden, see, e.g., Geigel/Rixecker 2001, p. 62f.
200 Wacke 1977, p. 11; 1979, p. 276; Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 703; - An older 
discussion of the requirements of Verursachung and Verschulden can be found with Rother 1965, 
p. 42ff. (with enumeration of various views in scholarly literature); Wester 1976, p. 252ff.; Jansen 
2007, p. 707ff. The concept of (eigenes) Verschulden is also extensively discussed by Adriani 1939. 
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other concrete factors in the apportionment of damage, e.g. the nature of the 
faults, the social and economic relation between the litigating parties, including 
a possible insurance agreement, the personal relationship between the parties, 
the nature of the damage, etc.201 The defence of contributory negligence can 
also be taken into account against a wrongdoer who is strictly liable.202
In Germany, contributory negligence, i.e. Mitverschulden203 in the sense of § 
254 BGB, applies when the plaintiff acts negligently as regards his own inter-
ests.204 In the past, various dogmatic solutions were given in doctrine as to the 
legal basis for this rule of Mitverschulden.205 None of these theories seem to 
explain the Verschulden in § 254 in a satisfying and in all the facts comprehen-
sive manner.206 Today two approaches have established themselves.207 Some 
scholars justify contributory negligence by the prohibition of self-contradic-
tory or inconsistent behaviour (venire contra factum proprium), and this idea 
is thus closely related to the idea of loyalty, equity and good faith (i.e. Treu und 
Glauben) codified in § 242 BGB.208 If an injured party demands full compen-
sation although he partly caused his damage, the claim is regarded as being 
against good faith.209 Other scholars trace § 254 BGB back to the principle of 
responsibility (Verantwortlichkeitprinzip),210 included in § 840 BGB that each 
201 Weyts 2003, p. 470 with references.
202 For the first time decided by the Reichsgericht in the event of liability of an animal 
keeper (§833 BGB); see RG, 5 May 1902, RGZ 51, 275, 277 and Looschelders 1999, p. 254.
203 On this term see, e.g., Von Bar 2000, p. 544; contributory negligence is viewed by 
reference to an objective standard, which is determined by the standard of conduct by one‘s 
peers; see Von Bar 2000, p. 560; - Various dogmatic bases are provided for Mitverschulden; these 
can already be found with Wester 1976, p. 4ff. On the various views on the Verschuldensbegriff 
and on the Sorgfaltmaßstab, see also the same Wester 1976, p. 128f., p. 129ff.
204 Van Dam 2006, p. 335; see also Geigel/Rixecker 2001, p. 48: ‘vorwerfbar gegen seine 
eigenen Interessen verhalten hat’; - If an operational risk or inherent danger in tangible property 
of the injured party contributed to the cause of the damage, this in principle leads to a reduction 
in the amount of compensation. See also, including exceptions to this rule, Von Bar & Clive 2009, 
p. 3653, who gave a summary of some leading cases (case law) on this topic.
205 See, e.g., Rother 1965, p. 80ff; Schäfer 1969; recently Jansen 2007, p. 689, 690ff. Various 
views can be distinguished: that § 254 BGB regards real negligence, the theories of Verschulden 
ohne Rechtswidrigkeit, Verschulden gegen sich selbst, § 254 BGB as an expression of Treu und 
Glauben, the doctrine of Obliegenheitsverletzung, the idea of a violation of a genuine legal 
obligation, or the legal duty to the nation as a whole, the doctrine of the sozialen Pflicht, and 
considering the standards of conduct as hypothetical imperatives in the sense of the Kantian 
deontology.
206 In the same sense Lange 1979, p. 346.
207 See Wurmnest 2003, p. 304.
208 Fedtke & Magnus 2004, p. 76f., also including other views of academics on this topic; 
on the latter principle, see Adriani 1938, esp. p. 23ff., also on the idea of venire contra factum 
proprium. See also Jansen 2007, p. 692.
209 See, e.g., Weyts 2003, p. 347f. with references; Wurmnest 2003, p. 304; Fedtke & Magnus 
2004, p. 76.
210 See, e.g., Looschelders 1999, p. 118 with references.
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wrongdoer – according to his responsibility – has to pay for the damage.211 In 
that case, § 254 BGB regulates damage that falls within the area of the com-
mon responsibility of wrongdoer and injured party.212 The author of § 254 BGB 
principally chose for the equal treatment of wrongdoer and injured party.213
Before the conditions for a partial reduction due to contributory negligence 
can be considered there has to be a right of compensation of the injured party 
against the wrongdoer. The act of the injured party must be contrary to law; § 254 
(1) BGB preconceives the objective fault requirement that is filled on the basis of 
§ 276 BGB,214 i.e. there is a fault of the injured party if he acts intentionally or if he 
in a careless manner forsakes to take the care which he owed with regard to his 
own interests.215 Apart from this infringement of the duty of care (Sorgfaltsver-
letzung), for § 254 BGB to become applicable his conduct must be imputable 
to the victim (delictual capacity as defined by §§ 827/828 BGB) and there must 
be a causal link between his conduct and the injury.216 In principle, an objective 
test is applied to the victim’s conduct, i.e. the conduct of a careful person of 
average circumspection and capability is decisive.217 
211  Wurmnest 2003, p. 304.
212  See also Jansen 2009, p. 1080; - While the (medieval) Roman law solution presupposes 
a strict separation of the responsibilities of the parties involved, as according to this solution 
the responsibility of the wrongdoer ends where that of the injured party begins – to which the 
all-or-nothing approach is the only thinkable model – the modern acknowledgment of the 
overlapping responsibilities of both parties does not lead to the all-or-nothing approach as 
the only thinkable solution. The latter lends itself more to a partition of damages based on the 
respective responsibilities. See Looschelders 1999, p. 12f.
213  Looschelders 1999, p. 127.
214  Although the fault as required by § 254 BGB is, however, not (really) comparable to the 
general standard as defined in § 276 BGB since contributory negligence constitutes the neglect 
of one’s own interests, while the general standard considers the infringement of someone else’s 
interests; see Fedtke & Magnus 2004, p. 80.
215  Haas & Hartlief 1998, p. 92; Weyts 2003, p. 19f.; - It is generally accepted that the 
German rules on the ability of minors to be negligent can also be applied to injured parties; § 254 
BGB contains a specific rule which applies in the event of contributory negligence of the injured 
party, but the application of § 828 BGB on this article is generally accepted. See Weyts 2003, 
p. 89. According to Van Dam 2006, p. 340, unconscious and mentally disabled persons cannot 
be contributorialy negligent (§ 827 jo. § 254 BGB), provided they are not able to understand 
the negligence of their conduct or to act accordingly. According to § 829 BGB, despite the lack 
of accountability, children or handicapped persons can be contributorily negligent if equity 
demands so. 
216 Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 703ff., also for a discussion of the prevalent theories 
of causation under German law.
217  Van Dam 2006, p. 335; on the ‘Mitwirkende Betriebs- und Sachgefahren’, see, e.g., Lange 
1979, p. 350ff., 388f.; Fedtke & Magnus 2004, p. 82; - According to German law, contributory 
negligence can also contain undertaking or accepting an activity or situation involving an 
unusually high amount of danger; see Fedtke & Magnus 2004, p. 81.
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The outcome of the damage partition is determined by judicial discretion. 
According to § 254 BGB, the duty to compensate as well as the amount of 
compensation depend on the circumstances, especially on the extent to which 
the injury was caused predominantly by one or the other party (‘vorwiegende 
Verursachung’). The causative potency of the victim’s conduct in producing 
the damage will thus be the vital, although not the unique factor, to take into 
account.218 In the solution provided in the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch, contributory 
negligence (so-called ‘Mitverschulden’) seems to be considered primarily from 
the perspective of preponderant causation, the proximate or near cause (causa 
proxima or propinqua).219 This change led to considerable concern in the litera-
ture. However, although the new criterion that the duty to compensate as well 
as the amount of compensation depend on the circumstances, especially on the 
extent to which the injury was caused predominantly by one or the other party 
(‘vorwiegende Verursachung’) was codified, the Reichsgericht continued to apply 
its old view,220 and kept searching for the main fault. Also in legal doctrine, the 
view that the new criterion that the duty to compensate as well as the amount of 
compensation depend on the circumstances, especially on the extent to which 
the injury was caused predominantly by one or the other party (‘vorwiegende 
Verursachung’) had to be understood as ‘especially on the question of which 
of the parties’ negligence was preponderant/predominant’ (‘überwiegendes 
Verschulden’), gradually prevailed.221 In conclusion, two principles can be seen 
in the contemporary solution in the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch: the assessment/
weighing (Abwägung) of the negligence of the contributions of both parties with 
regard to the occurrence of the damage (gradually worked out in usus modernus 
and from Wolff onwards as part of general theory and practice in ius commune), 
and the idea of the divisibility of the damage-in-total (Wolff ’s idea222), in order 
218  Markesinis & Unberath 2002, p. 110, who refer to the view of the Bundesgerichtshof 
that ‘Vorwiegend verursacht hat einen Schaden derjenige, der dessen Eintritt nicht nur objektive 
ermöglicht, sondern darüber hinaus einem höheren Maße wahrscheinlich gemacht hat als der 
anderen Beteiligte.’ See BGH, 8 February 1952, NJW 1952, 537; BGH, 29 January 1969, NJW 1969, 
789, and also Nieuwenhuis 1997, p. 82 nt. 10; Geigel/Rixecker 2001, p. 55.
219  Wacke 1977, p. 12, who stated that in the second place, case law seems to apply 
Mitverschulden in the weighing. See also Venzmer 1960, p. 134 (case law), p. 139 (legislator); 
Soergel/Mertens 1986, Rdnr. 112, p. 385; Looschelders 1999, p.568ff., 581ff.; the latter mentioned 
Sach- und Betriebsgefahr as a third factor and with regard to the applicability of 829 BGB the 
‘Billigkeitsrelevante Umstände’.
220 That the Reichsgericht remained making the partition based on the gravity of faults 
can also be deduced from RG, 14 February 1903, RGZ 54, 13-15, stating that the question of the 
respective negligence of both parties coincides in the rule with the question of the gravity of 
faults (Guex 1904, p. 166f.)
221  Von Leyden 1902, p. 50; Van Nierop 1905, p. 61f.
222 According to Lorenz 1979, p. 37, 58, the legislator of § 254 BGB did not give up Wolff ’s 
concept of contributory negligence – i.e. the concept of Gesamtschuld – but only simplified it, 
so that one could, in case of questions of doubt, go back to this concept. However, it is doubtful 
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to assign a certain part of the damage to each party, according to the extent of 
their negligence.223
5.5 Modern contemporary solutions to the problem  
of contributory negligence
5.5.1 The Netherlands
5.5.1.1 New directions in Dutch case law and literature in the twentieth century
As just described, in the Netherlands the all-or-nothing approach continued 
to be applied since there was no explicit legal provision on contributory neg-
ligence in the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838. With the judgment of the Hoge Raad 
in 1916,224 this, however, changed.225 According to the Hoge Raad, the duty to 
whether – from an historical view – this was indeed the concept which was codified, as the idea 
of proportional settlement within joint and several liability only enforced itself after the coming 
into force of the BGB. See Looschelders 1999, p. 144, who refers to the fundamental decision of 
the RG, 22 December 1910, RGZ 75, 251, 256. However, any (direct) influence of Wolff ’s concept 
on the rule of § 254 BGB cannot be proven; see Looschelders 1999, p. 144.
223 Luig 1969, p. 237f.; if the injured party self-inflicted damage intentionally, usually there 
is no right to claim against the other party; see Wester 1976, p. 225. If the injured party merely 
acted negligently, while the wrongdoer acted intentionally, no partition of damages would take 
place, according to case law, as the wrongdoer could not invoke the injured party’s contributory 
negligence in that case; see Wester 1976, p. 225, with reference to case law (not in the case of § 
254 II; see Enneccerus-Lehmann 1958, p. 81); see also recently on this topic (with exceptions 
to the rules stated above and with refinements to it) Soergel/Mertens 1986, Rdnr. 116, p. 386f.; 
MünchKommentar BGB/Oetker § 254 (2007), Rdnr. 11, p. 499, Rdnr. 112, p. 527; Erman/Ebert 
2008, p. 975f.
224 HR, 4 February 1916, NJ 1916, 450; on this case, see, e.g., Van Wassenaer van Catwijck 
1971, p. 20; Schut 1990, p. 184f.; Smits 1997, p. 214f.; Jansen 2002a, p. 107f.; 2002b, p. 206f.; Keirse 
2003, p. 28f.; 2005b, p. 5.
225 See also Maeijer 1962, p. 196; Van Boom 2004, p. 132; - Nevertheless, in Ktg. Den Helder, 
3 September 1936, NJ 1937, 138, the plaintiff-driver’s contributory negligence contributed to the 
occurrence of the accident and therefore the Kantongerecht denied his claim for damages; this 
view, as Ekering 1941, p. 144, rightly argued, resembles the view which prevailed before 1916 (all-
or-nothing); - Except for certain cases in which legal provisions including the all-or-nothing 
approach were available, this principle was applied even longer. See Van Wassenaer van Catwijck 
1971, p. 15f., 30, particularly in cases of commercial law and labour law. A recent discussion on 
special provisions on contributory negligence can be found in Keirse 2003, p. 57ff.; Van Boom 
2004, p. 133. As was already the case with Art. 1638x lid 2 (old) BW, Art. 7:658 lid 2 BW still 
continues to apply the all-or-nothing approach in the event of negligence in labour accidents 
(Keirse 2003, p. 59; 2005b, p. 5): the defence of contributory negligence only succeeds if his 
intentional act or wilful reckless act substantially contributed to his injury of the employee; see 
also already HR, 27 March 1992, NJ 1992, 496, where the Hoge Raad decided that gross negligence 
in Art. 1638x lid 2 BW is to be understood as intent or conscious recklessness; see also Hartlief 
1997a, p. 131; Bouman 1997, p. 29; Frenk 2006a, p. 50. Art. 7:952 NBW (non-mandatory rule), 
still providing an all-or-nothing approach is also of particular interest for my argument: when 
the injured is to blame to a certain extent (intent or recklessness), or – as this is only a non-
mandatory rule – the gradations of negligence as written down in the policy are exceeded, he 
will not receive any compensation, otherwise he will be entitled to total compensation. See, e.g., 
Frenk 2006a, p. 24, 52.
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compensate has to be measured based on the extent to which the negligence 
of both parties has contributed to the damage.226 It is remarkable that the 
Hoge Raad decided in a contributory negligence case that the case concerned 
wrongful acts of several persons.227 Then, despite there having been multiple 
wrongful acts, no full compensation was put on each of the wrongdoers, but 
the degree of compensation was measured based on the extent to which 
everybody’s fault contributed to the cause of the damage.228 A motivation is 
totally missing: namely, a motivation for the line of thought of the Hoge Raad 
which provides insight into how one goes from a situation of shared liability 
(more persons are liable towards one injured party) to a situation of reduced 
liability of the injured party; this led to the appearance of the phenomenon 
of partial compensation in cases where contributory negligence of the in-
jured party was decided. This possibility just appeared, meaning that lower 
courts did not elaborate any further on a case in the event of reduced liability; 
normally they noted that for that reason (i.e. due to contributory negligence) 
the damage should be divided between the parties involved.229
Since then, i.e. the judgment of the Hoge Raad of 1916, it has  generally 
been accepted that contributory negligence of the injured party can lead to 
a diminishment of the liability of the wrongdoer. However, it still often oc-
curred in case law after 1916 that in the event of contributory negligence of the 
injured party, that party was not able to recover his damages, and – due to the 
existence of contributory negligence – no action was granted (all-or-nothing 
226 On case law applying this new approach after 1916, see Keirse 2005, p. 4f.
227 However, the original concept of this decision written by justice B.C.J. Loder (1849-
1935) as found in Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, 1838-1939, 2.09.28, 
inv.nr. 130, was as follows ‘… dat art. 1401 BW aan hem door wiens schuld schade is veroorzaakt 
den plicht tot vergoeding daarvan oplegt, welk wetsvoorschrift den rechter die over de feiten 
oordeelt niet verbiedt doch veeleer noopt, om in geval van door onrechtmatige daad ontstane 
schade den vergoedingsplicht af te meten naar de mate waarin ieders schuld heeft medegewerkt 
tot het veroorzaken diens schade.’ This made more sense: if a wrongdoer unlawfully inflicted 
damage, the amount of damages should be measured/proportioned based on the degree to 
which each party’s fault contributed to the damage that occurred. First, one justice tried to 
change this into ‘of more persons’ (van meerdere personen), probably justice J.A.A. Bosch (1855-
1937), but ultimately this is also deleted/crossed out and a justice with siglum N (probably justice 
A.P.L. Nelissen (1851-1921)) changed it into the sentence that became the final form: ‘schade is 
ontstaan door onrechtmatige daden (verzuimen) van meerdere personen’.
228 HR, 4 February 1916, NJ 1916, 450; Ekering 1941, p. 139; see also A-Rb. Amsterdam, 
16 October 1925, NJ 1926, 996, where the court decided that in that case each of the parties 
(plaintiff and defendant) could be held liable for a portion of the damage. The court states that 
in general, the obligation to compensate loss due to wrongful acts is indivisible. However, an 
exception had to be made in this case, as the damage was caused due to several people, the 
one who compensated the damage has a right of recourse against the joint wrongdoer(s) for a 
proportionate part. In this case, as the defendant would have had a right of recourse against the 
plaintiff of a proportionate part, the court decided to shed more light on this matter and let both 
parties carry half of the damages. 
229 Ekering 1941, p. 139.
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approach);230 it is likely that the lack of a legal basis for a proportional partition 
of damages based on the extent of negligence of each party has contributed 
to this denial of action.231 Another question was the basis for reduction of the 
damages award. The Hoge Raad in 1916, as discussed above, did not explain 
this basis very clearly. Lower courts often did not partition based on the causal 
impact of the fault of each party, but often they balanced the faults, the degree 
of faults.232 In the decennia after this judgment, the decisions of the Hoge Raad 
on contributory negligence, when taken altogether, suggest that the measure 
with which one had to partition the damage was no separate consideration, 
and that a variety of measures (and not just one measure) was used until the 
late 1980s when the Hoge Raad started to anticipate the new Article 6:101 BW.233
We see various arguments in the literature raised to support the idea of 
reducing the (amount of) damages.234 Scholten believed that it was indecent 
to bring a claim for total compensation for damages when the plaintiff himself 
had acted negligently and so contributed to causing the damage.235 The ma-
jority of the Dutch scholars refer to fairness/equity as basis.236 However, some 
authors argue that only equity as a basis is insufficient; and that the legal basis 
has to be found in the balance/compromise between the viewpoints ‘everyone 
suffers his own loss’ (casum sentit dominus) and ‘do not cause harm to others’ 
(alterum non laedere).237 In the event of a violation of the duty to mitigate the 
harm (see also section 5.7), the legal basis can be found in the fact that due to 
circumstances on the side of the injured party, the legal basis for shifting the 
damage is only present at a reduced level.238
Under the regime of the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838, three cases existed in 
which contributory negligence of the injured party still resulted in the refusal 
of a claim for damages. 1. This applied, according to doctrine and case law, if a 
230 Polak 1949, p. 55; - According to Schut 1990, p. 185, only when contributory negligence 
was that small in comparison to the negligence of the wrongdoer that it can be neglected, will 
the wrongdoer be fully liable.
231  Jansen 2002a, p. 108; 2002b, p. 207.
232 Ekering 1941, p. 139f.
233 Keirse 2003, p. 196f.
234 Van Wassenaer van Catwijck provided eleven grounds for justification in his 
dissertation of 1971 (p. 19ff.); a more recent discussion on the doctrinal views concerning the 
legal basis of the partition of damages in case of contributory negligence can be found with 
Keirse 2003, p. 64ff.
235 Scholten 1921a, p. 35; 1921b, p. 45f.; Jansen 2002a, p. 109; 2002b, p. 207; Keirse 2003, p. 68.
236 See also later Bloembergen 1997, p. 7f. with references, also including other – according 
to Bloembergen – more in-depth explanations; - Further references can be found in Hartlief 
1997a, p. 130; Jansen 2002a, p. 109 nt. 23; 2002b, p. 207, nt. 24.
237 See also Weyts 2003, p. 324.
238 Keirse 2003, p. 69ff., 79.
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victim deliberately underwent the damage inflicted on him. An exception was 
made (a.) if there was intent, conditional intent or gross recklessness of the 
wrongdoer, or (b.) if the injured party acted with the intent to save his own or 
someone else’s property or life,239 or (c.) in case of the imputation of someone 
else’s blame as contributory negligence of the injured party. 2. Furthermore, 
this applied when the fault of the victim outweighed the fault of the wrong-
doer, and the fault of the latter fell into insignificance.240 3. Finally, this applied 
based on circumstances on the side of the victim: when it could be assumed 
that the victim accepted the risk that the damage would occur, or consented 
to the occurrence of the damage.241
The reverse situation was also possible (i.e. a total claim in spite of con-
tributory negligence): when intent or gross negligence absorbed a minor neg-
ligence from the side of the victim, the total claim for damages had to be paid 
(no reduction of the amount of damages).242 Such a situation occurs when the 
wrongdoer acts with intent and his intentional behaviour is favoured by acts 
of the injured party or when the negligence of the injured party is insignificant 
compared to that of the wrongdoer.243 However, this last case, in which some-
one can pass on the damage to someone else, is an exception. The main rule is 
that the person who suffers damage has to bear it himself.244 According to Van 
239 In this study rescue cases are not discussed further.
240 See also HR, 4 November 1977, NJ 1978, 146; Van Wassenaer van Catwijck & Jongeneel 
1995, p. 12; Boonekamp aant. 17.7 ad Art. 6:101 BW; Keirse 2003, p. 227ff.; this did not change 
under the NBW; see Asser/Hartkamp 2004 (IV-I), nr. 452, p. 408. See also HR, 31 March 1995, NJ 
1997, 592. 
241  Van Wassenaer van Catwijck 1971, p. 30ff. 
242 To the rule that intent or gross negligence of the wrongdoer absorbed a minor 
negligence of the injured party, and so did not lead to any reduction of the amount of damages, 
there are some exceptions. A discussion of these exceptions can be found in Van Wassenaer van 
Catwijck 1971, p. 35ff.; on risk or presumption of negligence and contributory negligence, see Van 
Wassenaer van Catwijck 1971, p. 162ff. This topic will not be discussed here.
243 Van Wassenaer van Catwijck 1971, p. 35; on the final situation, in the era of Burgerlijk 
Wetboek of 1992, see Keirse 2003, p. 229f.
244 The question of liability is answered by balancing two viewpoints in the law of delicts: 
each party carries his own loss (it concerns the adage casum sentit dominus; see Gai. Inst. 3.211; 
D. 50.17.23; C. 4.24.9; a variant is res perit domino), and: cause no damage to another (Alterum 
non laedere, D. 1.1.10.1; Jansen 2009, p. 231). A discussion of these points of view can be found, 
e.g., with Hartlief 1997a, p. 129; 1997b (esp. on the first viewpoint); Keirse 2003, p. 13ff.; Weyts 
2003, p. 1ff., 121, 323f. The balance will be tipped in favour of the adage ‘each carries his own loss’ 
when the act that caused the damage was not unlawful; see Chao-Duivis 2005, p. 5. According 
to Jansen 2009, p. 231, the purpose of the law of delicts is to establish in which case a delict 
is the basis of an eventual liability in order to shift the damage from the injured party to the 
wrongdoer. Sieburgh 2000, p. 1f., 9ff., talks about finding a balance, depending on the weight 
awarded to each of these two points of view. See also Asser/Hartkamp 2006 (IV-III), nr. 12ff., p. 
16f.; - With regard to the injured party, related points of view are relevant: when someone suffers 
damage because of his own negligence, he is not considered to have suffered any damage (rule 
of D. 50.17.203); and the rule that everyone is lord and master in his own sphere of law; on these 
points of view, see Keirse 2003, p. 16f.
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Wassenaer van Catwijck in his dissertation (1971), therefore, judges (in general) 
should be very reluctant in deciding that the careless act of the injured party 
was considered of so little weight that it had no effect on his claim for com-
pensation; they had to assign more weight to the fault of the injured party and 
decide sooner to deny a claim.245 Notice that if one decides that contributory 
negligence of the injured party has so little weight that it has no effect on his 
claim for damages, one in fact puts all the burden/all the damage on the side 
of the wrongdoer. Thereby, one departs from the main rule mentioned above, 
namely that the person who suffers damage has to bear it himself.
Another question is how the partition of damages should be made. Various 
standards are mentioned and discussed in Van Wassenaer van Catwijck’s 
dissertation;246 the most often mentioned by scholars are the degree of causa-
tion of both parties and the degree of negligence of both parties. Van Wassenaer 
van Catwijck believed that in many cases causation was the most important 
standard, but in some cases a correction of this standard was required by us-
ing other standards.247
5.5.1.2 Recent codification: The Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992
Before reaching the rule of Article 6:101 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992 (BW), 
it has to be noted that in some cases the contributory negligence of the injured 
party may be of overwhelming preponderance, and so, according to Article 
6:98 BW,248 the necessary causal nexus between the conduct of the defendant 
and the damage is absent,249 and the requisites to apply Article 6:98 BW (the 
doctrine of attribution according to reasonableness) are not met.
245 Van Wassenaer van Catwijck 1971, p. 35.
246 See Van Wassenaer van Catwijck 1971, p. 226ff., 238ff.
247 ibid., p. 244; - According to Asser/ Hartkamp 2004 (IV-I), nr. 450, p. 403, the main rule 
of Art. 6:101 BW (weighing of causality) as well as the exception (correction based on equity) 
were already accepted by the Hoge Raad under the regime of the OBW, and therefore the case 
law of that period retains its significance.
248 According to Art. 6:98 BW, the judge has to constitute the causal connection taking 
into account the nature of the liability and of the damage, but also other factors of assessment 
are possible, such as the foreseeability of the damage, the expertise of the defendant, the nature 
of the fault, the existence of an insurance agreement; see Weyts 2003, p. 465 with references, 
who calls it a multifactor approach. This term is used firstly by Schut, 1990, p. 89.
249 See also Keirse 2003, p. 11; Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3638.
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The principle of contributory negligence is codified in Article 6:101 BW,250 
which provision reads as follows:
1. Wanneer de schade mede een gevolg is van een omstandigheid die aan de 
benadeelde kan worden toegerekend, wordt de vergoedingsplicht verminderd door 
de schade over de benadeelde en de vergoedingsplichtige te verdelen in evenredig-
heid met de mate waarin de aan ieder toe te rekenen omstandigheden tot de schade 
hebben bijgedragen, met dien verstande dat een andere verdeling plaatsvindt of de 
vergoedingsplicht geheel vervalt of in stand blijft, indien de billijkheid dit wegens 
de uiteenlopende ernst van de gemaakte fouten of andere omstandigheden van het 
geval eist.
2. Betreft de vergoedingsplicht schade, toegebracht aan een zaak die een derde 
voor de benadeelde in zijn macht had, dan worden bij toepassing van het vorige lid 
omstandigheden die aan de derde toegerekend kunnen worden, toegerekend aan 
de benadeelde.251
This legal provision can be applied in cases of fault liability as well as in cases 
of strict liability. The burden of proof of ‘contributory negligence’ of the injured 
party in principle rests on the party that invokes contributory negligence of 
his opponent (cf. Article 149 of the Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering 
(Code of Civil Procedure, Rv)).252 In the event of contributory negligence,253 
250 Apart from the possible applicability of Article 6:101 BW in delictual liability cases, it 
can also be applicable for the duty to provide compensation due to a culpable breach of contract; 
on this topic, see, e.g., Jansen 1997, p. 31ff.
251  An English translation of this provision can be found in the edn. of Kiiver & Kornet 
2010, p. 330: Article 6:101. (1). Where the damage is partly a consequence of a circumstance that 
can be attributed to the prejudiced person [benadeelde], the duty to compensate is reduced by 
dividing the damage among the prejudiced person and he who has a duty to compensate in 
porportion to the extent to which the circumstances attributable to each have contributed to 
the damage, provided that a different division shall take place or the duty to compensate lapses 
or remains in its entirety, where fairness [billijkheid] so demands given the discrepancy between 
de [=the, EvD] severity of the errors made or other circumstances of the case. (2) Where the 
duty to compensate concerns damage inflicted to an object which a third party kept for the 
aggrieved party, circumstances that can be attributed to the third party shall be attributed to the 
prejudiced person when applying the previous paragraph.
252 HR, 11 June 2010, NJ 2010, 333; HR, 8 July 2011, NJ 2011, 307 (the obligation to furnish 
the facts and the burden of proof of the factual basis of the defence of contributory negligence 
lies with the defendant); see also HR, 17 November 2006, RvdW 2006, 1076; see also HR, 22 April 
2005, NJ 2006, 20). See also Keirse 2003, p. 112 with reference to older case law.
253 This implies that, in the circumstances of the case, the victim failed to deal carefully 
with his own interests (he acted differently than a careful, reasonably acting person would have 
done in the given circumstances); see Parliamentary History of book 6 (PG Boek 6, p. 351); Spier 
1992, p. 3; Asser/Hartkamp 2004 (IV-I), nr. 448, p. 399; Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3638; - The term 
‘eigen schuld’ is somewhat misleading and too narrow; Art. 6:101 BW covers a broader area: not 
only acts of the injured party itself are relevant, but also faulty acts and circumstances which 
belong to the sphere of risk of the injured party. Furthermore, also acts of others can belong to 
his sphere of risk; see, e.g., Van Wassenaer van Catwijck & Jongeneel 1995, p. 3; Boonekamp aant. 
2 ad Art. 6:101 BW.
modern and contemporary law 345
a diminished duty to compensate follows by dividing the damage between 
the injured party and the wrongdoer in proportion to the extent to which the 
circumstances attributable to each party have contributed to the damage. After 
the partition of the damage, the injured party carries (that proportion of) his 
own loss that he ought to carry (see also the above-mentioned principle).254 
This damage is caused by the injured party himself; at least he is held account-
able for his damage, since it is attributed to circumstances that lie in his sphere 
of risk (idea of so-called equity (‘billijkheid’)).255 
Article 6:101 BW is very broad as it covers situations in which the injured 
party contributed to the occurrence of the damage as well as situations in 
which the injured party contributed (in a negative sense) to the extent of the 
damage. In this latter sense, the (violation of the) duty to limit the damage 
(implicitly) found its way into this article.256 In addition, not only the injured 
party’s own behaviour can constitute contributory negligence, but also the acts 
of persons for whom the person bears (vicarious) responsibility; furthermore, 
the person also bears the risk for strict liabilities – damage done by an animal 
or by tangible objects in his possession.257 The part of the damage that cannot 
be recovered is imputed to the injured party, according to the general rules of 
Article 6:162 (1) and (3) and 6:163 BW; therefore, the injured party must have 
been at fault or the cause must have been encompassed in his sphere of risk 
according to the law or to social conventions.258
 Article 6:101 BW has two standards:259 the primary apportionment 
made by a correlative balancing of causes,260 and, secondarily, an equitable 
adjustment of the outcome of the primary apportionment (the so-called 
254 It seems that recent developments in the area of legal provisions on traffic accidents 
and on the liability of employers do not do justice to this principle, in this sense Jansen 2002b, 
p. 209; see also Hartlief 2002b, p. 17ff., who states that in these cases the wrongdoer has to 
compensate more than he caused.
255 Hartlief 2002b, p. 13.
256 Spier et al. 2000, p. 218; Hartlief 2002b, p. 13f.
257 On this point, see Hartlief 2002b, p. 14, also on reflexwerking and the special legal 
provisions regarding traffic accidents; on the reflexwerking and Art. 185 WVW see also, e.g., 
Hartlief 2001, p. 73ff. Unmotorised traffic participants are also protected if they collide with 
a motorised vehicle and damage the latter. If they are sued because of injuries or damage to 
property, the protective standard of Art. 185 WVW still applies: the motorised partly has to bear 
his own damage, as far as he cannot prove force majeure or at least fails to prove the contribution 
of the unmotorised party. See Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 20f.; Hartlief 2001, p. 73.
258 Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3639.
259 A discussion of these standards can be found, e.g., with Barendrecht 1997b, p. 153ff., 
esp. 165ff.; - Art. 6:101 (subsections 1 and 2) were already accepted by case law under the regime 
of the former Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838); see Spier 1992, p. 3.
260 Van Boom 2004, p. 134.
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billijkheidscorrectie).261 The first standard262 assumes that the damage is causally 
linked with the act of the wrongdoer as well as with the circumstances on the 
side of the injured party.263 These circumstances must be imputable to the 
injured party, i.e. when the victim acted with negligence or when the circum-
stances are at his risk, based on statutory provisions, juridical act or social 
conventions (de in het verkeer geldende opvattingen).264 The weighing of causal 
factors265 leads to a partition of damage; this partition can be adjusted based on 
equity, e.g. reasons can be found in the diverging severity of the faults266 of the 
parties involved or in other circumstances (e.g. the age of the victim).267 The 
estimation of the faults on either side to an important extent is based on the 
intuitive insights of the judge and therefore the motivation required in this re-
spect is limited.268 According to the Hoge Raad, the judge should make explicit 
261 There seems to be no profound dogmatic thought behind this choice. From the 
Parliamentary History of book 6 (PG Boek 6, p. 352), one can deduce that it was only because 
of a question of the (Committee of Justice of the) Second Chamber of the Parliament (House of 
Representatives) whether one could give more concrete shape for the standard of reasonableness 
to the judgment of the judge; see also Nieuwenhuis 1997, p. 80f., and Tjong Tjin Tai 2006, p. 
27f.; according to the latter the partition in two stadia is somewhat artificial and in practice not 
always good to realise. On the equitable adjustment, see, e.g., Bouman 1997, p. 25ff. According 
to Hijma’s annotation to HR, 5 December 1997, NJ 1998, 402, the order of the standards in Art. 
6:101 is not so much based on substantive considerations, but on generic legal-systematic ones 
(in many grounds for liability, culpability (verwijtbaarheid) is not a requirement for liability; see 
the Memorandum of Reply (MvA II in: PG Boek 6, p. 352)).
262 On this standard see, e.g., Spier 1997, p. 15ff. This author argued – see Spier 1997, p. 20f. 
– that judges find it difficult to apply this standard. Their decision-making should not be based 
on intuition; possibly experts could better indicate how the various causes contributed to the 
damage. 
263 Spier et al. 2000, p. 218; Asser-Hartkamp 2004 (IV-I), nr. 448a, p. 400.
264 Sterk 1994, p. 245.
265 There seems to be no unanimity on the criterion (see Boonekamp aant. 16 ad Art. 6:101 
BW); according to Nieuwenhuis 1997, p. 82, the determining factor is the probability that the 
circumstances attributable to wrongdoer and injured party would lead to the occurrence of the 
damage; see also Barendrecht 1997a, p. 13; 1997b, p. 166f. (in any case for traffic cases); according 
to Weyts 2003, p. 413, the Dutch Hoge Raad considers decisive the extent to which the conduct 
of the parties on either side have created the danger.
266 It is often assumed that the contributory negligence of the injured party may be 
disregarded if the wrongdoer acted intentionally, while on the other hand, there is no right 
to recovery if the injured party acted intentionally. See Spier 1992, p. 10 with references. If 
the negligence of the injured party is so small that it becomes insignificant compared to the 
negligence of the wrongdoer, one often disregards the contributory negligence of the injured 
party; see also Spier 1992, p. 10.
267 Spier et al. 2000, p. 219, 221; Hartlief 2002b, p. 15. In particular, the seriousness of the 
faults of both parties, and the degree of culpability of each party; see HR, 5 December 1997, NJ 
1998, 400, and the question of whether the driver/owner and the cyclist/pedestrian who is held 
liable are insured; see HR, 4 May 2001, NJ 2002, 214; or the severity of the injury; see HR, 22 April 
2005, NJ 2006, 20. On the influence of insurance on the equity correction, see, e.g., Hartlief & 
Tjittes 1999, p. 40ff.
268 HR, 8 July 2011, NJ 2011, 307; also Bouman 1997, p. 26 and Tjong Tjin Tai 2005, p. 187, 
seem to argue that the weighing and partition of Art. 6:101 BW is largely an intuitive assessment. 
Critical on this point is Barendrecht 1997b, p. 169f.
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to which result (to which kind of partition) the first standard leads as to the 
weighing of causality, and on what ground that result needs correction.269 This 
is different if the judge decides that because of the divergent seriousness of the 
faults, the duty to compensate should be 100 per cent (or nil270); in principle 
he does not have to indicate exactly to what extent circumstances attributable 
to each of the parties contributed to the damage in that case. However, such a 
decision, to be understandable, generally, should be based on a statement of 
those circumstances; and such a decision, when these circumstances at first 
sight seem to imply that the duty to compensate would be totally or partially 
annulled, requires a higher level of motivation.271
Recently, it has been argued that Article 6:101 BW should be subdivided 
into four phases, which follow from the text and the structure of the legal text 
itself,272 after the fulfilment of the general requirement, namely that liability of 
the wrongdoer is established in a certain case.273 The first two phases concern 
the founding of co-responsibility. The first phase is to investigate whether 
there is a sufficient causal link between the behaviour of the injured party and 
the damage;274 secondly, this causal contribution must be attributable to the 
injured party. Subsequently, in the third and fourth phases, the consequences 
of the (now) established ‘contributory negligence’ can be further investigated. 
They contain a twofold standard for dividing the damages in the event of con-
tributory negligence. In the third phase, the damage is partitioned according to 
the degree in which the circumstances attributable to each party contributed 
to the damage (measure of causality); and fourthly, a different partition will 
be made when  equiry so requires because of the different severity of the faults 
or other circumstances of the case.275
269 Asser/Hartkamp 2004 (IV-1), nr. 452a, p. 410; - See recently HR, 13 January 2006, NJ 
2006, 59, on this judgment, see also Tjong Tjin Tai 2006, p. 27f.; Keirse 2006, p. 188f.; - The 
correction based on equity ought to be applied by the judge by virtue of his office (ex officio), 
i.e. without the need of invocation by one of the parties; see on this topic Van Wassenaer van 
Catwijck & Jongeneel 1995, p. 141ff.
270 See Tjong Tjin Tai 2006, p. 28 with case law.
271  HR, 3 June 2005, NJ 2005, 286; see also Tjong Tjin Tai 2005, p. 189f.; Keirse 2006, p. 189f.
272 Keirse 2003, p. 83ff.; 2006, p. 186; see also Asser/Hartkamp 2004 (IV-I), nr. 450, p. 403; 
Frenk 2006a, p. 25; differently Van Boom 2004, p. 134.
273 Keirse 2003, p. 84.
274 Often a necessary, but not sufficient, condition will be the condicio sine qua non test/
principle, that is, that without the act of the injured party, the damage would not have occurred; 
Art. 6:98 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek can serve as a guide here; see also Keirse 2003, esp. p. 90, 115.
275 Keirse 2003, p. 83ff., 115f.; Knapen 2004, p. 6; - On these phases, see Keirse 2006, p. 
186ff., also on the question as to what extent the Hoge Raad can examine the decisions in the 
distinct four phases, see Keirse 2003, p. 238ff.; 2006, p. 190f.
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5.5.2 France
5.5.2.1 Contemporary solution in France
Of course before one could consider whether contributory negligence was 
present, also in France, there had to be a right to claim compensation against 
the wrongdoer.276 To have legally any influence on his right to damages, a victim 
has to commit a faute that was one of the causes of the damage. The faute de 
la victime277 even has to constitute a necessary antecedent of the damage and 
to make the damage objectively possible.278 As soon as the judge decides the 
faute de la victime was a cause of the damage, the division of damage claimed 
is applied not, however, according to the relative decisiveness of the parties’ 
conduct in producing the damage, but according to the relative gravity of 
their faults.279
The fault of the injured party (faute de la victime) leads to the (total or 
partial) elimination of the required causal connection between the faute280 
of the wrongdoer and the damage.281 Presently, the consequence of a victim’s 
276 Of course, in a concrete case the unlawful act can be justified. Examples are: permission 
or risk acceptance by the victim. Interestingly, with regard to risk acceptance, it cannot regard 
any possible risk, but at the utmost normal and frequently occurring risks. When risks above 
average are concerned, case law normally opts for partial liability, as when someone accompanies 
a drunken car driver: the acceptance of risk is then negotiated as a percentage of contributory 
negligence; see Van Dam 2000a, p. 29. An extensive (comparative) work on the ‘Handeln auf 
eigene Gefahr’ is provided by Stoll 1961, and on consent and risk assumption, see also Honoré 
1983, p. 112ff.
277 Extensively on the topic of fait/faute de la victime, Mazeaud & Mazeaud 1970, p. 540ff.; 
in the event in which the fault of one party is the consequence of or is logically entailed by the 
fault of the other, see Honoré 1983, p. 118f. See on the legal nature of the ‘faute’ of the victim the 
overview provided by Neumann-Schniedewind 1969, p. 99f.
278 Deschizeaux 1934, esp. p. 9f.; - With regard to the requirement of causal connection 
(lien de causalité), case law seems to have applied the theory of adequate cause; see Deschizeaux 
1934, p. 45ff., who discusses the case law of the 19th and early 20th centuries; differently, Terlez 
1938, p. 16 (equivalence theory). Extensively on the requirement of causal connection in legal 
doctrine and case law, see also Neumann-Schniedewind 1969, p. 80ff., esp. p. 89ff.
279 Lawson 1968, p. 63f. (critically); Wurmnest 2003, p. 310f.; - Also Deschizeaux 1934, 
p. 52ff., 110, 166, who argued that there are disadvantages to this method, and he suggested 
apportioning responsibility on the basis of the objective possibility of both parties to cause 
damage; - However, due to their inviolable discretion, the judges who decide on the questions 
of fact de facto use various criteria: they often partition the damage based on the causal 
contributions of each of the parties; see Weyts 2003, p. 388 with references; Deschizeaux 
suggested a practical plan of action: the judge has to determine and value the respective faults of 
both parties, e.g. three to the wrongdoer and five to the victim, in which case the wrongdoer has 
to pay 3/8 of the victim’s damage. See Deschizeaux 1934, p. 110.
280 On the definition of faute in doctrine and in general in the Avant-projet de réforme, see 
recently Borghetti 2009, esp. p. 278f.; - Art. 1352(2) of the Avant-projet defines faute as a breach 
of a rule of conduct imposed by legislation or regulation, or failure to conform to a general duty 
of care and diligence (Borghetti 2009, p. 279).
281  Josserand 1939, p. 265ff.; Kontogianni 2003, p. 164; Tourneau 2004, nr. 1796, p. 423; nr. 
1799, p. 424.
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negligence is that he cannot claim compensation for the full loss suffered. 
The court will reduce the damage amount. In French law the concept of fault 
is broadly construed.282 The fault of the injured party can give rise to a partial 
exoneration of the defendant. It can even leave the victim with empty hands 
if the defendant can prove that the victim’s conduct qualifies as an extraneous 
cause (cause étrangère), which means that it must have been unforeseeable and 
unavoidable (imprévisible et irrésistible) for the defendant, and constitutes the 
sole cause of the damage.283 Generally, an objective test of the victim’s conduct 
applies.284 Not only a violation of a rule of conduct imposed by statute, but 
also a breach of a ‘general duty to protect oneself ’ by a ‘victim’ is considered 
a faute.285
In most cases accidents are partly due to the fault of the defendant and partly 
to the plaintiff ’s own act. According to French law, the apportionment of dam-
ages must be made based on the principle that the defendant does not have to 
pay reparation for damages in excess of the damage he caused himself.286 The 
proportion the wrongdoer has to bear, despite the required faute de la victime, 
is determined by comparing the seriousness of the fautes on either side.287 
282 See Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 693ff.; according to these authors (p. 694f.), 
the apparent symmetry between the wrongdoer and the injured party is warped by the play 
of a third party or by liability insurance to the benefit of the defendant (wrongdoer), and the 
only person who ultimately pays for his fault often is the victim. Therefore, a proposal has been 
made to only hold a serious or inexcusable fault against the injured party, and to leave intact his 
right for compensation at least in cases in which the liability of the wrongdoer is covered by his 
insurance. The Loi Badinter makes a step in that direction with regard to victims of motor vehicle 
accidents (see section 5.6.1).
283 Le Tourneau 2004, nr. 1863, p. 441; nr. 1889, p. 447; see also Colin-Capitant-La Morandière 
1948, p. 228, 268; Planiol-Ripert-Esmein 1952, p. 788; Amos/Walton 1967, p. 215; Mazeaud & 
Mazeaud 1970, p. 551ff.; Van Gerven, Larouche & Lever 2000, p. 692; Van Dam 2006, p. 335.
284 Van Dam 2006, p. 335; Le Tourneau 2004, nr. 1882, p. 446 (but ‘l’application de ce critère 
de partage implique l’appréciation in concreto’); - Another issue is the question of whether a young 
victim can be contributorily negligent. In answering this question, French case law compares the 
conduct of the child-victim to that of the bon père de famille just as in the case where the child 
causes the damage himself; see Van Dam 2006, p. 340 and cited case law; this opinion has been 
criticised in the literature because it establishes the child’s contributory negligence too easily, 
meaning that the child can get compensation only for part of the damage. However, the Cour de 
cassation does not seem to be inclined to change its view; see Van Dam 2006, p. 340f. and cited 
case law.
285 See Cass. civ. 2e, 8 March 1995, Bull. Civ. 1995.II.82, p. 47; also Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 
2000, p. 694; Weyts 2003, p. 348f. (also on the views on the legal basis of the partition of damages); 
Le Tourneau 2004, nr. 1871, p. 443.
286 Amos/Walton 1967, p. 216.
287 Josserand 1939, p. 267, mentions the view that a fault of the injured, less serious than 
that of the wrongdoer, could annul the liability of the latter. Apparently, and Josserand sustains 
this by referring to various examples of case law, this view was sometimes held by judges in the 
1840s, but no longer in Josserand’s time (‘l’effet ne doit pas dépasser la cause et la concurrence 
des fautes détermine non un déplacement de la responsabilité, mais seulement sa modération; à 
chacun selon la part prise dans le dommage’). 
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The sovereign power granted to the trial judges gives plenty of room to consider 
other factors, especially the causal involvement of the injured versus that of the 
wrongdoer or to consider only the faute de la victime, regardless of the defend-
ant’s conduct.288 A total exoneration of liability is exceptional, and seems to be 
applied only if the injured party’s negligence greatly exceeds the wrongdoer’s 
misconduct, namely when the injured commits an intentional fault,289 provokes 
the wrongdoer290 or acts with the consent of the injured party.291 
288 Viney-Jourdain 2006, p. 340.
289 See, e.g., Haller 1926, p. 40ff.
290 Viney-Jourdain 2006, p. 340f.; when the wrongdoer acted intentionally, and the injured 
was merely negligent or imprudent, the wrongdoer was held solely responsible; see, e.g., Haller 1926, 
p. 92; Honoré 1983, p. 110, also including a discussion of the (possible) justifications for this rule.
291  Honoré 1983, p. 111; - In that respect, see also Art. 1350 of the Avant-projet Catala, 
according to which the victim is deprived of any compensation if he deliberately (volontairement) 
sought the harm – see also Article 26 projet Terré (2011; the victim is not entitled to compensation 
when he voluntarily sought the damages he suffered). 
 Also interesting are Art. 1386-58 of the reform proposal of 2010 (in personal injury cases 
in traffic accidents, contributory negligence does not lead to a reduction in the amount of 
damages except for the case in which the fault of the injured party was inexcusable and this 
fault was the exclusive cause of the accident) and Art. 1351 of the Avant-projet, according to 
which a fault of the victim of personal injury only provides a partial defence to the liability 
of the person responsible for that personal injury when the fault is serious (une faute grave). 
See Cartwright, Vogenauer & Whittaker 2009, p. 842f.; according to Cartwright, Vogenauer & 
Whittaker 2009, p. 842, footnote 2, this solution at present is not accepted in the law as it stands, 
and is a manifestation of a special treatment of victims of personal injuries. With regard to 
the ‘right to compensation’ of a victim of a personal injury, the victim’s fault may not be taken 
into account unless it is of a certain degree, i.e. a ‘serious fault’ (the definition of a serious fault 
remains to be established in practice); see Rémy-Corlay 2009, p. 308. The Avant-projet seems to 
aim to further protect the victim’s interests, since any fault on his part has to be serious in order 
to deprive him of his damage claim and, according to the literature, courts will undoubtedly 
be less inclined to rule in that sense when a victim is seriously injured; see Rémy-Corlay 2009, 
p. 315f.; nevertheless, according to this author, to the extent the defendant can incur liability 
without his fault, it can be considered unfair that he has to bear the burden of reparation for all 
physical harm suffered by a victim who contributed to the occurrence. According to the author, 
this is explicable only by reference to insurance law. However, this solution is currently adopted 
in relation to traffic accidents; see Art. 3 Loi Badinter. As will be shown below, the victim’s own 
fault is not sufficient to successfully ward off a claim for damages; the victim’s fault has to be 
inexcusable and the sole cause of the accident. The proposed Art. 1379 Avant-projet is less severe 
in that sense. Furthermore, according to Art. 4 of the Loi Badinter, only against an injured party/
victim, who is a driver, can his fault be invoked as a general defence. In the Avant-projet the 
victim-driver would be assimilated to other victims. See Rémy-Corlay 2009, p. 316.
 Also interesting is the Proposition de loi no. 657 (2009-2010) déposée le 9 juillet 2010 par 
L. Béteille, esp. Art. 1386, according to which damage which is a result of an act of God cannot 
be repaired if this resulted from the act of the victim or of a third party, when such events are 
unforeseeable and irresistible for the wrongdoer. Furthermore, damage voluntarily provoked by 
the victim can in principle not be repaired. And esp. Art. 1386-1, according to which the partial 
exemption of the wrongdoer can only result from a fault of the victim who contributed to the 
production of damage. In case of violation of physical integrity, only a serious fault (faute grave) 
may result in partial exemption.
 In the title on damage caused by motor vehicles, Art. 26 projet Terré (2011) states that a 
fault of the victim in cases of injuries to the physical or mental states (i.e. a change, instead of 
‘personal injury’) has no influence on the amount of recovery, unless the fault was inexcusable 
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Apart from the gravity of faults, also other circumstances can be considered, 
particularly the causal impact of the respective conduct of the parties.292
An almost opposite situation to that in France before the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century was reached by the end of the twentieth century, when in 
certain circumstances the claimant’s negligent conduct did not even lead to a 
reduction of his right to compensation. As will be shown below, particularly in 
France (and Germany) victims of road traffic accidents are strongly protected 
against the consequences of their own mistakes. This change of view reflects 
the compensation function the law of delict has increasingly gained in the 
course of recent decades.293
5.5.2.2 Contributory negligence in the context of liability without fault
Up to now, my exposé concerned the responsibility for one’s own acts (respon-
sabilité du fait personnel, Articles 1382 and 1383 Code civil). However, one has 
to realise that the overall picture of this subject in the French law of delict is 
also dictated by various sorts of strict liability. 
In this respect, mainly Article 1384 Code civil, which regards the liability 
for damage caused by objects (fait de la chose), is relevant and in that sense it 
constitutes a strict liability for the keeper (gardien) of the object. In earlier case 
law of the Cour de cassation (i.e. until 1934), exoneration from liability based on 
Article 1384 al. 1 Code civil was only possible because of an external cause (une 
cause étrangère), e.g. because of contributory negligence of the injured party. 
If contributory negligence of the injured party was proven, the wrongdoer 
was not liable at all – in that sense French law still applied the all-or-nothing 
approach. In that case, the behaviour of the victim had to be an external cause, 
unforeseeable (imprévisible) and unavoidable (insurmontable).294 In such a 
and the only cause of the accident; in easing the thresholds beyond which the inexcusable fault 
does not effect his right to recovery, no specific ages are proposed (as is currently done in Art. 
3 of the Loi Badinter), but the choice is made to let the judge decide to have regard to the age 
and the physical and mental condidition of the victim. See also Borghetti 2011, p. 181. In all other 
cases, the fault of the victim (or someone for whom the victim must answer for) leads to a partial 
exoneration when this fault contributed to the realisation of the damage.
In the title on the causes of exclusion or exoneration of liability, Art. 46 projet Terré states that 
conduct of the injured party can lead to a total exoneration if it meets the requirements of force 
majeure. cf. Art. 47 projet Terré the faute de la victime in principle leads to a partial exoneration if 
the fault of the victim contributed to the occurrence of the damage. See elaborately Grare-Didier 
2011, p. 187ff.
292 Van Gerven, Larouche & Lever 2000, p. 692.
293 Van Dam 2006, p. 339.
294 Lebreton 1941, p. 24ff.; Terré-Simler-Lequette 2002, nr. 802, p. 761. See also Esmein 1934, 
p. 985ff., esp.  p. 988. A different situation occurs when a person against whom a presumption of 
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case only an external cause could fully exonerate the wrongdoer from liability 
(Jand’heur judgment).295 
The Chambre des requêtes adopted a different, more balanced approach 
from 1904 onwards, reaffirmed in 1934,296 holding that the liability of the 
wrongdoer can be reduced in proportion to the degree of fault of the victim.297 
An apportionment of liability thus became possible and courts became very 
generous towards the keeper (gardien), and even partially exonerated him 
when no fault of the victim could be proven.298 The partial exoneration was 
first established in 1934.
Moreover, this possibility of partial exoneration of the wrongdoer in strict 
liability cases was curtailed by the Cour de cassation in the case of Desmares 
(1982).299 The possibility of partial exoneration was eliminated, and a total 
exoneration was only possible in case of force majeure (or an external cause), 
if the victim’s fault was unforeseeable and unavoidable to the keeper (gar-
dien)  (return to the all-or-nothing approach).300 Shortly after a reform by the 
Loi Badinter (see section 5.6.1), in 1987, the Cour de cassation overturned the 
Desmares judgment and re-introduced the principle that the keeper (gardien) 
of an object is partially exonerated when the victim’s fault contributed to the 
occurrence of the damage caused by the object (for cases not falling under 
the Loi Badinter).301 When the victim’s fault can be characterised as an external 
cause leading to force majeure, of course a total dismissal of the claim will follow. 
responsibility rests (and who is in effect strictly liable) is damaged by someone who has been at 
fault; in that case it is held that the former may recover his damages in full; see Honoré 1983, p. 127.
295 Cass. ch. réun., 13 February 1930, D.P. 1930.I.57; Van Gerven, Larouche & Lever 2000, p. 696. 
296 Honoré 1983, p. 120; according to Honoré, in 1936 the Chambre civile settled the law in the 
sense that the presumption of responsibility of the keeper (gardien) cannot be totally displaced 
unless it is shown that the fault of the injured party has been the sole cause of the damage.
297 See Req. 13 April 1934, D.P. 1934. I. 41.
298 Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 696.
299 See also Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche  2000, p. 693.
300 Cass. civ. 2e, 21 July 1982, D. 1982. 449ff., with note by Larroumet (p. 452-455) and see 
also note F. Chabas in JCP 1982, II, nr. 19861, and observations of G. Durry in RTD civ. 1982, 606. 
See also Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 21f.; Van Gerven, Larouche & Lever 2000, p. 696f.; 
Terré-Simler-Lequette 2002, nr. 803, p. 762; Weyts 2003, p. 133, 437.
301 See Cass. civ. 2e, 6 April 1987, D. 1988.32, with note by C. Mouly, JCP 1987.II.20828, nt. 
F. Chabas, RTD civ. 1987.767, with note by J. Huet; Van Gerven, Larouche & Lever 2000, p. 695f.; 
Terré-Simmler-Lequette 2002, nr. 803, p. 762f.; Weyts 2003, p. 138; - The partition of damages 
has to be made by a comparison of the (faultive character of the) acts of both parties; see Weyts 
2003, p. 402f. with references. However, as Weyts correctly stated, it is impossible to assess the 
fault of a strictly liable person.
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5.6 Traffic accidents: rise and fall of the all-or-nothing approach?
5.6.1 Traffic accidents: France302
At the beginning of the twentieth century, when contributory negligence of 
the injured occurred in a traffic accident, it led to a partition, in fractions, of 
damages according to the degree of gravity of faults.303 A recent development 
in France is the enactment of the statute on traffic accidents, the so-called Loi 
Badinter.304 This statute is the result of a compromise.305 The law covers and 
protects unmotorised traffic participants, passengers and drivers.306 The mere 
fact that an unmotorised person is hurt by a motorised vehicle or even that 
a motorised vehicle is involved (requirement of involvement (implication); 
see Article 1)307 in an accident in principle is sufficient to establish a 100 per 
cent liability for personal injuries for the owner or the ‘keeper’ (or the liability 
insurance) of the motorised vehicle.308 Force majeure or co-liability of a third party 
does not lead to any reduction or exclusion of the right for reimbursement.309 
302 Apart from the literature and case law mentioned in this subsection, this brief overview 
is also based on Van Dam 2000, p. 43ff.
303 Lebreton 1941, p. 6f.; Mazeaud & Mazeaud 1970, p. 625.
304 Loi n°85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 tendant à l’amélioration de la situation des victimes 
d’accidents de la circulation et à l’accélération des procédures d’indemnisation. On this law, and on 
the ‘droit des accidents de la circulation’ after the reform of 5 July 1985, see Chabas 1988; Haas & 
Hartlief 1998, p. 27ff.; Viney 1992, with an overview of the literature on this topic; Engelhard & 
Van Maanen 1998, p. 26f.; Viney-Jourdain 2006, p. 135f., nr. 431; - The most relevant articles, Arts. 
3-5, are extensively discussed by Viney 1992, p. 35ff. with the relevant literature and case law.
305 Tunc 1994, p. 325; according to Tunc, this law was accepted after fierce resistance 
and attacks, and it is often regretted that the law does not give a better protection to drivers. 
Apparently, the number of victims who receive compensation has increased; the time to reach 
a settlement and overall litigation has been substantially reduced; - On the twofold objective of 
this law, see, e.g., Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 26f.
306 Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 29.
307 On the requirement of implication, see, e.g., Viney 1992, p. 22ff.; Sterk 1994, p. 51ff.; Haas 
& Hartlief 1998, p. 30f.; Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 30f. In fact this is a foundation of a 
strict liability of the driver who is compulsorily insured for traffic accidents against pedestrians 
and cyclists (third-party insurance).
308 With regard to damage to objects (dommages aux biens), Arts. 2 & 5 Loi Badinter 
are relevant. With regard to damage to objects, the law protects motorised and unmotorised 
traffic participants in the same manner. The general rule is that the injured party has a right to 
total compensation, and that appeal to force majeure is excluded. The defence of contributory 
negligence is similar to that in common French law of delict, and can be invoked against every 
victim. When proven, the duty to compensate is diminished in proportion to the contributory 
negligence (no all-or-nothing approach as in cases of personal injuries). See Engelhard & Van 
Maanen 1998, p. 43.
309 See Art. 2 Loi Badinter; - According to Van Dam 2006, p. 367, the development of 
liability caused by motor vehicles cannot be understood without taking into account the fact 
that there is compulsory insurance for damage caused by motor vehicles throughout Europe. 
The focus seems more on the distributive than on the corrective justice and the goals seem 
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There are, however, two exceptions to the general rule of 100 per cent 
compensation. These rules regarding ‘contributory negligence’, as written in 
Articles 3 and 4 of the Loi Badinter, are very different from the normal rules of 
contributory negligence in the French law of delict. The first exception, leading 
to non-compensation, applies to both categories described below when an 
injured person voluntarily sought the damage.310 The second exception is when 
the fault of the injured party was inexcusable (faute inexcusable)311 and this 
fault was the exclusive cause of the accident (cause exclusive de l’accident);312 
also in such a case the victim has no right to claim any damages (Article 3 Loi 
Badinter).313 In this sense, French law still applies an all-or-nothing approach 
in these cases.314 Moreover, if the injured belongs to a special category of 
protected persons (children under 16 years of age, persons older than 70 or 
persons with a permanent incapacity or a disability of 80 per cent or more), 
they will always receive full compensation for damages suffered.315 Only the 
first exception applies to persons belonging to this category, i.e. in the event 
they act intentionally. From the above it becomes clear that a defence invoking 
contributory negligence of children in cases of road traffic accidents is almost 
completely excluded; apart from children under 16, this also applies to persons 
over 70 and the handicapped (over 80 per cent), provided they are not driving 
a motor vehicle.316
A totally different situation occurs when two motorised vehicles are 
involved in an accident. Persons who suffer damage in principle can claim 
to be to provide compensation to victims of traffic accidents for the loss they suffered due to 
the accidents. In that sense the rules are instrumental for that goal; indeed this seems relevant 
as to the French situation as the mere fact of ‘implication’ leads to liability, and the defence of 
contributory negligence is more or less minimised regarding personal injury cases in traffic 
accidents. Van Dam rightly argued that compulsory insurance of liability for damage caused by 
motor vehicles in fact attributes damage to the risk community of the insured rather than to the 
wrongdoer personally.
310 Art. 3 Loi Badinter. See, e.g., Cass. civ., 21 July 1992, D. 1993, 212 (intention suïcidiaire); 
see also Viney 1992, p. 44; Van Dam 2000a, p. 45; 2000b, p. 545; Le Tourneau & Cadiet 2003, 
p. 499, nr. 1877; - Of course, if the wrongdoer has acted intentionally, he will generally not be 
allowed to invoke a contributory negligence defence. According to Crim., 4 October 1990, D. 
1990. IR. 284 and Crim., 16 May 1991, D. 1991. IR. 220 the duty of the wrongdoer to compensate 
the victim is not reduced because of contributory negligence, if he acted intentionally; see also 
Viney-Jourdain 1998, p. 335, nr. 430; Le Tourneau & Cadiet 2003, p. 498, nr. 1873; Le Tourneau 
2004, nr. 1873, p. 444; nr. 1877, p. 445.
311  This term is interpreted very restrictedly by the Cour de cassation; see, e.g., Haas & 
Hartlief 1998, p. 34; Weyts 2003, p. 145f.; see also Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 35ff.
312  On this requirement, see, e.g., Weyts 2003, p. 150 with references.
313  See Chabas 1988, p. 165ff.; Viney 1992, p. 44ff., 47f.; Haas & Hartlief 1998, p. 33f.; Van 
Dam 2000b, p. 552.
314  See Sterk 1994, p. 60; Haas & Hartlief 1998, p. 33.
315  See Chabas 1988, p. 174f.; see also Weyts 2003, p. 143f.
316 Van Dam 2006, p. 341.
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compensation for damage to their belongings, unless they commit a faute that 
contributed to the occurrence of their damage.317 The compensation is limited 
or excluded if a faute of the driver (conducteur) can be proven (see Article 4 Loi 
Badinter).318  The judge who decides on the facts has to decide whether the faute 
is of such a nature that the compensation should be diminished or excluded.319
A final situation that can occur is where a motorised vehicle is damaged by a 
pedestrian or cyclist. In that case, the common rules of the French law of delict 
apply and the driver of the motorised vehicle can claim damages based on Article 
1382 (pedestrian) or 1384 al. 1 Code civil (cyclist); in that case it does not matter 
whether the cyclist or the pedestrian was also hurt. The pedestrian or cyclist can 
defend himself invoking force majeure or contributory negligence of the driver.320
To conclude, the compensation of drivers is left under the fault regime. 
Other victims, i.e. pedestrians, cyclists and passengers of motor vehicles, 
benefit from a quasi no-fault compensation regime.321 These victims are en-
titled to compensation, unless they are between 16 and 70 years of age and 
have committed an inexcusable fault that was the only cause of the accident.
5.6.2 Traffic accidents: Germany
Until 1909 traffic accidents had to be solved by the rules of the Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch; in that year, the Kraftfahrzeuggesetz took effect and remained 
in force until 1952 when it was replaced by the Straßenverkehrsgesetz (Road 
Traffic Act, StVG; into force on 23/1/1953). A distinction is made between strict 
liability for ‘keepers’322 or ‘holders’ (Halter; § 7 (1) StVG) and prima facie liability 
for drivers (§ 18 StVG).323 According to § 7 StVG, the holder must compensate all 
damages caused during the use of the motor vehicle if the damage occurred in 
the course of the operation (running) of the car (causal connection).324 Liability 
will be excluded if the defendant succeeds in proving that the accident was 
caused by an unavoidable event (see § 7 (2) StVG). Furthermore, according to 
317  See Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 52f. and case law mentioned. 
318  See also on this topic Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 50ff.
319  Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 53.
320 ibid., p. 55.
321  Tunc 1994, p. 325.
322 The keeper is the person who uses the car at his own expense and who has the power 
of disposal that goes with such use; see Markesinis & Unberath 2002, p. 733f.
323 Markesinis & Unberath 2002, p. 734: the driver can rebut by proving that he was not 
negligent when driving the car.
324 Weyts 2003, p. 131 with references; another situation occurs when a person with an 
operational risk (Betriebsgefahr) is injured by a wrongdoer who was at fault. On that situation, 
see, e.g., Honoré 1983, p. 127.
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§ 18 StVG, the driver is liable in the event of a fault, but with a reversal of the 
burden of proof. 
The apportionment principle contained in § 254 BGB is also incorporated 
in § 9 StVG:325 if the fault of the injured party (not being a holder or driver 
of a motor vehicle) has contributed to the occurrence of the damage, § 254 
BGB applies.326 If the victim of a road traffic accident does not observe traffic 
regulations or if he was responsible for operating a vehicle with an inherent 
danger, the rule of § 254 (1) BGB applies (to the detriment of the victim).327
In the event in which the damage is caused by more than one vehicle or in 
the event the keeper of one vehicle sustains loss caused by the other party, the 
provision of § 17 (1) StVG becomes applicable, which position does not differ 
from § 254 (1):328 apportionment is made where both are liable for a creation 
of risk, depending on the extent to which the injury was caused predominantly 
by one or the other of the parties. However, the nature of liability changes: it 
is not necessary for the defendant to invoke or establish the fault of the other 
driver or keeper; the risk inherent to the respective vehicle in the given cir-
cumstances is decisive.329 
5.6.3 Traffic accidents: The Netherlands
In traffic accidents,330 the appeal to contributory negligence with regard to chil-
dren younger than 14 and also older unmotorised traffic participants is restricted, 
as decided by the Hoge Raad in case law on Article 31 (old) Wegenverkeerswet of 
1935331 (Road Traffic Act, WVW; at present Article 185 Wegenverkeerswet 1994, 
325 On the latter legal provision, see extensively Hentschel/König/Dauer 2001, p. 163ff.; - 
Other legal provisions as to the Haftpflichtrecht, such as e.g. § 34 LuftVG and § 28 AtomG, will not 
be discussed here.
326 When the victim is a child or mentally disabled, the normal rules of §§ 827-829 apply. 
327 See Erman/Egbert 2008, p. 961f.; Van Dam & Clive 2009, p. 3648; see BGH, 9 January 
1959, BGHZ 29, 163-171; BGH, 30 January 1979, NJW 1979, 980; - No compensation is provided if 
the contributory negligence of the injured party outweighs the negligence of the wrongdoer in 
such a way that the cause (Ursache) of the wrongdoer completely withdraws; see Hentschel/
König/Dauer 2001, p. 165.
328 Van Dam & Clive 2009, p. 3648.
329 Markesinis & Unberath 2002, p. 736.
330 In general, railway accidents with passengers are not dealt with any further in this study; 
the legislative developments and case law in the nineteenth century, and also the contemporary 
statutory provisions such as Art. 8:109 BW (the carrier can invoke contributory negligence when 
the behaviour of the passenger was (in part) the cause of the damage), are elaborately discussed 
by Van Dam & Van Maanen 2010, p. 112ff.
331  Under a predecessor of this article, i.e. Art. 25 Motor- en Rijwielwet of 1905 (Motor 
Vehicles and Cyclists Act, MRW; Art. 25 was only inserted in 1924), the case law on this article 
showed more and more a reduction of the extent of liability in cases of contributory negligence 
of the injured party. See Star Busmann 1924, p. 55. On the basis for the liability rule of Art. 25 see 
also Van Dam & Van Maanen 2010, p. 136f.
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WVW 1994), with a 100 per cent and 50 per cent rule.332 These rules are based 
on the aforementioned equitable correction.333 Overall, the Hoge Raad has 
greatly restricted the possibility of an appeal to contributory negligence in 
its judgments.334 In case law Article 185 WVW 1994 is interpreted to contain 
an operational risk (so-called Betriebsgefahr), meaning that motorised 
vehicles represent a more serious danger in traffic and the motorised road 
users are therefore held liable more easily when colliding with unmotorised 
traffic participants – and that they are therefore liable for a large share of the 
damage – than in case of collisions between ‘equal’ traffic participants.335
Article 185 (1) WVW 1994 makes the owner or holder of a motor vehicle 
liable, unless he can prove force majeure. The latter exception is interpreted 
very restrictedly. For car accidents, where there are physical injuries,336 the 
Hoge Raad has formulated some rules on the basis of the second standard 
of Article 6:101 BW, the correction based on equity. If the victim of the car 
accident (collision) is under 14 (a pedestrian or a cyclist), only intentional 
or reckless acts of the victim can be taken into account for the division of 
damages.337 Furthermore, the driver will only be exempted from his liability 
if the sole cause of the accident is an intentional or reckless, bordering on 
intentional, act of the victim under 14.338 When someone is liable based on 
Article 185 WVW, since he could not prove force majeure,339 but there is a fault 
332 These rules can be regarded as compulsory rules for the outcome of the equity 
correction, regardless of the outcome of the assessment of the standard of causality; see also 
Tjong Tjin Tai 2005, p. 188; in general, on the (conditions for) liability based on Art. 31 (old) 
WVW, see Sterk 1994, p. 248ff. with literature references. According to Haas & Hartlief 1998, p. 
203, based on the motivation by the Hoge Raad, the background of these rules made by the latter 
is formed by the purpose of Art. 31 WVW (protection of victims), the nature and the severity of 
the damage (often bodily injuries) and the compulsory WAM (liability) insurance; - The rules are 
also called: the 100%-rule and the 50%-rule by the Hoge Raad; see HR, 2 June 1995, NJ 1997, 700.
333 Hartlief 2002b, p. 16.
334 Also with regard to Art. 7A: 1638x (old) BW/Art. 7:658 BW there is great restraint 
with regard to contributory negligence. In traffic accidents, the background of the restraint can 
be explained by the need to protect people from certain risks; the widespread WA-coverage 
makes such restraining course possible; see Hartlief & Tjittes 1999, p. 42; the authors wrote 
that eventually one can probably speak about restraint/reserve in case of violation of traffic 
and safety norms in general. See also Boonekamp aant. 17.4 ad Art. 6:101 BW (tendency towards 
reduction of contributory negligence in the event of violation of traffic and safety norms). 
335 Tjong Tjin Tai 2005, p. 188.
336 The rules also apply to damage to objects, but the reimbursement based on Art. 185 is 
limited (Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 18).
337 Tunc 1994, p. 326; Spier et al. 2000, p. 221f.; Tjong Tjin Tai 2005, p. 188. 
338 HR, 1 June 1990, NJ 1991, 720; HR, 31 May 1991, NJ 1991, 721; see also Hartlief 1997a, p. 
132; Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 18; Haas & Hartlief 1998, p. 202f.; Keirse 2003, p. 32, 232f.; 
Frenk 2006a, p. 29, 50f.
339 It would have been force majeure if he could prove that the collision was exclusively the 
result of faults of another person (and that he, therefore, had no blame at all), so unlikely for him 
that he, in determining his driver’s behaviour, reasonably did not have to take this possibility into 
consideration; see, e.g., Nieuwenhuis 1999, p. 357 and HR, 22 May 1992, NJ 1992, 527. See also Van 
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of the injured pedestrian or cyclist older than 14 years, the following rule ap-
plies: if the victim is older than 14, unless he acted intentionally or recklessly, 
bordering on intention, a minimum of 50 per cent of the damages will always 
be imputed to the driver-wrongdoer.340 Whether more than 50 per cent of the 
damages can be imputed to the driver is determined according to the general 
rule (i.e. the double standard)341 of Article 6:101 BW (primary apportionment 
made by a correlative balancing of causes and secondary apportionment by 
an equitable adjustment of the outcome of the primary apportionment.342 
When an insurer of the victim takes action against the driver, the general rule 
of Article 6:101 applies, and he cannot profit from these (50/100%) rules based 
on equity.343 In such a case the Betriebsgefahr can be taken into consideration 
in the correction, based on equity (‘normally’ this is already included in the 
50 per cent rule and of course it cannot be taken into consideration twice).344 
The differentiation in types of plaintiffs is underpinned by effective victim 
protection.345 Furthermore, the rule of Article 6:101 BW can still be applied 
in cases of accidents of cars and in situations in which occupants of motor 
vehicles are injured.
5.7 Contributory negligence after the damaging event
A connected problem is contributory negligence after the damaging event or – 
as it is often brought forward – the question of the injured party’s duty to limit 
Dam & Van Maanen 2010, p. 137ff.
340 Tunc 1994, p. 326; see also Spier et al. 2000, p. 222; Keirse 2003, p. 32, 236; Frenk 2006a, p. 51.
341  Differently Van Dam & Van Maanen 2010, p. 144: ‘Whether the owner or keeper can be 
obliged to pay more depends on the mutual causal contributions to the damage.’
342 HR, 28 February 1992, NJ 1993, 566; HR, 24 December 1993, NJ 1995, 236. See also 
Stolker 1994, p. 9ff.; Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 18; Haas & Hartlief 1998, p. 165; Keirse 
2003, p. 237; Weyts 2003, p. 135f.; Tjong Tjin Tai 2005, p. 188. With regard to the first standard, 
it becomes clear from HR, 2 June 1995, NJ 1997, 700-702, that the causal partition requires an 
objective weighing of endangering behaviour, where one abstracts from age and other subjective 
circumstances; in this sense Haas & Hartlief 1998, p. 165f., who also write that with regard to the 
second standard, the Hoge Raad gives the example of a child who is behind in his or her physical 
and mental development as a case that could lead to an extra correction based on equity (HR, 
24 December 1993, NJ 1995, 236) and also the example of the (diverging) degree of culpability of 
traffic behaviour (see HR, 2 June 1995, NJ 1997, 700-702).
343 Tunc 1994, p. 326f.; Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 18f., 61; Haas & Hartlief 1998, p. 167; 
Keirse 2003, p. 234, 237f.; Van Boom 2004, p. 144; Tjong Tjin Tai 2005, p. 188; Boonekamp aant. 17.5 
ad Art. 6:101 BW; - The advantages of more stringent requirements to the defence of force majeure do 
apply as does also the reversal of the burden of proof; see, e.g., Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 61.
344 HR, 10 November 2000, NJ 2000, 718; HR, 3 June 2005, NJ 2005, 286; Tjong Tjin Tai 
2005, p. 190. 
345 Engelhard & Van Maanen 1998, p. 19; see also Hijma’s annotation to HR, 5 December 
1997, NJ 1998, 402.
modern and contemporary law 359
his loss.346 In France, since no provision in the Code civil expressly mentions a 
failure to avert or minimise harm,347 this problem is dealt with in case law and 
doctrine.348 Generally, the claimant has a duty to restrict the damage as far as 
this can be reasonably expected from him.349  What can be reasonably expected 
from a victim will depend on the circumstances of the case.350 Therefore, the 
duty to take adequate measures to mitigate the loss under the circumstances 
can be attributed to the victim as blameworthy negligence.351
French (and Belgian) scholarly doctrine considers the breach of such a 
duty a species of the genus contributory negligence.352 The consequences of 
such neglect (and thus fault) have to be dealt with in the same manner as in 
the case of any other concurrence of fault of the wrongdoer and negligence 
of the injured party, i.e. by dividing the damage between both parties.353 Most 
scholars (of these countries) argue that the extra damage the injured suffers 
as a consequence of his neglect to limit his damage354 cannot be claimed from 
the wrongdoer and has to be borne by the victim.355 Some argue that this extra 
damage can possibly still be divided between the wrongdoer and the injured 
party.356 
346 Strictly speaking, the term ‘duty to mitigate the loss’ is incorrect, since no such duty 
exists. See, e.g., Keirse 2003, p. 72; Frenk 2006a, p. 2. It expresses the thought that someone who 
has not restricted the damage, when he should have done so, the damage totally or partially is 
at his own expense (also Keirse 2003, p. 79). On this topic, see also Van Dam 2006, p. 337. As the 
term ‘duty to limit the damage’ is quite common, I will use it here for the sake of convenience. 
On the failure to avert or minimise the harm, see for a comparative perspective, Honoré 1983, p. 
101ff.; - On the topic of the legal unification as to duty to mitigate the loss, see, e.g., Jansen 2009, 
p. 1082f.; 2012, p. 403.
347 Honoré 1983, p. 101.
348 Keirse 2005, p. 9; the same applies for Belgium.
349 Van Dam 2006, p. 338. If he negligently fails to take reasonable steps to get medical aid, 
to follow medical instructions, to look for work, or to follow courses to increase his opportunities, 
he will lose his right to claim full compensation for his damage; see Van Dam 2006, p. 338. On 
the right of the patient to refuse medical treatment in Belgian and French law, see Weyts 2003, p. 
56ff.; - According to Art. 1373 of the Avant-projet, a victim’s duty to mitigate his own harm ceases 
when the steps to be taken are of such a nature that they would compromise the victim’s physical 
integrity; see Rémy-Corlay 2009, p. 308.
350 See Honoré 1983, p. 102.
351  Keirse 2005, p. 9; the same applies for Belgium.
352 See (implicitly) Kallen 1932, p. 452 with references; Van Oevelen 1993/1994, p. 1396; 
Dirix 1984, p. 56; Ronse 1984, p. 325; Simoens 1999, p. 86; Weyts 2003, p. 51, 67; Keirse 2003, p. 
258; 2005, p. 9; see also Cousy & Droshout 2004, p. 29. 
353 Dirix 1980, col. 2924; 1984, p. 56; Honoré 1983, p. 101; Ronse 1984, p. 332; Van Oevelen 
1994, p. 1396; Simoens 1999, p. 89; see also Keirse 2003, p. 258; 2005, p. 5.
354 In Belgium, the Hof van Cassatie decided in Cass. 14 May 1992, R.W. 1993/1994, 1395, 
that the injured party is not obliged to limit the damage as much as possible, but only to take 
those measures to limit the disadvantage if that is consistent with the attitude of a reasonable 
and prudent person (comp. bonus pater familias).
355 Demogue 1924, p. 130, 516ff.; Ripert 1933, p. 116f.; Ronse 1984, p. 332; Kruithof 1989, p. 
53; Van Oevelen 1994, p. 1396; Simoens 1999, p. 89; Weyts 2003, p. 66; see also Keirse 2003, p. 258.
356 Keirse 2003, p. 258; 2005b, p. 9; see also Dirix 1980, col. 2924; 1984, p. 56.
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In Germany, from § 254 (2) BGB three duties to take positive action are 
imposed on the injured party: to warn, to avoid damage and to take appropriate 
measures to reduce the extent of the damage.357 Contributory negligence is 
attributed to the injured party if he fails to act in good faith by not taking the 
measures an ordinarily careful and reasonable person would take in order 
to safeguard his own interests.358 In Germany, various views are taken in this 
respect: some defend a total denial of the extra damage, others argue that 
under certain circumstances it can be just to leave the extra damage in total 
with the injured party, while also the view that the extra damage should be 
partitioned between wrongdoer and injured party has been defended.359 The 
Bundesgerichtshof decided that the view that the extra damage should always 
be borne by the injured party in total is not compatible with the wording of 
the provision of § 254.360
The central question in the event of the duty to minimise the harm is: did 
someone act differently than a reasonable person would have done in the cir-
cumstances of the case? As comparative standard the reasonable man (diligens 
pater familias) is taken. The reasonableness is decisive in this assessment, and 
thereby the concrete circumstances of the case are a major determinant.361 
Although the all-or-nothing approach in cases of contributory negligence362 
was abandoned after 1916 in the Netherlands, this was not the case in the 
Netherlands with regard to the extra damage suffered because of the breach 
of the obligation to limit the damage. The extra damage was not compensated; 
this was based on the assumption that the causal link was missing when the 
liability was based on and the extra damage partly caused by the breach of the 
duty to limit the damage.363 This approach was already criticised in the early 
357 See also Keirse 2003, p. 259; Fedtke & Magnus 2004, p. 78; Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3643; 
- If the injured party made expenditures to fulfil his duties, the wrongdoer must compensate 
them; see BGH, 1 April 1993, NJW 1993, 2685, 2687.
358 BGH, 13 December 1951, NJW 1952, 299, 300. It is for the judge to assess in each case 
what measures were advisable to avert or minimise the harm; see Ennecerus & Lehmann 1958, 
p. 78; Honoré 1983, p. 101. 
359 Keirse 2003, p. 259; 2005b, p. 10. On the latter view, see Venzmer 1960, p. 193f. See also 
Jansen 2007, p. 710f. with references.
360 BGH 24 July 2001, NJW 2001, 3257-3258; - On the topic of the duty/Obliegenheit to 
prevent or minimise the damage, see also, e.g., Lange 1979, p. 362ff.; Geigel/Rixecker 2001, p. 49ff.; 
MünchKommentar BGB/Oetker §254 (2007), Rdnr. 68ff., p. 516ff.; Erman/Elbert 2008, p. 968ff.
361 Keirse 2003, p. 160.
362 On the various views on the contents of the legal expression ‘contributory negligence’ 
in Dutch (eigen schuld), see, e.g., Keirse 2003, p. 73f.
363 See Keirse 2003, p. 44, 71, 249ff., 262; 2005b, p. 6, with the literature mentioned there; 
- An alternative system to obtain compensation is insurance, which is gaining popularity; the 
consequences of a move from liability law to an insurance system for the problem of contributory 
negligence and for the duty to mitigate the loss are discussed by Frenk 2006a; 2006b, p. 41ff. This 
topic is beyond the scope of this study.
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twentieth century, as a partition of the extra damage was defended.364 With 
the (new) Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992, the duty to limit the damage is 
considered a species of the genus contributory negligence.365 Therefore, Article 
6:101 BW became the basis for the doctrine on the duty to limit the damage, 
and not the break in the causal connection.366  Some authors still argue that the 
extra damage has to be attributed to the injured party, and this view was also 
applied in the case law of lower courts.367 Recently, it has been – in my view 
rightly – defended that it is preferable to apply the two criteria of Article 6:101 
of the Burgerlijk Wetboek to the breach of the duty to limit the damage, and so 
to partition the extra damage in proportion to these criteria.368 The criterion of 
causality developed into determining and weighing the degree of the mutual 
probability of causation;369 the second criterion is corrective, namely an equity 
correction where a lot of factors could be weighed, such as the seriousness of 
the mutual violation of legal provisions, the degree of culpability, the nature 
of the liability of the wrongdoer, the type and gravity of the damage incurred, 
personal circumstances, financial capacity of the injured party, insurance 
positions370 and the level of the costs to mitigate the damage, etc.371 
364 See Ribbius 1906, p. 194ff.; recently also Keirse 2003, p. 45, 262 with references and 
Knapen 2004, p. 6.
365 According to Art. 6:96 (2) NBW, the injured party is entitled to a claim for expenditures 
incurred in his attempt to avert or minimise the loss. See also Van Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3645; 
extensively on the topic of the compensation for expenditures made to limit the damage, Keirse 
2003, p. 280ff.
366 Keirse 2003, p. 262f.; 2005b, p. 7.
367 See Keirse 2005, p. 7f.
368 Van Wassenaer van Catwijck & Jongeneel 1995, p. 55, 130; Keirse 2003, p. 269ff.; 2005, 
esp. p. 11f.; see also Asser/Hartkamp 2004 (IV-I), nr. 453a, p. 412f.; Frenk 2006a, p. 86f.
369 The extent to which circumstances on either side brought into existence the damage risk. 
370 See also HR, 4 May 2001, NJ 2002, 214; - According to Hartlief & Tjittes 1999, p 41, if the 
wrongdoer is compulsorily insured against liability, it could/would be fair to limit the appeal 
on contributory negligence or make an appeal on it less easy; in the opposite situation, where 
it is the injured party who is insured for losses, it would be possible that one more easily and/
or more extensively adopt the defence of contributory negligence. However, it is also argued 
that restraint is required. The question of who is insured in the concrete case should not answer 
the question of whether the injured party is contributorily negligent. Further arguments can 
be found in  Hartlief & Tjittes 1999, p. 41f. (with further references). Less restraint is needed, 
according to these authors, in the context of a realisation of a collectivist point of view, as, e.g., 
the great restraint as to contributory negligence in the application of Art. 185 WVW, Art. 7:658 
BW and probably in cases of violation of traffic and safety norms in general – situations in 
which there is need to protect certain people against certain risks; - Critical are Brunner, see his 
objections in his note to HR, 4 May 2001, NJ 2002, 214 and Van Dam 2001, p. 352. See also, e.g., 
Keirse 2003, p. 222ff.
371  Keirse 2005, p. 14f.; 2006, p. 187; an extensive discussion of various factors can be found 
with Keirse 2003, p. 213ff.
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5.8 Harmonisation: rules for the future?
This chapter examined the question of whether damages can be awarded to the 
injured party in case of contributory negligence – assuming that the wrongdoer 
is in principle liable for the damages, of course. In most of the contemporary 
continental European law systems, in the event of contributory negligence, 
the wrongdoer is liable only for part of the damage (‘§ 254 of the Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch, § 1304 of the Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch, Article 51 II of the 
Schweizerische Obligationenrecht of 1881, Article 44 of the Schweizerische Obli-
gationenrecht of 1911, Article 6:101 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek’). The proportional 
apportionment of damages as legal consequence of the contributory negligence 
of the injured party seems to be ‘contemporary common European law’.372 
To achieve a common European law in the area of private law, one would aim 
at harmonisation.373 However, this could lead to the inevitability of considering 
whether other doctrines (among which causality) have to be adjusted as well 
as of realising the application of one liability law in Europe.374 In any case, the 
adoption of a common ‘European’ terminology is necessary to counteract the 
traditional national notions of the law, which can give rise to ambiguities and 
misunderstandings.375
The method of comparative law can provide valuable insights of course 
but, in case of differences between private law rules in various countries, it is 
372 Also Jansen 2007, p. 677. See also Jansen 2009, p. 1082; 2012, p. 402; - See also for the 
acknowledgment of the solution of proportional apportionment of damages in non-contractual 
liability cases in European law, the leading case C-145/83, Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 
3539, 3592, esp. nr. 53. In this case the amount of damages, which the Commission had to pay, 
was diminished due to the contributory negligence of the injured party. As the injured party 
contributed significantly to the damage, which he suffered, and in assessing the conduct of the 
Commission (wrongdoer) on the one hand and that of the injured party on the other hand, 
the Court decided that it was equitable to apportion the responsibility for the damage equally 
between the two parties (i.e. 50/50). See on this case elaborately Wurmnest 2003, p. 312ff.; see 
also Article 8(2) Directive 1985/374/EEC, [1985] OJ L 210/29 concerning liability for defective 
products, which states that the liability of the producer may be reduced or disallowed when, 
having regard to all the circumstances, the damage is caused both by the defect in the product 
and by the injured party’s fault or the fault of any other person for whom the injured party is 
responsible.
373 One could question, however, whether a (further) harmonisation of liability law 
should be endeavoured and whether national preferences in this area should be given up. On 
the topic of (European) harmonisation of liability law and an (negative) assessment of the 
arguments in favour of such harmonisation, see Hartlief 2002a.; - However, it has been argued 
that the doctrine of contributory negligence is one of the factors that make unification difficult, 
see Weyts 2003, p. 6f., 515; differently, Kontogianni 2003, p. 176; - See also Hartlief 2002a, p. 
946, who points out that with regard to contributory negligence of the injured party, there are 
important differences in various European countries in general, but in particular in the area of 
traffic liability.
374 See Weyts 2003, p. 515.
375 See Kontogianni 2003, p. 176f.
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difficult to say which rule has to be chosen. By adding the historical component, 
by looking at the common foundations of private law in Europe, a private law 
that became fragmented after the period of ius commune, the insights received 
from the comparative law perspective can be deepened; the historical study 
can provide insight into the arguments chosen for certain models (and the 
advantages and disadvantages). In this way, the discussion can become more 
fundamental. There are some initiatives to come to a basis for harmonisation 
of extra-contractual liability law, and I would like to discuss two of them. 
Firstly, the European Group on Tort Law (EGTL) that published their Principles 
of European Tort376 Law (PETL) in 2005 and, secondly, the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code (SGECC), that, together with the Research Group on EC 
Private Law (Acquis Group), published their Draft Common Frame of Reference 
in 2008.377
The PETL are meant to reveal the common foundations of the various 
national legal systems and to offer a basis for discussion for a future European 
law of delict. Moreover, already now the Principles are expected to have some 
sort of harmonising effect.378 On our topic, Article 8:101 PETL is the most rel-
evant provision: contributory conduct or activity of the victim. The expression 
‘contributory conduct or activity’ is chosen instead of the terminologies used 
in all current national legal systems. The aim was to overcome the shortcom-
ings arising not only from the widely diverging terminology but, according 
to Martín-Casals, also from the misleading idea arising from the traditional 
labelling of the conduct of the victim as negligence or culpa.379 The original 
expression used by the Group was ‘contributory negligence’, being aware of the 
meaning of contributory negligence in common law, just as culpae compensatio 
376 While ‘tort law’ is the common law term, in this study, the term ‘law of delict(s)’ – the 
civil law term – is used.
377 As regarding contributory negligence of the injured party/creditor in initiatives 
of European contract law, see, firstly, the Principles of European Contract Law, 9:504 PECL. 
Remarkably, this article in fact applies the all-or-nothing approach. Differently, Article 9:505 
PECL which does apply the option of a reduction of loss, but this article only applies in the 
event of a violation of the duty to minimise or avoid the damage; see also Kontogianni 2003, p. 
173ff. See also, secondly, Article 7.4.7 UNIDROIT PICC, including a reduction of the amount of 
damages in the event harm is in part due to the (conduct of the) aggrieved party, and, thirdly, 
Article 8:403 Acquis principles, which includes the possibility of a reduction or exclusion of 
damages to the extent that the creditor wilfully or negligently contributed to the effect of the 
non-performance or could have reduced the loss by taking reasonable steps. See, finally, Article 
77 of the United Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), according 
to which a party that relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable 
in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If 
he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the 
amount by which the loss should have been mitigated. 
378 Koziol 2004, p. 234; Van Boom & Giesen 2004, p. 517f.
379 Martín-Casals 2005, p. 130f.
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in ‘old’ Continental law, as an all-or-nothing rule, in the sense that the victim’s 
negligence excludes compensation.380 Furthermore, the Group rightly stated 
that all European systems now follow a more flexible approach leading to a 
partition of damages within the range from 0 to 100 per cent, which only results 
in exclusion of a claim if the damage is solely due to the conduct or the activity 
of the victim.381 The Group thought the term negligence misleading since in a 
strict technical sense the conduct of the injured cannot properly be qualified 
as fault or negligence. Firstly, no one has a legal duty to not cause damage to his 
or her own sphere. Secondly, in some cases, the operational risks embedded in 
the activity carried out by the victim can also contribute to the damage.382 The 
consequences of contributory conduct or activity of the victim could lead to a 
reduction of the amount of damages. The normal apportionment procedure 
is to establish the amount of the victim’s full damage and then reduce it in 
proportion to the victim’s contribution.383 The contributory conduct or activ-
ity has no effect if the wrongdoer acted intentionally, except in the event of 
provocation by the victim.384 Intent on the side of the victim normally leads 
to a denial of claim, unless the wrongdoer has a specific obligation to prevent 
the victim from damaging himself or herself.385
It is highlighted by its drafters that the DCFR promotes knowledge of private 
law in the jurisdictions of the European Union and will, in particular, help to 
show how much national private laws resemble one another and have pro-
vided mutual stimulus for development – and indeed how much those laws 
may be regarded as regional manifestations of an overall common European 
legacy.386 The drafters of the DCFR nurture the hope that it will be seen also 
outside the academic world as a text from which inspiration can be gained for 
suitable solutions for private law questions.387 Although the provisions of the 
DCFR were based on a comparative analysis of the law of the Member States 
and the applicable European law, this method is not convincing if one does 
not know how this method was applied. It is not clear whether one looked at 
the common denominator of the involved jurisdictions or whether one chose 
the ‘better’ solution.388
380 Contributory negligence was also understood in this sense in the United States, but 
the rule has been progressively abandoned and is substituted by ‘comparative negligence’; see 
Martín-Casals 2005, p. 131.
381  Martín-Casals 2005, p. 131.
382 ibid., p. 131f.
383 ibid., p. 134.
384 See also Van Dam 2006, p. 339.
385 Martín-Casals 2005, p. 135.
386 Draft-CFR (edn. Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 4), nr. 7.
387 Draft-CFR (edn. Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 4), nr. 8.
388 See Smits 2008, p. 278f.
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 Article VI.-5:102 (1) DCFR concerns the situation in which the personal 
contributory fault of the injured party389 contributed to the occurrence or the 
extent390 of the legally relevant damage. In this article, two requirements are 
included: the causal connection of the injured party’s act to the materialisa-
tion or the extent of the damage; and fault in the broad sense of negligent and 
intentional harm to one’s own interests. Besides liability based on negligence 
or intention, this rule of contributory negligence also applies to strict liability. 
This article is, in essence, based on the so-called mirror principle: everything 
which can support accountability and liability for legally relevant damage can 
wholly or partially reduce liability when the roles are reversed and the injured 
party’s conduct or source of danger is concerned.391
In principle, as a result of contributory negligence the claim for damages 
is reduced according to the degree of contributory negligence. The result is 
mostly a division of liability (the proportions will depend on the circum-
stances); this can even lead to a denial of the injured party’s right to recovery, 
if his contributory negligence outweighs the wrongdoer’s responsibility to 
such an extent that there is no room left for liability. When the injured party 
intentionally caused the accident, he will usually get no compensation at all 
(it is by no means rare that the same applies in case of gross fault); a reduction 
of the victim’s claim in the event of intentional contributory fault mostly 
emerges in cases in which someone intentionally and unreasonably refuses 
to minimise the harm that already occurred.392
There are some cases in which no regard is taken with respect to con-
tributory fault, namely, first, in case of a very minimal contributory fault of 
the injured party, as in that case 100 per cent compensation will be granted 
(usually the minimum threshold is set at 10 per cent),393 second, in cases of 
an insignificant (negligibly low) causal contribution, and, third, in case of a 
special rule for traffic accidents (in cases of bodily injury contributory fault 
only gives cause for a reduction of the claim for damages in cases of gross 
389 According to Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3628, who prefer to speak of ‘contributory fault’ 
instead of ‘contributory negligence’, as the injured party does not cause harm to someone else, 
and ‘contributory fault’ better reflects why the claim is to be reduced, namely the adoption of a 
personally neglectful position towards his own interests.
390 According to Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3630, this also relates to the minimisation of 
patrimonial consequences of a bodily injury; it is only required to take or permit reasonable 
measures.
391  Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3628, where also exceptions to this principle are mentioned.
392 ibid., p. 3630.
393 Von Bar 1999, p. 554, and see already Wester 1976, p. 251 (with regard to the situation in 
German case law); see Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3631, according to whom, this corresponds with court 
practice, saves work for the judiciary, is in line with the considerations that support the defence of 
contributory fault and reflects in this area the rule of liability in VI.-6:102 (De minimis rule).
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disregard of the injured party’s own safety). In these cases, when someone 
suffered bodily injury, only gross disregard of one’s own safety could give cause 
to a reduction of his claim. In this way, the more general European tendency to 
specially protect victims of car accidents is reflected. Road traffic leads to high 
risks; furthermore, the originator of the damage is normally insured against 
liability, while pedestrians or cyclists usually are not. This lack of balance is, 
at least partially, remedied by the special rule of paragraph (2)(c): assuming 
that there is a contributory fault in the occurrence of the damage (not a failure 
to minimise the damage), and that the traffic accident is caused by a motor 
vehicle.394
In general, Article VI.-5:102 DCFR does not distinguish a difference in the 
types of legally relevant damage, except for the rule contained in paragraph 
(2)(c), a special rule regarding bodily injury resulting from traffic accidents. In 
the latter category, one has to make a distinction between personal injuries and 
damage to objects (property damage). In the event of damage to property, the 
usual care in dealing with one’s own goods can also be required where traffic 
is concerned, and a partition of damage is possible. In the category of personal 
injuries, a further distinction between categories of persons is not made, since 
everyone is affected in a special way and is subject to the dangers of road traffic. 
According to paragraph (2)(c), no regard is to be had to the injured person’s want 
of care contributing to that person’s personal injury caused by a motor vehicle 
in a traffic accident, unless that want of care constituted profound failure to 
take such care as was manifestly required in the circumstances. Therefore, 
when the injured party acts in a grossly negligent manner, the claim will be 
reduced or totally denied. Such gross negligence, i.e. a profound failure to take 
care as manifestly required in certain circumstances, occurs for example in 
the situation of drunken driving.395
Paragraphs (3) and (4) contain extensions of the mirror principle to strict 
liability: paragraph (3) concerns the case where damage is caused to an em-
ployer by a third party, but where the damage has also occurred (or has been 
increased) due to the contributory fault of his employee; in legal proceedings, 
where a claim is brought for damages, the claim will be reduced due to con-
tributory fault of his employee (the same applies in case of a representative). 
And paragraph (4) relates to the circumstances in which compensation is 
reduced because of the injured person’s own responsibility for a contributory 
source of danger.396
394 See also Von Bar 2000, p. 548; Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3631f.
395 Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 3632.
396 ibid., p. 3627.
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5.9 Concluding remarks 
5.9.1 The concept of contributory negligence  
in the nineteenth century
In French law, the Code civil of 1804 did not contain a general rule on contributory 
negligence; the topic was dealt with in case law and in particular by the Cour 
de cassation. In case law the concept of faute de la victime was developed. The 
legal situation with regard to contributory negligence in the first half of the 
nineteenth century is not quite clear. It has been argued in scholarly studies 
that a partition was made based on the faults of both parties, while others say 
that the all-or-nothing approach was still applied. A more profound study of 
case law seems to be necessary here. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
the situation in which the injured party and the wrongdoer were at fault was 
characterised as faute commune, and a partition of damages was applied, pro-
portionate to the gravity of faults on either side.397 This solution was not exactly 
the same as that proposed by Chr. Wolff, but the legal consequences were more 
or less the same. The development in France was initiated by the acceptance 
of judicial discretion when assessing the question of whether negligence (in 
cases in which both parties were at fault) would give rise to liability and when 
determining the part of the total damages which the wrongdoer had to pay. The 
partition made based on the gravity of faults was accepted by the majority of 
legal scholars and judges who initially stuck to the application of D. 50.17.203, 
leading to a denial of claim. Later, the all-or-nothing approach was abandoned 
as in the last quarter of the nineteenth century case law began to apply the 
theory of partition according to the gravity of faults.
The partition of damages as proposed by Wolff seems to have had its first codifica-
tion in § 1304 of the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch, in which one 
can also find judicial discretion as regards the consequences of contributory neg-
ligence. The situation in nineteenth-century Germany was different. The His-
torical School just reproduced Roman law texts, and defended the view that no 
compensation had to be provided if the injured party had (any) contributory 
negligence. However, the more practical-oriented literature applied the maior 
culpa doctrine. As to the all-or-nothing approach, however, an adjustment 
was made in this literary genre. It was generally stated that according to the 
397 The term faute commune can already be found in maritime cases, where one can find a 
subsidiary solution of division in halves, which can also be found in old French law and which is 
called judicium rusticorum (see also Solomon’s judgment in 1 Kings 3:16-28); it has found its way
into § 407 Code de commerce, and later into Loi relative aux événements de mer (1967).
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principles in D. 19.1.11.12 and D. 19.1.45.1 the individual consequential losses, 
for which the injured was responsible, could not be imputed to the wrongdoer. 
This was in fact a first attempt to escape the all-or-nothing approach (and the 
tradition of ius commune). Nevertheless, the maior culpa doctrine survived in 
the nineteenth-century German usus modernus. The Pandectists tried to find 
new dogmatic reasons to justify the denial of claim in the event of contributory 
negligence. Their theories were mainly causation theories based on the thought 
of an interruption of the causal connection in case of contributory negligence. 
An (often) connected theory was that of culpae compensatio, based on the rule 
of D. 50.17.203. In the end, the prevailing view held that equity must be the dog-
matic basis of the rule of fault compensation. In practice, a small contributory 
negligence already led to a denial of claim. However, to avoid unfair solutions, 
to an increasing extent practice opposed this approach; legal practice may have 
turned to the preponderant responsibility of one of the parties, following also 
the doctrine of maior culpa. Already the Reichsoberhandelsgericht in some 
cases ruled that a small contributory negligence of the injured party did not 
lead to the denial of a claim. A reduction of the compensation amount in case 
of contributory negligence was accepted for the first time by the Reichsgericht 
in 1883. The principle of judicial estimation of damages according to § 260 
Reichscivilprozessordnung of 1877 (now § 287 ZPO) allowed the Reichsgericht 
to apply the natural law rule in its practical consequence in totality. 
 
In the Netherlands, the Burgerlijk wetboek of 1838 contained no explicit rule 
on contributory negligence. From the thesis of Van Nierop (1905), one can 
deduce that in the event of a small contributory negligence, no weighing of 
causality was applied, but of negligence; the ‘main fault’ is aimed at. Only when 
the contributory negligence of the injured party was less than the negligence 
of the wrongdoer did he have a right to claim damages, i.e. 100 per cent of 
the damages. There was still an all-or-nothing approach, based on the maior 
culpa variant of the culpae compensatio doctrine. The all-or-nothing approach 
in cases of contributory negligence ended with the judgment of the Dutch 
Hoge Raad in 1916, when the Hoge Raad decided that the duty to compensate 
had to be measured based on the extent to which the negligence of both par-
ties contributed to the damage. Although the legal basis remained disputed 
throughout the twentieth century, the majority view came to hold that the 
reduction of liability was based on equity.
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5.9.2 The concept of contributory negligence in codes  
and in contemporary law
In France, a partition was made based on the gravity of the parties’ faults. 
Contributory negligence seems to have (totally or partially) broken the causal 
connection. In principle, faute de la victime led to a partial compensation. A 
denial of claim was only provided if the faute de la victime was regarded as an 
external cause (cause étrangère), which was unforeseeable (imprévisible) and 
unavoidable (irrésistible), and the sole cause of the damage. A total denial 
of claim was only provided if the injured party’s faute greatly exceeded the 
wrongdoers’ conduct, i.e. in the case of an intentional fault, a provocation or 
consent of the victim. Next to the gravity of faults also other circumstances 
can be taken into account in the assessment, e.g. the causal impact.
With regard to the strict liability based on Article 1384 of the Code civil, a total 
exoneration of the wrongdoer was only possible in the event of an external 
cause, e.g. an act of the victim that was unforeseeable and insurmountable.398 
From 1934 onwards a reduction was possible in the event of contributory neg-
ligence based on the gravity of faults, until 1982 when the Cour de cassation 
decided that such a partition was not possible anymore in the case of contribu-
tory negligence (Desmares case); this was in fact a return to the all-or-nothing 
approach. However, the possibility of a partition of damages in the event of 
contributory negligence was re-introduced in 1987 by the Cour de cassation. 
With regard to traffic accidents, the Loi Badinter (1985) gave a general rule in 
principle of 100 per cent liability for personal injuries for the owner or the 
keeper (gardien) (or the liability insurance) of motorised vehicles. The rules 
regarding ‘contributory negligence’ are written in Article 3 and 4 of the Loi 
Badinter and are very different from the normal rules of contributory negligence 
in the French law of delict. The first exception applies when an injured person 
has voluntarily sought the damage, because in that case no recovery has to be 
paid. The second exception is when the fault of the injured party was inexcusable 
and this fault was the exclusive cause of the accident; also in such a case the 
victim has no right to claim any compensation (Article 3 Loi Badinter). In this 
sense, French law still applies an all-or-nothing approach in these cases (i.e. 
to victims aged between 15 and 71 years with no permanent incapacity or a 
disability of 80 per cent or more). Moreover, if the injured party belongs to a 
special category of protected persons (children under 16, persons older than 
70 or persons with a permanent incapacity or a disability of 80 per cent or 
398 See Cass. ch. réun. 13 February 1930, D.P. 1930.I.57 (Jand’heur).
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more), they will always receive compensation for damages suffered. Only the 
first exception applies to persons belonging to this category, i.e. in case they 
act intentionally. So a defence invoking contributory negligence of children 
in cases of road traffic accidents is almost completely excluded; apart from 
children under 16, this also applies to persons over 70 and the handicapped 
(over 80 per cent), provided they are not driving a motor vehicle.
In Germany at the beginning of  the twentieth century, the concept of 
Mitverschulden – influenced by the Swiss OR, the French doctrine and the 
Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1811) – was codified in § 254 of 
the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch. This concept of Mitverschulden is considered a 
rule of equity; in this case an apportionment has to be made, based on the 
circumstances of the case, with an emphasis on preponderant causation. 
Although the primary standard was causation, the secondary standard was a 
review of other circumstances (such as negligence). With the codification in 
§ 254 BGB, the doctrine of fault compensation was dismissed. Shortly before, the 
Reichsgericht still applied this doctrine in 1891, making only an exception when the 
contributory negligence was insignificant. Just as § 1304 of the Austrian Allgemeine 
Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch, § 254 of the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch contained the 
rule of judicial discretion. § 254 BGB aimed at the predominant causation 
(vorwiegende Verursachung), which seems like the doctrine of proximate or 
near cause (causa proxima or propinqua). However, the Reichsgericht kept 
searching for the main fault, and therefore the predominant causation (vor-
wiegende Verursachung) seems to have been interpreted already from the start 
of the twentieth century as überwiegende Verschulden. One can conclude that 
the contemporary weighing of faults is an idea already present in the period 
of usus modernus combined with Wolff ’s theory, the latter theory also coming 
back in the partition of damage based on the respective faults. 
In the Netherlands, according to Article 6:101 of the (new) Burgerlijk Wetboek 
of 1992, a reduction of the amount of damages is given in the event of con-
tributory negligence, based on the circumstances that can be attributed to the 
parties that contributed to the occurrence of the damage. Two standards are 
provided: probability of causation and the correction based on equity, includ-
ing the faults of the parties, etc. Recently, Keirse (2003 et al.) defended that it 
is preferable to distinguish four phases in this article (see above). In traffic 
accidents, when a motor vehicle collides with a pedestrian or cyclist, Article 
31 Wegenverkeerswet of 1935 (at present Article 185 Wegenverkeerswet of 1994) 
and case law developed for that particular situation are applied. The second 
standard of Article 6:101 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992 is given further form 
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in a special way, namely by the 100 per cent and 50 per cent rules developed by 
Dutch case law. In that respect one can argue that an all-or-nothing approach 
was re-introduced, and the wrongdoer can only be relieved when the injured 
party acted intentionally or recklessly, bordering on intention, in which case 
no compensation will be provided at all; out of this exception, in cases where 
the injured party is younger than 14 years old, 100 per cent of his damage will 
be compensated and in cases where the injured party is older than 14, still a 
minimum of 50 per cent will always be compensated. 
Some final remarks on the concept of contributory negligence at the outset of 
the twenty-first century have to be made. The rule of Article 8:101 PETL gives the 
possibility of a reduction or a total dismissal of the amount/claim of damages in 
the event of contributory negligence, which possibility can indeed be qualified 
as a common rule of the various legal systems. Article VI.-5:102 (1) DCFR is 
more elaborate and concerns the situation in which the personal contributory 
fault of the injured party contributed to the occurrence or to the extent of the 
legally relevant damage. In this article, two requirements are included: causal 
connection of the injured party’s act to the materialisation or the extent of the 
damage; and fault in the broad sense – negligent and intentional harm to one’s 
own interests. In principle, the consequence of contributory negligence is a re-
duction according to the degree of fault.399 To this rule of personal contributory 
fault there are some exceptions: in the event of a very minimal contributory 
fault of the injured party, because in that case a 100 per cent compensation 
will be granted (usually the minimum threshold is set at 10 per cent); insignifi-
cant (negligibly low) causal contribution; and there are special rules in case 
of traffic accidents. In these cases, when someone suffered bodily injury, only 
(surprisingly) gross disregard of one’s own safety could give rise to a reduc-
tion of the victim’s claim. In this way, the more general European tendency 
to especially protect victims of car accidents is reflected. The special rule of 
paragraph (2)(c) as regards bodily injury resulting from traffic accidents makes 
no distinction between different categories of persons (as the aforementioned 
legal provisions in various countries did).
399 This can even lead to a denial of his right to compensation, if his contributory 
negligence outweighs the wrongdoer’s responsibility to such an extent that there is no room 
left for liability. When the injured party intentionally caused the accident, he will usually get 
no compensation at all (it is by no means rare that the same applies in case of gross fault); a 
reduction of the victim’s claim in the event of intentional contributory fault mostly emerges 
in cases in which someone intentionally and unreasonably refuses to minimise the harm that 
already occurred.
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5.9.3 Contributory negligence after the damaging event
The duty to limit the damage is considered as a species of the genus contributory 
negligence in France; there is no unanimity on the question as to what to do 
with the additional damages: some argue that these cannot be claimed by the 
injured party, while others argue that they can be split. In Germany, § 254 (2) 
BGB gives the rule on the duty to limit the damage. As to the consequences 
to be given in case of non-fulfilment hereof, the same difference of opinion 
exists as in France. However, the Bundesgerichtshof decided that the first view 
was not compatible with § 254 BGB. Also in the Netherlands, the additional 
damage was not compensated (nor after the decision of the Dutch Hoge Raad 
in 1916). The basis for such denial was found in the missing causal link. Already 
in the early twentieth century, Ribbius defended a partition of the additional 
damage. In 1992, the duty to limit the damage was considered a species of the 
genus contributory negligence; Article 6:101 of the (new) Burgerlijk Wetboek 
became the basis for the doctrine on the duty to limit the damage, and not 
a break in the causal connection. Although some authors still argue that the 
extra damage has to be attributed to the injured party, it has recently been 
defended that the criteria of Article 6:101 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992 
have to be applied to the duty to limit the damage, and as a consequence the 
extra damage should be partitioned accordingly.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
 
6.1 Introduction
This study has shown how from Antiquity to today the fault of the injured party 
influenced claims for damages based on delictual liability and evolved into the 
modern concept of contributory negligence. This study mainly addressed the 
following two central questions. Firstly, what was the historical development 
as to the solutions provided to the problem of contributory negligence in the 
event of delictual liability? Secondly, what was the influence of the solutions 
found in Roman law, canon law and indigenous law on later and present-day 
doctrines and codes?
For the purpose of my study it appeared necessary to start with the answer 
to the first question in order to be able to provide an answer to the second question; 
the second part of the study can be regarded as pulling together various views 
and solutions provided in various periods in legal history. This main query 
gave rise to several (sub)questions upon which I concentrated: what were the 
views of classical Roman jurists as regards contributory negligence, how was 
the topic of contributory negligence treated in Justinian law, what were the 
views on contributory negligence in the medieval ius commune, what was the 
development of the topic of contributory negligence from the reception of 
Roman law up to the codifications (in the eighteenth to the twentieth century) 
and, finally, how do contemporary jurists in European countries (particularly 
France, Germany and the Netherlands) deal with the problem of contributory 
negligence? 
In the discussion of these modern codifications (and the preceding nine-
teenth-century development), particular emphasis has been laid on the extent 
to which these legal systems were influenced by ius commune approaches to 
contributory negligence, theories of Natural Law and the German Pandectists 
and also on the extent to which these legal systems have developed their own 
unique approach to the concept of contributory negligence. Special attention 
was also given to the effect of contributory negligence. Theoretically, two solu-
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tions appear possible to the problem: all-or-nothing or an apportionment of 
damages between wrongdoer and injured party. Which solution was chosen 
in different periods in time, and what were the dogmatic reasons jurists gave 
for the solution they chose?
The answers to these questions as well as the main findings of this study 
are summarised below.
6.2 Roman law in Antiquity
In the second chapter of this study, Roman law in Antiquity was studied 
whereby a distinction was made between classical Roman law and Justinianic 
law. Both approaches to the Corpus Iuris are important as points of view. The 
study of the approach of classical Roman jurists to the problem of contributory 
negligence is interesting from a comparative perspective (compared to the 
later development of contributory negligence), and also necessary in order to 
be able to understand the later views of the humanists and twentieth-century 
scholarly (Romanistic) studies. In particular, to understand the views of the 
humanists, the point of view of classical Roman law has to be kept in mind. 
Although I only studied one particular problem, i.e. the problem of contributory 
negligence, the results question certain clichés regarding that matter as the 
humanists appear to have been more rooted in practice than often is assumed. 
On the other hand, in order to understand the medieval and later development 
of the problem of contributory negligence, the point of view in Justinian law 
had to be taken as a starting point.
 What were the consequences of the conduct of the injured party for the li-
ability of the wrongdoer? The conclusion for Roman law that the injured party 
could not recover any damages if his negligence contributed to the occurrence 
of the damage is erroneous. The rule of D. 50.17.203 cannot be understood as 
a general rule applied in classical Roman law. However, due to the fact that the 
compilers made it a general rule by placing it into the title De diversis regulis iuris 
antiqui, it could become one of the starting points for the (medieval) theory of 
contributory negligence. Furthermore, in (post)classical Roman law a specific 
legal notion of contributory negligence as we know it today did not exist. 
 The Roman jurists merely enquired whether the injury, considering the 
circumstances, was due to the negligence of the wrongdoer or not. The ap-
plication of the doctrine of culpae compensatio to texts of the Digest has to be 
regarded as being anachronistic as the theory originated in medieval times. 
Certain Digest texts, such as the text of the javelin thrower (D. 9.2.9.4), show 
that Roman jurists approached the culpa requirement in a casuistic manner. 
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Often they approached the matter by using the status theory of Hermagoras 
of Temnos, which allowed them to argue more precisely on the legal problem 
at stake. The examples of the Digest show that technical (dogmatic) theories 
could often not be found in responsa of classical jurists. 
 Due to the penal character and to the wording of the lex Aquilia the only 
and final question in classical Roman law was whether the wrongdoer had 
been at fault or not. In the formulary procedure, the iudex’s only possibility 
was to condemn the defendant to pay the poena if he was convinced that the 
requirements of the formula were fulfilled, otherwise he had to absolve the 
defendant. The possibility to reduce the poena – due to the negligence of the 
injured party – did not exist. This important characteristic, the all-or-nothing 
approach, was retained in Justinian law and enforced until the lex Aquilia lost 
its penal character (only in early modern times). 
 For the study of Justinian law, the fragments concerning the lex Aquilia 
written by various Roman jurists could be read in relation to each other,1 as they 
were promulgated by Justinian as being part of one and the same title. Further-
more, they could be read in relation to other texts of Justinian’s compilation, 
such as D. 50.17.203, which rule was regarded as a general principle from that 
time on. This latter approach particularly makes sense when studying the last 
phrase of D. 9.2.11pr and also D. 9.2.9.4. The conclusion for Roman law that 
the injured party could not recover any damages if his negligence contributed 
to the occurrence of the damage is only right if Roman law is understood as 
Justinian law. 
 It was not possible to claim recovery if the victim caused his injury by his 
own fault. Such an attitude would lead to the unreasonableness of punishing a 
wrongdoer. Formally, an action was only denied due to the insufficiency in the 
requirements of the lex Aquilia. In that respect another remark is important, 
namely, that in classical Roman law no balancing of culpable behaviour of the 
two parties was possible, but only an assessment of the culpable behaviour 
of the wrongdoer. Still, the concept of culpae compensatio probably did not 
develop in Justinian law, but came to be a novelty introduced in medieval le-
gal scholarship only. A balancing of faults did not take place. A few scattered 
texts in the Digest, outside the law of delicts, could indicate that the liability 
of the wrongdoer could be restricted. In those cases, consequential losses were 
concerned, only caused by wrong behaviour of the injured party.2 However, 
these exceptional casuistic decisions do not provide sufficient proof to assume 
1 How one reads a (Digest) text depends on how one reads another text; until that time (i.e. 
during the period of classical Roman law) these texts were disjointed.
2 I.e. Neratius D. 19.1.11.12 and Paul. D. 19.1.45.1.
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a general rule, implying a restriction of the range of compensation, and surely 
this was not the case in the classical period. However, these texts appear to be 
important, as they were used in later periods.
6.3. Medieval ius commune
6.3.1 Medieval Roman legal scholarship
The question of how to qualify the act of the injured party in legal terms was 
first explicitly discussed in medieval times when also for the first time a discus-
sion of the acts of both parties concerned can be observed. In medieval Roman 
legal scholarship, contributory negligence of the injured party seems to have 
been regarded as reproachable misconduct to be sanctioned by a refusal of any 
claim for damages. Thus contributory negligence of the injured party came to 
be considered a possible legal problem. Two starting points for the problem of 
contributory negligence in the medieval period were identified in this study. 
The first starting point is the doctrine of culpae compensatio; the second start-
ing point is identified in the rule laid down in D. 50.17.203. 
As to the doctrine of culpae compensatio: the Glossators did take the re-
spective negligence of both parties into account. They applied this doctrine 
to situations in which both parties acted with negligence of the same sort or 
were negligent to the same degree. The Gloss does not provide explicit proof 
whether or not the Glossators believed that culpae compensatio could only be 
applied to cases of contributory negligence in which both parties had been 
negligent to the same degree or whether it also applied to cases in which the 
degree of negligence was not identical. Therefore, all kinds of contributory neg-
ligence of the injured party, as long as it could be qualified as culpa, cancelled 
out all liability of the wrongdoer. A comparison of the amount of negligence, 
and a refinement in the sense that a small degree of contributory negligence 
would not lead to compensatio and thus to the deprivation of the possibility to 
claim compensation for damages/fine, was probably made by the successors 
to the Glossators at the instigation of the canonists. Some medieval Roman 
legal scholars used this doctrine of culpae compensatio to solve problems of 
contributory negligence in cases of damnum iniuria datum, especially Paulus 
de Castro.
As to the second starting point, Accursius linked D. 50.17.203 to the law of 
delicts.3 According to Accursius, an injured party’s own negligence prevented 
3 See gloss Quod quis ad D. 50.17.203.
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him from claiming damages from someone else. D. 50.17.203 indeed can be 
understood in the sense that it only concerns negligence of the injured party. 
However, Accursius understood it not to concern only cases in which negli-
gence of the wrongdoer was not at all in discussion. It is rather strange that the 
examples of this maxim mentioned later by the Commentators4 all concern 
cases in which only negligence on the side of the injured party occurred, not 
contributory negligence, since Accursius opened the door to such an approach.
A final remark to be made regards the exact dogmatic foundation of the 
denial of claim in the event of contributory negligence. In medieval Roman 
legal scholarship, various opinions – the same as those in later developments 
in history (see below) – can be found. In the first approach, the behaviour of 
the injured party was taken into consideration when determining the culpa-
bility of the wrongdoer’s act. In the kinds of cases in which this approach was 
followed, therefore, the act of the injured party cannot really be considered as 
contributory negligence. In the second approach, the act of the injured party 
was regarded as his own responsibility, which led to the non-responsibility 
and non-liability of the wrongdoer. In the third approach, due to the fact that 
an injured party exposed himself to danger, he was considered to have caused 
the injury himself and thus his claim for recovery was denied.
6.3.2 Medieval canon law
According to canon law, contributory negligence of the injured party can be 
seen as contributory causation (co-causation) and therefore in such cases it 
had to be established whether the wrongdoer or the injured party produced the 
proximate cause (causa proxima). It seems that the causational contributions 
of both parties were compared. However, causation and fault seem not to have 
been separated in this period. Furthermore, the canonists also embraced the 
theory of culpae compensatio, in various areas of law, although rarely in cases of 
the law of delicts, unless both persons in the case were laymen. However, with 
regard to the question of whether a cleric could be granted a higher ordina-
tion, this was different, according to the commentary of Animal on D.50 c.50, 
because in that case culpa could never be compensated by culpa. The author 
of the Animal also stated that when the wrongdoer and the person killed both 
acted culpably, even if the culpability of the first was less serious, the cleric 
could never be promoted to a higher rank.
Two canonists explicitly commented on the position of the injured party. 
With regard to X 5.12.9, Bernardus Parmensis argued that the killing was 
4 And on its counterpart – VI 5.12.86 – by the canonists.
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due to the negligence (culpa) of the injured party (who threw the other on 
the ground). One has to keep in mind that the question in this case before 
the Pope was only whether the cleric did or did not act with negligence and 
whether the cleric could or could not be promoted (and if dispensation was 
necessary). The conclusion that due to the lack of a possibility to distribute the 
damages over both parties in case of contributory negligence (which was not 
at all at stake here) the jurists tended to attribute the ‘sole guilt’ to the party 
that acted with the highest degree of negligence can only be taken with care 
(analogous interpretation). 
Hostiensis argued that the other cleric should have been aware that wearing 
a knife attached to a belt was customary, and therefore he should have been 
careful. It seems that therefore the ‘contributory negligence’ led to the sole guilt 
on the side of the injured party. One could argue, as some modern scholars do, 
that the liability of the tortfeasor in question is cancelled out because of the 
preponderant contributory negligence of the injured party. Although the question 
of liability was not at all at stake in the legal case brought before the Pope if 
one looked at it from that modern perspective; the majority of the commen-
taries of the decretalists I consulted do not follow such a theory. However, the 
just-mentioned comments of Bernardus Parmensis and Hostiensis, who were 
two influential persons, could indeed indicate that this theory was applied.
Furthermore, towards the end of the medieval period, mainly in consilia 
literature, the term culpa admixta (literally ‘mixed fault’) was used to qualify 
the behaviour of the injured party in a way that led to the exclusion of liability 
of the wrongdoer. In this way contributory negligence led to a denial of claim 
without a discussion of the degree of the negligence of each party. The use of 
the term culpa admixta (or culpa communis) shows that the occurring damage 
was considered the common responsibility of both parties.
6.3.3 Some final words on medieval ius commune
An all-or-nothing approach in the event of ‘contributory negligence’ was also 
present in some other medieval sources outside the Roman-canonical tradi-
tion (iura propria – indigenous laws). In some other old medieval traditions 
(e.g. medieval Irish law), this idea of a division of damages can be found in 
some cases. Contributory negligence of the injured party could lead to partial 
compensation, the so-called judicium rusticorum, or to a reduction of damages to 
the amount of two-thirds. This judicium rusticorum is interesting as it appeared 
again in later periods of legal history, such as in Roman-Dutch law.
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6.4 The humanistic contribution
Although the humanists tried to resituate D. 50.17.203 in its original classical 
context (law of legacies), the examples of this rule given by the humanists are 
mainly the same as those given in the medieval period. Furthermore, without 
looking at the different palingenetical contexts, the humanists connected the 
rule of D. 50.17.203 to the cases of D. 9.2.52.1, D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr. Note that 
it is explicitly stated that these cases concern events in which the injured party 
acted negligently. Furthermore, the connection of D. 9.2.9.4 with D. 9.2.10, 
as assumed by the humanists, is not palingenetically defendable, as it is the 
fact that D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr. are considered examples of the situation in 
which both parties acted negligently. Furthermore, it also appears that some 
humanists on the substantive level sometimes remained strong in the tradition 
of ius italicus; thus some considered D. 9.2.52.1 as an example of compensation 
of unlawfulness, or as an example of self-defence. 
 However, only by stating that D. 9.2.9.4 and D. 9.2.11pr. in fact are examples 
of the situation in which both parties acted negligently could the negligent 
acts be compared and could theories develop. One of those theories concerns 
the continuation of the application of the culpae compensatio, and also the 
first traces of the theory of gravior culpa (A. Faber) or maior culpa (M. Freher 
and G. Noodt) appeared. The last new development of major importance is 
that H. Donellus arguably, but surely P. Faber and J. de Sande, envisaged the 
possibility of a partial compensation for the first time in the continental Roman 
law tradition.
6.5 Reception, Roman-Dutch law and usus modernus
My study of the question of why the injured party had no right to claim damages 
proceeded from the hypothesis that the approach to recovery based on the actio 
de damno dato was still all-or-nothing. The source materials investigated con-
firmed that this hypothesis was correct. As was put forward first and foremost, 
in this period a general action for damage done unlawfully was provided, an 
action that was only Roman in its name (see section 4.3.2). In this early modern 
period, the idea that an equal or preponderant contributory negligence (maior 
culpa) excluded the right to claim compensation began to gain acceptance. 
However, not all jurists used this idea of the maior culpa variant of the culpae 
compensatio doctrine to solve the problem of contributory negligence; others 
took different paths in their approach to solving this problem.
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Some Roman-Dutch scholars continued to explain the sedes materiae in the 
same way as it was done in the Middle Ages, but they tried to situate them in 
their own time. Others applied the maior culpa theory, e.g. Voet. In Roman-
Dutch law, ship-collision cases are particularly interesting. In these cases a 
different starting point was applied compared to Roman law. If ship A, without 
being negligent, hit ship B, ship A still had to pay 50 per cent of the damage. 
But when two ships collided and both acted negligently, there were two main 
views on what the law dictated: (1) If the negligence was equal on both sides, 
the damage had to be regarded as common and both parties had to bear the 
damage in equal proportions (the view of the Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland 
en West-Friesland); (2) Each party should carry its own loss, because whoever 
had been negligent could not bring an action and the damage that occurred 
was not regarded as damage cf. D. 50.17.203 (the view of Van Bijnkershoek and 
Van der Keessel). Another problem was to determine what the law dictated in 
case a stationary ship was hit by a moving ship. Van der Keessel considered the 
negligence of the latter as more serious, and therefore no culpae compensatio 
could take place (mark the application of the ius commune theory) Thus one 
ship had to bear 50 per cent of the damage of the other ship, and so something 
quite similar to the idea of division of damage occurred. Compare the old tra-
dition of judicium rusticorum, with one renewal, namely, that in case of culpa 
maior 50 per cent of the damage of the other party had to be paid.
Several doctrinal starting points are present in the usus modernus in Germany 
to solve the problem of contributory negligence. Firstly, the role of the injured 
party was considered a problem of causality. Secondly, the role of the injured 
party was considered a question of negligence, and in that respect it was con-
sidered a question of concurrence of faults. Several variants of the application 
of the culpae compensatio doctrine were found, among which the variant in 
which the mere existence of contributory negligence – even a very small degree 
of contributory negligence – led to the deprivation of the possibility to obtain 
compensation, and the opposite situation, namely that only (equal or) prepon-
derant contributory negligence should exclude liability (maior culpa theory). 
Another solution was to solve the problem of contributory negligence with-
out any reference to the contributory negligence of the injured party. In this 
variant, the negligence of the wrongdoer was the only relevant factor, and the 
contributory negligence of the injured party was not considered as a separate 
legal issue. A last solution was provided by the use of the criterion of the auctor 
rixae as an alternative way to solve the problem of contributory negligence. 
The initiator of a fight could not claim damages for injuries suffered during 
the fight, unless the other party acted excessively in self-defence.
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In Italy, the criterion of auctor rixae was connected with the concept of 
culpa admixta. If someone started a fight or provoked a fight (the so-called 
auctor rixae), his negligent behaviour was qualified as culpa admixta, leading 
to a denial of his claim in totality. The Rota Romana sometimes held the view 
that contributory negligence, however small, led to a denial of claim, while in 
another case it seemed to require culpa maior on the side of the injured party, 
the view which was also held by De Luca.
 Apparently, in the early modern period there was discussion on the question 
as to what sort of damages had to be compensated, and especially whether im-
material damages had to be compensated or not. In the event of quarrels, if the 
reaction by the provoked party was excessive, the provoker could only claim medi-
cal costs, no immaterial damages were granted. In two cases a small amount of 
negligence of the injured party did not exclude the victim’s compensation claim, 
but was taken into account in order to determine the amount of damages to be 
paid. However, these examples concern the non-compensation of certain types 
of damages. No reduction of the total damage occurred and the all-or-nothing 
approach is to be considered as being still intact in the early modern period.
6.6 The northern natural law school
Some scholars followed the ‘old’ ius commune approach: in the event of 
contributory negligence of the injured party, they just applied the rule of 
 D. 50.17.203. In such case the application of that rule led to a total denial of a 
claim for damages. Possibly Grotius but certainly Domat and Pothier followed 
this approach. Others applied the doctrine of culpa maior, such as Pufendorf 
and Thomasius. In both approaches the legal consequence was the same: if the 
injured party was contributorily negligent respectively if his negligence was 
more serious than that of the wrongdoer, his claim for damages was denied. 
In that sense the all-or-nothing approach was still followed. 
The possible attribution of damage both to the wrongdoer and to the injured 
party (according to the resp. faults or causal contributions) had its origin in 
the ‘Aufklärungstheorie’ of Christian Wolff5 and is therefore a relatively recent 
phenomenon. But the assessment and balancing of the respective gradations 
of negligence of both parties was already a step in that direction. So, although 
Wolff was the first legal scholar who turned away from the ‘all-or-nothing principle’, 
his theory can also be considered a continuation of the preceding development. 
5 He argued that when both the wrongdoer and the injured party acted negligently, the 
damages should be borne by both parties according to the extent of their individual negligence.
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Wolff did not treat the matter of contributory negligence in an abstract way, 
but only for some concrete cases. In particular, no remarks are found as to 
the relation with the delictual obligation to pay damages. In that respect, the 
aforementioned example included in the Selectae decisiones of Schoepff, of 
an earlier date than the work of Wolff, is a much clearer example of a partial 
compensation of damages in the area of liability for damages, in the sense that 
certain specific sorts of damages (amount for maintenance expenses) were not 
recoverable due to the contributory negligence of the injured party. 
6.7 The concept of contributory negligence in  
the nineteenth century
In French law, the Code civil of 1804 did not contain a general rule on contribu-
tory negligence. The topic has been dealt with in case law and in particular 
by the Cour de cassation. At the end of the nineteenth century, the situation 
in which the injured party and the wrongdoer were at fault (characterised as 
faute commune) led to a partition of damages proportionate to the gravity of 
the faults on each side. The development in France was initiated by the ac-
ceptance of judicial discretion in assessing the question whether negligence 
(in cases in which both parties were at fault) would give rise to liability and 
when determining each party’s share of compensation. The partition, made 
on the basis of the gravity of faults, was accepted by the majority of legal 
scholars and judges who initially stuck to the application of the principle of 
D. 50.17.203 (although the Digest was not a formal source of law anymore - thus 
I have not found a direct reference to D. 50.17.203), which led to a denial of 
claim. Although no (direct) reference to the work of the natural law scholar 
Wolff can be found in France, it is possible that, taking into consideration the 
probable familiarity of the jurists with the works of Wolff, that his ideas could 
have played a role in the intellectual luggage of the jurists. Thus the solution 
proposed by French doctrine was not exactly the same as that proposed by 
Chr. Wolff, but the legal consequences were more or less the same. Wolff ’s 
doctrine seems to have been codified for the first time in § 1304 of the Austrian 
Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1811), the article also in which judicial 
discretion is provided as to the consequences of contributory negligence.
The situation in nineteenth-century Germany was different. The Histori-
cal School just reproduced Roman law texts, and defended the view that no 
compensation had to be provided if the injured party had committed (any) 
contributory negligence. However, the more practical-oriented literature ap-
plied the maior culpa doctrine. As to the all-or-nothing approach, however, 
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an adjustment was made in this literary genre. It was generally stated that 
according to the principles in D. 19.1.11.12 and D. 19.1.45.1 the individual con-
sequential losses, for which the injured was responsible, could not be imputed 
to the wrongdoer. This was in fact a first attempt to escape the all-or-nothing 
approach (and the tradition of ius commune). Nevertheless, the maior culpa 
doctrine survived in the German usus modernus in the nineteenth century. The 
Pandectists tried to find new dogmatic reasons to justify the denial of claim 
in the event of contributory negligence. Their theories were mainly causation 
theories, based on the thought of an interruption of the causal connection in 
the case of contributory negligence. A theory (often) connected to this was 
the culpae compensatio theory, based on the rule of D. 50.17.203. Later, equity 
was regarded as the foundation of the rule of D. 50.17.203. In legal practice, 
a small degree of contributory negligence already led to a denial of claim. 
However, to avoid unfair solutions, this approach was increasingly opposed in 
legal practice. A reduction of the amount of damages in the event of contribu-
tory negligence was accepted for the first time by the German Reichsgericht in 
1883. In Switzerland, somewhat earlier, the natural law solution (particularly 
in Article 51 II of the Schweizerische Obligationenrecht 1881) had been codi-
fied under the influence of the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch as 
well as the French doctrine. Eventually, the Swiss code, as to the problem of 
contributory negligence, was taken as example by the drafters of the German 
Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1900) and, also under the influence of case law, the 
Swiss regulation was taken over in its entirety.
In the Netherlands, the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838 contained no explicit 
rule on contributory negligence. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, 
in the event of a small degree of contributory negligence, an assessment of neg-
ligence of the parties involved was applied in the sense that the ‘main fault’ was 
decisive. Only when the contributory negligence of the injured party was less 
than the negligence of the wrongdoer did the injured party have a right to claim 
damages, i.e. 100 per cent (of the damages). There was still an all-or-nothing 
approach, based on the maior culpa variant of the culpae compensatio doctrine. 
The legal basis of the denial of damages to the injured party in the event his act 
contributed to his own damage remained disputed throughout the twentieth 
century, although the majority view became that equity demanded the denial 
of claim and that the damage should be imputed to the victim if he could have 
prevented the accident from occurring. The all-or-nothing approach ended 
with the judgement of the Dutch Hoge Raad in 1916, in which the Hoge Raad 
decided that the duty to compensate had to be measured, based on the extent 
to which the negligence of both parties contributed to the damage.
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6.8 The concept of contributory negligence in modern  
and contemporary law
In France, a partition of damages is made based on the gravity of the parties’ 
faults. Contributory negligence seems to have (totally or partially) broken the 
causal connection. In principle, faute de la victime led to a partial compensa-
tion. A denial of claim was only provided if the faute de la victime was regarded 
as an external cause, which was unforeseeable and unavoidable, and the sole 
cause of the damage. Next to the gravity of the faults also other circumstances 
were taken into account in the balancing, e.g. the causal impact. Furthermore, 
if the injured party’s faute greatly exceeded the wrongdoer’s conduct, i.e. in 
the case of intentional misconduct, provocation or consent of the victim, no 
damages have to be paid. 
With regard to the strict liability mentioned in Article 1384 Code civil – at 
first –  a total exoneration of the wrongdoer was only possible in the event of 
an external cause, e.g. a fait de la victime which was unforeseeable and insur-
mountable. From 1934 onwards, a reduction was possible in the event of con-
tributory negligence based on the gravity of the faults, until 1982 when the Cour 
de cassation decided that such a partition was not possible anymore in the case 
of contributory negligence (Desmares case), which in fact meant a return to the 
all-or-nothing approach. Shortly after a reform by the Loi Badinter, in 1987, the 
Cour de cassation overturned the Desmares judgment and re-introduced the 
principle that the keeper (gardien) of an object is partially exonerated when 
the victim’s fault contributed to the occurrence of the damage caused by the 
object (for cases not falling under the Loi Badinter). When the victim’s fault 
can be characterised as an external cause leading to force majeure, of course a 
total dismissal of the claim will follow.
With regard to traffic accidents, in France, the Loi Badinter (1985) gave a 
general rule of 100 per cent liability (in principle) in case of personal injuries 
to the owner or the ‘keeper’ (or the liability insurance) of motorised vehicles. 
The rules regarding ‘contributory negligence’ can be found in Articles 3 and 4 of 
the Loi Badinter. They are very different from the normal rules of contributory 
negligence in the French law of delict. French law still applies an all-or-nothing 
approach here for victims not driving a motor vehicle. Victims between 15 and 
71 years of age with no permanent incapacity or a disability of 80 per cent or 
more are granted 100 per cent of their damages, unless the fault of the injured 
party is inexcusable and that fault was the exclusive cause of the accident or 
if the victim voluntarily sought the damage, i.e. in case he acted intentionally, 
in which case the victim has no right to claim any compensation. Moreover, if 
the injured person belongs to a special category of protected persons (children 
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under 16, persons older than 70 years of age or persons with a permanent 
incapacity or a disability of 80 per cent or more), he or she will always receive 
compensation for damages suffered. Only when an injured person belonging 
to this category has voluntarily sought the damage, i.e. in the event that he 
acted intentionally, can he not claim damages.
In Germany, the concept of Mitverschulden was codified in § 254 of the 
Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1900). This application of the concept of Mitver-
schulden – whose legal doctrinal basis is much debated – leads to an appor-
tionment based on the circumstances of the case, with an emphasis on the 
preponderant causation. Although the primary standard is causation, the 
secondary standard is a review of the other circumstances (among which 
negligence). With the codification in § 254 of the Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch, the 
doctrine of culpae compensatio was dismissed. Shortly before, the Reichsgericht 
still applied this doctrine in 1891, making only an exception in the event that 
the contributory negligence was insignificant. Just like § 1304 of the Austrian 
Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch, § 254 of the German Bürgerliche Gesetzbu-
ch gave the judge judicial discretion. Although § 254 aimed at the predominant 
causation (vorwiegende Verursachung), the Reichsgericht continued to apply 
the doctrine of the main fault, and that means that the predominant causation 
seems to have been interpreted already from the start of the twentieth century 
as überwiegende Verschulden. In Germany, the apportionment principle con-
tained in § 254 BGB is also incorporated in § 9 StVG: if the fault of the injured 
party (not being a holder or driver of a motor vehicle) has contributed to the 
occurrence of the damage, § 254 BGB applies. 
In the Netherlands, Article 6:101 BW (of 1992) provides a reduction of the 
amount of damages in the event of contributory negligence, based on the cir-
cumstances that contributed to the occurrence of the damage and that can be 
attributed to the parties. Two standards are provided: firstly, causal connection 
probability (veroorzakingswaarschijnlijkheid) and, secondly, a correction based 
upon equity, considering the faults of the parties, etc. When a motor vehicle 
hits with a pedestrian or a cyclist in traffic accidents, Article 31 (old) WVW of 
1935 (at present Article 185 WVW 1994) and the case law for that particular 
situation are applied, meaning that the second standard of Article 6:101 BW 
is filled in by 100 per cent and 50 per cent rules developed in Dutch case law. 
In that respect one can argue that an all-or-nothing approach has been re-
introduced – at least for the 100 per cent rule –,6 and the wrongdoer can now 
6 This also applies in cases of employers: as was already the case with Art. 1638x lid 2 
(old) Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838, Art. 7:658 lid 2 of the (new) Burgerlijk Wetboek still continues 
to apply the all-or-nothing approach in the event of negligence in labour cases: the defence of 
contributory negligence only succeeds if the intentional or wilful reckless act of the employee 
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only be relieved inthe event that the injured party has acted intentionally or 
recklessly, bordering on intention, in which case no compensation will be 
provided. If the injured person is younger than 14 years old, 100 per cent of 
his damage will be compensated, and to persons older than 14, a minimum 
compensation of 50 per cent of the damage is granted.
6.9 To conclude
Some systematic final remarks have to be made. What were the solutions taken 
to the problem of contributory negligence in legal history? Before making a 
first distinction in formulating an answer to this question, it has to be stated 
that the role of the injured party’s conduct was sometimes taken into account 
when determining whether the wrongdoer acted with negligence and/or 
whether the act could be imputed to the wrongdoer. Furthermore, I found 
cases that in fact dealt with the opposite situation; in some cases the damage 
suffered by the injured party was only caused by himself, and no negligence 
could be imputed to another person. Both of these situations cannot, in a strict 
sense, be called contributory negligence.
As to the situation in which the injured party contributed to the occurrence 
of the damage, and so there is also a tortfeasor, two main solutions have been 
found: all-or-nothing (I) or a partition of damages (II). The all-or-nothing 
approach (I) had several variants: when the injured party was considered 
negligent (which in fact would mean that this would apply already in case of 
a small degree of negligence),7 only when the victim’s negligence was equal 
or preponderant to that of the wrongdoer8 or only when his negligence was 
gross or wilful was his claim denied.9 Throughout legal history, the denial of 
claim was caused by and/or dogmatically founded in different ways: sometimes 
it was caused by the legal procedure and/or the penal character of the civil 
liability, sometimes it was due to the strict application of Roman law rules, 
substantially contributed to his injury.
7  Applied in medieval Roman legal scholarship, by most decretalists, by some jurists in 
the early modern period and by some natural law scholars. This can also be said for various 19th 
century Pandectist School scholars, and can be found in 19th century German case law as well as 
in French case law at the beginning of the 19th century.
8  The culpa maior theory is present not only in the works of various jurists in the early 
modern period, but also in the commentary Animal est substantia (and possibly with some 
decretalists), with some humanists, and with various natural law scholars. It is also present in 
19th-century Dutch case law and scholarly literature, 19th-century German practical literature 
and later in 19th-century German case law.
9  This latter solution can be found in modern French and Dutch law regarding personal 
injury cases in traffic accidents.
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based on or linked to causation theories (interruption of causal connection), 
or based on the theory of culpae compensatio, and in other cases it was due 
to socio-political reasons (e.g. an operational risk, so-called Betriebsgefahr) 
which were codified in various legislative provisions. Another possibility was 
to compare causal contributions, denying a claim if the injured party’s act was 
the proximate cause (causa proxima) for the damage.10 
The approach in which a partition is possible (II) can mainly be divided 
into two groups: a division between the parties of some kind of (consequen-
tial) damages to the parties in question,11 or a division of the total amount of 
damage.12 Although the possibility of partition was proposed and defended 
by Christian Wolff, his proposal did not – as one might expect – conquer the 
legal area immediately.13
In the event of a partition of damages, the apportionment can take place 
based on one or more of the following criteria: the degree of fault of both 
parties,14 their causal contribution to the damage15 and equity reasons.16 The 
emphasis was put differently in various times and places; sometimes some 
of these criteria were considered equal, and sometimes a criterion was used 
as a corrective. The partition could lead to percentages or quota. Normally 
percentages between 0 and 100 per cent were possible, although minor seg-
ments at either extreme were normally not granted. A 50/50 partition is also 
applied,17 sometimes as the outcome of a partition in percentages/quota, 
sometimes as an alternative solution (subsidiary solution), sometimes as the 
standard solution.
10  This approach is found in canon law.
11  As applied in Justinian law in some cases outside the area of the law of delicts, and later in the 
early modern period in cases of quarrels where, in particular, immaterial damages were sometimes 
regarded as being non-compensable, due to the fact that the injured party started the fight.
12  I found such partition already in the medieval period in some traditions outside the 
tradition of ius commune (leading to a 50/50 partition or 1/3–2/3); in the latter tradition the all-
or-nothing approach remained the prevailing one until the end of the early modern period, and 
even to a certain extent in the 19th century.
13  The first traces of consideration of such a partial compensation can already be found 
with the humanists, as discussed before.
14  As Christian Wolff proposed (although it is generally accepted that this requirement 
included causation in his theory); it is the solution codified in § 1304 ABGB, as accepted in 
French case law and doctrine in the 19th century, applied by the Reichsgericht in Germany at the 
end of the 19th century (1883; even after the codification of the new emphasis in § 254 BGB this 
remained the focus of the Reichsgericht), and was accepted by the Dutch Hoge Raad in 1916.
15  Codified in Germany in § 254 BGB and as first criterion in the Dutch Art. 6:101 BW (1992).
16  See the second (corrective) criterion codified in the Dutch Art. 6:101 BW.
17  The solution of judicium rusticorum; in collision cases in Roman-Dutch law, Van der 
Keessel defended the solution that in case one of the colliding party’s negligence was greater 
(quantitatively) than that of the other party, the colliding party had to bear half of the damages 
of the other party.
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Although in the event of contributory negligence an apportionment of damages 
is commonly applied in Western Europe today, apportionment has had a short 
history. Furthermore, this concept – at first proposed by Wolff – has not been 
received throughout Europe with open arms, but has been consolidated only 
after a difficult struggle. The solution in Roman law, all-or-nothing, common 
to various countries in Western Europe, is indeed a common foundation and 
it has not been easy to set this concept, which survived many centuries, aside. 
 This study cannot give a normative answer on which solution would be 
best. Legal scholars and/or comparatists will have to consider other perspec-
tives, such as philosophical, economic, social, etc. Common concepts are also 
those taken from Roman law, which survived and were handed on to us over 
the course of many centuries. Fault and causation came more and more to be 
considered communicating vessels. The emphasis sometimes lies on fault, 
other times on causation. In this respect, different choices have been made in 
various codes in force in European countries today. Although the partition of 
damages between parties seems to be in accordance with equity, it is not at all 
clear what the standards have to be, and when clear standards are established, 
what the exact apportionment should be, and so the study of this issue remains 
of great interest. Furthermore, the historical development of contributory 
negligence, i.e. the way in which this legal issue was dealt with, is even more 
interesting – as a source of inspiration – since recently the all-or-nothing ap-
proach has regained acceptance again (e.g. in cases of traffic accidents; see 
chapter five) as to the legal issue of contributory negligence of the injured party.
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D. 17.2.55 140, 176 (n.422)
D. 18.1.57 102 (n.546)
D. 18.1.57.3 112, 118 (n.72)
D. 18.1.69 82 (n.438)
D. 18.6.13(12) 232 (n.207)
D. 18.6.14(13) 232 (n.207)
D. 19.1.11.12 101, 322, 368, 375  
 (n.2), 383
D. 19.1.17.6 81 (n.427)
D. 19.1.21.3 293 (n.546)
D. 19.1.45.1 101, 203, 322, 368,  
 375 (n.2), 383
D. 19.1.51 273 (n.436)
D. 19.2.13.4 87 (n.467)
D. 21.1.42 226 (n.171)
D. 21.2.17 118 (n.75)
D. 21.2.29.1 200
D. 21.2.55pr. 200
D. 23.2.43pr. 38 (n.133)
D. 23.3.66 19 (n.23), 198
D. 24.3.39 107, 111-112, 113, 116 
  (n.60), 118 (n.72), 119 (n.79), 126 
(n.123), 171 (n.396), 184 (n.456), 
213, 264 (n.386), 265 (n.395), 
266 (n.398), 270 (n.422)
D. 24.3.47 265 (n.295)
D. 27.1.6.19 218 (n.129)
D. 28.6.39pr. 27 (n.70)
D. 28.8.5 197
D. 29.2.77 19 (n.23), 197
D. 30.37 26 (n.64)
D. 30.39pr.-§6 26 (n.64)
D. 31.45 19 (n.23)
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D. 31.45.1 198
D. 32.29.1 27 (n.70), 28 (n.73)
D. 33.6.16 82
D. 33.7.13 38 (n.133)
D. 33.9.3.10 81 (n.428)
D. 39.2.40.1 111
D. 39.2.44pr. 291 (n.532)
D. 40.1.6 36 (n.123)
D. 41.1.54.1-2 116 (n.62)
D. 41.3.1 201
D. 42.2.8 26 (n.64)
D. 43.16.1.27 131 (n.153), 133 (n.169)
D. 43.16.3.9 133, 205 (n.68)
D. 43.16.9.1 19 (n.23), 197-198
D. 44.4.4.13 171 (n.396), 268
D. 46.3.16 24
D. 46.3.39 81, 82
D. 46.3.95.11 139 (n.206)
D. 46.8.22.4 176
D. 47.2.12.1 276 (n.451)
D. 47.2.50.4 120 (n.86), 212
D. 47.2.55.2 42 (n.175)
D. 47.7.6pr. 125 (n.116)
D. 47.10.1.1 270 (n.422)
D. 47.10.1.5 280
D. 47.10.1.15 217 (n.126)
D. 47.10.5.1 31 (n.90)
D. 47.10.26 217 (n.126)
D. 48.5.2.5 112 (n.38), 173
D. 48.5.14(13).5 112 (n.38)
D. 48.10.25 223 (n.156)
D. 48.10.32.1 223 (n.156)
D. 48.19.5pr. 142 (n.217)
D. 48.19.11.2 72, 240 (n.257)
D. 50.15.1pr. 56 (n.247) 
D. 50.16.183 38 (n.133)
D. 50.16.207 81
D. 50.17.23 342 (n.244)
D. 50.17.151 274 (n.442)
D. 50.17.154 112
D. 50.17.155pr. 198, 199
D. 50.17.173.2 199
D. 50.17.174.1 198 (n.36)
D. 50.17.198 17 (n.12)
D. 50.17.203 14, 16-30, 54, 63,  
  65 (n.310), 73, 90 (n.485), 94 
(n.510), 96, 98-99, 102-103, 108, 
110, 111 (n.33), 125 (n.121), 126 
(n.122), 139-143, 145, 147, 176, 
182, 184, 185, 186, 195-203, 205, 
206, 212, 214, 228, 231, 241, 248 
(n.306), 251 (n.329), 252, 254, 
257, 259 (n.357), 260, 262, 263, 
264, 271-272, 273 (n.436), 275 
(n.448), 278, 280, 281 (n.482), 
283 (n.488, 490), 284, 286, 288, 
290, 291 (n.532), 298, 299, 300, 
301, 302, 311 (n.39), 315 (n.63), 
319-320, 325 (n.133), 327, 331, 
332, 334, 342 (n.244), 367, 368, 
374-377, 379, 380-383
Gloss deteriore 
ad D. 2.7.2 112 (n.34)
Gloss quamuis 
ad D. 2.10.1.2 111 (n.31)
Gloss dolo compensando 
ad D. 2.10.3.3 112
Gloss uideantur 
ad D. 3.5.33 250 (n.321)
Gloss sibi 
ad D. 9.1.1.11 138, 264 (n.386)
Gloss glori(a)e causa 
ad D. 9.2.7.4  226 (n.171)
Gloss sed et si per lusum ad  
iaculantibus 
ad D. 9.2.9.4  119-120
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Gloss seruus 
ad D. 9.2.9.4 119
Gloss quia non debuit 
ad D. 9.2.9.4 116 (n.60), 143, 184
Gloss tenebitur 
ad D. 9.2.9.4 116, 120 (n.87), 143 
 (n.226), 174, 264 (n.388), 306 (n.10)
Gloss nam ludus 
ad D. 9.2.10 119
Gloss teneri 
ad D. 9.2.11pr. 124 (n.113)
Gloss queri debere 
ad D. 9.2.11pr. 127, 217
Gloss tabernarius 
ad D. 9.2.52.1 129 (n.141)
Gloss inerat 
ad D. 9.2.52.1 32, 133 (n.165)
Gloss nisi data ad hoc opera 
ad D. 9.2.52.1 132-133 (n.163)
Gloss uellet 
ad D. 9.2.52.1 134
Gloss rixatus esset 
ad D. 9.2.52.1 133 (n.167)
Gloss non repeteret 
ad D. 10.2.44.5 143 (n.225)
Gloss ipso iure 
ad D. 16.2.10pr. 112 (n.37, 39), 143  
 (n.226)
Gloss culpa tua 
ad D. 17.1.26.7 143 (n.226)
Gloss omnimodo 
ad D. 19.1.45.1 143 (n.226)
Gloss para enim 
ad D. 24.3.39 111-112
Gloss onera 
ad D. 39.2.40.1 111
Gloss penali 
ad D. 48.10.25 223 (n.156)
Gloss condemnatur 
ad D. 48.10.32.1  223 (n.156)
Gloss Quod quis 
ad D. 50.17.203 140-141, 142-143,  
 185, 376-377
 
Codex (534)
C. 1.3.17 164
Auth. after C. 1.3.17, Interdicimus  
 158 (n.306), 164
C. 1.27.2.9 58 (n.262)
C. 3.35.5 212
C. 3.43.1 158 (n.306)
C. 3.43.1.4 157, 158 (n.306)
C. 4.24.9 342 (n.244)
C. 5.27.1pr. 41 (n.167)
C. 6.27.6 141
C. 8.4.1 132, 133 (n.163), 137
C. 8.44(45).8  177 (n.429), 202
C. 8.44(45).9 202-203
C. 9.12.6 133 (n.162)
C. 9.16.1 75 (n.376)
Novella
Nov. 72.4 (Coll. 6.2) 117 (n.66)
BYZANTINE LAW
Basilica
B. 2.3.200 (BT 66/10-11) 178 
 (n.432)
B. 2.3.203 (BT 66/16-17) 17 (n.16)
B. 60.3.9(.4) (BT 2752/7-9) 77 
B. 60.3.10 (BT 2752/10-11) 77
B. 60.3.11(pr.) (BT 2752/12-16) 
 78, 80 (n.414), 84 (n.449), 220  
 (n.140)
B. 60.3.51(.1) (BT 2767/1-5)  
 38 (n.139), 42 (n.170), 48 (n.215)
Basilica Scholia
BS 3101/12  72 (n.363)
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BS 3101/12-14 77 (n.389, 391)
BS 3101/15-18 77 (n.393)
BS 3101/22-23 77 (n.390)
BS 3104/28-3105/13 178-179
BS 3163/2  38 (n.139)
BS 3163/3-5 48 (n.215)
Epitome legum
42.34 48 (n.215)
Scholia Balsamon on Nomocanon of 
Photius
tit. XIII, cap. 29 157 (n.305)
Theophilus, Paraphrasis Institutionum
4.3.4 62 (n.288), 63, 75
(ANCIENT) NON LEGAL SOURCES
Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae
XVIII.7 57 (n.257)
XX.4  57 (n.259)
XX.4.11f.  57 (n.258)
XX.5.1  57 (n.258)
XX.9.6  57 (n.258)
XXI.2.1  57 (n.258)
XXX.1.21  33 (n.102)
Antiphon, Tetralogiae
II.2 56 (n.254)
II.2.8  65 (n.308)
III.2.6  50 (n.221)
III.4.2 & 4 50 (n.221)
III.3.2 50 (n.221)
Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea
II.1 147-148
V.4 148 (n.250)
V.8 135 (n.180)
 
Aristoteles, Physica
II.6 239 (n.253)
Artemidorus of Daldis, Oneirocritica 
I.58 57 (n.257)
Augustinus, Liber de vera religione
XIV 239 (n.253)
 
Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 
VII.5.1  41
XI.18.6-8 42 (n.175)
Johannes Chrysostomus, Homiliae 
in 1 Thess.
III.4 58 (n.265)
Cicero, De legibus 
II.20.50 27 (n.70), 28 (n.73)
Cicero, De officiis
I.103f. 208 (n.79)
Cicero, De oratore
I.57.244 67 (n.326)
I.239-240 52 (n.231)
Cicero, In Catilinam 
IV.17  42 (n.168)
Cicero, Pro Caecina 
IV.12 27 (n.70)
Cicero, Pro Cluentio 
VII.21 27 (n.70)
Cicero, Pro Flacco 
18 42 (n.168)
Cicero, Topica
10.63-20.64 72 (n.362)
17.64 72
17.65 51 (n.228)
17.66 51 (n.228)
20.58 72
21.82 51 (n.225)
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Cyprianus, Liber de exhortatione 
Martyrii
Praefatio 58 (n.263)
Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica
XX.61.8 35 (n.116)
Donatus 
on Terentius’ Eunuchus  
III.3.9 33 (n.103), 34 (n.110)
Ennodius, Panegyricus Theoderico 
dictus
19 57 (n.257)
Herodotus, Ἱστορίαι
I.43 209 (n.84), 240 (n.256)
Hesychius Alexandrinus, Lexicon
s.v. Δόλωνες 33 (n.102), 34  (n.110)
Historia miscella 
XVII.74 57 (n.259)
Horatius, Epistulae
I.7.50ff. 83 (n.442)
I.7.88 26 (n.65)
I.17.57 26 (n.65)
Horatius, Sermones 
I.3.130(ff.) 40
I.6.126 83 (n.441)
II.6.49 83 (n.441)
II.3.300 26 (n.65)
Isidorus of Sevilla, Etymologiae
XVIII.9(.4) 33 (n.103, 107)
XIX.3.3 35 (n.116)
Juvenalis, Satires
III.287 43 (n.181)
VI.214f. 83 (n.442)
Libanius, Orationes 
XV.76 57 (n.257)
Livius, Ab urbe condita
XXXVI.44.2f. 35 (n.114)
XXXVI.45.1 35
XXXVII.30.7 35 (n.114)
Manilius, Astronomica
IV.227-229 210 (n.87)
Martialis, Epigrammata
VII.60(61).7-10 835 (n.442)
Nonius Marcellus, De compendiosa 
doctrina
II.104.28-30 83 (n.440)
Otfired von Weißenburg,  
Evangelienbuch 
III, c.25 34 (n.111)
Ovidius, Ars Amandi
III.382-385 58 (n.266)
Ovidius, Metamorphoses
VII.841 209 (n.84)
X.174ff, esp. 196ff.  215
Phaedrus, Fabulae Aesopiae
III.6.3 33 (n.106), 34 (n.110)
Plato, Leges
869C 50 (n.221)
Plautus, Bacchides
III.3 217 (n.121)
Plutarchus, Pericles 
36.3 69-70
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Plutarchus, Tiberius Gracchus
X.7 34 (n.110, 111)
Pollux, Onomasticon 
I.91 35 (n.115)
Polybius, Historiae
XVI.15.2 35 (n.116)
Porphyrio 
on Horatius’ Sermones  
I.3.130ff. 40
Procopius, De bello Vandalico
I.17 35 (n.116)
(Pseudo-)Quintilianus, Declamatio 
Maior 
XIII 22 (n.45), 70-71
XIII.11 206-207
Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria
III.5.10 51 (n.225)
V.10.38-40 65 (n.306), 85 (n.451)
V.10.58-63 24 (n.55)
V.10.71-72 50-52
V.10.94 52 (n.232)
V.11.39 268 (n.407)
VII.9.15 219, 221
Seneca (Minor), De beneficiis 
II.17.3-5 83 (n.440)
II.32 83 (n.440)
V.8.4 83 (n.440)
VII.18 83 (n.440)
Seneca (Minor), Epistulae
104.33 83 (n.441)
Seneca (Maior), Controversiae
VI.6 268 (n.407)
VII.3.6 268 (n. 407)
Servius Grammaticus, 
on Vergilius, Aeneis  
VII.664 32 (n.96, 97), 33, 34 (n. 110)
Silius Italicus, Punica
III.250 34 (n.110)
Strabo, Geographica
V.3.8 217 (n.122)
Suetonius, Augustus
83 57 (n.259)
Suetonius, Claudius
XIII.1 33 (n.102), 34 (n.110)
Suetonius, Domitianus
XVII.1 34 (n.110)
Suetonius, Nero
XXVI.2 43 (n.181)
Tacitus, Historiae
I.64 43 (n.181)
Theodoretus Cyrensis,  
Historia ecclesiastica
IV.26.2 58 (n.264)
Valerius Maximus,  
Facta et dicta memorabilia  
I.7 ext. 4 209 (n.84)
Varro, De lingua Latina
V.35 41 (n.164)
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Vegetius, Epitoma rei militari
II.23 58 (n.262)
Vergilius, Aeneis
VII.162 58 (n.216)
VII.664 32-33
IX.431 79 (n.404)
Xenophon, Hellenica
VI.2.27 35 (n.116)
Zosimus, Historia nova
IV.54 57 (n.257)
CANON LAW
Decretum Gratiani
D.35 c.1 157-158 (n.306)
D.50 c.6 238 (n.249)
D.50 c.37 149, 153, 154 (n.287), 238
D.50 c.39 149 (n.260), 238 (n.249)
D.50 c.43-44 238 (n.249)
D.50 c.50 149, 153 (n.287), 154-155
C.14 q.6 c.1 148
C.15 q.1 p.c.2  238 (n.246)
C.22 q.2 c.18 164 (n.349)
C.22 q.4 c.22 §2 166 (n.370)
C.23 q.4 c.38 176-177
C.23 q.5 c.8 149 (n.258)
C.31 q.2 c.4 170 (n.388)
C.32 q.4 c.2 164 (n.349)
C.32 q.6 c.1 171 (n.396)
Gloss penitus 
ad C.15 q.1 p.c.2  238 (n.248)
Gloss bonum 
ad C.23 q.5 c.8  149 (n.262), 150  
 (n.265)
Quinque compilationes antiquae
1 Comp. 5.10.9 153 (n.287), 154,  
 155, 156, 175
1 Comp. 5.10.10 154, 163, 168
3 Comp. 5.8.1 168
3 Comp. 5.14.4 165 (n.355)
4 Comp. 3.1.4 165
5 Comp. 5.6.2 152 (n.277)
Decretales Gregorii IX (Liber Extra, 
1234)
X 1.41.1 174 (n.410)
X 2.13.12 129 (n.139), 275 (n.450), 
 276
X 3.1.2 165-166 (n.364)
X 3.1.15 165
X 5.12.8 108, 121 (n.95), 147, 153  
  (n.287), 154, 155, 156-163, 164, 
165, 167 (n. 376), 175, 
X 5.12.9 108, 147, 154, 156, 163-168,  
 186, 235, 377
X 5.16.6 108, 147, 168-173, 175   
 (n.416), 265 (n. 395)
X 5.16.7 265 (n. 395), 270 (n.422)
X 5.31.11 165 (n.355)
X 5.31.18 268
X 5.36.3 162 (n.337), 183
X 5.36.9 147 (n.243), 223 (n.155)
Gloss dederunt 
ad X 2.20.9 149 (n.262), 150  
 (n.265)
Gloss ludum 
ad X 5.12.8 159 (n.313)
Gloss eiusdem Diaconi
ad X 5.12.8 159 (n.312)
Gloss Romanis Pontificis 
ad X 5.12.8  159 (n.318), 166,  
 167 (n.375), 168
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Gloss luderet 
ad X 5.12.9  164 (n.349)
Gloss proiecit istum ad terram 
ad X 5.12.9  165 (n.359)
Gloss libere 
ad X 5.12.9 167 (n.373, 376)
Gloss spontanea 
ad X 5.16.6 170 (n.385)
Gloss euidentiam 
ad X 5.16.6 170 (n.387)
Gloss confessionem 
ad X 5.16.6 170 (n.388)
Gloss cessante 
ad X 5.16.6 171 (n.395)
Gloss mutua compensatione 
ad X 5.16.6  172 (n.397)
Gloss alioquin 
ad X 5.16.6 170 (n.383)
Liber Sextus Bonifatii VIII (1298)
VI 1.12.1 173, 175 (n.416)
VI 3.4.11 177
VI 5.12.4 148
VI 5.12.65 174
VI 5.12.86 108, 145, 147, 152  
  (n.279), 175-177, 182 (n.446), 186, 
257 (n.352), 262 (n.373, 375), 265 
(n.396), 274 (n.442), 283 (n.488), 
290
Gloss commentum 
ad VI 1.21.1  116 (n.63), 173-174
Gloss damnum 
ad VI 5.12.86 116 (n.63), 142  
  (n.223), 174 (n.411), 176, 177 
(n.429)
(MEDIEVAL) INDIGENOUS LAW
Bretha Étgid 
§ 30 182
Codex Euricianus 
283 180 (n.437)
Klagspiegel, de actione legis aquilie 
Blatt XCIXv 179 (n.434)
Leges Frisionum 
titulus 22 34 (n.111)
Leges Visigothorum
III.4.8 180 (n.435, 437)
V.5.6 180 (n.436, 437)
VIII.4.18 180 (n.437)
Liutprandi Leges Anni XXI
cap. 136 180-181
Matthäus von Normann, Wendisch-
Rügianisches Landgebrauch
tit. 177, al. 4 and 5 183
Nicolaus Wurm, Blume von Magdeburg 
II.3.98 181 (n.442)
 
Sachsenspiegel 
II.48(.2) 181-182
CODES OF MARITIME LAW
Consolato del mare
cap. 33 242 (n.263)
cap. 34 242 (n.263)
cap. 157 318 (n.79) 
cap. 183 242 (n.263) 
Rôles d’Oléron
Art. 14 246 (n.289), 318 (n.81, 83)
Wisbuische Zee-rechten
Art. 27 243 (n.274)
Art. 48 243 (n.274), 246 (n.290)
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Art. 49 246 (n.290)
Art. 50 246 (n.290), 248 (n.302) 
Art. 68 243 (n.274)
Art. 70 248 (n.302)
Art. 71 246 (n.290)
Art. 73 248 (n.302)
CASTILIAN-SPANISH LEGISLATION
Siete Partidas 
I.6.15 162 (n.333)
Fuero Real
IV.7.7 217 (n.123)
Nueva Recopilacion
VIII.7.8 217 (n.123)
VIII.23.3 217 (n.123)
Novísima Recopilación
XII.23.7 217 (n.123)
XII.21.4 217 (n.123)
 
AUSTRIAN LAW
Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(1811)
§ 1304 298, 311, 312 (n.42, 43), 317,  
 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 387 (n.14)
DUTCH LAW
Placaet ende Ordonnantie, Op ’t stuck 
vande Zee-Rechten (1551)
Art. 46 243 (n.274), 250 (n.315),   
 253 (n.333)
Art. 48 243 (n.274)
Art. 49 246 (n.291)
Ordonnantie, Statuyt ende eeuwige 
Edict etc. (1563), title 5
Art. 1 243 (n.274), 247 (n.298),  
 250 (n.316), 253 (n.333)
Art. 2 250 (n.316)
Art. 3  243 (n.274), 250 (n.316),  
 252-255
Art. 4 246 (n.292) 
Instructie van den Hoogen Raedt (1582)
§ 20 249 (n.309)
Ordonnantie of Rotterdam (1721)
Art. 167 242 (n.267)
Art. 255 250 (n.317)
Art. 262 253 (n.338), 254
Instructie of Dordrecht (1775)
Art. 172 250 (n.318)
Art. 179 253 (n. 338)
Wetboek van Koophandel (1830)
Art. 413 251 (n.329)
Burgerlijk Wetboek (1838)
Art. 1392 326 (n.142)
Art. 1401 328, 329 (n.155), 330  
 (n.227)
Art. 1402 328
Art. (7A:) 1638x  339 (n.225), 357  
 (n.334), 385 (n. 6)
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechts- 
vordering (1838)
Art. 149 (2002) 344
Wetboek van Koophandel (1838) 
Art. 276  325 (n.131)
Art. 294  325 (n.131)
Art. 534ff. 330 (n.166)
Art. 535  248 (n.306), 251 (n.329), 
  325, 329, 331
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Art. 700 327
 
Motor- en Rijwielwet (1905)
Art. 25 356 (n.331)
Wegenverkeerswet (1935)
Art. 31 356, 357 (n.332), 370, 385
Burgerlijk Wetboek (1992)
Art. 6:96 361 (n.365)
Art. 6:98  343, 347 (n.274)
Art. 6:101 1, 307 (n.20), 341,  
  343-347, 358, 361, 362, 370, 372, 
385, 387 (n.15, 16)
Art. 6:162 345
Art. 6:163  345
Art. 7:658  339 (n.225), 357 (n.334),
 361 (n.370), 385 (n.6)
Art. 7:952 339 (n.225)
Art. 8:109 356 (n.330)
 
Wegenverkeerswet (1994)
Art. 185 345 (n.257), 356-357, 361 
 (n.370), 370, 385
FRENCH LAW
Ordonnance de la Marine (1681)
II.8.2 242 (n.267)
III.7.10 243 (n.273)
Code civil (1804)
Art. 1149  310 (n.33)
Art. 1150  310, 312
Art. 1151  310, 312
Art. 1382  310 (n.29), 313, 316, 351,  
 355
Art. 1383  313, 351
Art. 1384  311 (n.40), 316, 351, 355,  
 369, 384
Art. 1599 311 (n.37)
Code de commerce (1807; modification 
1915)
Art. 407 318 (n. 84), 367 (n.397)
Loi concernant les responsabilités 
des accidents dont les ouvriers sont 
victimes dans leur travail (1898)
Art. 20 317 (n.75)
Loi relative aux événements de mer 
(1967)
Art. 4 318 (n.84)
Loi tendant à l’amélioration de la 
situation des victimes d’accidents 
de la circulation et à l’accélération 
des procédures d’indemnisation (Loi 
Badinter; 1985)
Art. 1 353 
Art. 2 353 (n.308, 309)
Art. 3 350-351 (n.291), 354, 369,  
 384 
Art. 4  350 (n.291), 354, 355, 369, 
 384
Art. 5  353 (n.308)
GERMAN LAW
Halsgerichtsordnung of Bamberg 
(1507)
Art. 172 236
Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (1532)
Art. 146 84, 235-237
Landrecht des Hertogtums Preußen 
(1620)
Art 4, § 4 of title 10, book 6  
 190 (n.3)
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Art 6, § 2 of title 5, book 6  
 237-238
Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus 
Civilis (1756)
IV 1 § 20 308 (n.23)
IV 2 § 5 308 (n.23)
IV 3 § 16 308 (n.23)
Allgemeines Landrecht für die 
preußischen Staaten (1794)
ALR I.3 §§ 27f. 298 (n.576)
ALR I.6 § 18 308 (n.24)
ALR I.6 § 19 308 (n.24), 309
ALR I.6 § 20 308-309
ALR I.6 § 21 308 (n.24), 309
ALR I.6 § 22 248 (n.306), 309  
 (n.24)
ALR II.8 § 1930  248 (n.306)
ALR II.8 §§ 1911f.  309 (n.28)
Allgemeines Deutsches Handels-
gesetzbuch (1861)
Art. 737 321 (n.105)
Reichscivilprozessordnung (1877)
§ 260 324 (n. 368)
Zivilprozeßordnung (1900)
§ 287 324, 368
Handelsgesetzbuch (1897)
§ 736  321 (n.105)
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1900)
§ 242  336
§ 254  298, 303 (n.2), 321 (n.104),  
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samenvatting en conclusies
EIGEN SCHULD 
EEN HISTORISCHE EN RECHTSVERGELIJKENDE STUDIE
1. INLEIDING
In dit boek wordt de invloed van eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde bij schadever-
goedingsvorderingen uit buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid bestudeerd, en 
wel vanaf de Oudheid tot op heden. Twee hoofdthema’s staan daarbij centraal: 
(1) de historische ontwikkeling van de rol van eigen schuld bij buitencon-
tractuele aansprakelijkheid, en (2) de invloed van Romeinse, canonieke en 
inheemse regelingen met betrekking tot eigen schuld bij buitencontractuele 
aansprakelijkheid op latere doctrines en codificaties.
In het kader van de behandeling van genoemde hoofdthema’s, wordt een 
aantal deelvragen geadresseerd. Voorbeelden van deze deelvragen zijn: Wat 
was de visie van de Romeinse juristen uit de periode van het (voor)klassieke 
Romeinse recht op de rol van eigen schuld? Hoe werd het onderwerp ‘eigen 
schuld’ behandeld ten tijde van het Justiniaanse recht? Wat waren de opvat-
tingen over eigen schuld in de periode van het middeleeuwse ius commune? 
Wat was de ontwikkeling van het leerstuk van de eigen schuld vanaf de receptie 
van het Romeinse recht tot en met de codificaties van de achttiende tot en met 
de twintigste eeuw? En, ten slotte, hoe gaan hedendaagse Europese juristen 
om met het leerstuk van de eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde (met name in 
Frankrijk, Duitsland en Nederland)?
 Bij de bespreking van de moderne en hedendaagse codificaties, rechtspraak 
en doctrine (en de daaraan voorafgaande negentiende-eeuwse ontwikkeling), 
is bijzondere aandacht besteed aan de mate waarin deze codificaties, recht-
spraak en doctrines werden beïnvloed door benaderingen van eigen schuld in 
het ius commune, het natuurrecht en de Duitse Pandektistiek. Bovendien wordt 
bezien in welke mate deze rechtssystemen een eigen, unieke benadering ten 
aanzien van de rol van eigen schuld hebben ontwikkeld. Speciale aandacht 
wordt ook gegeven aan het rechtsgevolg van eigen schuld: alles-of-niets of een 
verdeling van de schade tussen laedens en gelaedeerde. Tevens wordt bezien 
welke oplossingen in verschillende periodes van de (rechts)geschiedenis 
werden gekozen en wat de dogmatische redenen waren die juristen voor deze 
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oplossingen gaven. In het onderstaande worden de belangrijkste bevindingen 
van dit boek samengevat. 
2. ROMEINSE RECHT IN DE OUDHEID
Bij de studie van het Romeinse recht in de Oudheid is een onderscheid ge-
maakt tussen de periode van het klassieke Romeinse recht en het Justiniaanse 
recht. Beide periodes in de ontwikkeling van het Romeinse recht zijn voor 
deze studie van belang. De benadering van de klassieke Romeinse juristen van 
het probleem van eigen schuld is niet alleen interessant vanuit comparatief 
juridisch perspectief, maar ook om de latere standpunten van de humanisten 
en twintigste-eeuwse geleerde (Romanistische) studies te kunnen begrijpen 
en te plaatsen. In het bijzonder dient men, om de visies van de humanisten te 
kunnen begrijpen, het gezichtspunt van het klassieke Romeinse recht in het 
hoofd te houden. Hoewel in deze studie slechts één leerstuk is bestudeerd, 
namelijk de eigen schuld, kan toch reeds worden aangetoond dat bepaalde 
clichés ter discussie moeten worden gesteld. Zo bleek bijvoorbeeld dat de 
humanisten meer geworteld waren in de juridische praktijk dan gewoonlijk 
wordt aangenomen. Om de middeleeuwse en de latere ontwikkeling van het 
leerstuk van de eigen schuld te kunnen begrijpen, dient het Justiniaanse recht 
als uitgangspunt te worden genomen.
 Wat waren de gevolgen van het gedrag van de gelaedeerde voor de 
aansprakelijkheid van de laedens? De conclusie voor ‘het Romeinse recht’ 
dat de gelaedeerde geen recht op schadevergoeding had indien zijn schuld 
had bijgedragen aan het ontstaan van de schade, is onjuist. De regel van 
D. 50.17.203 kan in het klassieke Romeinse recht namelijk niet als algemene 
regel worden gezien. Slechts omdat de compilatoren van deze tekst er in de 
Justinaanse codificatie een algemene regel hebben gemaakt, en wel door 
hem te plaatsen in de titel De diversis regulis iuris antiqui, kon hij een van de 
uitgangspunten worden voor de (middeleeuwse) theorie over eigen schuld. 
Overigens bestond er in het (post-)klassieke Romeinse recht geen specifieke 
juridische notie van ‘eigen schuld’ zoals wij die tegenwoordig kennen.
 De klassieke Romeinse juristen keken slechts of de schade, gezien de 
omstandigheden van het geval, al dan niet te wijten was aan de schuld van de 
laedens. De toepassing van de culpae compensatio-leer op teksten uit de Digesten 
moet als anachronistisch worden bestempeld, aangezien deze leer stamt uit 
de middeleeuwse periode. Bepaalde Digestenteksten, bijvoorbeeld die over de 
speerwerpers (D. 9.2.9.4), laten zien dat klassieke Romeinse juristen het culpa-
vereiste op een casuïstische wijze benaderden. Vaak maakten zij gebruik van 
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de status-theorie van Hermagoras van Temnos, die het hen mogelijk maakte 
om het juridische probleem in kwestie nauwkeuriger te beargumenteren. De 
casus uit de Digesten die in het kader van deze studie zijn bestudeerd, laten 
zien dat er geen technische (dogmatische) theorieën over eigen schuld in de 
responsa van de klassieke (Romeinse) juristen zijn te vinden.
 Vanwege het poenale karakter van de actio legis Aquiliae en de bewoording(en) 
van de lex Aquilia was de enige, uiteindelijk te beantwoorden vraag in het 
klassieke Romeinse recht of de laedens al dan niet culpoos had gehandeld. 
In het kader van de formula-procedure kon de iudex enkel de aangeklaagde 
veroordelen tot het betalen van de poena, namelijk indien hij ervan overtuigd 
was dat de vereisten van de formula vervuld waren, of hij kon hem vrijspreken 
indien hij niet tot dit laatste oordeel kwam – een tussen oplossing was niet mo-
gelijk. De mogelijkheid om de hoogte van de poena te verminderen op grond 
van eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde bestond niet. Deze zgn. alles-of-niets-
benadering werd behouden in het Justiniaanse recht en bleef gehandhaafd 
totdat de lex Aquilia haar poenale karakter in de vroegmoderne tijd verloor.
 Voor bestudering van het Justiniaanse recht kunnen de ons overgeleverde 
fragmenten over de lex Aquilia, hoewel geschreven door verschillende 
Romeinse juristen, in onderlinge samenhang worden gelezen, aangezien zij 
als onderdeel van één en dezelfde titel als wetgeving zijn uitgevaardigd door 
keizer Justinianus. Daarnaast kunnen ze worden gelezen in samenhang met 
andere teksten uit de compilatie van Justinianus, zoals D. 50.17.203, dat een 
rechtsregel bevat die vanaf de Justiniaanse tijd wordt beschouwd als een alge-
meen beginsel. Deze laatste benadering is met name zinvol bij bestudering van 
D. 9.2.9.4 en het laatste gedeelte van D. 9.2.11pr. De conclusie dat de gelaedeerde 
naar Romeins recht geen schadevergoeding kon verkrijgen indien zijn gedrag 
had bijgedragen aan het ontstaan van de schade, is enkel juist indien het 
Romeinse recht wordt geïnterpreteerd als Justiniaans recht.
 Afsluitend kan worden gesteld dat het in de Oudheid niet mogelijk was om 
(schade)vergoeding te vorderen wanneer de eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde 
had bijgedragen aan het ontstaan van  zijn verwonding of de schade. In dat 
geval zou het onredelijk zijn om de laedens een straf op te leggen. Formeel 
werd de actie tot (schade)vergoeding afgewezen vanwege het feit dat de 
vereisten van de lex Aquilia niet waren vervuld. In dit opzicht is het ook van 
belang te vermelden dat in het klassieke Romeinse recht geen mogelijkheid tot 
schuldweging bestond, maar het enkel aankwam op een waardering van het 
al dan niet schuldige gedrag van de laedens. De culpae compensatio-leer werd 
vermoedelijk pas geïntroduceerd in de middeleeuwse rechtswetenschap. Een 
afweging van fouten werd in het Justiniaanse recht naar alle waarschijnlijkheid 
ook niet gemaakt. Enkele verspreide fragmenten in de Digesten, buiten het 
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gebied van de onrechtmatig toegebrachte zaakschade om, zouden een indicatie 
kunnen geven van een beperking van de aansprakelijkheid van de laedens. 
In deze gevallen, die gevolgschades betreffen, werd de schade echter louter 
veroorzaakt door een foute gedraging van de gelaedeerde. De uitzonderlijke, 
casuïstische beslissingen in deze fragmenten vormen echter geen afdoende 
bewijs om het bestaan van een algemene regel aan te nemen tot restrictie van 
de omvang van schadevergoeding in geval van eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde; 
in elk geval bestond deze restrictie niet in de klassieke periode. Genoemde 
teksten (D. 19.1.11.12 en D. 19.1.45.1) blijken echter toch relevant omdat ze in 
latere periodes in de rechtsgeschiedenis werden gebruikt.
3. HET MIDDELEEUWSE IUS COMMUNE
3.1 De middeleeuwse bestudering van het Romeinse recht
De vraag hoe men het (eigen) handelen van de gelaedeerde juridisch moet 
kwalificeren, werd in de middeleeuwse periode voor de eerste keer expliciet 
gesteld toen de handelingen van beide betrokken partijen naast elkaar 
werden bediscussieerd. Uit de middeleeuwse interpretaties van teksten uit 
het Corpus Iuris blijkt dat ‘eigen schuld’ van de gelaedeerde werd beschouwd 
als laakbaar wangedrag dat ertoe leidde dat de gelaedeerde (in beginsel) geen 
schadevergoeding kon verkrijgen. Een gevolg van deze opvatting was dat eigen 
schuld van de gelaedeerde werd beschouwd als een juridisch probleem. In de 
middel eeuwse periode kunnen twee uitgangspunten voor het leerstuk van de 
eigen schuld worden geïdentificeerd. Het eerste uitgangspunt is de leer van 
de culpae compensatio; het tweede uitgangspunt is vereenzelvigd met de regel 
zoals neergelegd in D. 50.17.203. 
 Bij de culpae compensatio-leer namen de glossatoren de schuld van beide 
partijen in beschouwing. Zij pasten culpae compensatio toe op situaties waarin 
beide partijen schuld van dezelfde soort of in dezelfde mate hadden. De Glossa 
Ordinaria verschaft geen expliciet bewijs voor het feit dat de glossatoren van 
mening waren dat culpae compensatio enkel kon worden toegepast op gevallen 
waarin beide partijen in dezelfde mate schuld hadden aan het ontstaan van 
de schade, of ook op gevallen waarin de ernst van de schuld aan weerszijden 
ongelijk was. Daarom sloot elk soort eigen schuld, zolang deze kon worden 
gekwalificeerd als culpa, de gehele aansprakelijkheid van de laedens uit. Een 
vergelijking van de omvang van de schuld van partijen, en een verfijning in de 
zin dat een zeer geringe mate van eigen schuld niet zou leiden tot compensatio 
en dus tot het verlies van de mogelijkheid om een schadevergoeding/boete te 
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verkrijgen, werden vermoedelijk eerst door de opvolgers van de glossatoren 
gemaakt op instigatie van de canonisten. Sommige middeleeuwse legisten 
gebruikten culpae compensatio om problemen van eigen schuld op te lossen 
in gevallen van damnum iniuria datum, in het bijzonder Paulus de Castro.
 Ten aanzien van het tweede uitgangspunt kan worden opgemerkt dat 
Accursius D. 50.17.203 in verband bracht met het delictenrecht.1 Volgens 
Accursius zal de eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde hem ervan weerhouden om 
van iemand anders schadevergoeding te vorderen. De tekst van D. 50.17.203 
zou kunnen worden opgevat alsof deze uitsluitend betrekking had op de situatie 
dat er alleen schuld was aan de zijde van de gelaedeerde. Accursius meende 
echter dat de regel van D. 50.17.203 niet beperkt was tot gevallen waarin enkel 
de schuld van de laedens buiten twijfel stond. Het is echter vrij opmerkelijk 
dat de voorbeelden van toepassing van de rechtsregel van D. 50.17.203 die 
later door de commentatoren werden genoemd uitsluitend gevallen betref-
fen waarin er enkel aan de zijde van de gelaedeerde sprake was van schuld en 
derhalve geen sprake kon zijn van medeschuld.  Dit is opmerkelijk, aangezien 
Accursius de deur had opengezet voor een ruimere toepassing van de regel. 
Een laatste opmerking dient te worden gemaakt ten aanzien van de 
precieze dogmatische basis voor de afwijzing van de vordering tot schade-
vergoeding in het geval van eigen schuld. De middeleeuwse interpretaties 
van het Romeinse recht laten verschillende benaderingen zien, benaderingen 
die overigens ook aanwezig waren in de latere rechtsgeschiedenis. De eerste 
benadering betrok ook het gedrag van de gelaedeerde bij het bepalen van de 
verwijtbaarheid van de handeling van de laedens. Volgens deze benadering kon 
de handeling van de gelaedeerde dus niet echt als ‘eigen schuld’ worden gezien. 
In de tweede benadering werd gesteld dat de handeling van de gelaedeerde 
onder zijn eigen verantwoordelijkheid viel en leidde dit tot het ontbreken 
van verantwoordelijk heid en aansprakelijkheid van de laedens. Volgens de 
derde benadering werd de gelaedeerde beschouwd zelf zijn schade te hebben 
veroorzaakt en werd hem de vordering tot schadevergoeding op die grond 
geweigerd. Hij had zich immers zelf aan gevaar blootgesteld.
1 Zie glosse Quod quis ad D. 50.17.203.
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3.2 Middeleeuws canoniek recht
Volgens het canonieke recht kon eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde worden 
beschouwd als een medeoorzaak van het intreden van de schade. In dergelijke 
gevallen moest daarom worden onderzocht of de handeling van de laedens dan 
wel die van de gelaedeerde de meest nabijgelegen oorzaak (causa proxima) van 
de schade was. Het lijkt erop dat men de causale bijdragen van beide partijen 
vergeleek. Echter, veroorzaking en schuld schijnen in deze periode niet te 
worden gescheiden. Bovendien pasten de canonisten culpae compensatio op ver-
schillende terreinen toe, zij het dat het hier zelden ging om het delictenrecht, 
tenzij het delicten betrof waarbij geen van beide partijen geestelijke was. Bij 
de vraag of een geestelijke al dan niet een hogere wijding kon worden verleend, 
was dit echter volgens het commentaar van Animal op D.50 c.50 anders, omdat 
in dit geval de culpa van de geestelijke nooit kon worden gecompenseerd door 
de culpa van de gelaedeerde. De schrijver van Animal stelde ook dat de geestelijke 
nooit kon worden gepromoveerd naar een hogere rang wanneer de laedens 
en de gedode gelaedeerde beiden schuld hadden aan het feit, zelfs wanneer 
de verwijtbaarheid van de laedens geringer was dan die van de gelaedeerde.
 Twee canonisten hebben zich expliciet uitgelaten over de positie van de 
gelaedeerde in de casus van X 5.12.9. Met betrekking tot deze casus schreef 
Bernardus Parmensis dat het erin vervatte dodelijke ongeval toe te schrijven 
was aan de schuld (culpa) van de gelaedeerde. Men dient hierbij in gedachten 
te houden, dat de vraag voor de Paus in deze zaak enkel was of de geestelijke 
wel of niet met schuld gedood had en of de geestelijke derhalve wel of niet kon 
worden gepromoveerd (en ook of dispensatie noodzakelijk was). Men dient 
terughoudend te zijn met de conclusie dat de canonisten in geval van ‘eigen 
schuld’ (waarvan hier eigenlijk in het geheel geen sprake was) gewoon waren 
de partij met de grootste schuld als de enige schuldige aan te merken vanwege 
het ontbreken van de mogelijkheid om de schade tussen partijen te verdelen 
(analoge interpretatie). 
 Hostiensis (Henricus de Segusio) was van mening dat in de beschreven 
casus de gelaedeerde geestelijke zich ervan bewust had moeten zijn dat het ge-
bruikelijk was om een aan een riem bevestigd mes te dragen. Hij had voorzichtig 
moeten zijn. Het lijkt er daarom op dat ‘eigen schuld’ leidde tot de vaststelling 
dat er enkel schuld aanwezig was aan de kant van de gelaedeerde. Men kan, zoals 
sommige hedendaagse rechtsgeleerden doen, stellen dat de aansprakelijkheid 
van de laedens in kwestie wegvalt vanwege de zwaarderwegende eigen schuld 
van de gelaedeerde. Hoewel het in de betreffende rechtszaken voor de Paus in 
het geheel niet ging om de aansprakelijkheidsvraag, kan, wanneer men deze 
teksten zou bekijken vanuit een modern perspectief, worden gesteld dat de 
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meerderheid van de in het kader van deze studie bestudeerde commentaren 
van decretalisten deze theorie niet volgen. Enkel de twee zojuist genoemde 
kanttekeningen van de invloedrijke Bernardus Parmensis en Hostiensis kunnen 
een indicatie vormen van het feit dat deze theorie werd toegepast.
 Later, tegen het einde van de middeleeuwse periode, werd hoofdzakelijk 
in consilia-literatuur de term culpa admixta (letterlijk ‘gemengde schuld’) 
gebruikt om het gedrag van de gelaedeerde te kwalificeren op een manier die 
leidde tot de uitsluiting van aansprakelijkheid van de laedens. Op deze wijze 
leidde eigen schuld tot een afwijzing van de vordering van de gelaedeerde 
zonder discussie over de ernst van ieders schuld. Het gebruik van de term culpa 
admixta (of culpa communis) laat zien dat de geleden schade werd beschouwd 
als een gemeenschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid van beide partijen (laedens 
en gelaedeerde).
3.3 Enkele afsluitende woorden over het middeleeuwse  
ius commune
Een alles-of-niets benadering in het geval van ‘eigen schuld’ zoals deze hier-
boven werd beschreven, werd ook gevolgd in enkele middeleeuwse bronnen 
buiten de romano-canonieke traditie (iura propria – inheems recht). In sommige 
andere middeleeuwse bronnen (bijvoorbeeld die van het middeleeuwse Ierse 
recht) kan een verdeling van de schade in sommige gevallen echter wel worden 
gevonden. Eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde kon dan leiden tot een gedeeltelijke 
vergoeding, het zogenoemde judicium rusticorum, dat wil zeggen een reductie 
van de schadevergoeding tot 1/3 van de gehele schade. Dit judicium rusticorum 
is van belang omdat het in latere periodes in de rechtsgeschiedenis opnieuw 
voorkomt, zoals bijvoorbeeld in het Rooms-Hollandse recht.
4. DE HUMANISTISCHE BIJDRAGE
Hoewel de humanisten het initiatief namen tot de reconstructie van de 
oorspronkelijke samenhang van de Digestenfragmenten in het klassieke 
recht en aldus D. 50.17.203 trachtten terug te plaatsen in de oorspronkelijke 
klassieke context, zijn de voorbeelden van de toepassing van de in deze tekst 
vervatte regel door humanistische juristen hoofdzakelijk dezelfde als die uit 
de middeleeuwse periode. Bovendien verbonden de humanisten de regel van 
D. 50.17.203 met de gevallen van D. 9.2.52.1, D. 9.2.9.4 en D. 9.2.11pr. zonder 
te kijken naar de verschillende palingenetische contexten. Op te merken valt 
dat expliciet werd gezegd dat deze laatste teksten gevallen betroffen waarin de 
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gelaedeerde met schuld handelde. Daarnaast is het verband tussen D. 9.2.9.4 
en D. 9.2.10, zoals aangenomen door de humanisten, palingenetisch niet 
verdedigbaar, noch het feit dat D. 9.2.9.4 en D. 9.2.10 worden beschouwd als 
voorbeelden van een situatie waarin beide partijen schuld hebben. Ook bleek 
dat sommige humanistische juristen op materieelrechtelijk vlak soms sterk 
in de traditie van het mos italicus bleven staan; zo beschouwden enkelen de 
rechtsregel in D. 9.2.52.1 als een voorbeeld van een compensatie van onrecht-
matigheden, of als een voorbeeld van zelfverdediging. 
 Enkel door D. 9.2.9.4 en D. 9.2.11pr. te beschouwen als voorbeelden van 
de situatie waarin beide partijen schuldig waren aan (het ontstaan van) de 
schade, konden de schuldige handelingen vergeleken worden en kon theorie-
vorming plaatsvinden. Een van de theorieën continueert de toepassing van 
culpae compensatio. Bovendien treft men in deze theorie de eerste sporen 
aan van de gravior culpa-benadering (A. Faber) en de maior culpa-benadering 
(M. Freher en G. Noodt). Een andere, nieuwe ontwikkeling van groot belang 
was, dat wellicht H. Donellus, maar in ieder geval P. Faber en J. de Sande, voor 
het eerst in de continentale Romeinsrechtelijke traditie melding maakten van 
de mogelijkheid van een gedeeltelijke vergoeding van de schade.
5. RECEPTIE, ROOMS-HOLLANDS RECHT EN USUS MODERNUS
Mijn onderzoek naar de vraag waarom de gelaedeerde geen recht had om 
schadevergoeding te vorderen ging uit van de veronderstelling dat de algemene 
actio de damno data nog altijd was gebaseerd op de alles-of–niets benadering. 
In de vroegmoderne tijd was een algemene actie voor onrechtmatig toege-
brachte schade ontstaan, een actie die nog slechts in naam Romeins was. In 
deze periode begon ook de gedachte post te vatten, dat alleen als de schuld 
van de gelaedeerde even groot was als, of groter dan de schuld van de laedens, 
de aansprakelijkheid van de laedens verviel. Niet alle juristen volgden echter 
deze culpa maior-variant van de culpae compensatio-leer om het eigenschuld-
probleem op te lossen. Bovendien werden andere wegen bewandeld in de 
benadering van deze problematiek.
Enkele Rooms-Hollandse geleerden bleven de sedes materiae uitleggen op een 
middeleeuwse manier, maar zij probeerden bovendien de teksten te situeren 
in hun eigen tijd. Anderen pasten het criterium van de maior culpa toe. Een 
voorbeeld hiervan vormt Johannes Voet. In het Rooms-Hollands recht zijn 
in het bijzonder casus van botsingen van schepen interessant. In deze zaken 
werd een ander uitgangspunt gehanteerd dan in het Romeinse recht. Indien 
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schip A schip B zonder schuld geraakt had, moest de eigenaar van schip A nog 
steeds de helft van de schade betalen. Maar in het geval dat twee schepen tegen 
elkaar aan botsten en beide schepen hieraan schuld droegen, waren er twee 
verschillende opvattingen over wat het recht dicteerde: (1) De schade moest 
aan beide zijden gelijk worden gedragen, aangezien de schuld aan beide zijden 
gelijk was (dit was de visie van de Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-
Friesland); (2) De eigen schade diende door elke partij te worden gedragen, 
omdat iemand die schuld heeft geen actie kan instellen en omdat de schade 
niet wordt beschouwd als verhaalbare schade, cf. D. 50.17.203 (dit was de 
visie van Van Bijnkershoek en Van der Keessel). Een ander probleem vormde 
de vraag wat het recht voorschreef in het geval dat een stilliggend schip werd 
geraakt door een varend schip. Van der Keessel beschouwde de schuld van het 
laatstgenoemde schip als zwaarder, en daarom kon volgens hem geen culpae 
compensatio plaatsvinden (zie hier de toepassing van de ius commune-theorie). 
Eén schip moest daarom de helft van de schade van het andere schip dragen; 
dit is vergelijkbaar met de idee van de verdeling van schade en ook met de 
oude traditie van het judicium rusticorum, maar dan met één vernieuwing, 
namelijk dat bij culpa maior de helft van de schade van de andere partij moet 
worden vergoed.
Verscheidene dogmatische uitgangspunten om het probleem van eigen 
schuld op te lossen kunnen worden gevonden in literatuur uit de periode 
van de usus modernus in Duitsland. Door sommige usus modernus-auteurs 
werd de vraag naar het gedrag van de de gelaedeerde beschouwd als een 
causaliteitsprobleem. Door anderen werd deze vraag beschouwd als een 
schuldvraag, namelijk als een samenloop van fouten. Ook kunnen verscheidene 
varianten van culpae compensatio worden gevonden, waaronder de variant 
waarbij het loutere bestaan van eigen schuld, zelfs in een zeer geringe mate, 
leidde tot het ontnemen van de mogelijkheid om schadevergoeding te 
verkrijgen, en de variant waarbij enkel gelijke of zwaarderwegende eigen 
schuld aansprakelijkheid uitsloot (maior culpa). Nog een andere oplossing 
was om het eigenschuldprobleem op te lossen zonder enige verwijzing 
naar de eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde. In deze variant was de schuld 
van de laedens de enige relevante factor en werd de eigen schuld van de 
gelaedeerde niet beschouwd als een afzonderlijk juridisch vraagstuk. In een 
laatste oplossing, een alternatieve manier om het probleem van de eigen 
schuld op te lossen, werd voorzien door het gebruik van het criterium van de 
auctor rixae. De aanstichter van een gevecht kon geen vergoeding eisen voor 
verwondingen, opgelopen tijdens dit gevecht, tenzij de andere partij excessief 
ter zelfverdediging had gehandeld (noodweerexces).
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 In Italië was het criterium van de auctor rixae verbonden met het concept 
culpa admixta. Indien iemand een gevecht begon of een gevecht provoceerde 
(de zogenaamde auctor rixae), werd zijn schuldig gedrag gekwalificeerd als 
culpa admixta, hetgeen leidde tot het geheel afwijzen van zijn vordering tot 
schadevergoeding. De Rota Romana verkondigde hierbij soms de opvatting 
dat eigen schuld, hoe gering ook, moest leiden tot afwijzing van de schadever-
goedingsvordering, terwijl de Rota in andere gevallen  culpa maior aan de zijde 
van de gelaedeerde leek te vereisen, een visie die ook De Luca aanhing.
 Blijkbaar was er in de vroegmoderne tijd een discussie gaande over de vraag 
welk soort schades vergoed moest worden, en in het bijzonder of immateriële 
schade wel of niet voor vergoeding in aanmerking kwam. Bij ruzies kon de 
provocerende partij, als de reactie van de geprovoceerde partij excessief was, 
enkel vergoeding van medische kosten vorderen, maar - volgens de heersende 
leer - geen immateriële schadevergoeding. In twee gevallen verhinderde een 
geringe mate van eigen schuld de vordering van de gelaedeerde tot schade-
vergoeding niet, maar werd die schuld in aanmerking genomen om de omvang 
van de schadevergoedingsplicht te bepalen. Deze gevallen betreffen echter het 
al dan niet vergoeden van bepaalde soorten schades; er vond geen vermindering 
van de gehele schade plaats. De alles-of-niets-benadering moet dus voor de 
vroegmoderne periode nog steeds als geldend worden beschouwd.
6. DE NATUURRECHTSGELEERDEN
Enkele geleerden bleven de ‘oude’ ius commune-benadering volgen: bij eigen 
schuld van de gelaedeerde paste men simpelweg de regel van D. 50.17.203 
toe. In dergelijke gevallen leidde de toepassing van deze regel ertoe dat de 
vordering tot schadevergoeding in haar geheel verviel. Mogelijkerwijze werd 
deze benadering toegepast door Grotius, maar in ieder geval deden Domat en 
Pothier dit. Anderen, zoals Pufendorf and Thomasius, pasten het criterium van 
culpa maior toe. In beide benaderingen was het juridische gevolg hetzelfde: 
als er eigen schuld was aan de zijde van de gelaedeerde respectievelijk als de 
eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde zwaarder woog dan de schuld van de laedens, 
werd de vordering tot schadevergoeding van eerstgenoemde afgewezen. In dit 
opzicht werd de alles-of-niets-benadering nog steeds toegepast. 
 De mogelijkheid tot verdeling van schade tussen de laedens en de 
gelaedeerde (in evenredigheid met de mate van ieders schuld, respectievelijk 
met de mate van de causale bijdrage van de handeling van elke partij), vindt 
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zijn oorsprong in de ‘Aufklärungstheorie’ van Christian Wolff2 en is dan ook 
een relatief recent fenomeen. Maar de beoordeling en de afweging van de 
respectieve gradaties van schuld van partijen was reeds een stap in deze 
richting. Hoewel Wolff het traditionele alles-of-niets-beginsel als eerste 
opzij heeft gezet, kan zijn benadering dus tevens als voortzetting van de 
eraan voorafgaande ontwikkeling worden gezien. Wolff behandelde eigen 
schuld niet op abstracte wijze, maar enkel in verband met concrete gevallen. 
Hij behandelde de vergoedingsplicht niet in het kader van een gepleegde 
onrechtmatige daad. In dit verband is het eerdergenoemde en oudere geval, 
opgenomen in de Selectae decisiones van Schoepff, een veel duidelijker 
voorbeeld van een gedeeltelijke vergoeding van schade bij aansprakelijkheid 
voor onrechtmatig toegebrachte schade, in die zin dat bepaalde specifieke 
soorten schades (namelijk de kosten van levensonderhoud) niet verhaalbaar 
zijn vanwege de eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde.
7. HET CONCEPT ‘EIGEN SCHULD’ IN DE NEGENTIENDE EEUW
De France Code civil (1804) bevat geen algemene bepaling over eigen schuld. 
Eigen schuld werd wel behandeld in de rechtspraak, in het bijzonder van de 
Cour de cassation. Aan het einde van de negentiende eeuw leidde de situatie 
waarin gelaedeerde en laedens beiden schuld hadden aan de schade (dit 
werd gekarakteriseerd als faute commune) tot een verdeling van de schade in 
evenredigheid met de omvang van ieders schuld. De ontwikkeling in Frankrijk 
werd geïnitieerd door de acceptatie van de discretionaire bevoegdheid van de 
rechter bij de waardering van de vraag of, in gevallen waarin beide partijen 
schuld hadden aan het ontstaan van de schade, genoemde schuld aanleiding 
zou geven tot aansprakelijkheid en bij het vaststellen van het door elk der par-
tijen te dragen deel van de schade. Een verdeling op basis van de omvang van 
ieders schuld werd geaccepteerd door de meerderheid van de rechtsgeleerden 
en rechters, hoewel die laatsten aanvankelijk vasthielden aan de toepassing 
van het beginsel zoals neergelegd in D. 50.17.203 (dit hoewel de Digesten geen 
formele bron van recht vormden – een directe verwijzing naar D. 50.17.203 
heb ik dan ook niet gevonden), wat leidde tot de afwijzing van de vordering 
tot schadevergoeding. Hoewel in Frankrijk geen (directe) verwijzing naar 
het werk van Wolff kon worden gevonden, is het mogelijk dat zijn ideeën een 
bestanddeel hebben gevormd van de intellectuele bagage van de negentiende-
2 Hij was van mening dat wanneer zowel laedens als gelaedeerde schuld hadden aan 
het ontstaan van een schade, die schade moest worden gedragen door beide partijen in 
evenredigheid met de omvang van ieders schuld.
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eeuwse Franse juristen. De gevolgen van de oplossing die werd geboden door 
de Franse doctrine waren niet exact hetzelfde als die Wolff voor ogen had, maar 
de juridische gevolgen waren wel min of meer gelijk. Wolffs opvatting werd 
overigens gecodificeerd in § 1304 van het Oostenrijkse Allgemeine Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch (1811), in welk wetsartikel tevens discretionaire bevoegdheid aan de 
rechter werd gegeven ten aanzien van de bepaling van de gevolgen van eigen 
schuld van de gelaedeerde.
De situatie in het negentiende-eeuwse Duitsland was anders. De juristen 
van de Historische School reproduceerden enkel Romeinsrechtelijke teksten 
en verdedigden de opvatting dat er geen aanspraak op schadevergoeding kon 
bestaan wanneer de gelaedeerde zelf (enige) schuld had aan (het ontstaan 
van) zijn eigen schade. Daarentegen werd ook in de op de praktijk gerichte 
literatuur het criterium van de maior culpa toegepast. Ten aanzien van de 
alles-of-niets-benadering vond er bovendien in dit literaire genre een aanpas-
sing plaats, omdat gesteld werd dat volgens de beginselen, opgenomen in 
D. 19.1.11.12 en D. 19.1.45.1, de individuele gevolgschades waarvoor de gelaedeerde 
aansprakelijk was niet konden worden toegeschreven aan de laedens. Dit was 
in feite een eerste poging om te ontsnappen aan de alles-of-niets-benadering 
(en dus de ius commune-traditie). Desalniettemin overleefde de maior 
culpa-variant, en wel in de Duitse usus modernus in de negentiende eeuw. 
De Pandektisten zochten naar nieuwe dogmatische gronden om de afwij-
zing van de vordering tot schadevergoeding in het geval van eigen schuld te 
rechtvaardigen. Hun theorieën waren hoofdzakelijk causaliteitstheorieën, 
gebaseerd op de gedachte van een verbreking van het causaal verband tussen 
het gedrag van de laedens en de geleden schade in het geval van eigen schuld 
van de gelaedeerde. Een leer die hier (vaak) mee verbonden was, was de leer 
van de schuldcompensatie (culpae compensatio), (nu) gebaseerd op de regel 
van D. 50.17.203. Later werd de billijkheid beschouwd als de grondslag van de 
regel van D. 50.17.203. In de rechtspraktijk wezen rechters de vordering van 
de gelaedeerde reeds af bij een geringe mate van eigen schuld. Ter vermijding 
van onbillijke uitkomsten, verzette men zich in de rechtspraktijk echter in 
toenemende mate tegen deze benadering. In 1883 werd een vermindering 
van de omvang van de vergoedingsplicht in het geval van eigen schuld voor 
het eerst aanvaard door het Duitse Reichsgericht. In Zwitserland was, net 
iets eerder, de natuurrechtelijke oplossing (in het bijzonder in artikel 51 II 
van het Schweizerische Obligationenrecht 1881) gecodificeerd, onder invloed 
van zowel het Oostenrijkse Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch als ook van de 
Franse rechtsgeleerde doctrine. Uiteindelijk werd door de samenstellers van 
het Duitse Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1900) ten aanzien van het leerstuk van de 
eigen schuld de oplossing van het Zwitserse wetboek als voorbeeld genomen 
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en werd, ook onder invloed van de rechtspraak, de Zwitserse regeling integraal 
overgenomen.
 In het Nederlandse Burgerlijk Wetboek van 1838 kwam geen algemene be-
paling inzake eigen schuld voor. Tot aan het begin van de twintigste eeuw werd 
een afweging gemaakt van de zwaarte van de wederzijdse fouten van partijen, 
in die zin dat het beslissend was wie de meest zwaarwegende schuld had. Enkel 
wanneer de eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde minder ernstig was dan die van 
de laedens, had de gelaedeerde recht op schadevergoeding, dat wil zeggen op 
een vergoeding van 100 %. De alles-of-niets-benadering, gebaseerd op de maior 
culpa-variant van de culpae compensatio-doctrine, werd nog steeds gevolgd. De 
juridische basis voor het ontbreken van een vordering tot schadevergoeding 
wanneer de eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde had bijgedragen aan het ontstaan 
van de schade bleef gedurende de hele twintigste eeuw betwist. Volgens de 
meerderheidsopvattingen was het echter de billijkheid, die tot het ontbreken 
van de vordering aanleiding gaf. Men stelde dat de schade diende te worden 
aangerekend aan het slachtoffer indien het had kunnen voorkomen dat het 
ongeval geschiedde. Er kwam pas een einde aan de alles-of-niets-benadering 
toen de Hoge Raad in een arrest uit 1916 besliste dat de vergoedingsplicht moet 
worden afgemeten naar de mate waarin ieders schuld heeft meegewerkt tot 
het veroorzaken van de schade.
8. HET LEERSTUK VAN DE ‘EIGEN SCHULD’ IN HET  
HEDENDAAGSE RECHT
Tegenwoordig is in Frankrijk de verdeling van de schade bij buitencontractuele 
aansprakelijkheid gebaseerd op de ernst van de fouten van partijen. Eigen 
schuld lijkt (geheel of gedeeltelijk) het causale verband tussen de handeling 
van de laedens en de schade te hebben verbroken. In beginsel leidt een faute 
de la victime tot een gedeeltelijke vergoeding van diens schade. De vordering 
tot schadevergoeding wordt enkel geweigerd indien de faute de la victime kan 
worden gezien als een externe oorzaak van de schade, die onvoorzienbaar 
en onvermijdelijk was, en die de enige oorzaak van de schade vormt. Naast 
de ernst van de fouten worden ook andere omstandigheden in aanmerking 
genomen bij de afweging, bijvoorbeeld de causale invloed. Bovendien behoeft 
er, als de faute van de gelaedeerde veel ernstiger is dan die van de laedens, 
dat wil zeggen bij opzettelijk wangedrag, provocatie of toestemming van de 
gelaedeerde, geen schadevergoeding te worden betaald. 
 Met betrekking tot de risicoaansprakelijkheid van art. 1384 Code civil was 
aanvankelijk een algehele bevrijding van de vergoedingsplicht van de laedens 
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enkel mogelijk in het geval van een van buitenaf komende oorzaak, dat wil 
zeggen een fait de la victime dat onvoorzienbaar en onvermijdbaar was. Vanaf 
1934 was een vermindering van de omvang van de vergoedingsplicht bij eigen 
schuld mogelijk. Deze werd gebaseerd op de ernst van ieders fout en wel tot 
1982, toen de Cour de cassation besliste dat een dergelijke verdeling in het geval 
van eigen schuld niet meer mogelijk was (Desmares zaak), wat in feite een 
terugkeer naar de alles-of-niets-benadering inhield. Kort na de hervorming 
door de Loi Badinter in 1987 kwam de Cour de cassation terug op de Desmares-
beslissing en voerde opnieuw het beginsel in, dat de houder (gardien) van een 
object gedeeltelijk bevrijd is van zijn vergoedingsplicht wanneer de faute van 
het slachtoffer bijgedragen heeft aan het ontstaan van de schade die veroor-
zaakt werd door de zaak (voor gevallen die niet vielen onder de Loi Badinter). 
Indien de eigen schuld van het slachtoffer kan worden gekarakteriseerd als 
een van buitenaf komende oorzaak die leidt tot force majeure, wordt natuurlijk 
geen aansprakelijkheid aangenomen.
 Met betrekking tot verkeersongevallen hanteert het Franse recht, op grond 
van de Loi Badinter (1985), een algemene regel tot een in beginsel volledige 
vergoedingsplicht voor personenschade voor de eigenaar of houder (of de 
aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar) van gemotoriseerde voertuigen. De regels 
over ‘eigen schuld’ kunnen worden gevonden in art. 3 en 4 van de Loi Badinter. 
Deze verschillen aanzienlijk van de normale regels over eigen schuld in het 
Franse onrechtmatigedaadsrecht. Voor ongemotoriseerde verkeersslachtoffers 
wordt in het Franse recht nog steeds een alles-of-niets-benadering toegepast. 
Indien het slachtoffer behoort tot een speciale categorie van beschermde 
personen (kinderen onder de 16 jaar, personen ouder dan 70 jaar of personen 
met een blijvende invaliditeit van 80 procent of meer), zal steeds volledige 
schadevergoeding moeten worden betaald. Alleen in geval de tot deze catego-
rie behorende gelaedeerde de schade (vrijwillig) over zich heeft afgeroepen, 
dat wil zeggen in het geval hij opzettelijk handelde, heeft hij geen recht op 
schadevergoeding. Voor andere personen – slachtoffers – wordt 100 procent 
van de schade vergoed, tenzij er sprake is van een onverschoonbare fout van de 
gelaedeerde en die fout tevens wordt aangemerkt als de uitsluitende oorzaak 
van de schade. Hetzelfde geldt als het slachtoffer de schade (vrijwillig) over 
zich heeft afgeroepen, dat wil zeggen in het geval hij opzettelijk handelde. In 
dit geval heeft het slachtoffer geen enkel recht op schadevergoeding. 
 In Duitsland werd Mitverschulden gecodificeerd in § 254 van het Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch (1900). De toepassing van dit wetsartikel leidt tot een schadever-
deling die is gebaseerd op de omstandigheden van het geval, en die in het 
bijzonder afhankelijk is van de vraag in hoeverre de schade overwegend door 
de ene of de andere partij veroorzaakt is. Hoewel de primaire verdelings-
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maatstaf de causaliteit is, kunnen bij de secundaire verdelingsmaatstaf andere 
omstandigheden (waaronder schuld) in aanmerking worden genomen. Met 
§ 254 van het Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch is door de Duitse wetgever afstand 
genomen van de leer van de schuldcompensatie. In 1891, kort voor invoering 
van dit artikel, had het Reichsgericht genoemde leer nog toegepast, waarbij 
enkel een uitzondering werd gemaakt voor gevallen waarin de eigen schuld 
onbetekenend was. Net als in § 1304 van het Oostenrijkse Allgemeine Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch, werd in § 254 van het Duitse Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch de rechter 
discretionaire bevoegdheid geboden. Hoewel in § 254 het criterium van de 
vorwiegende Verursachung centraal stond, bleef het Reichsgericht de doctrine 
van de zogenoemde hoofdschuld toepassen. Dit betekende dat de vraag of 
de schade overwegend door de ene of door de andere partij veroorzaakt was, 
reeds vanaf het begin van de twintigste eeuw werd geïnterpreteerd als de vraag 
welke partij de grootste schuld had (überwiegende Verschulden). In Duitsland 
is de verdelingsgedachte van § 254 BGB ook overgenomen in § 9 StVG: indien 
de eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde (niet zijnde een houder of een bestuurder 
van een motorvoertuig) heeft bijgedragen tot het ontstaan van de schade, is 
§ 254 BGB toepasselijk. 
 In Nederland voorziet art. 6:101 BW (1992) in een vermindering van de om-
vang van de vergoedingsplicht bij eigen schuld aan de zijde van de gelaedeerde 
door de schade over gelaedeerde en laedens te verdelen in evenredigheid met 
de mate waarin de aan elke partij toe te rekenen omstandigheden tot de schade 
hebben bijgedragen. In art. 6:101 zijn twee maatstaven voor verdeling te vinden: 
de primaire maatstaf is causaliteit gebaseerd op de veroorzakingswaarschijn-
lijkheid, en de secundaire maatstaf is de billijkheid, waarbij de uiteenlopende 
ernst van de gemaakte fouten en eventuele andere omstandigheden van het 
geval kunnen worden meegewogen. Bij verkeersongevallen tussen een gemo-
toriseerde verkeersdeelnemer en een ongemotoriseerde verkeersdeelnemer 
(voetganger of fietser) worden art. 185 WVW 1994 (art. 31 (oud) WVW 1935) 
en regels uit de rechtspraak over die specifieke situatie toegepast. Dit komt 
er in de praktijk op neer dat de billijkheidscorrectie van art. 6:101 BW wordt 
ingevuld door de zogenaamde 100%- en 50%-regels die zijn ontwikkeld in 
de rechtspraak van de Hoge Raad. In dit kader kan men beargumenteren dat 
de alles-of-niets-benadering opnieuw geïntroduceerd is – in ieder geval bij 
toepassing van de 100%-regel3 – en de laedens enkel van het geheel van zijn 
3 Dit geldt ook voor werkgevers: zoals reeds het geval was met art. 1638x lid 2 (oud) 
Burgerlijk Wetboek 1838, wordt volgens art. 7:658 lid 2 (nieuw) Burgerlijk Wetboek de alles-
of-niets-benadering nog steeds toegepast in het geval van eigen schuld bij arbeidsongevallen: 
het eigenschuldverweer slaagt enkel indien opzettelijke of moedwillige roekeloosheid van de 
werknemer substantieel heeft bijgedragen aan diens schade.
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vergoedingsplicht kan worden bevrijd wanneer sprake is van opzet of daaraan 
grenzende roekeloosheid van de gelaedeerde, in welk geval in het geheel geen 
vergoeding behoeft te worden betaald. Indien het ongemotoriseerde slachtoffer 
jonger dan 14 jaar is, dient de gehele schade te worden vergoed. Bij een leeftijd 
van 14 jaar of ouder, komt in beginsel tenminste 50% van de schade voor ver-
goeding in aanmerking.
9. AFSLUITING
Het is dienstig enkele systematische afsluitende opmerkingen te maken. Een 
eerste opmerking betreft de vraag welke oplossingen in de rechtsgeschiedenis 
zijn aangedragen voor het eigenschuldprobleem. Alvorens een eerste onder-
scheid ter beantwoording van deze vraag te maken, kan worden gesteld dat 
het gedrag van de gelaedeerde regelmatig in aanmerking werd genomen bij 
beantwoording van de vraag of de laedens al dan niet met schuld had gehandeld 
en of de laedens de handeling al dan niet kon worden toegerekend. Ook 
worden gevallen gevonden waar de door de gelaedeerde geleden schade enkel 
was veroorzaakt door hemzelf en waarin derhalve geen schuld kon worden 
toegerekend aan een ander. In beide situaties is, in strikte zin, geen sprake van 
‘eigen schuld’ in de zin van medeschuld.
 Voor de situaties waarin het handelen van de gelaedeerde slechts had bi-
jgedragen aan het ontstaan van de schade, worden in de rechtsgeschiedenis 
twee benaderingen gevonden: alles-of-niets (I) of een verdeling van de schade 
(II). De alles-of-niets-benadering (I) kende verschillende varianten. De vor-
dering van de gelaedeerde werd afgewezen: (a) wanneer de gelaedeerde enige 
schuld had,4 (b) wanneer de schuld van de gelaedeerde gelijk of groter was 
dan die van de laedens,5 en (c) wanneer de gelaedeerde met grove schuld of 
opzet had gehandeld.6 Gedurende de gehele rechtsgeschiedenis vloeide het 
afwijzen van een vordering voort uit uiteenlopende oorzaken of werd zij dog-
matisch onderbouwd op uiteenlopende wijzen: soms was het een gevolg van 
4 Cf. de middeleeuwse legisten, de meeste decretalisten, sommige juristen uit de vroegmoderne 
tijd, sommige natuurrechtsgeleerden, en verschillende 19de-eeuwse Pandektisten. Zie ook de 19de-
eeuwse Duitse rechtspraak en de Franse rechtspraak aan het begin van de 19de eeuw.
5 Het criterium van de culpa maior wordt niet alleen in werken van verschillende juristen 
uit de vroegmoderne periode gevonden, maar ook in het middeleeuwse commentaar Animal 
est substantia (en mogelijkerwijs tevens in de werken van enkele decretalisten) en in de werken 
van sommige humanisten en diverse natuurrechtsgeleerden. Het is ook terug te vinden in de 
19de-eeuwse Nederlandse rechtspraak en rechtsgeleerde literatuur, in de 19de-eeuwse Duitse 
praktijkliteratuur en in de latere 19de-eeuwse Duitse rechtspraak.
6 Deze variant kan worden gevonden in het moderne Franse en Nederlandse recht ten 
aanzien van letselschade bij verkeersongevallen.
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het proces recht of van het poenale karakter van de civiele aansprakelijk heid, 
soms ook op een strikte toepassing van regels van Romeinse recht, soms op 
causaliteitstheorieën (onderbreking causaal verband), soms op de leer der 
schuldcompensatie (culpae compensatio) en in andere gevallen op sociaal-
politieke gronden (bijvoorbeeld het aan het gemotoriseerd verkeer verbonden 
gevaar: Betriebsgefahr). Ook werden de (causale) bijdragen aan het ontstaan 
van de schade van laedens en gelaedeerde met elkaar vergeleken. Wanneer 
men tot de conclusie kwan dat de handeling van de gelaedeerde was te be-
schouwen als de meest onmiddellijke oorzaak (causa proxima) van de schade, 
werd de schadevordering van de gelaedeerde afgewezen. 7
De tweede benadering, waarbij een verdeling van de schade mogelijk werd 
geacht (II), valt uiteen in twee subgroepen: (a) een verdeling tussen partijen 
in die zin dat enkele schadeposten geheel door de gelaedeerde moesten 
worden gedragen,8 of (b) een verdeling van de totale schade tussen laedens 
en gelaedeerde.9 Hoewel de mogelijkheid tot verdeling werd voorgesteld en 
verdedigd door Wolff, werd zijn voorstel niet meteen in het juridische domein 
overgenomen.10
 De verdeling van de gehele schade (b) kan plaatsvinden op grond van een 
of meer van de volgende criteria: de zwaarte van ieders schuld,11 de causale 
bijdrage van elke partij aan de schade,12 en de billijkheid.13 De nadruk werd 
op verschillende plaatsen en op verschillende momenten in de tijd steeds 
anders gelegd: soms werd (sommige van) genoemde criteria een gelijke 
waarde toegekend, maar soms ook werd een van genoemde criteria gebruikt 
als correctief op een van de andere criteria. De verdeling kon leiden tot 
7 Deze variant kan worden gevonden in het canonieke recht.
8 Zie het Justiniaanse recht wat betreft enkele gevallen buiten het gebied van de 
onrechtmatig toegebrachte schade, en de vroegmoderne periode wat betreft gevallen van ruzies 
waar in het bijzonder immateriële schade soms als niet-compenseerbaar werd beschouwd 
vanwege het feit dat de gelaedeerde met de ruzie was begonnen.
9 Ik heb de toepassing van een dergelijke verdeling reeds in de middeleeuwse periode 
aangetroffen, en wel buiten het ius commune (ze leidde tot een verdeling van 50/50 of van 1/3–
2/3); in het ius commune bleef de alles-of-niets-benadering gehandhaafd tot en met het einde 
van de vroegmoderne periode en tot op zekere hoogte zelfs tot in de 19de eeuw.
10 De eerste sporen van een overweging om de schade te verdelen kunnen al worden 
gevonden bij de humanisten, zoals hierboven beschreven.
11 Zoals werd voorgesteld door Christian Wolff (hoewel het algemeen geaccepteerd is dat 
dit vereiste in zijn theorie ook causaliteit omvatte); het is de oplossing die is gecodificeerd in 
§1304 ABGB, geaccepteerd in de Franse jurisprudentie en doctrine in de 19de eeuw, toegepast 
door het Duitse Reichsgericht aan het einde van de 19de eeuw (1883; zelfs na de codificatie van 
de nieuwe beslissende maatstaf in §254 BGB bleef dit de benadering van het Reichsgericht), en 
geaccepteerd door de Nederlandse Hoge Raad in 1916.
12 Gecodificeerd in Duitsland in §254 BGB en als eerste criterium opgenomen in het 
Nederlandse art. 6:101 BW (1992).
13  Zie het tweede (correctieve) criterium dat is gecodificeerd in het Nederlandse Art. 6:101 BW.
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bepaalde percentages of quota. Normaal gesproken waren percentages tussen 
0 en 100 procent mogelijk, hoewel kleine percentages aan een van beide 
zijden gewoonlijk niet werden toegestaan. Een 50/50-verdeling wordt ook 
gevonden,14 soms als resultante van een verdeling in percentages of quota, 
soms als alternatieve oplossing (subsidiair), soms als standaardoplossing.
Hoewel tegenwoordig in eigen-schuld-zaken in West-Europa gewoonlijk een 
verdeling van de schade wordt toegepast, heeft de verdelingsgedachte zoals in 
deze studie wordt aangetoond pas een korte geschiedenis. Bovendien is deze 
benadering, nadat zij voor het eerst werd voorgesteld door Wolff, niet meteen met 
open armen ontvangen in West-Europa, maar heeft zij zich pas geconsolideerd 
na een lange en lastige strijd. De Romeinsrechtelijke oplossing van alles-of-niets 
vormde inderdaad een gemeenschappelijke basis voor verschillende West-
Europese landen en het was niet gemakkelijk om de alles-of-niets-benadering, 
die vele eeuwen heeft overleefd, zomaar opzij te zetten. 
Aan de hand van deze studie kan geen normatief antwoord worden ge-
geven op de vraag welke benadering het beste zou zijn. Rechtsgeleerden en/
of comparatisten zullen deze vraag ook vanuit andere perspectieven moeten 
bezien, zoals het filosofische, economische en sociale perspectief. Gemeen-
schappelijke elementen voor de eigenschuldproblematiek zijn overgenomen 
uit het Romeinse recht. Schuld en causaal verband werden meer en meer 
beschouwd als communicerende vaten. De nadruk lag soms op de schuld en 
soms op het causale verband tussen fout en schade. In dit opzicht zijn in de 
diverse codificaties die in de Europese landen heden ten dage gelden, verschil-
lende keuzes gemaakt. Hoewel de verdeling van de schade tussen de partijen 
in overeenstemming lijkt te zijn met de billijkheid, is geenszins duidelijk wat 
precies de maatstaven voor een verdeling zouden moeten zijn. Waar duidelijke 
maatstaven wel zijn vastgesteld is niet duidelijk tot welke exacte verdeling de 
afweging zou moeten leiden. Het onderwerp van deze studie is dan ook van 
blijvend belang. De historische ontwikkeling van de eigenschuldproblematiek 
heeft bovendien aan belang gewonnen omdat sinds kort de alles-of-niets- 
gedachte bij eigen schuld van de gelaedeerde weer  acceptatie heeft herwon-
nen (bijvoorbeeld bij verkeersongevallen).
14 Deze verdeling is die van het judicium rusticorum. Ten aanzien van aanvaringszaken 
verdedigde Van der Keessel voor het Rooms-Hollandse recht de oplossing dat in het geval de 
schuld van één van de in botsing komende partijen (kwantitatief) groter was dan die van de 
andere partij, de botsende partij de helft van de schade van de andere partij moest dragen.
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